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This thesis establishes the nature and meaning of ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ in 
the law of England and Wales where they originated using a Common Law principle 
common to all jurisdictions. According to Baker: 
 
“Key terms like ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ – which are some of the 
most important basic building blocks for discourse about domestic and 
international taxation – are not sufficiently clearly understood or defined, 
and that is wrong.”1  
 
The thesis, therefore, proposes the meaning of “the elusive concept of ‘tax avoidance’”2 
in English law as the antidote to “the judge-induced disease of ‘tax avoidance’”3 in all 
jurisdictions. According to the 1955 Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and 
Income:  
 
“Avoidance of tax is a problem that faces every tax system. Not all systems 
attempt to solve the problem in the same way, nor is there necessarily any 
large measure of agreement as to what is involved in the idea of tax 
avoidance. But until some certainty is reached upon this question of 
definition, the question as to what sort of steps should be taken to prevent 
or correct it remains an aimless one.”4 
 
The meaning of ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ in English law is cheating the public 
revenue, which corresponds to tax fraud in all jurisdictions. According to Justice Hardy 
in R v Less: 
 
“The common law offence of cheating the Public Revenue can include any 
form of fraudulent conduct by the defendant to prejudice, or take the risk of 
prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has 
no right to do so.”5 
 
‘Tax evasion’ is cheating the public revenue by a taxpayer who deliberately fails to 
make a return of the relevant tax liability or who deliberately makes a false return of the 
relevant tax liability without using a tax scheme.  
 
In R v Mavji the taxpayer cheated by deliberately failing to make returns of VAT liability. 
According to Judge Davies:   
 
                                                 
1 ‘Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion & Tax Mitigation’, p.1. 
2 Lord Nolan, IRC v Willoughby [1997] S.T.C. 995, 1003. 
3 Avery Jones, ‘Tax Law: Rules or Principles?’ (1996) Fiscal Studies, p.71.   
4 Final Report, p.304.  
5 The Times, March 30, 1993. 
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“This appellant had a statutory duty to make value added tax returns and 
to pay over to the Crown the value added tax due. He dishonestly failed to 
do either. Accordingly, he was guilty of cheating the public revenue.”6 
 
 
In R v Hudson the taxpayer cheated by deliberately making false returns of income tax 
liability without using a tax scheme. According to Lord Goddard:  
 
“The offence here consisted of sending in documents to the inspector of 
taxes which were false and fraudulent to the appellant’s knowledge for the 
purpose of avoiding the payment of tax. That is defrauding the public.”7 
 
 
‘Tax avoidance’ is cheating the public revenue by the professional advisers that devise, 
market, implement and otherwise facilitate the use of tax schemes (‘the professional 
enablers’) in which the taxpayer using an individual scheme (‘the participating 
taxpayer’) may or may not be complicit.  
 
In R v Charlton, Cunningham, Kitchen and Wheeler, where the professional enablers 
were successfully prosecuted, Lord Justice Farquharson stated: 
 
“These Appellants were convicted on an indictment containing 14 counts 
of cheating the public revenue. Kitchen and Wheeler are qualified 
accountants. Charlton has practised for many years as an accountant, as 
a partner in a firm called Charltons, but was not professionally qualified. 
Cunningham is a barrister practising at the Revenue Bar. The case for the 
prosecution was that Charlton had devised a dishonest, tax-avoidance 
scheme for the benefit of some of the firm’s clients and that the Appellants 
were involved with the implementation of the schemes or the concealment 
from the Revenue of the existence of the fraud.”8 
 
The solution to ‘tax avoidance’ is, therefore, to judge every scheme in all jurisdictions 
based on whether the professional enablers and the participating taxpayer cheated the 
public revenue in law. According to Lord Farquharson in Charlton:  
 
“It is a feature of the tax or Revenue law of any country that it must, to a 
large extent, in its tax-gathering activities, rely on the truthfulness of the 
taxpayer in indicating the extent of his income or whatever other matter is 
relevant to the particular statute being considered. It follows also that the 
Revenue not only have to rely on the taxpayer’s good faith, but more 
especially on the professional advisors they appoint to act for them.”9 
 
 
                                                 
6 [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1388, 1391-1392.    
7 [1956] 2 Q.B. 252, 261-262. 
8 [1996] S.T.C. 1418, 1420-1421. 
9 Ibid, p.1442. 
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The Goose and the Common  
 
The law locks up the man or woman 
Who steals the goose from off the common 
But leaves the greater villain loose 
Who steals the common from off the goose 
 
The law demands that we atone 
When we take things we do not own 
But leaves the lords and ladies fine 
Who take things that are yours and mine 
 
The poor and wretched don’t escape 
If they conspire the law to break 
This must be so but they endure 
Those who conspire to make the law 
 
The law locks up the man or woman 
Who steals the goose from off the common 
And geese will still a common lack 













































































INTRODUCTION    
                                              
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND MEANING OF ‘TAX AVOIDANCE’ AND ‘TAX 
EVASION’ IN LAW 
 
The Nature of Legal Nonsense 
It would be tedious to prolong our survey; in every field of law we should find 
the same habit of ignoring practical questions of value or of positive fact and 
taking refuge in ‘legal problems’ which can always be answered by 
manipulating legal concepts in certain approved ways. In every field of law 
we should find peculiar concepts which are not defined either in terms of 
empirical fact or in terms of ethics but which are used to answer empirical 
and ethical questions alike, and thus bar the way to intelligent investigation 
of social fact and social policy. 
Felix Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935) 
Columbia Law Review, 809, page 820. 
 
 
I. OBJECTIVES    
 
It is very important to remember that the terms ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ are not 
legal concepts but classic examples of legal nonsense or “peculiar concepts which are 
not defined either in terms of empirical fact or in terms of ethics but which are used to 
answer empirical and ethical questions alike, and thus bar the way to intelligent 
investigation of social fact and social policy.” 
 
The overarching objective of this thesis is, therefore, to establish their nature and 
meaning in the law of England and Wales where they originated using a common law 
principle common to all jurisdictions. According to Rhodes et al:  
 
“[T]he terms ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ have been created by the 
legal and accountancy professions as convenient generic terms to 
distinguish what is legal from what is illegal, and the fact that they have also 
been adopted by the courts should not blind us to what they actually are.”10 
 
 
As a matter of historical fact, “the terms ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ have been 
created by the legal and accountancy professions as convenient generic terms” or legal 
nonsenses to disguise the fraudulent nature of “the judge induced disease of ‘tax 
avoidance’”11 and the resultant tax avoidance industry. According to Bennion’s cryptic 
summary expounded in chapter eleven:  
 
“The large amounts of money at stake in the tax field have led to some 
confusion over nomenclature. Earlier it was clearly established that 
escaping a statutory obligation was termed ‘evasion’ when it constituted a 
                                                 
10 ‘Regina v Charlton, Cunningham, Kitchen and Wheeler’ (1999) JMLC, 197, 203-206. 
11 Avery Jones, ‘Tax Law: Rules or Principles?’ (1996) Fiscal Studies, p.71.   
17 
 
breach of the obligation (and was therefore unlawful) and ‘avoidance’ when 
it meant that the obligation was never incurred because the case narrowly 
missed fitting the statute (and was therefore lawful). This is a convenient 
distinction, which still generally obtains. In the tax field however the term 
avoidance is now equivocal. This is because the huge sums at stake in a 
vast number of cases have led to the emergence of what is sometimes 
called the tax avoidance industry. Professional experts devise elaborate 
schemes designed to allow taxpayers to escape tax in cases where 
Parliament intended tax to be charged. When this happens on a large scale 
in relation to a particular charging enactment it may lead to counter 
measures in the form of an equally elaborate anti-avoidance provision 
inserted in a Finance Act. The experts then seek to devise ways around the 
provision, and so the chase goes on. In these circumstances, the term 
‘avoidance’ has come to be used in two senses in the tax field. What may 
be called unacceptable tax avoidance ... is countered by the application of 
the Ramsay principle. The rest, that is ‘acceptable’ avoidance, is now 
sometimes called tax mitigation.”12 
 
 
The invention of ‘tax mitigation’ continued the use of legal nonsenses to  legitimise “the 
judge induced disease of ‘tax avoidance’”13 and the resultant tax avoidance industry. 
In the words of Lord Oliver:  
 
“What ... the Courts have succeeded in doing is to trespass into the 
legislation field by creating, almost arbitrarily, two categories of tax 
avoidance; permissible tax avoidance and impermissible tax avoidance.  
And they have done it without at the same time establishing any reliable 
criteria for distinguishing between the two. ... So the citizen and the Courts 
themselves are left without any readily intelligible reference points.”14 
 
 
By establishing the nature and meaning of ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ in the law 
of England and Wales where they originated using a common law principle common to 
all jurisdictions, therefore, the thesis proposes internationally applicable definitions of 
‘tax avoidance’, ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax mitigation’. As Baker stated in his seminal paper:  
 
“The fundamental thesis behind this paper is that key terms like ‘tax 
avoidance’, ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax mitigation’ – which are some of the most 
important basic building blocks for discourse about domestic and 
international taxation – are not sufficiently clearly understood or defined, 
and that is wrong. We need to have these terms better understood and 
clearly defined, particularly at governmental and inter-governmental levels. 
Increasingly these terms are appearing on the agenda of governments and 
inter-governmental agencies, but without any precise explanation of their 
meaning. ... 
 
                                                 
12 Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (2008) pp.1017-1018. 
13 Avery Jones, ‘Tax Law: Rules or Principles?’ (1996) Fiscal Studies, p.71.   
14 ‘Judicial Approaches to Revenue Law’ in Gammie (ed), Striking the Balance: Tax 




It seems perfectly reasonable, if these concepts are to remain on the 
international agenda (which seems likely), that the bodies which use them 
should take steps towards developing internationally accepted definitions 
of the concepts. Given the amount of other work on taxation in which the 
OECD is engaged, perhaps that body is best placed to work towards 
internationally accepted and clear definitions of these concepts based upon 
bright line distinctions. It seems quite reasonable to expect the OECD to 
clarify these terms before it proceeds further with initiatives such as that on 
harmful tax competition.”15  
 
 
As explained above, “key terms like ‘tax avoidance’, ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax mitigation’ 
… are not sufficiently clearly understood or defined” because they are not legal 
concepts but legal nonsenses. Regrettably, however, the OECD not only failed to 
define them in law before it proceeded further with initiatives such as that on harmful 
tax competition, but used the new initiatives to introduce new terms. The 2008 Study 
into the Role of Tax Intermediaries16 introduced ‘aggressive tax planning’ while the 
2013 study commissioned by the G-20 – Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting17 
– invented ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)’, but without any precise 
explanation of their meaning.  
 
By establishing the nature and meaning of ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ in the law 
of England and Wales where they originated using a common law principle common to 
all jurisdictions, the thesis also proposes the meaning of “the elusive concept of ‘tax 
avoidance’”18 in law as the antidote to “the judge induced disease of ‘tax avoidance’”19 
in all jurisdictions. As the 1955 Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and 
Income pointed out:  
 
“Avoidance of tax is a problem that faces every tax system and is likely to 
continue to do so when rates are high and the burden of tax is seen to have 
a major influence upon the affairs of business and upon every aspect of 
social and personal life. Not all systems attempt to solve the problem in the 
same way, nor is there necessarily any large measure of agreement as to 
what is involved in the idea of tax avoidance. But until some certainty is 
reached upon this question of definition, the question as to what sort of 
steps should be taken to prevent or correct it remains an aimless one.”20 
 
 
                                                 
15 ‘Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion & Tax Mitigation’, pp.1&14. 
16 OECD (2008). 
17 OECD (2013). 
18 Lord Nolan, IRC v Willoughby [1997] STC 995, 1003. 
19 Avery Jones.   
20 Final Report (London: HMSO, 1955) p.304. 
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The rest of this introductory chapter seeks to achieve the two specific objectives set 
out above by explaining the proposed definitions of tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax 
mitigation in law and the proposed antidote to tax avoidance. It starts by explaining the 
methodology and research questions, and concludes by summarising the rest of the 
chapters.   
 
II. METHODOLOGY  
 
The thesis is qualitative rather than quantitative. It combines legal and constitutional 
theory with legal and administrative practice, and includes historical, comparative and 
empirical approaches. It uses a comprehensive exposition of the origins, developments 
and applications of the common law offence of cheating the public revenue, which 
corresponds to tax fraud in all jurisdictions, to show that tax avoidance involves one 
form of cheating the public revenue or tax fraud while tax evasion involves another 
form.  
 
The main focus of the inquiry is English law and practice but the relevant laws and 
practices of other common law jurisdictions, such as the US, Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia and Ireland, and civil law jurisdictions, such as France and the Netherlands, 
are also used to demonstrate the universality of the problems and the universal 
applicability of the proposed solutions. The thesis also explores wider issues of tax 
fraud common to all jurisdictions, as well as some of the international tax issues that 
arise in the context of tax fraud. ‘Law’ and ‘English Law’ are used synonymously on the 
basis that the meaning of ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ in English law where they 
originated is their true meaning in law. 
 
The thesis uses library materials, including online resources. The materials used 
include primary sources from legislation and case law, secondary sources from criminal 
information and indictments in unreported cases, reports of Parliamentary and other 
legislative inquiries and Royal Commissions, quasi-judicial administrative decisions, 
administrative practices, policies and official guidance, doctrinal writings, scholarly 
commentaries, research reports and media reports. 
 
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 




What Lord Nolan described aptly as “the elusive concept of ‘tax avoidance’”21 is the 
paradigm of legal nonsense which Cohen defined aptly as “peculiar concepts which 
are not defined either in terms of empirical fact or in terms of ethics but which are used 
to answer empirical and ethical questions alike, and thus bar the way to intelligent 
investigation of social fact and social policy.” According to Tiley: 
 
“Politicians, tax officials and practitioners spend a lot of time and energy on 
the problem of tax avoidance. No one seems to have a very precise idea 
of what is meant by the term, but it is to be distinguished from evasion, 
which is illegal.”22 
 
 
In other words, the dogma that “tax evasion is illegal but tax avoidance is legal” 
(hereafter referred to as “the tax dogma”), which is universally accepted as an article 
of faith in the existing body of knowledge, serves to “bar the way to intelligent 
investigation” of the nature and meaning of tax avoidance in law because it involves 
the circular proposition that nobody knows its precise meaning but everybody knows 
the precise difference between it and tax evasion.  
 
In its 1997 study, therefore, the Tax Law Review Committee of the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (IFS) chaired by Aaronson similarly stated:  
 
“We are concerned in this Report only with the issues of legal tax 
avoidance. We have not addressed the prevention and control of the illegal 
evasion of taxes. We think it impossible to define the expression ‘tax 
avoidance’ in any truly satisfactory manner.”23  
 
 
If it is “impossible to define the expression ‘tax avoidance’ in any truly satisfactory 
manner”, how can it be distinguished from “illegal evasion of taxes” in any truly 
satisfactory manner, let alone by merely asserting that avoidance is “legal” and without 
considering evasion?  
 
The acceptance of the dogma that “tax avoidance is legal” as gospel truth in the existing 
literature, however, involves the equation of tax evasion (which is a legal nonsense) 
with tax fraud (which is a legal concept), and the exclusion of tax evasion (and thus tax 
fraud) from consideration, which automatically excludes the consideration of the 
                                                 
21 Lord Nolan, IRC v Willoughby [1997] STC 995, 1003. 
22 Revenue Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) p.85.    
23 Tax Avoidance (London: IFS, 1997) p.ix. Emphasis supplied. 
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possibility that tax avoidance could be tax fraud.  As Bowler put it in her 2009 study for 
the IFS:  
 
“Defining what is meant by tax avoidance is far from easy. It can be 
distinguished from tax evasion, which is the illegal means to reduce tax 
liabilities such as making false statements on tax returns. This paper is 
not concerned with tax evasion.  
 
Tax avoidance, in contrast, is a legal means of reducing the tax payable, 
the question being whether the action works technically or not. However, 
increasingly the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion has 
been blurred, at least by the tax authorities, and tax avoidance has been 
treated with some of the disapproval previously reserved for tax evasion.  
 
This still leaves the question of just what it is that so much effort has gone 
into to counteract.”24 
 
 
III.II. Legal Fiction  
 
As demonstrated below and throughout, “the question of just what it is that so much 
effort has gone into to counteract” in tax avoidance remains elusive precisely because 
“whether the action works technically or not” as a matter of statutory construction 
(hereafter referred to as “the constructional approach”) tells us little or nothing about its 
nature and meaning as a matter of law.  
 
In the words of Lord Diplock’s theory of retrospective judicial legislation which shows 
that the constructional approach is the recipe for “the judge induced disease of tax 
avoidance”25:  
 
“Whenever the Court decides that kind of dispute it legislates about 
taxation. It makes a law taxing all gains of the same kind or all documents 
of the same kind. Do not let us deceive ourselves with the legal fiction that 
the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant. 
Anyone who has decided tax appeals knows that most of them concern 
transactions which Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the 
Act had not anticipated, about which they had never thought at all. 
Some of the transactions are of a kind which had never taken place 
before the Act was passed: they were devised as a result of it. The 
Court may describe what it is doing in tax appeals as interpretation. So did 
the priestess of the Delphic oracle.”26 
 
 
                                                 
24 Bowler (2009) p.10. Emphases supplied.  
25 Avery Jones.  




As expounded in chapter two, a tax avoidance scheme is by definition two or more 
interrelated “transactions … of a kind which had never taken place before the 
[tax] Act [it was devised to cheat or defraud] was passed … devised as a result 
of it”; and can, therefore, amount to two or more interrelated “transactions which 
Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the [tax] Act had not anticipated, 
about which they had never thought at all.”  
 
Tax avoidance schemes can, therefore, only be judged legitimately and countered 
effectively in accordance with the rule of law and tax justice by applying overriding 
principles that operate on a juristic basis independent of the tax Acts they are devised 
to cheat and fraud, such as the pre-existing common law of cheating the public and 
fraud, rather than by “the legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and giving 
effect to what Parliament meant.” In the words of “Watchful”:  
 
“This is not quite the paradox it seems if we remember that the Tax Acts 
are but a part of the general law of the land. Just as, on the one hand, 
nobody can be taxed otherwise than in accordance with the law, so it can 
and should be insisted that the whole of that law is relevant in any question 
concerning taxation.”27 
 
Significantly, in the overwhelming majority of cases that are dealt with administratively, 
the Revenue replicates “the legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and giving 
effect to what Parliament meant.” As Gribbon (then Director of the Inland Revenue’s 
Compliance Division) put it:  
  
“In relation to tax avoidance the ... Revenue’s role involves ascertaining the 
facts (which may require full and detailed investigation) and exercising first 
judgment as to the interpretation of law and its application to those facts. 
The determination of the facts and law is, of course, ultimately for the ... 
Courts, but it is very much the minority of cases that come before ... the 
Courts and in practice, therefore, they operate as a check on the ... 
Revenue’s function. Just as the Courts, in interpreting legislation, will not 
confine themselves to a close literal interpretation, so the ... Revenue will 




By purporting “to ascertain the intention of Parliament when applying legislation to 
novel situations” or more accurately “transactions ... of a kind which had never taken 
place before the Act was passed ... devised as a result of it” and “transactions which 
Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the Act had not anticipated, about which 
                                                 
27 ‘Common Law Prosecutions for Revenue Fraud’ [1956] BTR 119, p.119. 
28 ‘A Sterile Activity’, Tax Journal (1997) p.4. Emphases supplied.  
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they had never thought at all”, therefore, the Revenue perpetuates “the legal fiction that 
the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant”, which means 
that “[w]henever the [Revenue] decides that kind of dispute it legislates about taxation.”  
 
This thesis is, therefore, not concerned with the question whether a tax 
avoidance scheme ‘works’ or ‘is effective’ as a matter of statutory construction, 
and the case law and administrative practice on that subject are of very limited 
use to this thesis. This is because, as demonstrated above and throughout, a 
decision of a court that a scheme ‘works’ by applying “the legal fiction that the 
Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant” to 
“transactions ... of a kind which had never taken place before the Act was passed 
... devised as a result of it” and a decision reached by the Revenue that a scheme 
‘works’ when it purports “to ascertain the intention of Parliament when applying 
legislation to novel situations” tell us little or nothing about its nature and 
meaning in law.   
 
The dogma that a tax avoidance scheme is “legal” or cannot be illegal because 
it ‘works’ or ‘is effective’ as a matter of statutory construction is, therefore, 
emphatically rejected.  
 
Dixon’s statement in his article, which nevertheless accepted the tax dogma that ‘tax 
avoidance is legal’ and excluded tax evasion from consideration, shows that a question 
framed in terms of legal nonsense (tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax mitigation) and 
legal fiction (“whether the action works technically or not”) cannot produce a meaningful 
answer in law and in fact:  
 
“There is another fundamental difficulty with defining tax avoidance in terms 
of the legal construction of the statutory provisions that are being ‘avoided’. 
The classic trichotomy for analysing different ways of reducing how much 
tax a person pays is, (a) tax evasion (failures to comply with the law, often 
criminal), (b) tax avoidance (legal, but morally controversial), and (c) tax 
mitigation (legal, and morally supportable). However, what should be 
immediately apparent is that there is no legal difference between a 
successful tax avoidance scheme and successful tax mitigation planning – 
each reduces the taxpayer’s liability to tax. Equally, there is no difference 
between unsuccessful tax mitigation and unsuccessful avoidance – both 
fail to reduce the liability to tax. So, how  can  the  concept  of  tax  avoidance  
be  analysed  through  statutory provisions  when  those  statutory  provision  
will  produce the same outcome regardless of whether it is called avoidance 
or mitigation?”29  
                                                 




A consideration of tax evasion produces similar nonsensical propositions. First, there 
is simultaneously no legal difference between unsuccessful avoidance and 
unsuccessful evasion (because both fail to reduce the tax liability) and a legal 
difference between the two (because avoidance is ‘legal’ and evasion is illegal). 
Secondly, there is no legal difference between a successful avoidance and an 
unsuccessful avoidance because both are ‘legal’. In the words of Cohen in his article 
of ‘Legal Nonsense’ cited above:  
 
“Legal arguments couched in these terms are necessarily circular, since 
these terms are themselves creations of law, and such arguments add 
precisely as much to our knowledge as Moliere’s physician’s discovery that 
opium puts men to sleep because it contains a dormitive principle. Now the 
proposition that opium puts men to sleep because it contains a dormitive 
principle is scientifically useful if ‘dormitive principle’ is defined physically or 
chemically. Otherwise it serves only to obstruct the path of understanding 
with the pretense of knowledge.”30 
 
 
Freedman’s restatement of the tax dogma in the 2004 article that emerged from her 
Inaugural Lecture, which Bowler mirrored, demonstrates how the proposition that “Tax 
avoidance … is a legal means of reducing the tax payable, the question being whether 
the action works technically or not” similarly “serves only to obstruct the path of 
understanding with the pretense of knowledge”: 
 
“For many tax advisers and taxpayers, the line that is seen to matter is that 
to be drawn between avoidance and evasion, with only evasion being 
illegal. All forms of avoidance, be they described as aggressive, acceptable 
or unacceptable, are legal and for the adviser the question is whether or 
not they work technically. ...  
 
The complexity of the tax system is such that there may well be reasonable 
different views on whether a scheme will work. How definite must advisers 
be that there is a reasonable case? BMBF, was decided against the 
taxpayers by the Special Commissioners and a very experienced High 
Court Judge but the decision was reversed by an equally experienced 
Court of Appeal. How should a company director or even a tax adviser 




The invariably “different views on whether a scheme will work” as a matter of statutory 
construction, which was underscored by BMBF, undermine the dogma that: “All forms 
of avoidance ... are legal ... the question is whether or not they work technically.”  
                                                 
30 Ibid.   




This analysis shows that the tax dogma is a logical fallacy or petitio principii (which is 
a fallacy in which a conclusion is taken for granted in the premises) because the 
conclusion (“tax avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal”) is the same premise that 
purports to prove it (“tax avoidance is different from tax evasion”).  
 
This thesis, therefore, abandons the sanctity of the tax dogma, which begs the question 
and “serves only to obstruct the path of understanding with the pretense of knowledge”, 
for the reality of tax behaviours in law and in fact. As Wisselink pointed out: 
 
“In the field of economics there is perhaps less conceptual difficulty 
because economists usually consider the effects of the ‘legitimate’ and 
‘illegitimate’ variants of domestic and international tax avoidance and of 
domestic and international tax evasion as one and the same phenomenon 




III.III. The Fraud-Negligence-Honesty Trichotomy  
 
The three legal “concepts which are ... defined ... in terms of empirical fact [and] 
ethics [and] which ... answer empirical and ethical questions alike”33 in taxation 
in all jurisdictions are:  
 
(1) cheating or fraud or dishonesty;  
(2) negligence or carelessness or failure to take reasonable care; and  
(3) honesty, which can be honest compliance or honest non-compliance 
because of ignorance or error.  
 
 
Every tax behaviour must, therefore, fall within the fraud-negligence-honesty 
trichotomy, depending on the knowledge, abilities and circumstances of the 
taxpayer and any professional adviser involved.  
 
The research questions are, therefore, simply where ‘tax evasion’, ‘tax 





                                                 
32 Wisselink, International Tax Avoidance (Deventer: Kluwer, 1979) p.193.  
33 Cohen.  
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III.IV. Cheating the Public Revenue  
 
Dishonesty is the essence of the common law offence of cheating the public revenue. 
According to Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law:  
 
“The actus reus of the offence has become so wide that the definition is 
almost best stated in negative terms. There need not be a dishonest act; 
an omission will suffice. The act or omission must be intended to prejudice 
the HMRC or Department of Work and Pensions. The offence cannot be 
committed in respect of a local authority34, nor, it is submitted, against the 
EU. There is no requirement of an operative deception35, nor of a need to 
prove actual loss to the revenue36, or to any other. It is not necessary to 
prove that the accused’s conduct resulted in any gain to himself.37 ... It is 
difficult to see how the offence could be stated in more expansive terms. 
The offence is of course even broader when charged as a conspiracy to 
cheat, as it often is. The breadth of the offence means that often the only 
live issue at trial will be dishonesty.”38 
 
 
III.V. Negligence    
 
According to Baron Alderson’s classic common law definition of negligence in Blyth v 
Birmingham Waterworks:  
 
“Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, 
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of 
human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and 
reasonable man would not do.”39 
 
 
Negligence under section 95 of Taxes Management Act 1970 equates to carelessness 
or “failure to take reasonable care” under Schedule 24 of Finance Act 2007. In 
Anderson v HMRC Judge Berner stated:   
 
“The test to be applied, in my view, is to consider what a reasonable 
taxpayer, exercising reasonable diligence in the completion and 
submission of the return, would have done.”40 
 
In Bingham v HMRC Judge Whitehead confirmed that ignorance of technical aspects 
of tax legislation does not amount to negligence under section 95:  
                                                 
34 Lush v Coles [1967] 1 W.L.R. 685. 
35 R v Mavji [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1388. 
36 R v Hunt [1994] S.T.C. 819. 
37 Ibid. 
38 (Oxford: OUP, 2011) p.940.  
39 (1856) 11 E.R. 781, 784. 




“Section 95 TMA requires the Revenue to establish negligence on the part 
of the taxpayer. For the reasons given above the Tribunal does not make 
such a finding. Mr Bingham has been wrong in his appreciation of the true 
position but that position involves the application of quite technical rules 
concerning settlements which the Tribunal considers would be outside the 
normal considerations which a taxpayer would have in mind when making 
a return to the Revenue. What he did was known to his accountants who 
did not, it appears, take issue with him or in any way alert him to the 
problems he might, and indeed, did, face.”41 
 
III.VI. Honesty      
 
The seminal exposition of the objective civil law test of dishonesty by Lord Nicholls in 
Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan provides an authoritative legal definition of honesty:  
 
“Honesty has a connotation of subjectivity, as distinct from the objectivity 
of negligence. Honesty, indeed, does have a strong subjective element 
in that it is a description of a type of conduct assessed in the light of what 
a person actually knew at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable 
person would have known or appreciated. Further, honesty and its 
counterpart dishonesty are mostly concerned with advertent conduct, not 
inadvertent conduct. Carelessness is not dishonesty. Thus for the most 
part dishonesty is to be equated with conscious impropriety. However, 
these subjective characteristics of honesty do not mean that individuals 
are free to set their own standards of honesty in particular circumstances. 
The standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not subjective. 
Honesty is not an optional scale, with higher or lower values according to 
the moral standards of each individual. In most situations there is little 
difficulty in identifying how an honest person would behave.”42 
 
 
The simple legal and moral test of “how an honest person would behave” corresponds 
to the simple legal and moral duty of honesty imposed by the common law of cheating. 
In the words of the Law Commission:  
 
“Dishonesty necessitates a moral as well as a factual enquiry.”43 
 
III.VII. Cheating, Fraud or Dishonesty  
 
The objective civil law test of dishonesty expounded by Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei 
was applied by Lord Hoffmann in Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust thus:  
 
                                                 
41 [2013] UKFTT 110 [110]. 
42 [1995] 2 AC 378, 389. Emphasis supplied. 
43 (2002) 39. 
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“Although a dishonest state of mind is a subjective mental state, the 
standard by which the law determines whether it is dishonest is objective. 
If by ordinary standards a defendant’s mental state would be characterised 
as dishonest, it is irrelevant that the defendant judges by different 
standards.”44 
 
According to the subjective criminal law test of dishonesty propounded by Lord Lane 
C.J. in R v Ghosh: 
 
“In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was 
acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether according to the 
ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was done was 
dishonest. If it was not dishonest by those standards, that is the end of the 
matter and the prosecution fails. If it was dishonest by those standards, 
then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself must have 
realised that what he was doing was by those standards dishonest.”45 
 
 
In the recent landmark cheating in gambling case of Ivey v Genting Casino, the 
Supreme Court overruled Ghosh and held that the objective civil law test should apply 
in both civil and criminal proceedings. Equating ‘tax evasion’ to tax fraud, Lord Hughes 
stated:    
 
“There is no reason why the law should excuse those who make a mistake 
about what contemporary standards of honesty are, whether in the context 
of insurance claims, high finance, market manipulation or tax evasion. The 
law does not, in principle, excuse those whose standards are criminal by 
the benchmarks set by society, nor ought it to do so. On the contrary, it is 
an important, even crucial, function of the criminal law to determine what is 
criminal and what is not; its purpose is to set the standards of behaviour 
which are acceptable. ... These several considerations provide convincing 
grounds for holding that the second leg of the test propounded in Ghosh 
does not correctly represent the law and that directions based upon it ought 
no longer to be given.  
 
The test of dishonesty is as set out by Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei and by 
Lord Hoffmann in Barlow Clowes. When dishonesty is in question the fact-
finding tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the 
individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or 
otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice 
determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional 
requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it 
is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or 
belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was 
honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the 
(objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement 
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that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those 
standards, dishonest.”46  
 
 
The substitution of a common test of dishonesty unites the common law offence of 
cheating the public revenue, which discharges the “function of the criminal law to 
determine what is criminal and what is not”, with the pre-existing common law of 
cheating or fraud, which applies in civil proceedings. In the words of Lord Hughes: 
 
“There will be a difference in standard of proof as between civil and criminal 
proceedings, but that does not affect the meaning of cheating.”47 
 
 
The common law offence of cheating the public revenue, like the fraud offence under 
the Fraud Act 2006, “acts upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty”48 in criminal 
proceedings. According to Lord Atkin’s classic statement in Proprietary Articles Trade 
Association v AG for Canada:  
 
“Criminal law connotes only the quality of such acts or omissions as are 
prohibited under appropriate penal provisions by authority of the State. The 
criminal quality of an act cannot be discerned by intuition; nor can it be 
discovered by reference to any standard but one: Is the act prohibited 
with penal consequences? Morality and criminality are far from co-
extensive; nor is the sphere of criminality necessarily part of a more 
extensive field covered by morality - unless the moral code necessarily 
disapproves all acts prohibited by the State, in which case the argument 
moves in a circle. It appears to their Lordships to be of little value to seek 
to confine crimes to a category of acts which by their very nature belong to 
the domain of ‘criminal jurisprudence’; for the domain of criminal 
jurisprudence can only be ascertained by examining what acts at any 
particular period are declared by the State to be crimes, and the only 
common nature they will be found to possess is that they are prohibited by 
the State and that those who commit them are punished.”49 
 
 
In his famous article, “The Definition of Crime”, Glanville Williams followed the same 
process of reasoning and concluded:  
 
“We have rejected all definitions purporting to distinguish between crimes 
and other wrongs by reference to the sort of thing that is done, or the sort 
of physical, economic or social consequences that follow from it. Only one 
possibility now remains. A crime must be defined by reference to the legal 
consequences of the act. We must distinguish, primarily, not between 
crimes and civil wrongs but between criminal and civil proceedings. A crime 
then becomes an act that is capable of being followed by criminal 
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47 [2017] UKSC 67 [38]. 
48 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, vol. 1, p.89. 
49 [1931] A.C. 310, 324. Emphasis supplied.  
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proceedings, having one of the types of outcome (punishment, etc.) 
known to follow these proceedings.”50 
 
 
The pre-existing common law of cheating the public revenue “acts upon the offence, 
by setting aside the fraudulent transaction”51 in civil proceedings. In the words of Lord 
Denning’s classic statement in Lazarus Estates v Beasley: 
 
“Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is 
distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved, it vitiates judgments, 
contracts and all transactions whatsoever.”52 
 
No distinction is drawn for the purposes of this thesis, therefore, because none exists 
in substance and in principle, between cheating or fraud or dishonesty in civil and 
criminal law. As Judge Heath stated in Hartshorn v Slodden:  
 




IV. THE MEANING OF TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION IN LAW  
 
IV.I. Cheating the Public Revenue  
 
The overarching thesis is that the nature and meaning of ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax 
evasion’ in English law is cheating the public revenue contrary to the common 
law, which corresponds to tax fraud under the common law and under the Fraud 
Act 2006, and to tax fraud in all jurisdictions.  
 
The common law offence of cheating the public revenue encompasses tax fraud in all 
jurisdictions because it boils down to dishonesty as explained above.  
 
Justice Hardy’s classic definition of “what in law is cheating the Public Revenue”54 in R 
v Less shows that the ambit is wider than the civil law and ordinary meanings of 
cheating and fraud and thus covers every case of tax avoidance and tax evasion: 
 
“To cheat ... is defined by the concise Oxford Dictionary as: ‘To deceive, or 
trick, a person into or out of a thing.’ The common law offence of cheating 
                                                 
50 Current Legal Problems (1955) 107, 123. Emphasis supplied. 
51 Blackstone, p.89. 
52 [1956] 1 Q.B. 702, 712.   
53 (1801) 126 E.R. 1452, 1454. 
54 The Times, March 30, 1993. 
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the Public Revenue does not necessarily require a false representation 
either by words or conduct. Cheating can include any form of fraudulent 
conduct which results in diverting money from the Revenue and in 
depriving the Revenue of the money to which it is entitled. It has, of course, 
to be fraudulent conduct. That is to say, deliberate, dishonest conduct by 
the defendant to prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the 
Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has no right to 
do so.”55 
 
The seminal statement of dishonesty by Lord Hughes in Ivey, therefore, applies to 
cheating the public revenue as demonstrated above:  
 
“Dishonesty is by no means confined to the criminal law. Civil actions may 
also frequently raise the question whether an action was honest or 
dishonest. ... There can be no logical or principled basis for the meaning of 
dishonesty (as distinct from the standards of proof by which it must be 
established) to differ according to whether it arises in a civil action or a 
criminal prosecution. Dishonesty is a simple, if occasionally imprecise, 
English word. It would be an affront to the law if its meaning differed 
according to the kind of proceedings in which it arose. It is easy enough to 
envisage cases where precisely the same behaviour, by the same person, 
falls to be examined in both kinds of proceeding.”56 
 
IV.II. Revenue Discretion  
 
Cheating the public revenue is the archetype of what Lord Hughes described as “cases 
where precisely the same behaviour, by the same person, falls to be examined in both 
kinds of proceeding.” This is because in all jurisdictions, albeit to varying degrees, when 
a tax fraud is discovered: 
 
“[I]t is entirely within the discretion of the tax authorities whether they take 
the procedural course of bringing a criminal tax-fraud case or imposing only 
civil tax-fraud penalties or simply establishing tax liability without fines or 
penalties, applying doctrines such as substance over form.”57 
 
  
Under the “highly selective” prosecution policy that applies in the UK, the Revenue 
deals with tax fraud usually by “imposing only civil tax-fraud penalties”, occasionally by 
“establishing tax liability without fines or penalties” and exceptionally by “bringing a 
criminal tax-fraud case”. According to the Inland Revenue’s evidence to the 1978 Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure: 
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“When a tax fraud is discovered, the Board are not bound to prosecute but 
may effect a pecuniary settlement instead. ... Moreover in the majority of 
cases the amount of the penalty is agreed informally between the 
Department and the taxpayer without recourse to formal proceedings. It 
follows that criminal prosecution for tax fraud is undertaken only in a small 
minority of cases.”58 
 
 
HMRC inherited the “highly selective” prosecution policy. According to HMRC Criminal 
Investigation Policy: 
 
“It’s HMRC’s policy to deal with fraud by use of the cost effective civil fraud 
investigation procedures under Code of Practice 9 wherever appropriate. 
Criminal investigation will be reserved for cases where HMRC needs to 
send a strong deterrent message or where the conduct involved is such 
that only a criminal sanction is appropriate.” 
 
 
The Profit Diversion Compliance Facility published on January 10, 2019 (which is an 
“amnesty” for multinational companies that used Transfer Pricing (TP) and other 
devices to cheat the public revenue by diverting profits taxable in the UK to offshore 
jurisdictions) shows that the multi-billion pound offshore tax avoidance is not included 
in the “cases where HMRC needs to send a strong deterrent message or where the 
conduct involved is such that only a criminal sanction is appropriate.” In the Profit 
Diversion Compliance Facility Guidance HMRC stated: 
 
“Our investigations into Profit Diversion to date have established that in a 
large number of cases the factual pattern outlined to HMRC at the start of 
an enquiry does not stand up to scrutiny once tested. That may be a result 
of a careless error (for example individuals within a group being unaware 
of what the actual facts are) but it may also be a result of a deliberate 
behaviour, that is a group knowingly submitting a TP methodology in a 
Corporation Tax Return based on a false set of facts. A common issue is 
an overstatement of functions performed, assets used and risks assumed 
in entities taxed at lower rates, and an understatement of the functions 
performed, assets used and risks assumed in the UK. 
 
Where HMRC suspects there has been an attempt by a group to 
deliberately mislead, then we will refer the issue to Fraud Investigation 




As a matter of law, “knowingly submitting a TP methodology in a Corporation Tax 
Return based on a false set of facts” is cheating the public revenue and “to deliberately 
mislead” is to defraud the public revenue.  
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The Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility that ran from September 1, 2009 to December 
31, 2015 (which is an “amnesty” for taxpayers and their professional advisers that 
cheated the public revenue by concealing incomes and gains taxable in the UK in 
Liechtenstein and other offshore jurisdictions) and the  UK-Swiss Agreement signed on 
October 6, 2011 (which is an “amnesty” for HSBC and the customers it helped to 
conceal incomes and gains taxable in the UK in Switzerland) also show that the multi-
billion pound offshore tax evasion is not included in the “cases where HMRC needs 
to send a strong deterrent message or where the conduct involved is such that only a 
criminal sanction is appropriate.” In the Side Letter of the Competent Authority of the 
United Kingdom on Criminal Investigation under the UK-Swiss Agreement, HMRC 
stated: 
 
“Provided that a relevant person agrees either to make a one-off payment 
in accordance with Article 9 of this Agreement or to make a voluntary 
disclosure in relation to his/her relevant assets in accordance with Article 
10 of this Agreement and fully cooperates with HMRC, that person is highly 
unlikely to be subject to a criminal investigation by HMRC for a tax-related 
offence for past liabilities in respect of relevant assets from the date he or 
she irrevocably opted for one of the options. ...   
 
Whilst it is never possible to provide an absolute assurance against a 
criminal investigation, it is highly unlikely to be in the public interest of the 
United Kingdom that professional advisers, Swiss paying agents and their 
employees will be subject to a criminal investigation by HMRC.”60 
 
 
V. THE MEANING OF TAX EVASION IN LAW  
 
V.I. Cheating by a Taxpayer 
 
Tax evasion is cheating the public revenue by a taxpayer who deliberately fails 
to make a return of the relevant tax liability or by a taxpayer who deliberately 
makes a false return of the relevant tax liability without using a tax scheme.  
 
This statement of tax evasion by the 1920 Royal Commission on Income Tax shows 
that the use of legal nonsense to legitimise tax fraud is not limited to tax avoidance:   
 
“That evasion of Income Tax exists at the present time is beyond question. 
The citizen who is deficient in public spirit has always aimed at paying less 
than his fair share of the nation’s expenses, and it is safe to assume that 
he will always continue to do so. This may be said of every tax, but it is 
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especially true of the Income Tax because there are many cases where a 
knowledge of the amount of the taxpayer’s profit is confined to himself or 
shared only by his confidential employees or his professional advisers. 
Although a taxpayer is obliged by law to make a return of his income, in 
many cases that return is, in the nature of things, capable of only a partial 
or imperfect check, and when this is known or suspected by the taxpayer 
he is tempted to speculate on the chance of escaping detection if the return 
is inaccurate. He may not always be guilty of fraud; he may be culpably 
careless; he may decide every doubtful point in his own favour by 
deliberately refraining from inquiry; he may cultivate a profitable ignorance 
or a negligence that is not free from guile. His conduct may, in short, occupy 
any position in the scale, from something less than complete honesty down 
to absolute fraud. The one common feature in all such cases is that the 
Revenue suffers, which is only another way of saying that the evader 
contrives to make his fellow-citizens pay something that ought to 
have come out of his own pocket.”61 
 
 
Cheating the public revenue, which boils down to dishonesty, encompasses all the 
underlined expressions and extends “from something less than complete honesty down 
to absolute fraud”, precisely because of the highlighted last sentence which effectively 
defines it. According to “Clericus”: 
 
“In all cases an intent to defraud is an essential element in the common law 
offence. ... At all events, it is not easy to think of a wilfully false statement 
made on a material matter to the Revenue where it is not apparent from the 
circumstances that it was made with intent to defraud. Given such an intent, 
false statements made to the Revenue constitute a clear exception to the 
generalisation that it is not a crime to tell a lie.”62 
 
 
V.II. Revenue Discretion 
 
The restatement of the dogma “tax evasion is illegal but tax avoidance is legal” by 
equating tax evasion to tax fraud is fundamentally flawed because tax evasion (or 
cheating the public revenue by a taxpayer who deliberately fails to make a return of the 
relevant tax liability or who deliberately makes a false return of the relevant tax liability 
without using a tax scheme) can amount to a criminal offence or a civil fraud or an 
administrative fraud depending on whether “the tax authorities … take the procedural 
course of bringing a criminal tax-fraud case or imposing only civil tax-fraud penalties or 
simply establishing tax liability without fines or penalties.”63  
 
V.III. Criminal Offence          
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In the criminal prosecution in R v Mavji, the taxpayer was convicted of cheating the 
public revenue by deliberately failing to make returns of VAT liability. According to 
Davies J:   
 
“This appellant was in circumstances in which he had a statutory duty to 
make value added tax returns and to pay over to the Crown the value added 
tax due. He dishonestly failed to do either. Accordingly, he was guilty of 
cheating HM The Queen and the public revenue.”64 
 
 
In the criminal prosecution in R v Hudson the taxpayer was convicted of cheating the 
public revenue by deliberately making a false return of income tax liability without 
using a tax scheme. Goddard CJ stated:  
 
“We think that the offence here consisted of sending in documents to the 
inspector of taxes which were false and fraudulent to the appellant’s 
knowledge ... for the purpose of avoiding the payment of tax. That is 
defrauding the Crown and defrauding the public.”65 
 
 
In other words, what matters is where the taxpayer’s conduct falls under the fraud-
negligence-honesty trichotomy rather than whether it is described as “avoiding the 
payment of tax” or “evading the payment of tax” (which are legal nonsenses). According 
to “Watchful”:  
 
“At Hudson’s trial at Nottingham Assizes Slade J at one point asked Mr 
Richard Elwes QC, appearing for the prosecution, whether he could 
imagine any false statement to the Revenue made knowingly and wilfully 
which would not involve intent to defraud. Mr Elwes replied ‘I cannot, my 
Lord, I must say.’ To which the learned judge said, ‘Nor can I.’”66 
 
 
V.IV. Civil Fraud and Administrative Fraud     
 
In R v IRC, ex parte Knight, the taxpayer cheated the public revenue by making a 
deliberately false return of the relevant tax liability without using a tax scheme, like the 
taxpayer in Hudson. As the Inland Revenue stated in its evidence to the 1978 Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure: 
 
“In the main, however, the Department deals with the tax evader not by 
prosecution but by imposing money penalties graded according to the 
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gravity of the offence. Moreover in the majority of cases the amount of the 
penalty is agreed informally between the Department and the taxpayer 
without recourse to formal proceedings.”67 
 
Knight is, therefore, one of “the [minority] of cases [where] the amount of the penalty 
[was not] agreed informally between the Department and the taxpayer without recourse 
to formal proceedings.” According to Russell LJ: 
 
“This is an appeal from ... penalties under s 95 of the Taxes Management 
Act 1970 on the ground that the taxpayer, in submitting ... accounts of his 
trade ... had fraudulently or negligently submitted incorrect accounts. ... 
These assessments, being otherwise out of time, were based on 
allegations of fraud or wilful default by the taxpayer. 
 
On an appeal by the taxpayer, the Special Commissioners found wilful 
default. They made ... no finding one way or the other as to fraud. ... Then 
it is said ... that wilful default is not within s 95; it is neither fraud nor 
negligence. I think ... that when s 95 refers to fraud or negligence, it cannot 
sensibly be thought to exclude wilful default in that bracket. It would be ... 
quite absurd to hold under s 95 that it embraces careless breach of duty – 




The taxpayer’s contention shows that the supposed distinction between ‘wilful default’ 
(a legal nonsense) and fraud (a legal concept) is a distinction with no legal difference, 
and demonstrates why tax evasion (a legal nonsense) should not be used to describe 
tax fraud (a legal concept).  
 
VI. THE MEANING OF TAX AVOIDANCE IN LAW  
 
VI.I. Cheating by Professional Advisers       
 
The fundamental thesis is that tax avoidance is cheating the public revenue by 
the professional advisers that devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate 
the use of tax avoidance schemes (hereafter referred to as “the professional 
enablers” or “the enabling professional advisers” or “the tax avoidance 
industry”) in which the taxpayer using an individual scheme (hereafter referred 
to as “the participating taxpayer” or “the taxpayer”) may or may not be complicit.  
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In R v Charlton, Cunningham, Kitchen and Wheeler69 the professional enablers were 
convicted of cheating the public revenue by devising, marketing, implementing and 
otherwise facilitating the use of tax avoidance schemes. According to Lord Justice 
Farquharson:  
 
“On 1 August 1994 these Appellants were convicted at Nottingham Crown 
Court on an indictment containing 14 counts of cheating the public revenue. 
... Kitchen and Wheeler are qualified accountants. Charlton has practised 
for many years as an accountant, as a partner in a firm called Charltons, 
but was not professionally qualified. Cunningham is a barrister practising 
at the Revenue Bar, with chambers in Lincoln’s Inn. He also works in 
Glasgow in the same field as well as having an association with a firm of 
lawyers in Madrid. Another defendant, Lawlor, pleaded guilty to four counts 
of the indictment. He, too, was a qualified accountant working at the 
relevant time for Charltons. In imposing a suspended sentence of 
imprisonment upon him the Judge said that ‘... the whole Charltons empire 
was riddled with dishonesty’. The firm had offices in Derby, Birmingham, 
Manchester and Jersey.  
 
The case for the prosecution was that Charlton had devised a dishonest, 
tax-avoidance scheme for the benefit of some of the firm’s clients and that 
the Appellants were involved with the implementation of the schemes or 
the concealment from the Revenue of the existence of the fraud.”70 
 
 
No criminal proceedings were brought against the participating taxpayers that used the 
schemes. 
 
VI.II. Taxpayer’s Immunity        
 
Paragraph 18 of Schedule 24 to Finance Act 2007, which deals with the liability of a 
taxpayer to penalties for negligence or fraud where professional advisers are acting on 
his behalf, was considered in Hanson v HMRC. Judge Cannan confirmed the well-
established law and practice thus:  
 
“What is reasonable care in any particular case will depend on all the 
circumstances. In my view this will include the nature of the matters being 
dealt with in the return, the identity and experience of the agent, the 
experience of the taxpayer and the nature of the professional relationship 
between the taxpayer and the agent. In my view, if a taxpayer reasonably 
relies on a reputable accountant for advice in relation to the content 
of his tax return then he will not be liable to a penalty under Schedule 
24.”71 
 
                                                 
69 67 TC 500. 
70 Charlton, pp.504-505. Emphasis supplied.  




The corollary of the highlighted principle is that the participating taxpayer that 
uses a tax avoidance scheme, which is invariably devised and implemented by 
the professional enablers, to misrepresent or conceal his tax liability in a tax 
return submitted to the Revenue is more likely to do so honestly than negligently 
or fraudulently. 
 
HMRC’s written submission to the PAC for the purposes of its hearing on February 11, 
2016 on the controversial Google settlement, which confirmed that it was effected under 
“HMRC’s policy to deal with fraud by use of the cost effective civil fraud investigation 
procedures under Code of Practice 9”72, stated:  
 
“HMRC formally opened an enquiry into Google UK Ltd (GUK)’s returns in 
March 2010 after having carried out a detailed risk review. We concluded our 
enquiry in January 2016, when we reached agreement with GUK about 
additional tax that was due. ...  
 
For each year covered by the enquiry, we secured additional tax reflecting the 
full value of the economic activities carried on by Google in the UK.”73  
 
 
In fact, Google UK Ltd misrepresented its tax liability by at least £130 million. As it 
stated in a letter to the Financial Times:  
 
“After a six-year audit we are paying the full amount of tax that HM Revenue 




Despite the fact that Google UK Ltd misrepresented its tax liability by at least £130 
million, HMRC did not impose any penalty for negligence, let alone fraud, as this 
exchange between a member of the PAC and HMRC’s head of business tax at the 
Committee’s hearing shows:  
 
“Q195 Caroline Flint: Does the fact that Google have paid £130 million, of 
which £18 million is interest, reflect that they did not pay enough tax? 
 
Jim Harra:  Yes, it clearly does. If you look at their accounts from 2005 to 
2015, the total charge they have taken for corporation tax and interest is 
£196.4 million. They have acknowledged that £130 million of that is as a 
result of our investigation. That is a very significant uplift in their liability. ... 
 
                                                 
72 HMRC Criminal Investigation Policy. 
73 Supplementary written evidence, February 10, 2016. 
74 Barron, ‘Governments make tax law, Google complies’, January 27, 2016.  
39 
 
Q196 Caroline Flint: If that is the case, why hasn’t HMRC applied any 
penalties to Google for non-payment of tax? 
  
Jim Harra: Penalties and large businesses are quite a challenge. ... In 
order to attach a penalty, we have to demonstrate two things: first of all, 
that the return was wrong – and it clearly was in this case – and secondly, 
that insufficient care was taken in producing the self-assessment. The 
challenge in transfer pricing is ... that they can take a lot of expert advice 
and opinion, and can take a reasonable position in relation to a complex 
area of law. We can challenge that and they can accept that they need to 
change their position, but it is very difficult to establish that they have taken 
insufficient care. 
 
Q197 Caroline Flint: Basically their lawyers and tax people have 
outmanoeuvred HMRC with a story about why they should not face a 
penalty. You can understand why the public – whether individual taxpayers 
or businesses – find it hard to believe that ... in your own words, they did 
not return a proper tax return and have not paid the tax that they should 
have, but apart from the interest they have not faced a penalty. There is 
considerable public anger at that, because it seems that if they have 
enough hired guns in the form of lawyers and tax people, big companies 
can get away with it. 
 
Jim Harra: I understand that anger. HMRC’s position, and the 
Government’s position, is that the current penalty legislation does not work 
in relation to large businesses in the way that it should.”75 
 
 
The focus on the participating taxpayers rather than the professional enablers means 
that the prevailing approach to tax avoidance (including the current penalty legislation) 
does not work in relation to companies and other wealthy taxpayers that can afford tax 
avoidance schemes because of the principle that “if a taxpayer reasonably relies on a 
reputable accountant for advice in relation to the content of his tax return then he will 
not be liable to a penalty under Schedule 24.” 
 
The schemes in Charlton would also be described today as Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) schemes because they were devised to erode the UK’s tax base by 
shifting the taxable profits of UK companies to Jersey intermediaries. According to 
Farquharson LJ:   
 
“It was the case for the Crown that the accounts presented to the Revenue 
by the United Kingdom companies were false in that by using Charlton’s 
scheme to transfer part of their profits to the Jersey companies they were 
not disclosing the full extent of the profits they had made. It was this lack of 
disclosure which formed the basis of the false representations alleged in 
the indictment. Each of the Appellants was charged in the relevant counts 
with cheating the Revenue by ‘... falsely representing that the apparent 
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purchases (by the United Kingdom company) from (the Jersey company) 
were bona fide commercial transactions’.”76 
 
 
In other words, just as the returns and accounts submitted to HMRC by Google UK Ltd 
were not “reflecting the full value of the economic activities carried on by Google in the 
UK” in the words of HMRC, the returns and accounts submitted to the Inland Revenue 
by the United Kingdom companies in Charlton “were not disclosing the full extent of the 
profits they had made” in the UK in the words of Farquharson LJ. The Inland Revenue, 
however, prosecuted the professional enablers. Charlton, therefore, shows that the way 
to make the law effective in tax avoidance is to judge the schemes on the basis of 
whether the professional enablers cheated or defrauded the public revenue as a matter 
of law. As Farquharson LJ concluded: 
 
“It was apparent, therefore, as the learned Judge said on a number of 
occasions in the course of his summing-up, that there was no dispute by 
the end of the evidence that the schemes were being operated in fraud of 
the Revenue. The issue for the jury, as he correctly pointed out, was 
whether any, and if so which, of the Appellants took part in the devising, 




VI.III. Counsel’s Blessing  
 
The participating taxpayer’s obligation in respect of marketed tax avoidance schemes 
was considered in Litman v HMRC. Judge Short analysed the authorities and 
concluded:  
 
“It was accepted by HMRC that entering into a packaged avoidance 
scheme is not in itself a negligent act and the Tribunal accepts that the 
Taxpayers could not be expected to understand the legal and tax 
implications of the [scheme], the order in which documents needed to be 
signed, or the basis on which HMRC might argue that the transactions 
should not be respected for tax purposes. In each of these instances we 
accept, as reflected by the previous decisions in this area, that these are 
matters for which a reasonable taxpayer might properly be expected to rely 
on its professional advisers. The Taxpayers can rely, in this regard, on the 
decisions in Bingham and Hanson.”78 
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The taxpayer’s ability to rely on the decisions in Bingham79 (that ignorance of technical 
aspects of tax legislation does not amount to negligence or fraud) and Hanson (that “if 
a taxpayer reasonably relies on a reputable accountant for advice in relation to the 
content of his tax return then he will not be liable to a penalty under Schedule 24”80 for 
negligence or fraud if the advice proves to be wrong) facilitates the use of legal opinions 
to sell tax avoidance schemes and to fortify the participating taxpayers’ immunity from 
complicity in the fraud. Writing in the context of the US, where the practice originated, 
Rostain stated:  
 
“The accounting firm’s opinion letter, together with a similar opinion letter 
from an outside law firm, could be produced down the road to show a 
taxpayer’s good faith, thereby deflecting possible penalties if the IRS 
discovered and challenged the transaction. In addition, it served to 
reassure a client that the tax avoidance scheme was legitimate. Opinion 
letters are the stock in trade of tax lawyers.”81  
 
 
In the UK legal opinions (or “blessings” comparable to indulgences) are the stock-in-
trade of senior members of the Revenue Bar “who retail opinions”82 and “who prostitute 
themselves to these schemes.”83  
 
In his sanctimonious but illuminating critique, which should be seen in the context of 
his subsequent admission (that “[t]he vast majority of [his] work has been for taxpayers 
– and a majority of that work involves acting in courts and tribunals for taxpayers who 
have engaged in what are called (in the trade) ‘marketed tax avoidance schemes’84), 
Maugham highlighted the fundamental flaw in the prevailing approach to tax avoidance 
unwittingly:  
 
“I have on my desk an Opinion - a piece of formal tax advice - from a 
prominent QC at the Tax Bar. In it, he expresses a view on the law that is 
so far removed from legal reality that I do not believe he can genuinely hold 
the view he says he has. At best he is incompetent. At worst, he is criminally 
fraudulent: he is obtaining his fee by deception. And this is not the first such 
Opinion I have seen; they pass across my desk all the time. ...  
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Assume you are a seller of tax planning ideas: and let’s call you a ‘House’. 
You have developed a planning idea that you wish to sell to taxpayers. But 
your customers will typically want independent corroboration from a 
member of the Bar that your idea works; that is to say it delivers a beneficial 
tax treatment. The fees that can be generated from bringing a planning idea 
to market are substantial. I am aware of instances where a single planning 
idea has generated fees of about £100m for the House. But without 
barrister sign-off, you have nothing to sell. This fact creates predictable 
temptations for the Bar. If you are prepared to sign off a planning idea, the 
House will pay you handsomely; in some instances hundreds of thousands 
of pounds for a few days’ work. ...  
 
The House will then go out and sell that idea to taxpayers. In the case of 
individual taxpayers, they will sell it, typically, through IFAs to whom they 
will pay a sales commission. That sales commission, too, can be very 
substantial, running in some cases into hundreds of thousands of pounds 
for a single client. So the IFA can be strongly incentivised to persuade their 
clients that the idea works, and - should the taxpayer client care about such 
things - that it is not aggressive tax planning. 
 
In the archetypal case the taxpayer will then make their tax return, HMRC 
will disallow the beneficial tax treatment, and the taxpayer will challenge 
that disallowance in the tax tribunal (causing years of uncertainty and 
substantial professional fees). Should that challenge fail, the taxpayer will 
lose whatever money he put into the idea, face an unexpected tax charge 
and, very often, be publicly pilloried into the bargain. ...  
 
Most of my colleagues at the Revenue Bar act properly and scrupulously. 
But it saddens me that a number, whose names are well known to us all, 
do not. Their behaviour makes victims of the general body of taxpayers, 
whose tax take is reduced. And it besmirches my profession.”85 
 
 
Every professional adviser, including every member of the Revenue Bar, involved “in 
the trade” of devising, marketing, implementing and otherwise facilitating the use of tax 
avoidance schemes, including by “acting in courts and tribunals for taxpayers who have 
engaged in ... ‘marketed tax avoidance schemes’”, cheats the public revenue or “makes 
victims of the general body of taxpayers, whose tax take is reduced”. In the words of 
Viscount Simon in Latilla v IRC: 
 
“[O]ne result of such methods, if they succeed, is, of course, to increase 
pro tanto the load of tax on the shoulders of the great body of good citizens 
who do not desire, or do not know how, to adopt these manoeuvres.”86 
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In Charlton, Cunningham, the barrister, was convicted for “blessing” the schemes in 
circumstances strikingly similar to those described by Maugham. Rejecting “his case 
that he acted in the best traditions of the Bar”87, Farquharson LJ stated:  
 
“The Crown case against Cunningham at the outset of the trial was that he 
had been active with Charlton in promoting the scheme from the time it was 
launched. ... There was evidence before the jury in the form of Mr Wheeler’s 
interview that he had been taken by Charlton to meet Cunningham to be 
reassured that the scheme as sold by Charlton was tax effective. The first 
conference was said to have taken place at Derby on 19 March 1982 and 
was relied on in opening by the Crown as being part of a pattern whereby 
Charlton used Cunningham to reassure any doubting participants. The 
Crown’s case against Cunningham had been that he advised Wheeler that 
the scheme was effective although to his knowledge it was not.”88 
 
 
VI.IV. The Twin Fundamental Flaws in the Prevailing Approach  
 
As underlined statement by Maugham shows, the tax appeal system is designed 
for the relationship between the Revenue and the taxpayer. A tax avoidance 
appeal, therefore, obscures the fraudulent nature of tax avoidance because it is 
a dispute between the participating taxpayer and the Revenue to which the 
professional enablers are not parties.  
 
This fundamental flaw seems to go unnoticed because, as demonstrated above, 
unlike the criminal courts, the civil courts do not decide the legal question 
whether the participating taxpayer, let alone the absent professional enablers, 
cheated or defrauded the public revenue as a matter of law but purport to decide 
whether a scheme “works” supposedly as a matter of statutory construction.  
 
Justice O’Donnell’s statement in O’Flynn Construction v Revenue Commissioners, 
which involved the GAAR in section 86 of Ireland’s Finance Act 1989, demonstrates 
how the “the legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what 
Parliament meant” obscures and thus legitimises the fraudulent conduct of the 
professional enablers and any complicity by the participating taxpayer, even when a 
GAAR has been adopted:   
 
“The scheme in this case was devised with some ingenuity and 
implemented with a precision which at a technical level is undoubtedly 
admirable. One of the features of a tax avoidance scheme such as this is 
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that although it is presumably explained in some detail to the participants 
in order to encourage them to take part, only the mechanics of the 
transaction are disclosed to the Revenue. When this case made its way 
before the Appeal Commissioners, the tax payers and their advisors did not 
go into evidence. Accordingly, it is not always clear what exactly was 
involved in some of the steps, or why each individual step was taken. 
However, in sum, more than 40 individual steps were taken over a period 
of 50 days and the end result, as intended, was that ... two companies ... 
reduced their profit by making capital contributions to other companies 
(which contributions were later written off), while the shareholders of both 
companies received tax relieved dividends from other entities. ...  
 
This case proceeded to some extent on the basis that since what was 
planned and executed here was a tax avoidance scheme, the only question 
was whether or not it contravened s 86 of the Finance Act 1989, and for 
that purpose it was said, it was not necessary to understand in any detail 
how the scheme worked. That course has considerable attraction, but it 
seems to me that in order to resolve the question of the validity of the 
scheme by reference to the provisions of s 86, it is necessary to seek to 
understand the scheme at least in broad detail. Accordingly I have sought 
to set out in this judgment my understanding of what is a quite intricate 
scheme. It follows from what has already been observed as to the limited 
evidence available, that it may be that I have misunderstood some aspects 
of the scheme. Any observations made by me in relation to the purpose of 
any particular step are inferences drawn by me, perhaps inaccurately, from 
the surrounding circumstances, and are not derived from any explanation 
proffered by the tax payers.”89 
 
 
The answer to the “question ... whether or not it contravened s 86 of the Finance Act 
1989” tells us little or nothing about its nature and meaning in law because “in order to 
resolve the question of the validity of the scheme by reference to the provisions of s 
86” “the taxpayers and their advisors did not go into evidence” and “it was not 
necessary to understand in any detail how the scheme worked.” In the words of Lord 
Templeman’s dissenting speech in Fitzwilliam v IRC:  
 
“People should be judged by the results of their actions and not by 
the language of documents intended to mislead.”90 
 
As the professional enablers and the participating taxpayers are not “judged by the 
results of their actions [but] by the language of documents intended to mislead” in civil 
litigation, the fundamental thesis that tax avoidance is cheating the public revenue by 
the professional advisers that devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate the 
use of tax avoidance schemes in which the taxpayer using an individual scheme may 
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or may not be complicit is supported by obiter statements rather than actual decisions. 
According to Lord Templeman’s dissenting statement in Fitzwilliam:   
 
“Capital transfer tax would be payable out of the estate before Lady 
Hastings came into her inheritance. The rate was 75%. Lady Fitzwilliam, 
Lady Hastings and the independent trustees hoped that their solicitors 
Currey & Co would find some way in which Lady Hastings could inherit the 
estate but avoid the payment of tax. Curreys consulted Mr Walker, now a 
Queen’s Counsel, practising at the Chancery Bar and specialising in trusts 
and tax avoidance to see if he could find a way. Curreys first consulted Mr 
Walker on 11 October 1979 with a proposal for a tax avoidance scheme. 
Counsel amended the scheme from time to time and finally advised the 
implementation of the scheme by steps to be taken in accordance with an 
arranged timetable. The scheme was accepted by Curreys and was carried 
out between 20 December 1979 and 7 February 1980. On 18 January 
1980, after step 3, Mr Herbert of counsel was asked by Curreys to advise 
Lady Hastings. Mr Herbert was a member of Mr Walker’s chambers. Mr 
Herbert was ... asked ... to ... advise only on steps 4 and 5 and to discuss 
the matter with Mr Walker. ...  
 
Legal advisers should not conceal their activities from their clients in 
the hope of deceiving the Revenue. A client who subsequently adopts, 
ratifies and claims the benefit of the actions of his solicitors cannot deny 
the real consequences or avoid the fiscal consequences on the grounds of 
personal ignorance. Lord Keith does not condemn the concealment 
practised by Curreys with the approval of Mr Walker and does not even 
acknowledge that Lady Hastings was the client of Curreys and Mr Walker 
although the scheme was planned, concealed, implemented and 
completed for the benefit of Lady Hastings and nobody else.  
 
Mr Walker’s scheme which trembled on the brink of a sham employed the 
devices which proved ineffective in Ramsay and Furniss v Dawson. ...  
 
All decisions of this House are founded on justice, principle and precedent. 
If an individual taxpayer employs a device to avoid tax the result is unjust 
because the Revenue are deprived of money intended by Parliament to be 
available for the common good. A decision in favour of the taxpayer, Lady 
Hastings in this case, would enable an individual taxpayer to drive a coach 
and horses through any Revenue legislation by ingenious drafting and 
nothing else. ...  
 
In common with my predecessors I regard tax avoidance schemes of 
the kind invented and implemented in the present case as no better 
than attempts to cheat the Revenue.”91 
 
 
As if to confirm the proposition that counsel’s “blessing” serves to immunise the 
participating taxpayer from complicity in the cheating, he concluded:   
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“The advice of Mr Walker that such a scheme could properly be 
implemented for the purpose of avoiding capital transfer tax for the benefit 
of Lady Hastings was a complete protection for all the trustees.”92 
 
Lord Templeman’s dissenting judgement is the only one that illuminated the nature and 
meaning of tax avoidance in law because of his insistence that “[p]eople should be 
judged by the results of their actions and not by the language of documents intended 
to mislead.”93 As he later re-emphasised extra-judicially:  
 
“Tax should depend on facts and consequences and not on language 
or documents designed to enable a taxpayer to claim a tax advantage 
without paying the price.”94 
 
 
Under the prevailing constructional approach whereby the professional enablers and 
the participating taxpayers are not “judged by the results of their actions [but] by the 
language of documents intended to mislead” and where  “[t]ax [does not] depend on 
facts and consequences [but] on language or documents designed to enable a 
taxpayer to claim a tax advantage without paying the price”, however, Lord Keith (with 
whom Lords Ackner, Browne-Wilkinson and Mustill agreed) held that the schemes 
“worked” despite “the concealment practised by Curreys with the approval of Mr 
Walker.”  
 
Lord Templeman was clear that “the concealment practised by Curreys with the 
approval of Mr Walker” was concealment from the client with a view to deceiving the 
Revenue: 
 
“Legal advisers should not conceal their activities from their clients in the 
hope of deceiving the Revenue.” 
 
It is self-evident that “the concealment practised by Curreys with the approval of Mr 
Walker” benefitted, rather than prejudiced, Lady Hastings, the client, because “the 
scheme was planned, concealed, implemented and completed for the benefit of Lady 
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VI.V. The Tax Avoidance Industry 
 
English cases like Charlton that support the fundamental thesis involved the minnows 
at the fringes of the UK tax avoidance industry. By contrast, in the US where the 
authorities are significantly less tolerant of white-collar crimes, the big fish in the centre 
ground of the tax avoidance or tax shelter industry have admitted to conspiracies to 
cheat and defraud the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in recent times.   
 
In particular, following the ground-breaking investigation by the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations from 2003 to 2005 into the devising, marketing, and 
implementation of tax schemes by accountants, lawyers, financial advisors and 
bankers95, the IRS conducted unprecedented criminal investigations that resulted in 
several deferred prosecution agreements, as headlines like “Ernst & Young to Pay 
$123 Million to End Tax-Fraud Probe”96 and “BDO Admits Generating $6.5 Billion in 
Phony Tax Shelter Losses, Pays $50 Million”97 show.  
 
Most notably, according to the IRS statement entitled “KMPG to Pay $456 Million for 
Criminal Violations”98 dated August 29, 2005:  
 
“KPMG has admitted to criminal wrongdoing and agreed to pay $456 million 
in fines, restitution and penalties as part of an agreement to defer 
prosecution of the firm.  
 
In addition to the agreement, nine individuals – including six former KPMG 
partners and the former deputy chairman of the firm – are being criminally 
prosecuted in relation to the multi-billion dollar criminal tax fraud 
conspiracy. As alleged in a series of charging documents unsealed today, 
the fraud relates to the design, marketing, and implementation of fraudulent 
tax shelters.  
 
In the largest criminal tax case ever filed, KPMG has admitted that it 
engaged in a fraud that generated at least $11 billion dollars in phony tax 
losses which, according to court papers, cost the United States at least 
$2.5 billion dollars in evaded taxes. In addition to KPMG’s former deputy 
chairman, the individuals indicted today include two former heads of 
KPMG’s tax practice and a former tax partner in the New York, NY office of 
a prominent national law firm. 
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The criminal information and indictment together allege that from 1996 
through 2003, KPMG, the nine indicted defendants and others conspired 
to defraud the IRS by designing, marketing and implementing illegal tax 
shelters. The charging documents focus on four shelters that the 
conspirators called FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS and SOS. According to the charges, 
KPMG, the indicted individuals, and their co-conspirators concocted tax 
shelter transactions – together with false and fraudulent factual scenarios 
to support them – and targeted them to wealthy individuals who needed a 
minimum of $10 or $20 million in tax losses so that they would pay fees 
that were a percentage of the desired tax loss to KPMG, certain law firms, 
and others instead of paying billions of dollars in taxes owed to the 
government. To further the scheme, KPMG, the individual defendants, and 
their co-conspirators allegedly filed and caused to be filed false and 
fraudulent tax returns that claimed phony tax losses.  
 
KPMG also admitted that its personnel took specific deliberate steps to 
conceal the existence of the shelters from the IRS by, among other things, 
failing to register the shelters with the IRS as required by law; fraudulently 
concealing the shelter losses and income on tax returns; and attempting to 
hide the shelters using sham attorney–client privilege claims. ... 
 
To date, the IRS has collected more than $3.7 billion from taxpayers who 
voluntarily participated in a parallel civil global settlement initiative.”99 
 
 
In other words, as in Charlton, the participating taxpayers were not prosecuted. In fact, 
their immunity from the fraud was also fortified by the legal opinions used to sell the 
schemes. According to Rostain: 
 
“In order to make its products more attractive, KPMG emphasized that legal 
opinions from purportedly independent law firms were available. In the case 
of one product, the firm even agreed to pay a law firm a fee each time the 
law firm’s name was mentioned during a sale, regardless of whether the 
firm provided an opinion.”100 
 
 
The “Statement of Facts” accompanying the “Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
between Ernst & Young LLP and the US Department of Justice” dated February 26, 
2013, under which Ernst & Young paid $123 million in fines, restitution and penalties, 
underscores the pivotal role of lawyers in the tax avoidance industry:  
 
“Beginning in 1999 and ending in 2002, ‘E&Y’, in conjunction with various 
law firms, banks and investment advisers, developed, marketed and 
implemented four tax shelter products called COBRA, CDS, CDS Add-On, 
and PICO. Earlier and at or about the same time, other accounting firms 
developed similar tax shelter products and marketed them to their clients. 
E&Y implemented these four tax shelter products for approximately 200 
high net worth clients, intending to defer, reduce or eliminate tax liabilities 
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for their clients of more than $2 billion in the aggregate. E&Y prepared tax 
returns reflecting tax losses claimed to have been derived from those tax 
shelter products and subsequently defended certain of its clients in 
connection with audits of those transactions by the IRS. E&Y received 
gross fees of approximately $123,000,000 with regard to these 
transactions.  
 
A small group within E&Y known as the Strategic Individual Solutions 
Group (‘SISG’) was primarily responsible for supervising and coordinating 
the marketing, implementation and defense of E&Y's tax shelter products. 
Certain SISG tax shelter products were designed to appear to the IRS to 
be substantive investments that had favorable tax consequences when, in 
reality, the products were actually designed and marketed to clients as a 
series of preplanned steps that would defer, reduce or eliminate their tax 
liabilities, and the typical client participating in these shelters was primarily, 
if not exclusively, motivated to achieve a desired tax savings. In order to 
deceive the IRS as to the true nature of the tax strategies, and to bolster 
arguments that the transactions had economic substance, some SISG 
personnel agreed upon and directed other E&Y employees to participate in 
a concerted effort not to create, disseminate, or publicize documents 
reflecting the tax motivation behind the strategies, or the preplanned 
sequence of steps necessary to effect the strategies. These SISG 
personnel thereby sought to prevent the IRS from detecting their clients’ 
purposes in using these strategies. For example, in certain instances, 
members of SISG falsely portrayed the transactions under examination as 
purely investment driven transactions and falsely denied a tax motivation 
for the transactions in response to IRS Information Document Requests 
and in testimony to the IRS. Further, in implementing the sale of tax shelter 
products, certain members of SISG also prepared documents or 
correspondence that falsely and inaccurately reflected events or 
conversations, and that were designed to improperly influence the IRS’s 
view of the merits of the transactions in the event of an audit. These 
activities continued into 2003 and 2004. 
 
The tax shelter products were implemented with opinion letters from law 
firms. These legal opinions were intended to provide ‘penalty protection’ to 
individual clients in the event that the IRS audited their tax returns. The 
opinions were premised upon certain taxpayer representations that, in 
some instances, E&Y employees knew were false. E&Y did not issue 
opinions with regard to these transactions.”101 
 
The innovative use of parallel civil and criminal enforcement procedures to recover 
avoided taxes from the participating taxpayers and punitive fines from the professional 
enablers in the US debunks the apologist notion that enforcement action against the 
tax avoidance industry in the UK will be prejudicial to the public revenue. As IRS 
Commissioner Everson stated while announcing the KPMG settlement: 
 
“Today’s actions demonstrate our resolve to hold accountable those who 
play fast and loose with the tax code. At some point such conduct passes 
from clever accounting and lawyering to theft from the people. We simply 
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can’t tolerate flagrant abuse of the law and of professional obligations by 
tax practitioners, particularly those associated with so-called blue chip firms 
like KPMG that, by virtue of their prominence, set the standard of conduct 
for others. Accountants and attorneys should be the pillars of our system 
of taxation, not the architects of its circumvention.”102 
 
 
The essence of the fundamental thesis, which is a fundamental departure from 
the existing body of knowledge, is that the “point such conduct passes from 
clever accounting and lawyering to theft from the people” as a matter of law can 
only be determined by judging the conduct of the professional enablers.   
 
Gammie’s historical overview, which shows that the loss schemes that resulted in the 
criminal proceedings in the US have always been the stock-in-trade of the UK’s tax 
avoidance industry, underscores how the prevailing focus on the symptoms of tax 
avoidance (the participating taxpayers) rather than the causes (the professional 
enablers) constitutes a licence to cheat for the tax avoidance industry:  
 
“I have an enduring memory of attending a meeting as a newly-qualified 
solicitor nearly forty years ago at the office of a firm that specialized in 
devising and implementing tax schemes. On that occasion it was the office 
of Emson & Dudley rather than that of Rossminster or Bradman 
organizations. ...  
 
On the occasion in question I was representing a client who wished to 
reduce his liability to capital gains tax. The liability had arisen on a recent 
disposal but that was no obstacle to the proposed relief: the scheme 
ensured that an offsetting loss would appear as if by magic. All that had to 
be factored in was the size of the loss, which would form the basis of the 
figures to be inserted in the transaction document and the fee that would 
be paid.  
 
Most clients took the matter no further but in this case my client bought the 
scheme. His reasoning was simple: I could not say absolutely that the 
scheme did not work. ... He was happy to bet Emson & Dudley’s fees to 
see if tax could be avoided. The details of those arrangements escape me 
but the manner of their execution does not. At the outset the point was 
made that each step was intended to create the particular legal rights and 
obligations documented. Furthermore, any party (including the offshore 
entities involved) after any step could decide not to enter into the next step 
in the sequence. Pre-prepared scheme documents were then circulated at 
the meeting and solemnly signed in the correct order. I recall pointing out 
at one stage that if the merry-go-round were in fact to stop my client could 
have some difficulty extricating himself from the financial commitments he 
appeared to have assumed. Needless to say, the documents continued to 
circulate and he encountered no such difficulty. He entered the building 
with a large tax liability and he exited expecting to have none. As solicitors 
we did not ordinarily deal with the submission of clients’ annual tax returns 
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or with the subsequent negotiation of their tax liabilities. As I heard nothing 
further, I assume that tax was successfully avoided, unless the matter 
remained open long enough to be caught by the decision in Ramsay.  
 
By 2005 methods of implementation had apparently become more 
streamlined for taxpayers. The representative of NT [No Tax] Advisers [in 
Barnes v HMRC103] visited Mr Barnes’ office for him to sign in escrow the 
suite of scheme documentation and to provide a letter of authority enabling 
them to enter dates, amounts, and ‘any other issues’ into the documents, 
to change the dates, and in their absolute and sole discretion to release the 
documents from escrow. My part in Mr Barnes’ case was to explain to the 
Tribunal as Counsel for HMRC why such arrangements did not achieve 
their objective of exonerating Mr Barnes from tax on his annual income.   
 
My early experience of such schemes gave birth to ... the belief that tax 
liabilities ... ought not to be capable of being negated by the simple 
expedient of passing papers round a table; it made no sense to impose a 
tax if tax could be so easily avoided.”104 
 
 
The tax appeal system and the constructional approach to tax avoidance by the 
Revenue and the courts make “tax liabilities ... capable of being negated by the simple 
expedient of passing papers round a table” because they are fundamentally flawed as 
demonstrated above.  
 
VI.VI. Revenue Discretion 
 
The dogma that “tax avoidance is legal” is fundamentally flawed because tax avoidance 
(or cheating the public revenue by the professional advisers that devise, market, 
implement, and otherwise facilitate the use of tax schemes in which the taxpayer using 
an individual scheme may or may not be complicit) can amount to a criminal offence or 
a civil fraud or an administrative fraud depending on whether “the tax authorities … 
take the procedural course of bringing a criminal tax-fraud case or imposing only civil 
tax-fraud penalties or simply establishing tax liability without fines or penalties, applying 
doctrines such as substance over form.”105 
 
VI.VII. Criminal Offence       
 
In the highly exceptional case of Charlton where the Revenue took “the procedural 
course of bringing a criminal tax-fraud case”, it invoked the common law offence of 
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cheating the public revenue which “acts upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty”106 in 
criminal proceedings. As Cunningham stated in an article:   
 
“From February 1994 until August 1994, the writer had the inglorious 
distinction of being a participant in the longest ever prosecution by the 
Inland Revenue ... as a defendant! He was convicted on two counts of 
cheating the Inland Revenue by concealing the existence of two fraudulent 
schemes in the course of an Enquiry Branch investigation. He was sent to 
prison for fifteen months. On appeal, the conviction was upheld but the 
sentence was reduced to nine months. ...  
 
The counts on the indictment related to twelve different schemes. The 
writer was found guilty of concealing two of them. ... There was an 
assessment under appeal in relation to the United Kingdom company when 
Enquiry Branch raided the premises of the accountants and the company 
and others (not the writer’s chambers). The result was that the pending 
appeal hearing was replaced by a criminal trial.”107 
 
 
The conviction and incarceration of the professional advisers prove that tax avoidance 
is a crime or “an act that is capable of being followed by criminal proceedings”108 or an 
“act prohibited with penal consequences.”109 In the words of Farquharson LJ’s 
sentencing remarks that embody the overriding legal and moral duty of honesty 
imposed by the pre-existing common law of cheating: 
 
“It is a feature, no doubt, of the tax or Revenue law of any country that it 
must, to a large extent, in its tax-gathering activities, rely on the truthfulness 
of the taxpayer in indicating the extent of his income or whatever other 
matter is relevant to the particular statute being considered. It follows also 
that the Revenue not only have to rely on the taxpayer’s good faith, but 
more especially on the professional advisors they appoint to act for them 
and, accordingly, when professional advisors are found to have acted 
dishonestly towards the Revenue, it is almost inevitable, as I think each 
counsel before us has recognised, that sentences of imprisonment must 
follow and we adhere to that position.”110 
 
VI.VIII. Civil Fraud       
 
In the landmark case of Ramsay v CIR, where the Revenue decided to “take the 
procedural course of ... establishing tax liability without fines or penalties, applying 
doctrines such as substance over form”111 by pleading fraud in the House of Lords, it 
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invoked the pre-existing common law of cheating which “acts upon the offence, by 
setting aside the fraudulent transaction” in civil proceedings. According to Lord 
Wilberforce: 
 
“The first of these appeals is an appeal by W. T. Ramsay Ltd., a farming 
company. In its accounting period ending 31 May 1973 it made a 
‘chargeable gain’ for purposes of corporation tax by a sale-leaseback 
transaction. This gain it desired to counteract, so as to avoid the tax, by 
establishing an allowable loss. The method chosen was to purchase from 
a company specialising in such matters a ready-made scheme. The 
general nature of this was to create out of a neutral situation two assets 
one of which would decrease in value for the benefit of the other. The 
decreasing asset would be sold, so as to create the desired loss; the 
increasing asset would be sold, yielding a gain which it was hoped would 
be exempt from tax. In the courts below, attention was concentrated upon 
the question whether the gain just referred to was in truth exempt from tax 
or not. The Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of Goulding J., decided 
that it was not.  
 
In this House, the Crown, while supporting this decision of the Court of 
Appeal, mounted a fundamental attack upon the whole of the scheme 
acquired and used by the appellant. It contended that it should simply be 
disregarded as artificial and fiscally ineffective.”112 
 
 
The Ramsay principle is, therefore, a clear application of the pre-existing common law 
of cheating. In the words of Simpson:  
 
“This judge-made move towards regulating the conduct of citizens certainly 
goes beyond anything expressly demanded by the legislation. To that 
extent, it clearly involves the recognition that there is, after all, some 
common law (in the widest sense of that term) of taxation.”113 
 
Judge Learned Hand’s seminal statement of the sham transaction doctrine in Gilbert v 
Gregory, which Lord Wilberforce cited with approval in Ramsay, also shows that “it 
clearly involves the recognition that there is, after all, some common law (in the widest 
sense of that term) of taxation”:  
 
“It is a corollary of the universally accepted canon of interpretation that the 
literal meaning of the words of a statute is seldom, if ever, the conclusive 
measure of its scope. Except in rare instances statutes are written in 
general terms and do not undertake to specify all the occasions they are 
meant to cover; and their interpretation demands the projection of their 
expressed purpose upon occasions not present in the minds of those who 
enacted them. The Income Tax Act imposes liabilities upon taxpayers 
based upon their financial transactions, and it is of course true that the 
payment of the tax itself is a financial transaction. If, however, the taxpayer 
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enters into a transaction that does not appreciably affect his beneficial 
interest except to reduce his tax, the law will disregard it; for we cannot 
suppose that it was part of the purpose of the Act to provide an escape from 
the liabilities it sought to impose.”114 
 
 
As a matter of law, “a transaction that does not appreciably affect his beneficial interest 
except to reduce his tax” cheats the public revenue, and in the absence of anti-
avoidance legislation “the law [that] will disregard it” is the pre-existing common law of 
cheating which “acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction” in 
civil proceedings.  
 
VI.IX. Administrative Fraud      
 
Long before the ongoing Profit Diversion Compliance Facility, HMRC’s ‘sweetheart’ tax 
deals with companies like Google that used tax avoidance schemes to divert profit 
taxable in the UK to offshore jurisdictions highlighted the fact that it usually deals with 
tax fraud by “imposing only civil tax-fraud penalties”.115 
 
VI.X. The Tax Dogma  
 
Charlton disproved the dogma that “tax evasion is illegal but tax avoidance is legal” 
and proved the maxim that “the Revenue’s discretion is nine-tenths of tax law”. 
According to Rhodes et al:  
 
“It is a commonly held belief among professional advisers that tax 
avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal. Tax avoidance schemes may 
fail but the taxpayers and their advisers have, until now, been secure in the 
knowledge that the worst that can happen is the receipt of a large bill for 
tax and interest. ... 
 
Amongst professional tax advisers, alarm and concern have been 
expressed at the approach of the Revenue and the conduct of the case. It 
has been argued that there is a general move to ‘blur’ the ‘very clear’ 
distinction between legal tax avoidance and illegal evasion. However, it 
might well be suggested that the distinction is not and has never been as 
clear as many professional advisers (and their clients) would like to believe. 
Where avoidance arrangements are wholly artificial and have no substance 
then clearly it is and always has been open to the Revenue and the courts 
to consider whether they are in fact ‘devices to cheat the public revenue’.  
 
What perhaps has confused the issue is the Revenue’s highly selective 
policy on prosecutions. Although the Revenue are a law enforcement 
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agency, their principal purpose is to collect taxes. Accordingly, historically, 
they have only been interested in invoking the criminal law where they 
consider that they will be successful and the case will generate publicity 
which will serve as a warning to other taxpayers or professional advisers. 
Should this attitude change, and should the Revenue seek to act as a law 
enforcement agency on the lines adopted so successfully many years ago 
by the US Internal Revenue Service, then many more taxpayers and their 
professional advisers may find that they are at risk.  
 
Moreover, the terms ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ have been created 
by the legal and accountancy professions as convenient generic terms to 
distinguish what is legal from what is illegal, and the fact that they have also 
been adopted by the courts should not blind us to what they actually are.”116 
 
 
In other words, the supposed doctrine that “tax avoidance is legal”, which is universally 
accepted as gospel truth in domestic and international taxation, rests for its support 
upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the fact that in all jurisdictions “it is entirely 
within the discretion of the tax authorities whether they take the procedural course of 
bringing a criminal tax-fraud case or imposing only civil tax-fraud penalties or simply 
establishing tax liability without fines or penalties, applying doctrines such as substance 
over form”117, the Ramsay principle in English law, the sham transaction doctrine in 
American law and the abuse doctrine in European Union law. In the words of Lord 
Tomlin in Duke of Westminster v CIR that is often used ironically to justify it:  
 
“The sooner this misunderstanding is dispelled, and the supposed doctrine 
given its quietus, the better it will be for all concerned, for the doctrine 
seems to involve substituting ‘the incertain and crooked cord of discretion’ 
for ‘the golden and streight metwand of the law.’”118 
 
VII. THE MEANING OF TAX MITIGATION IN LAW  
 
Tax mitigation is making a true and honest return by a taxpayer without using a 
tax scheme. 
 
Tax mitigation is distinguished from tax avoidance by the absence of a tax scheme and 
thus dishonesty. In the words of Lord Templeman in Matrix-Securities:  
 
“Every tax avoidance scheme involves a trick and a pretence.”119 
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In CIR v Challenge, where Lord Templeman invented the concept of ‘tax mitigation’ 
while delivering the advice of the majority, he distinguished it from tax avoidance on 
the basis that it does not involve a scheme or arrangement or dishonesty: 
 
“The material distinction in the present case is between tax mitigation and 
tax avoidance. A taxpayer has always been free to mitigate his liability to 
tax. In the oft quoted words of Lord Tomlin in IRC v Duke of Westminster 
‘Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax 
attaching under the appropriate Act is less than it otherwise would be’120. 
In that case however the distinction between tax mitigation and tax 
avoidance was neither considered nor implied. 
 
Income tax is mitigated by a taxpayer who reduces his income or 
incurs expenditure in circumstances which reduce his assessable 
income or entitle him to reduction in his tax liability. [In] tax mitigation 
... the taxpayer’s tax advantage is not derived from an ‘arrangement’ but 
from the reduction of income which he accepts or the expenditure which he 
incurs. 
 
Thus when a taxpayer executes a covenant and makes a payment under 
the covenant he reduces his income. If the covenant exceeds six years and 
satisfies certain other conditions the reduction in income reduces the 
assessable income of the taxpayer. The tax advantage results from the 
payment under the covenant. 
 
When a taxpayer makes a settlement, he deprives himself of the capital 
which is a source of income and thereby reduces his income. If the 
settlement is irrevocable and satisfies certain other conditions the reduction 
in income reduces the assessable income of the taxpayer. The tax 
advantage results from the reduction of income. 
 
Where a taxpayer pays a premium on a qualifying insurance policy, he 
incurs expenditure. The tax statute entitled the taxpayer to reduction of tax 
liability. The tax advantage results from the expenditure on the premium. 
 
A taxpayer may incur expense on export business or incur capital or other 
expenditure which by statute entitles the taxpayer to a reduction of his tax 
liability. The tax advantages result from the expenditure for which 
Parliament grants specific tax relief. ...  
 
Income tax is avoided and a tax advantage is derived from an arrangement 
when the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax without involving him in the 
loss or expenditure which entitles him to that reduction. The taxpayer 
engaged in tax avoidance does not reduce his income or suffer a loss 
or incur expenditure but nevertheless obtains a reduction in his 
liability to tax as if he had.”121 
 
Applying the test of “how an honest person would behave” advanced by Lord Nicholls 
in Brunei, an honest person involved in tax mitigation “reduces his income or incurs 
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expenditure in circumstances which reduce his assessable income or entitle him 
to reduction in his tax liability” but a dishonest person involved in tax avoidance 
“does not reduce his income or suffer a loss or incur expenditure but 
nevertheless obtains a reduction in his liability to tax as if he had.” In the words 
of Lord Templeman in CIR v Challenge: 
 
“In an arrangement of tax avoidance the financial position of the taxpayer 
is unaffected (save for the costs of devising and implementing the 
arrangement) and by the arrangement the taxpayer seeks to obtain a tax 
advantage without suffering that reduction in income, loss or expenditure 
which other taxpayers suffer and which Parliament intended to be suffered 
by any taxpayer qualifying for a reduction in his liability to tax.”122 
 
The red herrings that are usually introduced into the debate, such as ISAs, 
premium bonds and pension contributions, are cases of tax mitigation 
distinguishable by the fact that there is no scheme or trick or pretence because 
“the taxpayer seeks to obtain a tax advantage [after] suffering that reduction in 
income, loss or expenditure which other taxpayers suffer and which Parliament 
intended to be suffered by any taxpayer qualifying for a reduction in his liability 
to tax.” In the words of Lord Templeman in Ensign Tankers: 
 
“There is nothing magical about tax mitigation whereby a taxpayer suffers 
a loss or incurs expenditure in fact as well as in appearance.”123  
 
 
The absence of case of law on ISAs and premium bonds is testament to the fact that 
the Revenue will not object to a tax advantage based on “tax mitigation whereby a 
taxpayer suffers a loss or incurs expenditure in fact as well as in appearance.”  
 
VIII. THE PREVAILING DEFINITIONS OF TAX EVASION, TAX AVOIDANCE AND 
TAX MITIGATION 
 
VIII.I The Tax Dogma 
 
As the analysis of the existing literature above shows, the pre-existing definitions are 
based on the dogma that ‘tax avoidance is legal’ because of the failure to recognise 
that the prevailing constructional approach to tax avoidance does not judge the conduct 
of the professional enablers and the participating taxpayers as a matter of law.   
                                                 
122 Ibid, p.555.  




VIII.II Lord Templeman’s Definitions   
 
The last definitive contribution by Lord Templeman, who invented the evasion-
avoidance-mitigation trichotomy, was in his 2001 article for the Law Quarterly Review 
entitled ‘Tax and the Taxpayer’124. As the title shows, Lord Templeman restated the tax 
dogma by focusing on the taxpayer and failing to judge the conduct of the professional 
enablers of tax avoidance. 
 
Subject to that flaw, his definitions of the “three methods by which an individual 
taxpayer may seek to reduce his burden of tax”125 support the definitions proposed in 
this thesis.  
 
Tax evasion is cheating the public revenue by a taxpayer who deliberately fails 
to make a return of the relevant tax liability or who deliberately makes a false 
return of the relevant tax liability without using a tax scheme. According to Lord 
Templeman:  
 
“The first method is tax evasion and is a criminal offence. The taxpayer 
conceals or fraudulently misrepresents to the Revenue the incidence 
and ambit of his tax affairs.”126 
 
 
The taxpayer who “conceals … the incidence and ambit of his tax affairs” cheats by 
deliberately failing to make a return of the relevant tax liability as in Mavji while the 
taxpayer who “fraudulently misrepresents to the Revenue the incidence and ambit of 
his tax affairs” cheats by deliberately making a false return of the relevant tax liability 
without using a tax scheme as in Hudson. 
 
Tax avoidance is cheating the public revenue by the professional advisers that 
devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate the use of tax avoidance 
schemes in which the taxpayer using a specific scheme may or may not be 
complicit. According to Lord Templeman: 
 
“The second method is tax avoidance, which does not involve unlawful 
conduct. The taxpayer’s advisers invent a scheme whereby he can 
hope to enjoy the benefit of a taxable event without becoming liable 
                                                 
124 ‘Tax and the Taxpayer’ [2001] L.Q.R. 575.  
125 Ibid.   
126 ibid. Emphasis supplied.  
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to pay the tax. A tax avoidance scheme includes one or more interlinked 
steps which have no commercial purpose except for the avoidance of tax 
otherwise payable, and can conveniently be described as artificial steps.”127 
 
 
The scheme (and thus the involvement of the professional enablers) distinguish the 
conducts of the taxpayer involved in tax evasion and the taxpayer involved in tax 
avoidance. By merging Lord Templeman’s definitions of tax avoidance and tax evasion, 
in tax avoidance:  
 
“The taxpayer’s advisers invent a scheme whereby he can hope to enjoy 
the benefit of a taxable event without becoming liable to pay the tax.”  
 
“The taxpayer conceals or ... misrepresents to the Revenue the incidence 
and ambit of his tax affairs.”   
 
 
In tax avoidance, whether “[t]he taxpayer conceals or ... misrepresents to the Revenue 
the incidence and ambit of his tax affairs” fraudulently or negligently or honestly 
depends on his knowledge, abilities and circumstances. The effect of the principle that 
“if a taxpayer reasonably relies on a reputable accountant for advice in relation to the 
content of his tax return then he will not be liable” for fraud or negligence only because 
the advice proves to be wrong is that the conduct of the taxpayer is likely to be honest 
rather than negligent or fraudulent.  
 
Lord Templeman based the tax dogma (“tax evasion ... is a criminal offence” and “tax 
avoidance ... does not involve unlawful conduct”) upon a misconception of the 
procedural difference between criminal and civil law:  
 
“The tax evader commits a criminal offence punishable with prison, 
penalties and fines. The tax avoider commits no offence and only risks 
failure to avoid the tax.”128  
 
 
“The tax evader commits a criminal offence punishable with prison, penalties and fines” 
because in criminal proceedings, which the Revenue usually brings in cases that are 
not resolved by contract settlement, the criminal law “acts upon the offender, and inflicts 
a penalty.” “The tax avoider commits no offence and only risks failure to avoid the tax” 
because in civil proceedings, which the Revenue usually brings in cases that are not 
resolved by contract settlement, the civil law “acts upon the offence, by setting aside 
the fraudulent transaction.” The unprecedented prosecution and incarceration of the 
                                                 
127 Ibid. Emphases supplied. 
128 Ibid. 587.  
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professional enablers in Charlton prove that tax avoidance “is a criminal offence” which 
is simply “an act that is capable of being followed by criminal proceedings”129 or an “act 
prohibited with penal consequences.”130  
 
Lord Templeman’s proposition that “tax avoidance ... does not involve unlawful 
conduct” because “[t]he tax avoider commits no offence and only risks failure to avoid 
the tax” in civil proceedings is a non sequitur. Tax avoidance is still unlawful in civil law 
which “acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction”. As he, 
himself, stated: 
 
“No one has ever advanced a convincing reason for allowing tax avoidance 
schemes based on artificial steps to distort the operation of taxing statutes 
and frustrate the intentions of Parliament.”131 
 
The true question, therefore, is whether the Revenue and the courts should continue 
to turn a blind eye to the conduct of the professional advisers that devise, market, 
implement and otherwise facilitate the use of tax avoidance schemes or artificial steps 
included in otherwise clearly taxable transactions. In the words of Lord Templeman:  
 
“On the one hand a taxpayer is free to organise his affairs so as to pay the 
least tax. On the other hand tax avoidance schemes which involves artificial 
steps are unfair to the public purse and may involve millions of pounds of 
lost revenue; specific legislation passed to outlaw a type of avoidance 
scheme is not retrospective and complicates a law which is already 
complicated. ... Tax avoidance schemes are also unfair to wage and salary 
earners and the generality of taxpayers because such schemes require the 
inventive genius of expensive lawyers and accountants studying the fine 
print of tax legislation to find loopholes and juggling with subsidiary 
companies and captive shareholdings. Tax should depend on facts and 
consequences and not on language or documents designed to enable a 
taxpayer to claim a tax advantage without paying the price.”132 
 
 
The fact that “such schemes require the inventive genius of expensive lawyers 
and accountants” makes the question of a well-informed taxpayer devising his 
own scheme without professional advice academic. A taxpayer well-informed 
enough to devise a tax avoidance scheme without “the inventive genius of 
expensive lawyers and accountants” and other professional enablers is more 
appropriately described as a self-advising professional than a taxpayer, not least 
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because he clearly has the ability to devise schemes for other people. The 
absence of case of law on a well-informed taxpayer devising his own scheme 
without professional advice shows that the issue is indeed academic.  
 
Tax mitigation is making a true and honest return by a taxpayer without using a 
tax scheme. According to Lord Templeman: 
 
“The third method is tax mitigation whereby a taxpayer incurs expenditure 
which reduces his taxable income or his taxable assets or whereby a 
taxpayer incurs expenditure which Parliament wishes to encourage or 
reward by a tax allowance or deduction. Tax mitigation may take a 
variety of forms but is distinguishable from tax avoidance; tax mitigation 
does not include any artificial step though the motive which inspires a 
taxpayer may be mainly or wholly the desire to reduce tax. A taxpayer may 
consider that premium bonds are a bad investment or that an ISA has a 
poor chance of increasing in value or that his children do not deserve his 
bounty. Nevertheless if he makes an investment or divests himself of 
property and otherwise fulfils the requirement of the legislation, then even 
though he may do so to reduce his tax, his motive is irrelevant.”133 
 
 
A scheme is not required in tax mitigation where “a taxpayer incurs expenditure which 
reduces his taxable income or his taxable assets or ... incurs expenditure which 
Parliament wishes to encourage or reward by a tax allowance or deduction” because 
in the words of Lord Templeman: 
 
“The object of a tax avoidance scheme is to enable the taxpayer to enjoy a 
taxable event without paying the tax.”134 
 
 
VIII.III. UK Government’s Definitions  
 
On March 19, 2015 the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury presented to Parliament a joint HMRC and HM Treasury strategy entitled 
“Tackling Tax Evasion and Avoidance”, which “sets out the government’s plans to find 
and punish more evaders, deter more avoiders and reassure the vast majority of 
taxpayers who already pay what they owe.”135 It provides these underlying definitions:  
 
“Clarifying tax terminology  
 
Tax evasion is always illegal. It is when people or businesses deliberately 
do not declare and account for the taxes that they owe. It includes the 
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hidden economy, where people conceal their presence or taxable sources 
of income.   
 
Tax avoidance involves bending the rules of the tax system to gain a tax 
advantage that Parliament never intended. It often involves contrived, 
artificial transactions that serve little or no purpose other than to produce 
this advantage. It involves operating within the letter – but not the spirit – of 
the law. Most tax avoidance schemes simply do not work, and those who 
engage in it can find they pay more than the tax they attempted to save 
once HMRC has successfully challenged them.  
 
Tax planning involves using tax reliefs for the purpose for which they were 
intended, for example, claiming tax relief on capital investment, or saving 
via ISAs or for retirement by making contributions to a pension scheme.”136 
 
 
Tax evasion is cheating the public revenue when taxpayers or “people or businesses 
deliberately do not declare and account for the taxes that they owe” by deliberately 
failing to make a return or by deliberately making a false return without using a tax 
scheme.  
 
Tax avoidance is cheating the public revenue by professional enablers “bending the 
rules of the tax system to gain a tax advantage that Parliament never intended” by 
devising, marketing, implementing and otherwise facilitating the use of a tax avoidance 
scheme or “contrived, artificial transactions that serve little or no purpose other than to 
produce this advantage” in which the taxpayer using the scheme to gain this advantage 
may or may not be complicit. Under the constructional approach some “tax avoidance 
schemes simply do not work, and those who engage in it can find they pay more than 
the tax they attempted to save once HMRC has successfully challenged them.” 
 
Tax planning or tax mitigation is making a true and honest return by a taxpayer without 
using a tax scheme and “involves using tax reliefs for the purpose for which they were 
intended.” 
 
By failing to judge the conduct of the enablers of tax avoidance, therefore, “the 
government’s plans to ... deter more avoiders and reassure the vast majority of 
taxpayers who already pay what they owe” effectively preserve the licence to cheat 
enjoyed by the tax avoidance industry.  
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VIII.IV. HMRC’s Definitions     
 
Every loss to the public revenue must fall within the fraud-negligence-honesty 
trichotomy, depending on the knowledge, abilities and circumstances of the taxpayer 
and any professional adviser involved.  
 
Because of the fallacy that “tax avoidance is legal” and the failure to consider cheating 
by the professional enablers of tax avoidance, the focus is invariably on tax evasion or 
cheating by a taxpayer who deliberately fails to make a return or deliberately makes a 
false return without using a tax scheme. The 1920 Royal Commission on Income Tax 
considered the matter and concluded:  
 
“The amount that the Revenue loses by these means cannot be definitely 
known ... but the evidence as a whole fully convinced us that there is a 
serious loss of revenue caused by fraud, negligence, and ignorance, and 
that there is a considerable minority of taxpayers who ... deliberately seek 
to cheat their fellows by understating their liability to assessment.”137 
 
 
The Committee on the Enforcement Powers of the Revenue Departments (the Keith 
Committee) similarly stated:  
 
“While the majority of taxpayers meet their obligations with fairly good 
grace, some do not. Enforcement powers are therefore necessary not only 




By contrast, in order to boost its performance in Tackling Tax Evasion and Avoidance 
(which as explained above is “the government’s plans to find and punish more evaders, 
deter more avoiders and reassure the vast majority of taxpayers who already pay what 
they owe”139) HMRC attributes the Tax Gap (which it defines as “the difference between 
the amount of tax that should, in theory, be paid to HMRC, and what is actually paid”140) 
to eight “taxpayer behaviours”141 by dividing tax evasion and tax avoidance into new 
legal nonsenses thus: 
 
“The tax gap can be described as the tax that is lost through a range of 
behaviours – non-payment, use of avoidance schemes, legal 
interpretation of the tax effects of complex transactions, error, failure to 
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64 
 
take reasonable care, evasion, the hidden economy and criminal 
attacks on the tax system.”142 
 
 
Error and failure to take reasonable care correspond to honest mistake and negligence 
respectively. Non-payment can be honest or negligent or fraudulent.  
 
Like evasion and avoidance, however, legal interpretation, hidden economy and 
criminal attacks are legal nonsenses substituted for cheating the public revenue or tax 
fraud. In particular, legal interpretation is a new term for what is traditionally understood 
as tax avoidance. 
 
HMRC’s “Descriptions”143 and “estimate of taxpayer behaviours attributed to the tax 
gap for 2016-17”144 support the above propositions:  
 
“Criminal attacks [£5.4bn or 16%] 
 
Organised criminal gangs undertake co-ordinated and systematic attacks 
on the tax system. This includes smuggling goods such as alcohol or 
tobacco, VAT repayment fraud and VAT Missing Trader Intra-Community 
(MTIC) fraud.  
 
Evasion [£5.3bn or 16%] 
 
Tax evasion is an illegal activity, where registered individuals or businesses 
deliberately omit, conceal or misrepresent information in order to reduce 
their tax liabilities. 
 
Hidden economy [£3.2bn or 10%] 
 
Undeclared economic activity that involves what we call ‘ghosts’ — whose 
entire income is unknown to HMRC, and ‘moonlighters’ — who are known 
to us in relation to part of their income, but have other sources of income 
that HMRC does not know about.  
 
There is a difference between the hidden economy and tax evasion: 
• Hidden economy — where an entire source of income is not declared. 
• Tax evasion — where a declared source of income is deliberately 
understated. 
 
Avoidance [£1.7bn or 5%] 
 
Avoidance is exploiting the tax rules to gain a tax advantage that Parliament 
never intended. It often involves contrived, artificial transactions that serve 
little or no commercial purpose other than to produce a tax advantage. It 
involves operating within the letter but not the spirit of the law. ...  
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Tax avoidance is not the same as tax planning. Tax planning involves using 
tax reliefs for the purpose for which they were intended. For example, 
claiming tax relief on capital investment, saving in a tax-exempt ISA or 
saving for retirement by making contributions to a pension scheme are all 
forms of tax planning. 
 
Legal interpretation [£5.3bn or 16%] 
 
Legal interpretation losses arise where the customer’s and HMRC’s 
interpretation of the law and how it applies to the facts in a particular case, 
result in a different tax outcome. Examples include the correct 
categorisation of an asset for allowances, the allocation of profits within a 
group of companies, or VAT liability of a particular supply. 
 
Non-payment [£3.4bn or 10%] 
 
For direct taxes, non-payment refers to tax debts that are written off by 
HMRC and result in a permanent loss of tax — mainly as a result of 
insolvency. It does not include debts that are eventually paid. 
 
VAT non-payment differs as it is based on the difference between new 
debts arising and debt payments. 
 
Failure to take reasonable care [£5.9bn or 18%] 
 
Failure to take reasonable care results from a customer's carelessness 
and/or negligence in adequately recording their transactions and/or in 
preparing their tax returns. Judgements of ‘reasonable care’ should 
consider and reflect a customer’s knowledge, abilities and circumstances. 
 
Error [£3.2bn or 10%] 
 
Errors result from mistakes made in preparing tax calculations, completing 
returns or in supplying other relevant information, despite the customer 
taking reasonable care.”145 
 
 
“Tax planning involves using tax reliefs for the purpose for which they were intended” 
and thus corresponds to tax mitigation or making a true and honest return by a taxpayer 
without using a tax scheme. 
 
“Hidden economy — where an entire source of income is not declared” is cheating by 
a taxpayer who deliberately fails to make a return of the relevant tax liability, as in Mavji. 
“Tax evasion — where a declared source of income is deliberately understated” is 
cheating by a taxpayer who deliberately makes a false return of the relevant tax liability 
without using a tax scheme, as in Hudson. Both hidden economy and tax evasion, 
therefore, fall with the definition of tax evasion as cheating by a taxpayer who 
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deliberately fails to make a return or who makes a deliberately false return without using 
a scheme.   
 
Charlton shows that tax avoidance or cheating by the professional advisers that devise, 
market, implement and otherwise facilitate the use of tax avoidance schemes in which 
the taxpayer using a specific scheme may or may not be complicit encompasses 
avoidance (“exploiting the tax rules to gain a tax advantage that Parliament never 
intended”) and and legal interpretation (“where the customer’s and HMRC’s 
interpretation of the law and how it applies to the facts in a particular case, result in a 
different tax outcome”). Every tax avoidance dispute is a case “where the customer’s 
and HMRC’s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the facts in a particular case, 
result in a different tax outcome.” 
 
As expounded in chapters one and six, marketed tax avoidance masterminded by the 
tax avoidance industry and offshore tax evasion masterminded by the private banking 
industry constitute criminal attacks or “co-ordinated and systematic attacks on the tax 
system”.  
 
An analysis of the “estimate of taxpayer behaviours attributed to the tax gap for 2016-
17” shows how the introduction of new legal nonsenses enables HMRC to deflect the 
criticism that “HMRC is too passive in its approach to closing the tax gap”146 by masking 
its poor performance in Tackling Tax Evasion and Avoidance, particularly tax 
avoidance for which it comes under the greatest criticism.  
 
The division of tax evasion into evasion (£5.3bn) and hidden economy (£3.2bn) 
reduces the loss from tax evasion by £3.2bn.  
 
Criminal attacks (£5.4bn) reduces the losses from tax evasion and tax avoidance by 
£5.4bn. 
 
The division of tax avoidance into avoidance (£1.7bn) and legal interpretation (£5.3bn) 
reduces the loss from tax avoidance by £5.3bn. In other words, it is not the tax gap 
caused by legal interpretation that is a legal nonsense, but the term legal 
interpretation. The tax gap caused by legal interpretation (£5.3bn) is part of the 
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tax gap caused by tax avoidance, but by substituting ‘legal interpretation’ HMRC 
reduces the recorded tax gap for tax avoidance by £5.3bn.  
 
Most significantly, HMRC underestimates the loss from tax avoidance and thus the tax 
gap by the billions of pounds diverted from the public revenue by multinational 
corporations and avoids the criticism that “HMRC has not been sufficiently challenging 
of multinationals’ manifestly artificial tax structures”147 by claiming that:  
 
“Avoidance ... does not include international tax arrangements like base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), which will be tackled multilaterally 
through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). The OECD defines BEPS as ‘tax planning strategies that exploit 
gaps and mismatches in tax rules to make profits disappear for tax 
purposes or to shift profits to locations where there is little or no real activity 




In fact, the opening paragraph of the Inland Revenue’s Statement of Evidence in 
Charlton corresponds to the OECD’s definition of BEPS cited by HMRC:  
 
“The prosecution case is that each of the defendants participated in one or 
more of a series of similar schemes to cheat the public revenue. The 
purpose and effect of each scheme was the same. The apparent taxable 
profits of a United Kingdom business would be reduced below their true 
level. An untaxed fund would accumulate in an offshore company for the 
use of the directors/proprietors of the United Kingdom business.”150 
 
 
The enormity of the amount of loss from corporate tax avoidance excluded and the 
absurdity of the £1.7bn figure for tax avoidance are underscored by the statement by 
HMRC’s then Permanent Secretary for Tax in 2011 that:  
 
“In 2006 HMRC adopted a new approach to reaching tax settlements with 
large business. ... Settlements of above £1bn are now not uncommon, and 
£4.5bn has come from just four settlements with bespoke governance.”151 
 
 
In administering the tax credits system, HMRC does not make any distinction between 
fraud and criminal attacks, evasion, avoidance and legal interpretation.  
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Similarly, cheating the public revenue includes cheating the Department of Works and 
Pensions, as demonstrated above, but benefits cheats are not divided into evaders and 
avoiders, and neither the authorities nor the public make room for legal interpretation. 
After all, a typical dispute between a customer and the DWP arises “where the 
customer’s and [the DWP’s] interpretation of the law and how it applies to the facts in 
a particular case, result in a different tax outcome.” 
 
IX. THE ANTIDOTE TO TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
IX.I The Cheating or Fraud Approach to Tax Avoidance  
 
The fundamental contribution of this thesis is that judging tax avoidance 
schemes on the basis of the legal question whether the professional enablers 
and the participating taxpayers cheated or defrauded the public revenue as a 
matter of law (hereafter referred to as “the cheating or fraud approach”) is the 
antidote to tax avoidance, tax complexity and tax uncertainty and the recipe for 
tax justice and tax simplicity in all jurisdictions.    
 
According to Farquharson LJ’s seminal statement of the overriding legal and moral duty 
of honesty imposed by the pre-existing common law of cheating in Charlton:  
 
“It is a feature, no doubt, of the tax or Revenue law of any country that it 
must, to a large extent, in its tax-gathering activities, rely on the truthfulness 
of the taxpayer in indicating the extent of his income or whatever other 
matter is relevant to the particular statute being considered. It follows also 
that the Revenue not only have to rely on the taxpayer’s good faith, but 




The determination of tax avoidance litigation on the basis of the same legal question 
whether the participating taxpayer, but more especially the professional enablers, 
cheated or defrauded the public revenue as a matter of law is, therefore, a requirement 
of “the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law”153 and tax justice. In the words 
of “Watchful”:  
 
“This is not quite the paradox it seems if we remember that the Tax Acts 
are but a part of the general law of the land. Just as, on the one hand, 
nobody can be taxed otherwise than in accordance with the law, so it can 
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IX.II The Recipe for Tax Avoidance, Tax Complexity, and Tax Uncertainty  
 
The full version of Lord Diplock’s theory of retrospective judicial legislation shows 
clearly that the constructional approach is the recipe for the judge-induced vicious cycle 
of tax avoidance, tax complexity and tax uncertainty: 
 
“Whenever the Court decides that kind of dispute it legislates about 
taxation. It makes a law taxing all gains of the same kind or all documents 
of the same kind. Do not let us deceive ourselves with the legal fiction that 
the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant. 
Anyone who has decided tax appeals knows that most of them concern 
transactions which Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the Act 
had not anticipated, about which they had never thought at all. Some of the 
transactions are of a kind which had never taken place before the Act was 
passed: they were devised as a result of it. ... 
 
This should be borne in mind when one complains of the complexity of 
taxing statutes. They should be drafted so as to leave no room for dispute 
as to the application to particular transactions. The history of tax legislation 
is thus the history of an attempt to deal specifically with the liability to tax of 
every kind of financial transaction which people enter into. And it is a history 
of failure. ... [I]n the face of human ingenuity in devising new variants of 




Tax complexity (or “the history of an attempt to deal specifically with the liability 
to tax of every kind of financial transaction which people enter into”) results from 
the fact that anti-avoidance legislation that is not retrospective does not affect existing 
tax avoidance schemes (“transactions which Members of Parliament and the 
draftsman of the Act had not anticipated, about which they had never thought at 
all”) but creates loopholes for new schemes (“transactions ... of a kind which had 
never taken place before the Act was passed ... devised as a result of it”). In the 
words of the NAO: 
 
“Introducing narrowly targeted changes to legislation that stop particular 
schemes is not always effective and has disadvantages, such as increasing 
the length and complexity of tax law. They can also open new opportunities 
for avoidance.” 156 
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In Plummer157, Viscount Dilhorne described Rossminster’s Capital Income Plan 
masterminded by Roy Tucker as “an ingenious, complicated and well thought out 
scheme ... to avoid the payment of tax by those who participated and to raid the 
Treasury using the technicalities of revenue law as the necessary weapon.”158 
According to an associate:  
 
“Roy could take a piece of legislation and come up with a tax-avoidance 
idea in ten minutes”.159  
 
The House of Lords held that the scheme “worked” by a majority (Viscount Dilhorne 
and Lord Diplock dissenting). Lord Wilberforce concluded:  
 
“One final point: the familiar argument was used that Parliament can never 
have intended to exempt from the taxing provisions an arrangement solely 
designed to obtain fiscal advantages. But this is not the question, nor is a 
canon of interpretation of this kind admissible - or indeed a workable canon. 
The question is whether a certain series of transactions in a certain legal 
form do or do not fall within the taxing words. If they do not, and if 
Parliament dislikes the consequence, it can change the law - as in fact it 
has done since the scheme in question was operated. The subject is 
entitled to be judged under the law as it stood at the relevant time.”160 
 
 
“The subject is entitled to be judged under the law as it stood at the relevant time” but 
the law includes both the tax Act which the tax avoidance scheme was devised to cheat 
and the pre-existing common law that prohibits the cheating.  
 
In an interview published by the Financial Times on 9 October 1979 (following the 
hearing of Plummer by the House of Lords in June but before the delivery of the 
judgment in November 1979) Tucker demonstrated how the notion that “if Parliament 
dislikes the consequence, it can change the law” sends Parliament and the Revenue 
on a fool’s errand in the context of “transactions ... of a kind which had never taken 
place before the Act was passed ... devised as a result of it”:  
 
“After working out the avoidance objective the Revenue was trying to ban, 
you start thinking of other ways of reaching the same result.”161 
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Writing in 2012, Roy Lyness (who masterminded the ‘K2’ scheme used by the 
comedian Jimmy Carr and others) provided this up-to-date analogy:  
 
“It’s a game of cat and mouse. The Revenue closes one scheme, we find 
another way round it. It’s like a sat-nav. I’m driving to Manchester, get a 
message saying there’s a smash at Stoke, press this button to re-route. 
That’s all we do with tax avoidance. The Revenue puts a block in, we just 
go round the block.”162 
 
 
Tax uncertainty or retrospective judicial legislation (“[w]henever the Court 
decides that kind of dispute it legislates about taxation”) results from the 
application of “the legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to 
what Parliament meant” to “transactions which Members of Parliament and the 
draftsman of the Act had not anticipated, about which they had never thought at all” 
and “transactions ... of a kind which had never taken place before the Act was passed 
... devised as a result of it.” According to Lord Diplock:  
 
“In 1891 Parliament passed the Stamp Act providing for the imposition of 
ad valorem stamp duty upon various classes of documents. Written 
agreements for the sale of simple contract debts owed by debtors outside 
the United Kingdom made between 1901 and 1931 were liable to ad 
valorem stamp duty. That was because in a case decided in 1901 the Court 
of Appeal interpreted the relevant words of the Stamp Act 1891 in one way. 
Its judgment stood until 1931 when it was overruled by the House of Lords, 
who interpreted the same words in the opposite sense. The effect was the 
same as if a section had been inserted in the Finance Act 1901 imposing 
ad valorem stamp duty on this kind of document, and a section inserted in 
the Finance Act 1931 repealing it. ...  
 
I do not suggest that the Courts provide a suitable source of legislation in 
this field. Not only for the conventional reason that taxation is the 
responsibility of an elected legislature but also for the reason that a taxing 
statute in particular should not be retrospective. People should be able to 
arrange their affairs with knowledge of what their resulting liability to tax will 
be. But because the Courts in legal theory are merely expounding the 
meaning of words used by Parliament when the tax Act was passed, even 
though the exposition as in the example I have given comes forty years 
later, the only law the court can make is retrospective law.”163  
 
 
The constructional approach has resulted in landmark volte-face by the highest court 
in the land. In FA & AB Ltd v Lupton164 the House of Lords effectively overruled its 
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decision on similar facts ten years earlier in Griffiths v J P Harrison.165 According to 
Monroe’s graphic account:  
 
“In February and March 1962 the case of Harrison v Griffiths came before 
the House of Lords. The taxpayer company purchased shares pregnant 
with dividend. It extracted or ‘stripped’ the dividend. It sold the shares at a 
loss. It claimed relief for this ‘trading’ loss against the tax notionally 
deducted from the dividend. If the purchase of the shares, the stripping of 
the dividend and the sale of the shares constituted either a transaction 
carried out in the course of a share dealing trade or of itself was an 
adventure in the nature of trade, the claim for loss relief must succeed. It 
was the task of the Special Commissioners before whom the appeal came 
to decide the facts. They did. They found that the taxpayer company’s 
transaction in the shares (the purchase and sale and the intermediate 
stripping of the dividend) was not entered into as part of any trade of dealing 
in shares and was not an adventure in the nature of trade. ... A minority of 
the judges before whom the subsequent three appeals came took that view; 
but a majority, including the critical majority of three to two in the House of 
Lords, took the view that the true and only reasonable conclusion 
contradicted the determination of the Special Commissioners. The shares 
were purchased to be sold. That was a trade. That was that.  
 
Nine years later the case of FA & AB came to the House of Lords. In the 
intervening years Parliament had been busy blocking loopholes as new and 
ever more dazzling tricks were displayed on the high wire of dividend 
stripping. The statutory provisions, however, made no difference to the FA 
& AB case. On somewhat similar facts to the Harrison case the House of 
Lords decided the case the other way. Two of the five Law Lords 
distinguished the facts from the facts in the earlier case; two thought the 
earlier decision wrong; one reassessed the earlier decision. All five 
considered the relevant transaction not to be share-dealing within the trade 
of dealing in shares. ... The Special Commissioners were, of course, wrong 
once again. They had followed in the second case the decision of the 
House of Lords in the first case.”166 
 
 
In 1980 in Vestey v IRC167 the House of Lords suspended its pretension to infallibility 
and explicitly overruled its 1948 decision in Congreve v IRC168, which had in the 
meantime been followed by the Court of Appeal in R v Bambridge169 and expressly 
approved by the 1955 Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income. 
 
To invent the Ramsay principle, Lords Wilberforce, Fraser, Russell, Roskill and Bridge 
effectively overruled the decision by Lords Wilberforce, Fraser, Keith and Dilhorne 
(Lord Diplock dissenting) in Plummer fifteen months earlier. As Lord Oliver put it:  
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“What is interesting about this case is how the House continued 
nevertheless to pay lip-service to the Westminster decision (described as 
embodying a ‘cardinal principle’) and slid quietly over the inconveniently 
inconsistent case of Plummer by distinguishing it on the somewhat 
specious ground that in that case the taxpayer had actually paid out some 
money (although he got it back immediately).”170 
 
 
In the more recent decision of the Supreme Court in Tower MCashback v HMRC Lord 
Walker sought to pre-empt justified criticisms of uncertainty thus:  
 
“If a majority of the court agrees with my conclusion, it is to be expected 
that commentators will complain that this court has abandoned the clarity 
of BMBF and returned to the uncertainty of Ensign. I would disagree. Both 
are decisions of the House of Lords and both are good law. The composite 
transactions in this case, like that in Ensign (and unlike that in BMBF) did 
not, on a realistic appraisal of the facts, meet the test laid down by the CAA, 
which requires real expenditure for the real purpose of acquiring plant for 
use in a trade. Any uncertainty that there may be will arise from the 
unremitting ingenuity of tax consultants and investment bankers 
determined to test the limits of the capital allowances legislation.”171 
 
 
IX.III The Antidote to Tax Avoidance, Tax Complexity, and Tax Uncertainty  
 
The pre-existing common law of cheating the public revenue, which corresponds 
to tax fraud in all jurisdictions, is the antidote to tax avoidance (“transactions ... 
of a kind which had never taken place before the Act was passed ... devised as a 
result of it”), tax complexity (“the history of an attempt to deal specifically with 
the liability to tax of every kind of financial transaction which people enter into”) 
and tax uncertainty (“[w]henever the Court decides that kind of dispute it 
legislates about taxation”).  
 
As demonstrated above, the development of the Ramsay principle under the defective 
tax appeal system was an inchoate judicial recognition of cheating as the antidote to 
tax avoidance. As Avery Jones put it in his exposition of “the judge induced disease of 
‘tax avoidance’”172: 
 
“[T]he turning-point in tax cases was caused by the realisation by the 
judges that the narrow semantic approach led inevitably to tax avoidance. 
The courts were faced with lots of cases about tax avoidance schemes, 
which they alone had caused. ... The only way out of hearing an eternal 
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diet of artificial tax avoidance cases was for the judiciary to invent a 
principle, a principle so strong that it could overrule a previous House of 
Lords decision on the same facts. Ramsay and then Furniss v Dawson, by 
applying an extraneous principle to the interpretation of tax legislation, 
came as something of a shock.”173 
 
 
As if to disguise the fraudulent nature of tax avoidance and protect the tax avoidance 
industry, however, their lordships denied that they were “applying an extraneous 
principle to the interpretation of tax legislation.” As Lord Hoffmann admitted after the 
decision in MacNiven v Westmoreland:  
 
“In choosing the constructional approach rather than the Furniss v Dawson 
formula, the House had to rewrite history in a way which struck some 
people as a little disingenuous. We said that the formula was not a 
freestanding principle but rather the effect of construing a taxing provision 
in a particular way.”174 
 
 
The development of the Ramsay principle was indeed a recognition of the pre-existing 
common law of cheating, which “acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent 
transaction”175 in civil proceedings, as what Lord Hoffmann described severally in 
MacNiven as “an overriding legal principle, superimposed upon the whole of revenue 
law without regard to the language or purpose of any particular provision”176, “some 
paramount provision subject to which everything else must be read”177 and thus “a 
broad spectrum antibiotic which killed off all tax avoidance schemes, whatever the tax 
and whatever the relevant statutory provisions.”178  
 
Contrary to his claim that “the courts have no constitutional authority to impose such 
an overlay upon the tax legislation and ... have not attempted to do so”179, that was 
precisely what the Barons of the Exchequer did in 1584 in Heydon’s Case180 when they 
developed the mischief rule, which “marks the first and indeed only attempt by the 
judges fully to rationalise that important part of their function which concerns statutory 
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interpretation”181 and which “embodies the necessary legal policy of any democratic 
state.”182 According to Simpson’s rebuttal of “that apologist denial”183:  
 
“The first indication that it is wrong comes from Lord Hoffmann’s parallel 
insistence that the Ramsay principle is a principle of construction. 
Principles of construction are judicial overlays onto the legislation, 
operating across the board rather than in the circumstances of particular 
statutory words; and they tend accordingly to have constitutional 
significance. ... It is only because the need for them often arises in the 
context of statutory interpretation that they have so readily been disguised 
as involving no more than the identification of the (implied) intention of 
Parliament. ... 
 
But the real question to be addressed here is whether the development of 
the Ramsay principle could be better understood precisely as a 
fundamental, judge-made ‘overlay’ upon the statutory rules, and whether it 
can be found to be acceptable as such. If it can, then it will be a seminal 
indication of the pre-existing, constitutional common law of taxation, and 
may hold the key for the improvement of our anti-avoidance techniques in 
general, and perhaps even for a better understanding of the constitutional 
niceties of our tax system as a whole.”184 
 
 
This thesis develops the inchoate Ramsay principle to remedy the defect in the tax 
appeal system by extending the pre-existing common law of cheating, which is “the 
pre-existing, constitutional common law of taxation” and which Lord Mansfield 
described in his seminal exposition in R v Bembridge as “so essential to the existence 
of the country and the constitution, that ... the constitution would not exist without it”185, 
to the professional advisers that devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate the 
use of tax avoidance schemes in order to unite the criminal and civil law and to give 
effect to the rule of law and tax justice.  
 
If by devising or marketing or implementing or otherwise facilitating the use of a tax 
avoidance scheme the professional enablers cheated the public revenue as a matter 
of law, the participating taxpayer cannot recover any tax advantage from it in law, and 
any appeal against the Revenue’s decision disallowing the tax advantage should be 
defeated by “the principle that the courts would not lend their assistance to the 
achievement of an unlawful purpose.”186   
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Where the participating taxpayer is complicit in the cheating, as well as advancing this 
defence, the Revenue should also plead that in consequence he cannot recover any 
tax advantage in law because of “the principle that nobody may benefit from his own 
civil or criminal wrong.”187  
 
Furthermore, the corollary of the cardinal principle that “fraud unravels all” (or, if one 
likes, “cheating changes everything”) is that a tax avoidance scheme, which amounts 
to cheating the public revenue or tax fraud under the pre-existing general law, is 
unravelled in toto and thus outside the scope of the terms of the tax Act it was devised 
to cheat or defraud ab initio. This means that no question of statutory construction 
should arise in any case of tax avoidance scheme. 
 
The constructional approach is the recipe for tax avoidance, tax complexity and tax 
uncertainty as demonstrated above because it subverts these principles.  
 
In his famous statement in Latilla, which involved the schemes devised to transfer 
assets abroad, Viscount Simon acknowledged that tax avoidance cheats the public 
revenue but maintained the fallacy that tax cheats “are within their legal rights” by 
relying on the constructional approach:   
 
“[O]f recent years much ingenuity has been expended in certain quarters in 
attempting to devise methods of disposition of income by which those who 
were prepared to adopt them might enjoy the benefits of residence in this 
country while receiving the equivalent of such income without sharing in the 
appropriate burden of British taxation. Judicial dicta may be cited which 
point out that, however elaborate and artificial such methods may be, those 
who adopt them are ‘entitled’ to do so. There is, of course, no doubt that 
they are within their legal rights, but that is no reason why their efforts, or 
those of the professional gentlemen who assist them in the matter, should 
be regarded as a commendable exercise of ingenuity or as a discharge of 
the duties of good citizenship. On the contrary, one result of such methods, 
if they succeed, is, of course, to increase pro tanto the load of tax on the 
shoulders of the great body of good citizens who do not desire, or do not 
know how, to adopt these manoeuvres. Another consequence is that the 
legislature has made amendments to our income tax code which aim at 
nullifying the effectiveness of such schemes. The question in the present 
appeal is whether s.18 of the Finance Act, 1936, has the result of 
checkmating the design of avoiding income tax and sur-tax which was the 
main purpose of certain highly artificial dispositions made in 1933.”188 
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“Judicial dicta ... cited which point out that, however elaborate and artificial such 
methods may be, those who adopt them are ‘entitled’ to do so”, invariably focus on the 
participating taxpayers. If the professional enablers that “devise methods ... by which 
those who were prepared to adopt them might enjoy the benefits of residence in this 
country ... without sharing in the appropriate burden of British taxation” cheat the public 
revenue in law and “increase pro tanto the load of tax on the shoulders of the great 
body of good citizens who do not desire, or do not know how, to adopt these 
manoeuvres” in fact, however, “the principle that the courts would not lend their 
assistance to the achievement of an unlawful purpose” means that “those who adopt 
them are [not] ‘entitled’ to do so” and “are [not] within their legal rights”. Where “those 
who adopt them” are complicit in the cheating “the principle that nobody may benefit 
from his own civil or criminal wrong” will apply in addition.  
 
There is, therefore, no need for the complexity resulting from “amendments to our 
income tax code which aim at nullifying the effectiveness of such schemes” and the 
uncertainty resulting from “[t]he question ... whether s. 18 of the Finance Act, 1936, has 
the result of checkmating the design of avoiding income tax and sur-tax”, which the 
House of Lords answered in the affirmative in 1943 in Latilla and in 1948 in Congreve 
v IRC189, but in the negative in 1980 in Vestey v IRC190 when they overruled Congreve 
which had been followed by the Court of Appeal in Bambridge v IRC191 and approved 
by the 1955 Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income.  
 
Despite its correct diagnosis, the 1955 Royal Commission followed the prevailing 
approach in its prognosis and thus fell into the same error:  
 
“Avoidance of tax is a problem that faces every tax system and is likely to 
continue to do so when rates are high and the burden of tax is seen to have 
a major influence upon the affairs of business and upon every aspect of 
social and personal life. Not all systems attempt to solve the problem in the 
same way, nor is there necessarily any large measure of agreement as to 
what is involved in the idea of tax avoidance. But until some certainty is 
reached upon this question of definition, the question as to what sort of 
steps should be taken to prevent or correct it remains an aimless one. We 
propose therefore to begin by discussing the meaning of tax avoidance in 
so far as the phrase is used to denote something which a tax system should 
be concerned to control. 
 
It is usual to draw a distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion. The 
latter denotes all those activities which are responsible for a person not 
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paying the tax that the existing law charges upon his income. Ex hypothesi 
he is in the wrong, though his wrong-doing may range from the making of 
a deliberately fraudulent return to a mere failure to make his return or to 
pay his tax at the proper time. By tax avoidance, on the other hand, is 
understood some act by which a person so arranges his affairs that he is 
liable to pay less tax than he would have paid but for the arrangement. Thus 
the situation which he brings about is one in which he is legally in the right, 
except so far as some special rule may be introduced that puts him in the 
wrong.  
 
The treatment of tax avoidance in the United Kingdom would present much 
less difficulty if it were possible to assert as a matter of general principle 
that a man owes a duty not to alter the disposition of his affairs so as to 
reduce his existing liability to tax or, alternatively, for the purpose or for the 
main purpose or partly for the purpose of bringing this result about. But 
there is no such principle, and we are satisfied that it neither could nor ought 
to be introduced.”192 
 
 
Tax evasion, which “denotes all those activities which are responsible for a person not 
paying the tax that the existing law charges upon his income ... from the making of a 
deliberately fraudulent return to a mere failure to make his return or to pay his tax at 
the proper time”, is cheating by a taxpayer who deliberately fails to make a return 
of the relevant tax liability or deliberately makes a false return of the relevant tax 
liability without using a tax scheme. 
 
Tax avoidance, which “denotes all those activities which are responsible for a person 
not paying the tax that the existing law charges upon his income” on the ground that a 
scheme devised, marketed, implemented and otherwise facilitated by the professional 
enablers has extinguished it, is cheating by the professional enablers that devise, 
market, implement and otherwise facilitate the use of tax avoidance schemes in 
which the taxpayer using a particular scheme may or may not be complicit. Ex 
hypothesi the professional enablers are in the wrong, and “the principle that the courts 
would not lend their assistance to the achievement of an unlawful purpose” means that 
the participating taxpayer cannot claim any advantage from the scheme. Where the 
participating taxpayer is complicit “the principle that nobody may benefit from his own 
civil or criminal wrong” applies in addition. There is, therefore, no need for the tax 
complexity and tax uncertainty resulting from the question whether “some special rule 
may be introduced that puts him in the wrong.”  
 
                                                 
192 Royal Commission, p.304.  
79 
 
“The treatment of tax avoidance in the United Kingdom [and in all jurisdictions] would 
present much less difficulty”, therefore, if tax avoidance schemes were judged by the 
civil courts and the Revenue authorities on the basis of the legal question whether the 
professional enablers and the participating taxpayers cheated or defrauded the public 
revenue as a matter of law. In the words of Walton J in Vestey:  
 
“I conceive it to be in the national interest, in the interest not only of all 
individual taxpayers, which includes most of the nation, but also in the 
interests of the Revenue authorities themselves, that the tax system should 
be fair. ... One should be taxed by law, and not be untaxed by concession. 
... A tax system which enshrines obvious injustices is brought into disrepute 
with all taxpayers accordingly, whereas one in which injustices, when 
discovered, are put right (and with retrospective effect when necessary) will 
command respect and support.”193 
 
IX.IV. The Recipe for Tax Justice   
 
Tax justice is referred frequently in cases but without definition. In Arsenal Football 
Club v Ende Lord Wilberforce stated that:  
 




Tax justice can be defined as the intersection or coincidence of law and morality in the 
overriding legal and moral duty of honesty imposed by the pre-existing common law of 
cheating.  
 
In his article ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Hart stated that leading 
Positivists, whose insistence on a clear distinction between law as it is and law as it 
ought to be is usually described as “the separation of law and morals”, recognised this 
concept:   
 
“They certainly accepted many of the things that might be called ‘the 
intersection of law and morals.’ First, they never denied that, as a matter of 
historical fact, the development of legal systems had been powerfully 
influenced by moral opinion, and, conversely, that moral standards had 
been profoundly influenced by law, so that the content of many legal rules 
mirrored moral rules or principles. ... Secondly, neither Bentham nor his 
followers denied that by explicit legal provisions moral principles might at 
different points be brought into a legal system and form part of its rules, or 
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that courts might be legally bound to decide in accordance with what they 
thought just or best.”195 
 
 
Farquharson LJ’s statement in Charlton shows that the enactment of a Tax Act by 
Parliament means that “by explicit legal provisions moral principles [“the truthfulness of 
the taxpayer ... but more especially ... the professional advisers they appoint to act for 
them”] are brought into a legal system and form part of its rules”. The rule of law and 
Parliamentary sovereignty, therefore, mean that the “courts are ... legally bound to 
decide in accordance with” the overriding duty of honesty imposed by the pre-existing 
common law of cheating.  
 
The false law-and-morality dichotomy and the false rule of law argument used to justify 
tax avoidance rest upon the failure to “remember that the Tax Acts are but a part of the 
general law of the land.”196 According to Freedman:   
 
“The attitude of the judges to the correct development of the case law does 
not, of course, address the question of whether there is a morality against 
which taxpayers and their advisers should not offend, regardless of what 
the legislation or case law states. Recent comments from the tax collection 
agencies in the UK and elsewhere, from politicians and the media all 
suggest that there is some kind of overriding moral duty to pay the ‘right’ or 
‘fair’ amount of tax and to exercise self-restraint which goes beyond 
complying with the law. ...  
 
A rather more sensible response to the morality card, however, is that 
taxpayers have a guiding principle that they need only pay what has been 
determined by Parliament through legislation and that, under the Duke of 
Westminster's case, they may arrange their affairs in such a way as to pay 
the lowest amount of tax possible, provided they are within the law. By 
definition, the law does not extend to a moral code not embodied in 
legislation or case law. This attitude is deeply embedded in our history and 
politics, and in our law. According to this account, calls on morality, where 
the law proves inadequate to achieve what government intends, are 
unreasonable, unfair and incomprehensible since taxpayers are entitled to 
be able to rely on the law as it is written.”197 
 
 
As Charlton demonstrates, “taxpayers are entitled to be able to rely on the law as it is 
written” but the law includes the pre-existing common law of cheating, which is “a moral 
code ... embodied in legislation [and] case law”, and which provides “a morality against 
which taxpayers and their advisers should not offend”. The “overriding moral duty to 
pay the ‘right’ or ‘fair’ amount of tax” does not, therefore, require taxpayers and 
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professional advisers “to exercise self-restraint which goes beyond complying with the 
law.”  
 
Indeed, Honoré, who Freedman relied on, used the legal and moral obligation to pay 
tax to illustrate his theory of ‘The Dependence of Morality on Law’:  
 
“According to most people’s moral outlook members of a community should 
make a contribution to the expense of meeting collective needs. A morality 
which denied this would hardly count as co-operative. In a monetary 
economy the contribution has to be mainly in money, and takes the form of 
paying taxes. So members of a community have in principle a moral 
obligation to pay taxes. But this obligation is incomplete or, if one prefers, 
inchoate, apart from law. It has no real content until the amount or rate of 
tax is fixed by an institutional decision, by law.”198 
 
 
The “amount or rate of tax” fixed by an Act of Parliament is safeguarded by the pre-
existing common law of cheating the public revenue, which imposes the overriding legal 
and moral duty of honesty on taxpayers and professional advisers. The proposed 
cheating or fraud approach unites the legal and moral duties to contribute to the public 
revenue honestly. In the words of the Law Commission:  
 
“Dishonesty necessitates a moral as well as a factual enquiry.”199 
 
IX.V. The Recipe for Tax Simplicity  
 
The overriding legal and moral duty of honesty also unites the law with common sense 
and fairness. In Bradbury and Edlin, where the taxpayer challenged his conviction for 
cheating, Bray J stated: 
 
“It is said that that is not an offence known to the law, that it is not within 
the common law of England. It certainly struck me, when the argument was 
made, that if it was not an offence it was quite time it was made an offence. 
But the common law of England is based on common sense, and it seems 
to me to be eminently in accord with common sense that when a person 
commits an offence of this kind, and makes a false statement with a view 
to prejudicing His Majesty’s revenue, it ought to be punishable.”200 
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By contrast, under the constructional approach to tax avoidance litigation in Mayes v 
HMRC, Proudman J, with whom the Court of Appeal agreed, upheld the “SHIPS 2” 
scheme, stating:  
 
“I sympathise with the instinctive reaction that such an obvious scheme 
ought not to succeed. However I cannot extract from the legislation any 
underlying or overriding purpose enabling me to conclude that parts of the 
scheme may be ignored. To do so would ... revert to an acceptance of the 
type of submission that was roundly rejected in MacNiven. I am bound by 
the ratio of the decision in MacNiven and in my judgment it points only one 
way on the facts of this case.”201 
 
 
The layman’s “instinctive reaction that such an obvious scheme ought not to succeed” 
is superior in law and fact to “the legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and 
giving effect to what Parliament meant” because it corresponds to the overriding 
common law duty of honesty imposed by cheating. In the words of the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee (CLRC):  
 




X. CHAPTERS OUTLINE      
 
The rest of this thesis, which is divided into three parts, comprises eleven chapters and 
a conclusion. Each is a polemic against the tax dogma.   
 
The first part deals with tax avoidance and tax evasion and expounds the overarching 
thesis.   
 
Chapter one proves that tax avoidance and tax evasion constitute the common law 
offence of cheating the public revenue, which corresponds to tax fraud in both the 
criminal and civil law in all jurisdictions. It also underscores the fundamental principle, 
which is critical to understanding the fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme, that 
cheating and fraud under the common law and fraud under the Fraud Act are ‘conduct’ 
offences committed by prejudicing another person’s proprietary interest rather than 
‘result’ offences that require proof of actual loss, because they all boil down to 
dishonesty. 
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Chapter two demonstrates the inherently fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme 
in criminal and civil law. It shows that the corollary of the fundamental principle that 
cheating and fraud under the common law and fraud under the Fraud Act are ‘conduct’ 
offences committed by “deliberate dishonesty to the prejudice of another person’s 
proprietary right”203 is that any professional adviser involved in devising a tax avoidance 
scheme cheats the public revenue or “prejudice[s], or take[s] the risk of prejudicing, the 
Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has no right to do so” in the 
words of Hardy J’s classic definition. A tax avoidance scheme is, therefore, a fraud and 
a cheat by design as a matter of law regardless of whether it “works” as a matter of 
statutory construction under “the legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and 
giving effect to what Parliament meant.” 
 
Chapter three uses the roles of lawyers in blessing tax schemes, concealing tax 
schemes, subverting anti-avoidance doctrines and defending tax schemes in litigation 
to underscore the inherently fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme and the 
inherently fraudulent nature of the conduct of the lawyers involved in devising, 
marketing, implementing and otherwise facilitating its use. It concludes that the 
fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme invokes the principle that where 
confidential communication between a lawyer and client is for the purpose of obtaining 
legal advice as to how to commit a fraud or an illegality or an iniquity it is not privileged, 
which means that a taxpayer involved in a tax scheme is not entitled to legal 
professional privilege. 
 
Chapter four unravels the reliance of the dogma “tax evasion is illegal but tax 
avoidance is legal” on the equation of ‘tax evasion’ to tax fraud and the equation of both 
to cheating the public revenue by fraudulent concealment. It shows that the corollary 
of the proposition that a tax avoidance scheme is a cheat and a fraud by design 
established in chapter two is that the fraudulent nature of tax avoidance does not 
depend on any subsequent concealment by the enabling professional advisers or by 
the participating taxpayer.  
 
Chapter five uses a historical analysis of the Revenue’s “highly selective” prosecution 
policy to demonstrate that the dogma “tax avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal” 
rests for its support upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the fact in all cases of tax 
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fraud “it is entirely within the discretion of the tax authorities whether they take the 
procedural course of bringing a criminal tax-fraud case or imposing only civil tax-fraud 
penalties or simply establishing tax liability without fines or penalties”.204 
 
Chapter six similarly uses HMRC’s recent sweetheart tax deals, including the offshore 
tax evasion settlement with HSBC and the offshore tax avoidance settlements with 
Vodafone and Google, to demonstrate that the dogma “tax avoidance is legal and tax 
evasion is illegal” involves a misconception of the fact that in all cases of tax fraud “it is 
entirely within the discretion of the tax authorities whether they take the procedural 
course of bringing a criminal tax-fraud case or imposing only civil tax-fraud penalties or 
simply establishing tax liability without fines or penalties”. 
 
The third part concentrates on tax avoidance and expounds the fundamental 
contribution.  
 
Chapter seven demonstrates that the proposed cheating or fraud approach to tax 
avoidance will give effect to the principle of the equality of taxation expounded by Adam 
Smith and shows that the prevailing constructional approach enforces what he 
described as the inequality of taxation by explaining the latter’s manifestations in the 
perverse ‘certainty’ argument, the objections to retrospective anti-avoidance legislation 
and the fallacy of profit maximisation.  
 
Chapter eight proposes and expounds the concept of ‘the primacy of the public 
revenue law’. It demonstrates that it corresponds to cheating the public revenue and 
thus underpins the proposed cheating or fraud approach to tax avoidance. By contrast, 
it critiques ‘the primacy of the private law’ that underlies the prevailing constructional 
approach using the English Snook sham doctrine, the Duke of Westminster principle, 
the Ramsay principle, and the American private law sham doctrine and tax sham 
transaction doctrine.  
 
Chapter nine demonstrates that the mischief rule provides original authoritative judicial 
support for the proposed cheating or fraud approach to tax avoidance. It shows that its 
development by the Barons of the Exchequer in Heydon’s Case205 is a seminal 
recognition of the pre-existing common law of cheating or fraud, which “acts upon the 
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offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction”206 in civil proceedings, as what 
Lord Hoffmann described variously in MacNiven as “an overlay upon the tax 
legislation”207, “an overriding legal principle, superimposed upon the whole of revenue 
law without regard to the language or purpose of any particular provision”208, “some 
paramount provision subject to which everything else must be read”209 and thus “a 
broad spectrum antibiotic which killed off all tax avoidance schemes, whatever the tax 
and whatever the relevant statutory provisions.”210 
 
Chapter ten similarly demonstrates that the Ramsay principle provides a modern 
authoritative judicial support for the proposed cheating or fraud approach to tax 
avoidance. It shows that its development by the House of Lords is a seminal 
reaffirmation of the pre-existing common law of cheating or fraud as “an overlay upon 
the tax legislation”, “an overriding legal principle, superimposed upon the whole of 
revenue law without regard to the language or purpose of any particular provision”, 
“some paramount provision subject to which everything else must be read” and thus “a 
broad spectrum antibiotic which killed off all tax avoidance schemes, whatever the tax 
and whatever the relevant statutory provisions.” 
 
Chapter eleven expounds the origins and developments of the concepts of tax 
evasion, tax avoidance and tax mitigation and uses the landmark cases analysed in 
chapters nine and ten to demonstrate that “the elusive concept of ‘tax avoidance’”211 
was invented by the legal and tax professions to disguise the fraudulent nature of “the 
judge induced disease of ‘tax avoidance’”212 and thus serves to legitimise the resultant 
fraudulent multi-billion pound tax avoidance industry.  
 
The Conclusion highlights the fact that the existing body of knowledge in both 
domestic and international law continues to rest upon the dogma that “tax avoidance 
is legal and tax evasion is illegal”; reaffirms the overarching thesis that both tax 
avoidance and tax evasion amount to cheating the public revenue in law; and explains 
the main corollaries of the fraudulent and criminal nature of tax avoidance, namely: the 
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proposed new approach to tax avoidance, defamation and malicious falsehood, 
confidentiality and whistleblowing, and money laundering. 
 
The thesis also includes five appendices. Appendix 1 is the Information in the KPMG 
tax avoidance case of USA v KPMG LLP, which fortifies the proposed definition of tax 
avoidance. Appendix 2 is the Information in the HSBC tax evasion case of USA v 
Sanjay Sethi, which fortifies the proposed definition of tax evasion. Appendix 3 is the 
marketing letter in Ramsay, which illuminates the fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance 
scheme. Appendix 4 is the concealment letter in KPMG, which also elucidates the 
fraudulent nature of tax avoidance. Appendix 5 is HMRC’s Written Evidence to the PAC 
concerning the Google settlement, which also elucidates the fraudulent nature of tax 
avoidance. Appendix 6 is the letter by Chancellor George Osborne to Chairman Ben 
Bernanke on behalf of HSBC.  
 
XI. TIME LIMIT  
 
The contents of the thesis are based on materials available up to 1 March, 2019.  
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CHAPTER ONE    
                                              
THE NATURE AND MEANING OF TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION IN 
CRMINAL AND CIVIL LAW 
 
The next direction I have to give you is what in law is cheating the Public 
Revenue. To cheat, members of the jury, is defined by the concise Oxford 
Dictionary as: ‘To deceive, or trick, a person into or out of a thing.’ The 
common law offence of cheating the Public Revenue does not necessarily 
require a false representation either by words or conduct. Cheating can 
include any form of fraudulent conduct which results in diverting money 
from the Revenue and in depriving the Revenue of the money to which it is 
entitled. It has, of course, to be fraudulent conduct. That is to say, deliberate, 
dishonest conduct by the defendant to prejudice, or take the risk of 
prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has 
no right to do so. 





This chapter develops the overarching thesis that tax avoidance and tax evasion 
amount to the common law offence of cheating the public revenue, which  corresponds 
to tax fraud in both the criminal and civil law in all jurisdictions.  
 
Justice Hardy’s classic definition in his summing up approved by the Court of Appeal 
in Less shows that the ambit of the common law offence is wider than the civil law and 
dictionary meanings of cheating and fraud and thus covers every case of tax avoidance 
and tax evasion.  
 
As a ‘conduct’ (as opposed to ‘result’) crime, “diverting money from the Revenue” or 
“depriving the Revenue of the money to which it is entitled” is not a requirement as 
Hardy J implied. In R v Hunt, where the Court of Appeal rejected the appellant’s 
contention “that the offence of cheating at common law is a ‘result’ crime and ... not 
indictable unless the resultant loss is alleged and proved”213, Stuart-Smith LJ noted 
that:  
 
“The last sentence makes it plain that the actual result of the loss does not 
need to be proved.”214  
 
 
The rest of this chapter expounds the common law offences of cheating the public 
revenue, conspiracy to defraud and fraud, the Fraud Act 2006, and statutes against tax 
frauds including the GAAR; and explains the procedural distinction between the 
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criminal and civil law. It then uses cheating to expound tax avoidance and tax evasion; 
and uses conspiracy to defraud to expound marketed tax avoidance and offshore tax 
evasion. 
 
1.2. CHEATING THE PUBLIC REVENUE 
 
1.2.1. Common Cheat  
 
The right of the Revenue, like any other party, to bring a civil action for cheating has 
never been disturbed by the courts or by Parliament. All the judicial and legislative 
developments regarding cheating the public revenue have been concerned with when 
it would amount, in addition, to a criminal offence.  
 
According to the classic definition of the original common law offence of cheating or 
“common cheat” by Hawkins:  
 
“Cheats punishable by public prosecution ... at common law, may in general 
be described to be deceitful practices, in defrauding or endeavouring to 
defraud another of his known right by means of some artful device, contrary 
to the plain rules of common honesty. ... 
 
The deceitful receiving of money from one man to another’s use, upon a 
false pretence of having a message and order to that purpose, is not 
punishable by a criminal prosecution, because it is accompanied with no 
manner of artful contrivance, but wholly depends on a bare naked lie; and 
it is said to be needless to provide severe laws for such mischiefs, against 
which the common prudence and caution may be a sufficient security.”215 
 
 
Lord Templeman’s classic statements in Challenge show that actionable cheating 
“accompanied with no manner of artful contrivance, but wholly depends on a bare 
naked lie” corresponds to tax evasion while indictable cheating “by means of some 
artful device, contrary to the plain rules of common honesty” corresponds to tax 
avoidance: 
 
“Evasion occurs when the commissioner is not informed of all the facts 
relevant to an assessment of tax. ...  
 
In an arrangement of tax avoidance the financial position of the taxpayer is 
unaffected (save for the costs of devising and implementing the 
arrangement) and by the arrangement the taxpayer seeks to obtain a tax 
advantage without suffering that reduction in income, loss or expenditure 
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which other taxpayers suffer and which Parliament intended to be suffered 
by any taxpayer qualifying for a reduction in his liability to tax.”216 
 
 
East similarly wrote that cheating “by means of some artful device” such as by using 
false weights or measures was indictable because by such ‘false tokens’ “the public in 
general may be imposed upon without any imputation of folly or negligence.”217  
 
In R v Jones, therefore, A was indicted for obtaining £20 from B by falsely pretending 
that he had been sent by C to get £20 for his use. Holt C.J. acquitted him, stating:  
 
“It is no crime unless he came with false tokens. Shall we indict one man 
for making a fool of another? Let him bring his action.”218 
 
 
1.2.2. Cheating the Crown and the Public  
 
Hawkins wrote that “all frauds affecting the crown and public at large are indictable as 
cheats at common law.”219 East also stated that:   
 
“All frauds affecting the crown and public at large are indictable, though 
arising out of a particular transaction or contract with the party.”220  
 
 
Lord Mansfield’s seminal exposition in R v Bembridge221 specifically reaffirmed the 
Revenue’s right to bring a civil action. Bembridge involved what would be described 
today as a ‘sweetheart tax deal’. As Goddard CJ explained in Hudson:  
 
“The matter came before the Court of King’s Bench in Rex v Bembridge in 
1783, when a public officer, one Charles Bembridge, was indicted for a 
fraud on the Crown because he had knowingly and wrongly certified the 
amount due from the late Paymaster-General, Lord Holland, to the Crown. 
It does not appear that he had gained anything from it, but he did it and did 
it fraudulently, as the jury found.”222 
 
 
The basis of Bembridge’s appeal was that the Crown’s remedy was limited to a civil 
action. As Lord Mansfield put it, “the objection then is, that at most this amounts to a 
breach of trust, a concealment, a fraud of a pecuniary nature, which is a civil injury, and 
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therefore not indictable; that he is accountable, - an agent, a trustee that embezzles 
money, or by neglect suffers it to be lost, is accountable, - for a civil injury, and not for 
a public offence”.223  
 
Lord Mansfield rejected the appeal, and affirmed the conviction on the grounds of 
misconduct in a public office and cheating the public revenue respectively:   
 
“Now, there are two principles which seem to me clearly applicable to this 
prosecution; the first I will venture to lay down is, that if a man accepts an 
office of trust and confidence, concerning the public, especially when it is 
attended with profit, he is answerable to the king for his execution of that 
office; and he can only answer to the king in a criminal prosecution, for the 
king cannot otherwise punish his behaviour, in acting contrary to the duty 
of his office, and that this holds equally by whomsoever or howsoever he is 
appointed to the office, by whomsoever the office is given. ...  
 
There is another principle too, which I think applicable to this prosecution, 
and that is this; where there is a breach of trust, a fraud, or an imposition in 
a subject concerning the public, which, as between subject and subject, 
would only be actionable by a civil action, yet as that concerns the King and 
the public (I use them as synonimous terms), it is indictable; that is another 
principle of which you will make the application to the present case, without 
losing time in doing it. And there are some authorities; though I should think 
the principle so essential to the existence of the country and the 
constitution, that, without any authority, I may fairly say the constitution 
would not exist without it, - but I think there are authorities that support that 
principle. So long ago as the reign of Edward the 3d, it was taken to be 
clear that an indictment would lie for an omission or concealment of a 
pecuniary nature, to the prejudice of the king; and therefore, that in 27 
Assize, Placito 17, it was presented that such and such had levied a 
hundred marks of the county for the array of certain archers, which money 
had never come to the profit of the king; had this been between subject and 
subject, it would have been an action for money had and received; that 
would have been no crime, but barely keeping the money in his own hands 
which belonged to another; but concerning the public, - concerning the king, 
- so long ago as the reign of Edward the 3rd, it was held to be indictable.”224 
 
 
In Hudson, Lord Goddard cited Lord Mansfield’s statement with approval, and 
concluded:  
 
“That is the clearest possible statement by a great master of the common 
law that a fraud on the public by an individual is indictable, although the 
particular fraud might not have been indictable if it had been a fraud by one 
subject upon another. The simple question is, therefore, has that law ever 
been altered? We can find no case in which it ever has been altered. The 
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doctrine laid down by Hawkins, and by East, was affirmed by Lord 
Mansfield in R v Bembridge in the clearest possible manner.”225 
 
 
1.2.3 The Constitutional Common Law of Taxation   
 
In Pattni, Judge Mercer reaffirmed the constitutional significance of cheating by 
rejecting the frequent argument that it is too uncertain to satisfy the requirements of 
article 7 of the ECHR: 
 
“[P]rior, at any rate, to the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 the 
common law offence of cheating the Revenue was alive and well and in 
appropriate cases provided a relevant charge. ... In my view the common 
law of cheating the Revenue as interpreted by recent judicial decisions, and 
if properly understood and adequately particularised, is clear and 
ascertainable as well as readily understood by a jury.”226 
 
 
Parliament expressly affirmed the constitutional importance of cheating the public 
revenue in section 32(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968, which abolished cheats which are 
punishable at common law “except as regards offences relating to the public revenue”. 
The Act, therefore, preserved the right of the Revenue to bring a civil action for cheating 
or to plead cheating as a defence in a civil action against it.  
 
Parliament effectively reaffirmed the constitutional importance of cheating in the Fraud 
Act. In the debate on the Bill Lord Kingsland tabled an amendment for the “abolition of 
offence of cheating the public revenue” supposedly because it is “ill-defined”. Citing 
Pattni, the Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, resisted the amendment. Using ‘tax 
evasion’ to describe tax fraud, he stated:   
 
“This was an issue that the Law Commission quite specifically excluded 
from its review. It says at the beginning of its report that there are certain 
specialist branches of fraud that ... required separate consideration. Among 
those it included ... the common law offence of cheating the Revenue. ... It 
may be that if the Bill is enacted the use of the offence of cheating the public 
revenue will decline. As it stands, the offence is regularly used by 
prosecutors ... to deal with cases of tax evasion. I am sure that we all want 
to ensure that HMRC continues to have all the tools necessary to prevent 
others not meeting their fiscal obligations.”227 
 
 
                                                 
225 Hudson, p.260.  
226 [2001] Crim. L.R. 570.  
227 Hansard, HL, Vol 673, cols 1457-1458 (July 19, 2005).  
93 
 
Cheating the public revenue, therefore, remains the only form of cheating contrary to 
the common law which is indictable in criminal proceedings and actionable in civil 
proceedings.  
 
1.2.4. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Ivey 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ivey has changed the law on the question of 
“deliberate, dishonest conduct by the defendant to prejudice, or take the risk of 
prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has no right 
to do so” in the words of Hardy J’s classic definition in Less. In Less, he applied the 
now defunct Ghosh test:  
 
“I direct you that you must approach the question of dishonesty in two 
stages. You must first of all decide whether according to the ordinary 
standards of reasonable and decent people as determined by yourselves 
what was done in respect of the non-payment of tax was dishonest. If it was 
not dishonest by those standards that is the end of the matter and the 
prosecution fails. If it was dishonest by those standards then you must 
consider a further question. That is to say, whether the defendant himself 
must have realized what he was doing was [by] those standard of 
reasonable and decent people dishonest. If your answer to that second 
question, if you come to it, is, ‘Yes, we are sure’, then convict. If your 
answer is, ‘No’, or, ‘We are not sure’, then acquit.”228 
 
 
The acceptance of the mantra that “tax avoidance is legal” as gospel truth in the existing 
body of knowledge effectively made the Ghosh test a “defence” in tax avoidance 
because the accused could argue that he did not realise that it was dishonest because 
the profession and the wider society consider it to be “legal”. According to Ormerod: 
 
“[T]he accused might say that he believed that ordinary people would 
consider the activity to be lawful. This falls squarely within the Ghosh test 
as a matter for the discretion of the jury.”229 
 
 
The effect of Ivey is that the accused would no longer be able to say that he believed 
that ordinary people would consider the activity to be lawful. In the words of Lord 
Nicholls in Royal Brunei which the Supreme Court affirmed in Ivey as “[t]he test of 
dishonesty”230 in both civil and criminal proceedings: 
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“In most situations there is little difficulty in identifying how an honest 
person would behave.”231 
 
 
Tax avoidance, which is a subject where the views of the tax profession of what is right 
and wrong diverges from those of the general body of taxpayers, is the paradigm of 
cases where “there is little difficulty in identifying how an honest person would behave.” 
According to Porcheddu: 
 
“The decision in Ivey ... could encourage fact-finding tribunals and juries to 
find that, according to the contemporary standards of reasonable and 
honest people, particularly aggressive and artificial tax structures that do 
not appear to be supported by any genuine commercial drivers display a 
dishonest intent on the part of the management that approved them. In 
these circumstances, those in management might no longer be able to 
defend themselves by relying on their subjective belief that what they were 
doing was not dishonest.”232 
 
 
1.3. CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD  
 
In Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, where the House of Lords held that the 
related common law offence of conspiracy to defraud is also a conduct offence, Lord 
Diplock stated:  
 
“Although at common law no clear distinction was originally drawn between 
conspiracies to ‘cheat’ and conspiracies to ‘defraud,’ these terms being 
frequently used in combination, by the early years of the nineteenth century 
‘conspiracy to defraud’ had become a distinct species of criminal 
agreement independent of the old common law substantive offence of 
‘cheating.’ The abolition of this substantive common law offence by section 
32 (1) (a) of the Theft Act 1968, except as regards offences relating to the 
public revenue, thus leaves surviving and intact the common law offence 
of conspiracy to defraud.”233 
 
 
Viscount Dilhorne stated that there is “no support for the view that in order to defraud 
a person that person must be deceived”234, and concluded:  
 
“One must not confuse the object of a conspiracy with the means by which 
it is intended to be carried out.”235 
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1.4. FRAUD  
 
“The classic statement of the nature of fraud”236 by Stephen corresponds for tax 
purposes to Justice Hardy’s classic statement of “what in law is cheating the Public 
Revenue” in Less:  
 
“Fraud. There has always been a great reluctance amongst lawyers to 
attempt to define fraud, and this is not unnatural when we consider the 
number of different kinds of conduct to which the word is applied in 
connection with different branches of law, and especially in connection with 
the equitable branch of it. I shall not attempt to construct a definition which 
will meet every case which might be suggested, but there is little danger in 
saying that whenever the words ‘fraud’ or ‘intent to defraud’ or ‘fraudulently’ 
occur in the definition of a crime two elements at least are essential to the 
commission of the crime: namely, first, deceit or an intention to deceive or 
in some cases mere secrecy; and, secondly, either actual injury or possible 
injury or an intent to expose some person either to actual injury or to a risk 
of possible injury by means of that deceit or secrecy.”237 
 
 
In other words, fraud or cheating may be perpetrated by misrepresentation (or deceit 
or deception) without concealment (or secrecy or non‐disclosure) and an intent to 
defraud or cheat need not necessarily involve an intent to conceal; and vice versa.  
 
Fraudulent misrepresentation is the paradigm of fraudulent conduct. According to the 
Law Commission:  
 
“The concept of fraudulent misrepresentation is well established in both the 
civil and criminal law. It may be defined as an assertion of a proposition 
which is untrue or misleading, either in the knowledge that it is untrue or 
misleading or being aware of the possibility that it might be. The assertion 
may be express, implicit in written or spoken words, or implicit in non-verbal 
conduct. The proposition asserted may be one of fact or of law. It may be 




As a representation may be express or implicit, fraudulent misrepresentation 
encompasses fraudulent concealment. As the Law Commission put it: 
 
“Secrecy can be regarded as a kind of deception by omission. One person 
may deceive another by taking positive steps to create a false impression 
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in the other’s mind, or may simply refrain from taking any steps to dispel 
such an impression.”239 
 
 
Fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment are, therefore, not mutually 
exclusive, and both tax evasion and tax avoidance can be described as either 
fraudulent misrepresentation (or express misrepresentation) or fraudulent concealment 
(or implied misrepresentation by concealment).  
 
The term “possible injury” in Stephen’s definition confirms that fraud is also a ‘conduct’ 
crime. In the words of James J in R v Sinclair:  
 
“To cheat and defraud is to act with deliberate dishonesty to the prejudice 
of another person’s proprietary right.”240  
 
 
1.5. FRAUD ACT 2006    
 
1.5.1. Background   
 
The immediate history of the Act started with the Law Commission’s 1996 Consultation 
Paper Legislating the Criminal Code: Fraud and Deception241, which was followed by 
its 2002 report Fraud.242 The Government responded in the Home Office 2004 
Consultation Paper Fraud Law Reform. 
 
1.5.2. Conduct Offence   
 
The Government accepted the Law Commission’s proposal to enact a conduct offence 
that corresponds to cheating and conspiracy to defraud:   
 
“We re-considered the argument, made by a few respondents, that the 
concept of fraud should include the requirement that the victim’s financial 
interests be imperilled. However there was very wide support for the Law 
Commission’s proposal that the crime should be complete if the offender 
has the intention to make a gain or cause loss. The argument is that the 
focus should be on the offender’s behaviour and that the gravity of the 
offence depends on his intention, not the result.”243  
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The principal offence is, therefore, a general fraud or dishonesty offence created by 
section 1 in these terms:  
 
“(1) A person is guilty of fraud if he is in breach of any of the sections listed 
in subsection (2) (which provide for different ways of committing the 
offence). 
(2) The sections are — (a) section 2 (fraud by false representation), (b) 
section 3 (fraud by failing to disclose information), and (c) section 4 (fraud 
by abuse of position).” 
 
 
The Explanatory Notes confirm that the three offences are conduct offences because 
while “the intention of making a gain or causing loss or risk of loss to another”244 is a 
requirement, “[t]he gain or loss does not actually have to take place.”245  
 
Dishonesty is, therefore, the mens rea for each form of the offence. The Law 
Commission246 and the Government247 intended that the Ghosh definition should apply. 
This was emphasised repeatedly in the parliamentary debates, including by the 
Attorney General and the Solicitor General.248 The substitution of the objective civil law 
test by the Supreme Court in Ivey, therefore, redefined the Act the way it redefined 
cheating the public revenue and conspiracy to defraud.  
 
1.5.3. Fraud by False Representation  
 
The Law Commission “concluded that this form of the new offence should be defined 
in terms of misrepresentation rather than deception”, but that “the distinction is 
immaterial.”249  
 
Section 2, which corresponds to fraudulent misrepresentation under the common law, 
provides that:   
 
“(1) A person is in breach of this section if he—  
(a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and  
(b) intends, by making the representation—(i) to make a gain for himself or 
another, or (ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of 
loss.  
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(2) A representation is false if—  
(a) it is untrue or misleading, and  
(b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading.  
 
(3) ‘Representation’ means any representation as to fact or law, including 
a representation as to the state of mind of—  
(a) the person making the representation, or  
(b) any other person.  
 
(4) A representation may be express or implied.” 
 
 
Subsection (4) confirms that fraudulent misrepresentation encompasses express 
misrepresentation and implied misrepresentation by concealment.  
 
1.5.4. Fraud by Failing to Disclose Information  
 
The Government accepted “that failure to disclose could in some cases amount to a 
false representation” but decided “that it might be helpful, particularly for juries, to have 
the point made clear on the face of the law.”250  
 
Section 3, which corresponds to fraudulent concealment under the common law, 
provides that:  
 
“A person is in breach of this section if he—  
(a) dishonestly fails to disclose to another person information which he is under 
a legal duty to disclose, and  
(b) intends, by failing to disclose the information—  
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or  
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.” 
 
 
Virtually all cases of failing to disclose information under section 3 would, therefore, 
amount to false representation under section 2.  
 
In its explanation of the concept of “legal duty”, which was adopted in the Explanatory 
Notes251, the Law Commission stated:  
 
“Such a duty may derive from statute (such as the provisions governing 
company prospectuses), from the fact that the transaction in question is one 
of the utmost good faith (such as a contract of insurance), from the express 
or implied terms of a contract, from the custom of a particular trade or 
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market, or from the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties 
(such as that of agent and principal).”252 
 
 
Farquharson LJ’s statement in Charlton of the pre-existing common law duty of honesty 
imposed by cheating on professional advisers and taxpayers shows that it derives “from 
the fact that the transaction in question is one of the utmost good faith”:   
 
“It is a feature, no doubt, of the tax or revenue law of any country that it 
must, to a large extent, in its tax gathering activities, rely on the truthfulness 
of the taxpayer in indicating the extent of his income or whatever other 
matter is relevant to the particular statute being considered. It follows also 
that the Revenue not only have to rely on the taxpayer’s good faith, but 
more especially on the professional advisers they appoint to act for them 
and, accordingly, when professional advisers are found to have acted 
dishonestly towards the Revenue, it is almost inevitable, as I think each 
counsel before us has recognised, that sentences of imprisonment must 
follow and we adhere to that position.”253 
 
Waterhouse LJ’s original statement in the earlier case of R v Phelps and Stockitt 
demonstrates that the duty on professional advisers also derives “from the custom of 
a particular trade”: 
 
“In cases in which professional men abuse the privilege of their profession, 
albeit to assist clients but with the object of defrauding the Public Revenue, 
it is inevitable that sentences of immediate imprisonment will be imposed 
and that those sentences will be of substantial duration. They must be 
deterrent sentences because the operations of the Inland Revenue depend 
to a very great extent upon the integrity of members of the accountants’ 
profession in this country.”254 
 
1.5.5. Fraud by Abuse of Position 
 
The protection of the public interest in tax settlements by the common law was fortified 
by the offence of fraud by abuse of position under section 4 of the Fraud Act, which 
encompasses cheating the public revenue by abuse of office and misconduct in a 
public office:  
 
“(1) A person is in breach of this section if he– 
(a) occupies a position in which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act 
against, the financial interests of another person, 
(b) dishonestly abuses that position, and 
(c) intends, by means of the abuse of that position– 
                                                 
252 Fraud, paragraph 7.28.   
253 Ibid 531. 
254 (1993) 14 Cr. App. R. 141, 145.  
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(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or 
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. 
 
(2) A person may be regarded as having abused his position even though 
his conduct consisted of an omission rather than an act.” 
 
 
Goddard CJ’s summary of Bembridge cited above shows that the defendant did not 
intend “to make a gain for himself” in terms of section 4(1)(c)(i) but intended “to cause 
loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss” in terms of section 4(1)(c)(ii).  
 
Indeed, the example in the Explanatory Notes, which is analogous to a sweetheart tax 
deal, shows that fraud by abuse of position is wider than bribery: 
 
“The term ‘abuse’ is not limited by a definition, because it is intended to 
cover a wide range of conduct. Moreover subsection (2) makes clear that 
the offence can be committed by omission as well as by positive action. For 
example, an employee who fails to take up the chance of a crucial contract 
in order that an associate or rival company can take it up instead at the 
expense of the employer, commits an offence under this section.”255 
 
1.5.6. Codification of Cheating  
 
The Fraud Act, which corresponds to the common law offences of cheating the public 
revenue, conspiracy to defraud and fraud, meets Baker’s objections:  
 
“For those countries - like the UK - where we still have the offence of 
defrauding the Revenue as a common law offence based upon court 
decisions, this is no longer acceptable. Taxpayers are entitled to a clear, 
statutory definition of what is regarded as criminal conduct.”256 
 
 
The Act provides taxpayers, professional advisers and Revenue officials with “a clear, 
statutory definition of what is regarded as criminal conduct.”  
 
1.6. STATUTES AGAINST FRAUD  
 
1.6.1. Statutes Against Tax Fraud  
 
Statutes against frauds are the precursors of today’s anti-avoidance legislation, 
enacted to complement the pre-existing common law of fraud. According to Bennion: 
 
                                                 
255 Paragraph 21.  
256 Baker, pp.8-9.  
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“Sometimes Parliament inserts special provisions in an Act for the purpose 
of countering evasion of its requirements. … The presence or absence of 




In Twyne’s Case the Star Chamber held “that all statutes made against fraud should 
be liberally and beneficially expounded to suppress the fraud.”258 
 
Statutes against tax fraud are, therefore, statutes against fraud that codify specific 
forms of cheating the public revenue already prohibited by the pre-existing common 
law. According to Bennion: 
 
“An early example was a statute of Edward I against mortmain. An earlier 
provision of the Magna Carta to the like effect having been subject to 
evasion, this statute said mortmain was not to be effected quacunque arte 
vel ingenio (by whatever art or ingenuity).  
 
A modern instance is the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 s 
170(2), which provides that a person who does certain acts in relation to 
goods with intent to evade any prohibition or restriction on the goods, or to 
evade duty, is guilty of an offence and may be detained.”259 
 
 
Mortmain, which means “the dead hand”, refers to the perpetual, inalienable ownership 
of real estate by a corporation or legal institution such as the Church. The Statutes 
of Mortmain were, therefore, enacted by Edward I in 1279 and 1290 to counter cheating 
the public revenue by passing land into the possession of the Church.  
 
1.6.2. Civil Fraud260 Penalties Legislation  
 
Section 6 of statute 12 Hen. 7 (c. 13) 1496 entitled “An Act for a Subsidie to be graunted 
to the Kinge, and for dischardg of some psons from payment thereof” imposed “the 
doble some of the same Money so upon hym assessed not paied” for any non-
payment.  
 
Section 25 of statute 5 Eliz. 1 (c.31) 1562, entitled “penalty on evasion under such 
pretext, double rate”, penalised, amongst other things, “covyn”, “crafte” and “deceipte”.  
                                                 
257 Bennion, p.1014.  
258 (1601) 3 Coke 80, 82a. 
259 Bennion, p.1014.  
260 According to White, ‘“Civil penalties”: oxymoron, chimera and stealth sanction’ (2010) L.Q.R. 
593, 593: “‘Civil penalties’ seems an oxymoron: if something is ‘civil’, how can ‘penalties’ arise, 




Section 53 of “An Act for granting an Aid to Her Majesty to be raised by a Land Tax in 
Great Britain for the Service of the Year One thousand seven hundred and fourteen” 
(1713, Statute 13 Anne, c. 1) penalised any “fraud or covin”.  
 
Section 14 of 3 Jac. 1 (C. 26) 1605-6 entitled “Penalty on Evasion under such Pretext, 
&c. Double Rate” provided that “everie such person that, by such meanes or otherwise, 
willingly by Covine or without just cause, shall happen to escape from the said 
Taxacions ... shalbe charged ... the double value of so much as he should might or 
ought to have beene set and taxed at by vertue of this Act”.  
 
Section 53 of statute 13 Anne (c. 1) 1713 (An Act for granting an Aid to Her Majesty to 
be raised by a Land Tax in Great Britain for the Service of the Year One thousand 
seven hundred and fourteen) entitled “Persons avoiding the Tax, charged Treble”, 
penalised “any other Fraud or Covin”. 
 
Section 92 of the first Income Tax Act of 1799 effectively covered every form of cheating 
the public revenue in relation to income tax:  
 
“That if any Person who ought to be charged by virtue of this Act, shall ... 
by any Falsehood, Fraud, Covin, Art, or Contrivance whatsoever, already 
used or practised, or to be used or practised shall not be charged and 
assessed according to the true Intent and Meaning of this Act, every such 
Person shall, on Proof thereof, before any two Commissioners, be charged 
and assessed, for the Purposes of this Act, Double the Amount of the 
Charge which ought to have been made on such Person.”261 
 
 
The underlined expression corresponds to Hardy J’s classic definition of cheating as 
“any form of fraudulent [or] dishonest conduct by the defendant to prejudice, or take 
the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has 
no right to do so.” 
 
Section 178 of the Income Tax Act 1842 substituted “any Falsehood, willful Neglect, 
Fraud, Covin, Art, or Contrivance whatsoever” and increased the penalty to “Treble the 
Amount of the Difference between the Sum with which such Person shall have been 
charged and the Sum with which he ought to have been charged.” 
 
                                                 
261 Emphasis supplied.  
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Section 30 of the Income Tax Act 1918 similarly codified the pre-existing common law 
of cheating and fraud:  
 
“Penalty for fraudulent claims. 
 
(1) A person who in making a claim for or obtaining any exemption, 
abatement, or relief hereinbefore described, or in obtaining any certificate 
as aforesaid— 
(a) is guilty of any fraud or contrivance; or  
(b) fraudulently conceals or untruly declares any income or any sum 
which he has charged against or deducted from, or was entitled to 
charge against or to deduct from another person; or  
(c) fraudulently makes a second claim for the same cause,  
shall forfeit the sum of twenty pounds and treble the tax chargeable in 
respect of all the sources of his income and as if such claim had not been 
allowed.  
 
(2) A person who knowingly and willfully aids or abets any person in 




Under section 30(1)(b), a taxpayer who “fraudulently conceals” cheats by fraudulent 
concealment under the common law and defrauds by failing to disclose information 
under section 3 of the Fraud Act 2006 while a taxpayer who “untruly declares” cheats 
by fraudulent misrepresentation under the common law and defrauds by false 
representation under section 2 of the Fraud Act. In both cases the taxpayer is “guilty of 
any fraud or contrivance” under section 30(1), as is any professional adviser “who 
knowingly and willfully aids or abets” the taxpayer under section 30(2).   
 
Section 48 of the Income Tax Act 1952 penalised “any falsehood, willful neglect, fraud, 
covin, art or contrivance whatsoever” with “treble the amount of the charge which ought 
to have been made”.  
 
1.6.3. The 1970 Changes  
 
The legislative changes of 1970 changed the formulation and created a parallel system 
of civil fraud penalty and anti-avoidance legislation.  
 
Part X of TMA 1970 entitled “Penalties” enacted the penalty regime in sections 93 – 





1.6.4. Anti-Avoidance Legislation  
 
In a shift from the previous use of ‘fraud’, ‘evasion’ and ‘avoidance’ as synonyms, which 
reflected developments in case law, Part 7 of ICTA 1970 that enacted the ‘Cancellation 
of Tax Advantages from Certain Transactions in Securities’ and the ‘Transfer of Assets 
Abroad’ provisions in Chapter 1 and 3 respectively was entitled ‘Tax Avoidance’.   
 
Part XVII of ICTA 1988, also entitled ‘Tax Avoidance’, enacted the Controlled Foreign 
Companies (CFC) provisions in Chapter 4 (sections 747-756) and the transfer pricing 
provisions in Chapter 6 (sections 770-773).  
 
The decision of the ECJ in Cadbury Schweppes v IRC262 that the CFC provisions did 
not constitute a restriction on freedom of establishment under articles 43 and 48 of the 
European Charter shows that anti-avoidance legislation falls within the ambit of the pre-
existing common law of cheating. Affirming the decision of Advocate General Léger, 
the Grand Chamber held that:  
 
“Articles 43 EC and 48 EC must be interpreted as precluding the inclusion 
in the tax base of a resident company established in a member state of 
profits made by a controlled foreign company in another member state, 
where those profits are subject in that state to a lower level of taxation than 
that applicable in the first state, unless such inclusion relates only to wholly 
artificial arrangements intended to escape the national tax normally 
payable. Accordingly, such a tax measure must not be applied where it is 
proven, on the basis of objective factors which are ascertainable by third 
parties, that despite the existence of tax motives that controlled company 
is actually established in the host member state and carries on genuine 
economic activities there.”263 
 
 
A “wholly artificial arrangement” that does not involve “genuine economic activities” is 
a fraud. According to the Grand Chamber:  
 
“As suggested by the United Kingdom government and the Commission at 
the hearing, that finding must be based on objective factors which are 
ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to 
which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment. 
If checking those factors leads to the finding that the CFC is a fictitious 
establishment not carrying out any genuine economic activity in the territory 
of the host member state, the creation of that CFC must be regarded as 
having the characteristics of a wholly artificial arrangement. That could be 
so in particular in the case of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary.”264 
                                                 
262 [2006] STC 1908. 
263 Ibid, p.1941. Emphases supplied.  
264 Ibid, p.1940.  
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1.7. THE GENERAL ANTI-ABUSE RULE (GAAR) 
 
The substantive provisions of the General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) enacted in Part 5 
of Finance Act 2013 show that “abuse” falls within the ambit of the pre-existing common 
law of cheating the public revenue and fraud:  
 
“207 Meaning of “tax arrangements” and “abusive” 
 
(1) Arrangements are “tax arrangements” if, having regard to all the 
circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude that the obtaining of a 
tax advantage was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the 
arrangements. 
 
(2) Tax arrangements are “abusive” if they are arrangements the entering 
into or carrying out of which cannot reasonably be regarded as a 
reasonable course of action in relation to the relevant tax provisions, having 
regard to all the circumstances including— 
(a) whether the substantive results of the arrangements are consistent with 
any principles on which those provisions are based (whether express or 
implied) and the policy objectives of those provisions, 
(b) whether the means of achieving those results involves one or more 
contrived or abnormal steps, and 
(c) whether the arrangements are intended to exploit any shortcomings in 
those provisions. 
 
(3) Where the tax arrangements form part of any other arrangements 
regard must also be had to those other arrangements. 
 
(4) Each of the following is an example of something which might indicate 
that tax arrangements are abusive— 
(a) the arrangements result in an amount of income, profits or gains for 
tax purposes that is significantly less than the amount for economic 
purposes, 
(b) the arrangements result in deductions or losses of an amount for tax 
purposes that is significantly greater than the amount for economic 
purposes, and 
(c) the arrangements result in a claim for the repayment or crediting of tax 
(including foreign tax) that has not been, and is unlikely to be, paid, 
but in each case only if it is reasonable to assume that such a result was 
not the anticipated result when the relevant tax provisions were enacted. 
 
(5) The fact that tax arrangements accord with established practice, and 
HMRC had, at the time the arrangements were entered into, indicated its 
acceptance of that practice, is an example of something which might 
indicate that the arrangements are not abusive. 
 
(6) The examples given in subsections (4) and (5) are not exhaustive.”265 
 
 
                                                 
265 Emphasis supplied. 
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“Each ... example of something which might indicate that tax arrangements are 
abusive” in section 207(4) is a prima facie case of fraud by false representation under 
section 2 of the Fraud Act and cheating by fraudulent misrepresentation under the 
common law. The legal question raised in each case, therefore, is whether “the person 
making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading” in the words of section 2(2) 
of the Fraud Act or “knowing that he has no right to do so” in the words of Hardy J in 
Less.  
 
Honest people do not submit tax returns on the basis of arrangements that result in “an 
amount of income, profits or gains for tax purposes that is significantly less than the 
amount for economic purposes”, or “deductions or losses of an amount for tax purposes 
that is significantly greater than the amount for economic purposes”, or “a claim for the 
repayment or crediting of tax (including foreign tax) that has not been, and is unlikely 
to be, paid”. 
 
To consider “if it is reasonable to assume that such a result was not the anticipated 
result when the relevant tax provisions were enacted” as directed by section 207(4) is, 
therefore, to substitute the legal fiction of statutory construction for this legal question.  
 
“The fact that tax arrangements accord with established practice, and HMRC had, at 
the time the arrangements were entered into, indicated its acceptance of that practice” 
under section 207(5) does not change their nature in law. In the words of Lord 
Wilberforce in Vestey:  
 
“A proposition that whether a subject is to be taxed or not, or that, if he is, 
the amount of his liability is to be decided (even though within a limit) by an 




1.8. THE PROCEDURAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAW  
 
Blackstone’s statement of the distinction between penal statutes and statutes against 
frauds defines the different procedural consequences of findings of fraud or cheating 
in criminal and civil proceedings:  
 
“Penal statutes must be construed strictly. ... Statutes against frauds are to 
be liberally and beneficially expounded. This may seem a contradiction to 
                                                 
266 [1980] STC 10, 18-19.  
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the last rule; most statutes against frauds being in their consequences 
penal. But this difference is here to be taken: where the statute acts upon 
the offender, and inflicts a penalty, as the pillory or a fine, it is then to be 
taken strictly; but when the statute acts upon the offence, by setting aside 
the fraudulent transaction, here it is to be construed liberally.”267 
 
 
Section 1(3) of the Fraud Act 2006 shows that it is a penal statute that “acts upon the 
offender, and inflicts a penalty”:   
 
“A person who is guilty of fraud is liable— 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 
months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or to both); 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
10 years or to a fine (or to both).” 
 
 
By contrast, section 209(1) of Finance Act 2013 shows that the GAAR in Part 5, which 
“has effect for the purpose of counteracting tax advantages arising from tax 
arrangements that are abusive”268, is a statute against fraud that “acts upon the offence, 
by setting aside the fraudulent transaction”:   
 
“If there are tax arrangements that are abusive, the tax advantages that 
would (ignoring this Part) arise from the arrangements are to be 
counteracted by the making of adjustments.” 
 
 
Anti-avoidance legislation decriminalises cheating or fraud, which is why it “should be 
liberally and beneficially expounded.” The judicial legitimisation of tax avoidance under 
the prevailing constructional approach, however, supposes that anti-avoidance 
legislation, and indeed all tax legislation, “must be construed strictly” like penal statutes. 
The underlined “double reasonableness test” in section 207(2) of the GAAR resulted 
from this recommendation by Aaronson:  
 
“I have concluded that a GAAR which is appropriate for the UK must be 
driven by an overarching principle. This is that it should target those highly 
abusive contrived and artificial schemes which are widely regarded as 
intolerable, but that it should not affect the large centre ground of 
responsible tax planning. Critically, I consider that this overarching principle 
must be supported by the simple proposition that where there can be 
reasonable doubt as to which side of the line any particular arrangement 
falls on, then that doubt is to be resolved in favour of the taxpayer so that 
the arrangement is treated as coming within the unaffected centre 
ground.”269 
 
                                                 
267 Blackstone, pp.88-89. 
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269 Aaronson, p.28.  
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This “overarching principle” is akin to the benefit of a doubt enjoyed by an accused in 
criminal proceedings where fraud must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and where 
the criminal law such as the common law offence of cheating the public revenue or a 
penal statute like the Fraud Act “acts upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty” and “is ... 
to be taken strictly.”  
 
In civil proceedings, where fraud is proved on a balance of probability, a statute against 
fraud like the GAAR “acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction, 
here it is to be construed liberally.” In the words of Lord Hardwicke in Kinaston v Clark 
that should govern the construction of the GAAR:  
 
“The known rule upon statutes made to prevent frauds is, that they ought 
to have the most liberal construction, as in Twyne’s case.”270  
 
 
1.9. TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
The hallmark of tax avoidance is that each of the professional advisers involved in 
devising or marketing or implementing or otherwise facilitating the use of a tax scheme 
cheats the public revenue or “prejudice[s], or take[s] the risk of prejudicing, the 
Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has no right to do so.” According 
to Farquharson LJ in Charlton:  
 
“The case for the prosecution was that Charlton had devised a dishonest, 
tax-avoidance scheme for the benefit of some of the firm’s clients and that 
the Appellants were involved with the implementation of the schemes or 
the concealment from the Revenue of the existence of the fraud.”271 
 
 
Using the tax avoidance scheme by the participating taxpayer is a distinct and 
separate actus reus or “prejudice, or ... risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the 
tax in question”. The corollary of the principle that “if a taxpayer reasonably relies on a 
reputable accountant for advice in relation to the content of his tax return then he will 
not be liable”272 for negligence, let alone fraud, if the advice proves to be wrong is that 
the participating taxpayer using a tax avoidance scheme “to prejudice, or take the risk 
of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question” is not likely to do so “knowing 
that he has no right to do so.” In Charlton, Farquharson LJ applied the principle that 
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cheating is a conduct crime which means “that the actual result of the loss does not 
need to be proved”273 thus: 
 
“Furthermore, it was urged upon us that, unusually perhaps in a fraud of 
this scale, there was no loss to the public purse, in the sense that apart 
from one company the tax that was due, as a result of this defrauding of 
the Revenue, has now all been repaid as well as penalties and interest.”274 
 
 
In the earlier case of R v Phelps and Stockitt, where the professional enablers who 
devised, marketed, implemented and otherwise facilitated the use of similar tax 
avoidance schemes were convicted on an indictment containing counts of cheating the 
public revenue and conspiracy in the Crown Court at Middlesex Guildhall, Waterhouse 
LJ similarly stated:   
 
“The prosecution accepted that, in the event, there was no net loss overall 
to the Revenue. Although some of the clients were in liquidation, penalties 
and interest charges were imposed on other clients so that the Inland 
Revenue did not sustain a net loss.”275 
 
 
The conviction and incarceration of the professional advisers in Charlton and Phelps 
prove that devising or marketing or implementing or concealing or otherwise facilitating 
the use of a tax avoidance scheme by the professional enablers is a crime or an “act 
prohibited with penal consequences” or “an act that is capable of being followed by 
criminal proceedings”. According to Waterhouse LJ:  
 
“In cases in which professional men abuse the privilege of their profession, 
albeit to assist clients but with the object of defrauding the Public Revenue, 
it is inevitable that sentences of immediate imprisonment will be imposed 
and that those sentences will be of substantial duration. They must be 
deterrent sentences because the operations of the Inland Revenue depend 
to a very great extent upon the integrity of members of the accountants’ 
profession in this country.”276 
 
 
In R v Dimsey277 and R v Allen278 the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords upheld 
the conviction and imprisonment of the professional enablers and the participating 
taxpayers involved in similar schemes on indictments containing counts of conspiracy 
                                                 
273 Stuart-Smith LJ, Hunt, p.827.  
274 Charlton, p.532. 
275 (1993) 14 Cr. App. R. 141, 142.  
276 Ibid, p.145.   
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to cheat the public revenue by the Guildford and Knightsbridge Crown Courts 
respectively. 
 
In Dimsey, the conviction of the participating taxpayer (Chipping) on nine separate 
counts the professional enablers (Dimsey – the deviser of the scheme and Da Costa – 
the taxpayer’s solicitor) were not charged with proves that, subject to the requisite mens 
rea, using a tax avoidance by the participating taxpayer is also a crime or an “act 
prohibited with penal consequences” or “an act that is capable of being followed by 
criminal proceedings”. According to Lord Scott: 
 
“In due course the Revenue commenced criminal proceedings against Mr 
Chipping, Mr Da Costa and the appellant. There were eleven counts. All 
bar one, count ten, were counts under which Mr Chipping alone was 
accused of cheating the revenue.”279 
 
 
1.10. MARKETED TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
The Information in USA v KPMG (in Appendix 1) shows that avoidance, particularly 
marketed tax avoidance, is a conspiracy to cheat or defraud or “prejudice, or take 
the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has 
no right to do so” by each of the professional enablers involved in devising, marketing, 
implementing and otherwise facilitating the use of a tax avoidance scheme in which the 
participating using an individual scheme may or may not be complicit. According to 
paragraphs 8 and 9:   
 
“During the period from at least in or about 1996 through at least in or about 
2003, the defendant KPMG, and others known and unknown (hereinafter 
the ‘co-conspirators’), participated in a scheme to defraud the IRS by 
devising, marketing, and implementing fraudulent tax shelters, by preparing 
and causing to be prepared, and filing and causing to be filed with the IRS 
false and fraudulent U.S. individual income tax returns containing the 
fraudulent tax shelter losses, and by fraudulently concealing from the IRS 
those shelters. This illegal course of conduct was deliberately approved 
and perpetrated at the highest levels of KPMG’s tax management, and 
involved dozens of KPMG partners and other personnel.  
 
KPMG and its co-conspirators designed and marketed these shelters as a 
means for wealthy individuals with taxable income or gains generally in 
excess of $10 million in 1997 and of £20 million in 1998-2000 fraudulently 
to eliminate or reduce the tax paid to the IRS on that income or gain. As 
marketed and implemented, instead of the wealthy clients paying U.S. 
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individual income taxes generally exceeding 20% of the income or gain, the 
client could choose the amount of tax loss desired and pay certain of the 
conspirators and others an all-in cost generally equal to approximately 5 to 
7% of the desired tax loss. This “all-in” cost included the fees of KPMG, the 
SF Entities, the various law firms that supplied opinion letters, including a 
prominent national law firm with offices in New York, New York (the ‘Law 
Firm’), the bank participants, and others, as well as a small portion that 
would be used to execute purported ‘investments’ that were designed to 
make it appear that the shelters were legitimate ‘investments’ rather than 
tax shelters. The size of the purported ‘investments,’ the timing of the 
transactions, and the amount of the fees to certain conspirators and 
participants were all determined based on the tax loss to be generated.” 
 
In Drummond v HMRC the Special Commissioner summarised the contemporaneous 
KPMG loss scheme in strikingly similar terms:  
 
“Mr Simon McKie, director and controlling shareholder of MCL, formulated 
the strategy to enable individual customers with otherwise unrelieved 
capital gains to generate offsetable capital losses without suffering a 
corresponding economic loss. ... The strategy was to be marketed by MCL 
which would approach third party advisers (primarily tax professionals) and 
inform those advisers of the strategy in confidence. In late 2000 Simon 
McKie drafted a detailed strategy description which gave numerical 
examples of how it might be implemented with an analysis of its tax effects. 
... Simon McKie had three meetings with KPMG (accountants). KPMG, Mr 
McKie said in evidence, adopted it as a preferred strategy for their clients 
(subject to technical approval) and signed a confidentiality agreement on 
15 February 2001. 
 
Mr Jason Drummond is a man of means. He had realised a gain of £4.8 
million earlier in the financial year on sale of shares in a company in which 
he still had a large holding and that holding was, he said, ‘just one of my 
assets’. He had, he explained, asked KPMG to be more proactive in his tax 
affairs and had been having conversations with them about different 
schemes or strategies that could be used to offset his tax. ... Mr Drummond 
agreed with KPMG to engage KPMG to give advice on the strategy 
‘involving the acquisition and subsequent encashment of second-hand 
endowment bonds’ and to be introduced to MCL. KPMG also agreed to 
assist Mr Drummond with the reporting of the transaction to the Inland 




As a matter of law, “to enable individual customers with otherwise unrelieved capital 
gains to generate offsetable capital losses without suffering a corresponding economic 
loss” is to cheat the public revenue or “to prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the 
Revenue’s right to the tax in question”. According to the Special Commissioner:  
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“EFG Private Bank and its employees who ‘advised’ Ms. Sedgley and Mr. 
Drummond were, in my view, acting out a charade for which EFG Private 
Bank were paid a single fee of £5,000 by London & Oxford. Ms. Sedgley 




Under the constructional approach to tax avoidance, however, the Revenue and the 
courts failed to judge their conduct. As Rimer LJ put it:  
 
“The issue relates to the calculation of Mr. Drummond’s liability to capital 
gains tax (‘CGT’) for the tax year ended 5 April 2001. During that year Mr. 
Drummond made a capital gain of some £4.875 million upon the sale of 
shares. It exposed him to a large CGT liability. He claims to have been 
entitled to set against that gain an allowable loss of £1,962,233 (‘£1.962 
million’), so reducing the CGT liability by some £588,000. HMRC challenge 
his claim to do so. Their reason is that whilst the £4.875 million gain was a 
real economic gain, the claimed loss was not a real economic loss. Mr. 
Drummond’s claim is based on a tax avoidance scheme into which he 
bought at a cost of some £210,000 (part of the £1.962 million). The scheme 
depends upon a claimed application to the facts of s 37(1) of the Taxation 
of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (‘TCGA’). HMRC accept that s 37(1) applies, 
but their position is that it does not enable Mr. Drummond to create the 
magic he claims to conjure from it.”282 
 
 
To “accept that s 37(1) applies” after contending “that whilst the £4.875 million gain 
was a real economic gain, the claimed loss was not a real economic loss” is to divert 
attention from the conduct of the professional enablers and the participating taxpayer, 
and indeed the nature of the scheme, to the statutory provisions the scheme was 
devised to cheat and defraud.  
 
In Astall & Edward v HMRC, which involved another contemporaneous KPMG loss 
scheme, the Special Commissioner stated:  
 
“The scheme is entirely artificial and the Appellants had no commercial 
purposes in entering into it other than generating an artificial loss to set 
against taxable income.  
 
The terms of the Security were, in the words of the KPMG memorandum 
given to clients interested in the scheme, ‘structured so that it falls within 
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1.11. TAX EVASION  
 
The hallmark of tax evasion is that the taxpayer cheats the public revenue or 
“prejudice[s], or take[s] the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question 
knowing that he has no right to do so” by deliberately failing to make a return of the 
relevant tax liability or by making a deliberately false return of the relevant tax liability 
without using a tax scheme.  
 
In R v Mavji, the taxpayer cheated the public revenue by deliberately failing to make 
returns of VAT liability. According to Davies J:   
 
“This appellant was in circumstances in which he had a statutory duty to 
make value added tax returns and to pay over to the Crown the value added 
tax due. He dishonestly failed to do either. Accordingly, he was guilty of 
cheating HM The Queen and the public revenue.”284 
 
 
In R v Hudson the taxpayer cheated the public revenue by deliberately making a false 
return of income tax liability without using a tax scheme. Goddard CJ stated:  
 
“We think that the offence here consisted of sending in documents to the 
inspector of taxes which were false and fraudulent to the appellant’s 
knowledge ... for the purpose of avoiding the payment of tax. That is 
defrauding the Crown and defrauding the public.”285 
 
 
In Hunt, Stuart-Smith LJ cited Hudson for “the view that the offence is a conduct crime”, 
stating: 
 
“In R v Hudson this court held that the offence of making a false statement 
tending to prejudice the Queen and the public revenue with intent to 
defraud the Queen is, and always has been, a common law misdemeanour 
and includes the offence of causing to be delivered to an inspector of taxes 
accounts relating to the profit of a business which falsely and fraudulently 
state the profits to be less than they actually were.”286  
 
 
1.12. OFFSHORE TAX EVASION  
 
The Information in the HSBC case of USA v Sethi (in Appendix 2) shows that offshore 
tax evasion is a conspiracy to cheat or defraud the public revenue or “to prejudice, or 
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take the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question” between a 
taxpayer who fails to make a return of the relevant tax liability or who makes a 
deliberately false return of the relevant tax liability without using a tax avoidance 
scheme “knowing that he has no right to do so” and his professional enablers usually 
in the private banking or wealth management industry. According to paragraphs 15 to 
21 which refer to HSBC as “the International Bank”: 
 
“Defendant SANJAY SETHI was born in India, become a lawful resident of 
the United States on or about March 10, 1989, and became a naturalized 
United States citizen on or about June 1, 2004. From at least 2004 to the 
present, SETHI lived in Watchung, New Jersey.  
 
From in or about 2001 until in or about 2009, defendant SANJAY SETHI 
had a financial interest in undeclared bank accounts located in Switzerland 
and India. The accounts located in Switzerland and India were maintained 
at the International Bank. 
 
U.S. Banker A, a co-conspirator who is not charged as a defendant herein, 
was a senior vice president of a cross-border banking group with the private 
bank division of the International Bank that focused on developing and 
servicing clients in the United States with ties to India and elsewhere in 
South Asia. U.S. Banker A was based in the International Bank’s New York, 
New York office.  
 
U.K. Banker A, a co-conspirator who is not charged as a defendant herein, 
was a high-ranking executive of the International Bank and the head of a 
cross-border banking group within its private bank division that focused on 
developing and servicing clients worldwide with ties to countries in south 
Asia. U.K. Banker A was based in the International Bank’s London, England 
office.  
 
Swiss Banker A, a co-conspirator who is not charged as a defendant 
herein, was a financial advisor for the International Bank and was based in 
Geneva, Switzerland.  
 
From in or about 2001 through on or about April 21, 2010, in the District of 
New Jersey and elsewhere, the defendant, SANJAY SETHI, did knowingly 
and intentionally combine, conspire, confederate and agree with others to 
defraud the United States and an agency thereof, that is, the Internal 
Revenue Services of the United Sates Department of the Treasury, in the 
ascertainment, computation, assessment and collection of federal income 
taxes.  
 
The object of the conspiracy was for defendant SANJAY SETHI and his co-
conspirators to conceal from the IRS the existence, ownership, and income 




The involvement of professional advisers makes it a conspiracy like tax avoidance, but 
like classic tax evasion it does not require a tax scheme that is disclosed to the 
Revenue. The principle that “if a taxpayer reasonably relies on a reputable accountant 
for advice in relation to the content of his tax return then he will not be liable” for 
negligence or fraud if the advice proves to be wrong will, therefore, not avail the 
taxpayer. The purpose of professional advice is not to enable him to prove that he acted 
not “knowing that he has no right to do so” but to reassure him that he will be protected 
from discovery by the tax authorities.  
 
The “Swiss Leaks” – the disclosure by the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists (ICIJ) of some 30,000 secret bank accounts holding almost £78 billion of 
assets in HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) – revealed how the private banking or wealth 
management industry perpetrate offshore tax evasion. In contrast to the prosecution of 
one of the 3,600 potential UK tax evaders on the “Falciani list” and the amnesty granted 
to HSBC and their staff under the UK-Swiss tax treaty, there has been “more than 100 
prosecutions of evaders and 50 of their banking facilitators”287 in the US, including 
Sethi. According to the ICIJ:  
 
“The bank repeatedly reassured clients that it would not disclose details of 
accounts to national authorities, even if evidence suggested that the 
accounts were undeclared to tax authorities in the client’s home country. 
Bank employees also discussed with clients a range of measures that 
would ultimately allow clients to avoid paying taxes in their home countries. 
This included holding accounts in the name of offshore companies to avoid 
the European Savings Directive, a 2005 Europe-wide rule aimed at tackling 
tax evasion through the exchange of bank information.”288 
 
 
The new corporate offences of failure to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion 
under Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 do not change the meaning of offshore 
tax evasion in law. According to HMRC:  
 
“The new offences will be committed where a relevant body fails to prevent 
an associated person criminally facilitating the evasion of a tax, and this will 
be the case whether the tax evaded is owed in the UK or in a foreign 
country.  
 
Previously, attributing criminal liability to a relevant body required 
prosecutors to show that the senior members of the relevant body were 
involved in and aware of the illegal activity, typically those at the Board of 
Directors level. ...  
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The new offence, however, does not radically alter what is criminal, it simply 
focuses on who is held to account for acts contrary to the current criminal 
law. It does this by focussing on the failure to prevent the crimes of those 
who act for or on behalf of a corporation, rather than trying to attribute 
criminal acts to that corporation.”289 
 
 
1.13. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter proved the overarching thesis that tax avoidance and tax evasion 
constitute the common law offence of cheating the public revenue, which corresponds 
to tax fraud in both the criminal and civil law in all jurisdictions.  
 
It also underscored the fundamental principle, which is critical to understanding the 
fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme, that cheating and fraud under the 
common law and fraud under the Fraud Act are ‘conduct’ offences committed by 
prejudicing another person’s proprietary interest rather than ‘result’ offences that 
require proof of actual loss because they all boil down to dishonesty. In the words of 
James J in R v Sinclair:  
 
“To cheat and defraud is to act with deliberate dishonesty to the prejudice 
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CHAPTER TWO                                                                    
 
THE FRAUDULENT NATURE OF A TAX AVOIDANCE SCHEME IN CRIMINAL 
AND CIVIL LAW  
 
Whenever the Court decides that kind of dispute it legislates about taxation. 
It makes a law taxing all gains of the same kind or all documents of the same 
kind. Do not let us deceive ourselves with the legal fiction that the Court is 
only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant. Anyone who 
has decided tax appeals knows that most of them concern transactions 
which Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the Act had not 
anticipated, about which they had never thought at all. Some of the 
transactions are of a kind which had never taken place before the Act was 
passed: they were devised as a result of it. The Court may describe what it 
is doing in tax appeals as interpretation. So did the priestess of the Delphic 
oracle. 
Lord Diplock, The Courts As Legislators (University of Birmingham, 1965) page 6.  
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION      
 
This chapter establishes the inherently fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme in 
both the criminal and civil law based on the fundamental principle that cheating and 
fraud are ‘conduct’ crimes committed by prejudicing the Revenue’s right to the tax in 
question rather than ‘result’ crimes that require proof of actual loss to the Revenue.  
 
Using Lord Diplock’s theory of retrospective legislation, which underscores the 
fundamental flaw in the prevailing constructional approach to tax avoidance, a tax 
avoidance scheme is by definition two or more interrelated “transactions … of a kind 
which had never taken place before the [tax] Act [it was devised to cheat or defraud] 
was passed … devised as a result of it.” It can, therefore, amount to two or more 
interrelated “transactions which Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the Act 
had not anticipated, about which they had never thought at all.”  
 
The two minimum interrelated transactions required to constitute a scheme comprise 
one ‘normal’ or ‘real’ transaction (such as the deed of covenant in Westminster) and 
one ‘abnormal’ or ‘artificial’ transaction (such as the letter of explanation in 
Westminster) hence Lord Templeman’s statement that:  
 
“A tax avoidance scheme includes one or more interlinked steps which 
have no commercial purpose except for the avoidance of tax otherwise 
payable, and can conveniently be described as artificial steps.”291 
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A tax avoidance scheme or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind which had 
never taken place before the tax Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed, 
devised as a result of it is the paradigm of a fraud upon an Act in civil law. In the words 
of Lord Rodger in R v J:  
 
“The notion of a fraud upon an Act, acting in fraudem legis, is ancient. 
Although the outer limits of the doctrine remain notoriously difficult to 
define, this case at least falls squarely within its scope.”292 
 
 
A tax avoidance scheme or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind which had 
never taken place before the tax Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed, 
devised as a result of it falls within Hardy J’s classic definition of “what in law is cheating 
the Public Revenue” in criminal law: 
 
“To cheat ... is defined by the concise Oxford Dictionary as: ‘To deceive, or 
trick, a person into or out of a thing.’ The common law offence of cheating 
the Public Revenue does not necessarily require a false representation 
either by words or conduct. Cheating can include any form of fraudulent [or] 
dishonest conduct by the defendant to prejudice, or take the risk of 
prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has 
no right to do so.”293 
 
 
The narrower dictionary definition of cheating corresponds to Lord Templeman’s 
statement in Matrix-Securities: “Every tax avoidance scheme involves a trick and a 
pretence.”294 A fortiori, every tax avoidance scheme falls within the wider definition of 
“what in law is cheating the Public Revenue.”  
 
A fraud upon a tax Act in civil law is cheating the public revenue in criminal law because 
as “Watchful” stated in relation to the common law offence of cheating: “All taxation is 
the creature of statute. ... The gist of the crime is fraud upon the Crown.”295 Every fraud 
upon a Tax Act in civil law is, therefore, a fraud upon the Crown or cheating the public 
revenue or tax fraud in criminal law. 
 
The rest of this chapter develops this fundamental proposition by using the common 
law offences of cheating the public revenue and conspiracy to defraud and the common 
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law concepts of fraud upon an Act and fraud to establish the fraudulent nature of a tax 
avoidance scheme in criminal and civil law.  
 
2.2. CHEATING THE PUBLIC REVENUE  
 
2.2.1. Common Cheat  
 
Hawkins’ classic definition of common cheat (abolished by section 32(1)(a) of the Theft 
Act 1968 “except as regards offences relating to the public revenue”) corresponds 
broadly to the dictionary definition of cheating and Lord Templeman’s statement and 
embodies the two ingredients of a tax scheme: 
 
“Cheats which are punishable at Common Law, may, in general be 
described to be deceitful practices, in defrauding or endeavouring to 
defraud another of his known right by means of some artful device, contrary 
to the plain rules of common honesty.”296 
 
By merging the two classic definitions, tax avoidance schemes can be defined in 
criminal law as deceitful practices to prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the 
Revenue’s right to the tax in question by means of some artful device, contrary to the 
plain rules of common honesty. 
 
2.2.2. The Device: A Cheat by Design  
 
The corollary of the principle that cheating is a conduct crime committed by “prejudice, 
or ... the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question” (rather than “a 
‘result’ crime ... not indictable unless the resultant loss is alleged and proved”297) is that 
a tax avoidance scheme is a cheat by design (rather than by poor implementation). 
 
This means that each of the professional advisers involved in devising it cheats the 
public revenue or “prejudice[s], or take[s] the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to 
the tax in question knowing that he has no right to do so.” As Farquharson LJ stated in 
Charlton:  
 
“The case for the prosecution was that Charlton had devised a dishonest, 
tax-avoidance scheme for the benefit of some of the firm’s clients and that 
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the Appellants were involved with the implementation of the schemes or 
the concealment from the Revenue of the existence of the fraud.”298  
 
 
This shows that marketing or implementing or concealing or otherwise facilitating the 
use of the scheme is a distinct and separate actus reus or “prejudice, or ... risk of 
prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question” from devising the scheme, which 
consummates the offence.  
 
In terms of the DOTAS legislation, a tax avoidance scheme amounts to cheating the 
public revenue or “prejudice, or ... risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in 
question” when “it is capable of implementation in practice” under HMRC’s definition of 
“when it is made available for implementation by others”, namely:    
 
“A person makes a scheme available for implementation if and when:  
 the scheme is fully designed  
 it is capable of implementation in practice  
 he/she communicates information about the scheme to potential clients 




In other words, the fact that “the scheme is fully designed” may not suffice. According 
to HMRC: 
 
“The design of a scheme will typically consist of a number of elements (e.g. 
a partnership, a loan, partner’s contributions, the purchase of assets, etc) 
structured to deliver the expected tax advantage. The scheme will be 
capable of implementation in practice only when the elements of the design 
have been put into place ‘on the ground’. So, for example, if the design 
includes a loan, it will be capable of implementation only if and when an 
actual loan provider is in place and funds made available.”300 
 
 
The scheme is, therefore, already a cheat or fraud in law at the third stage where 
“he/she communicates information about the scheme to potential clients suggesting 
that they consider entering into transactions forming part of the scheme.” According to 
HMRC: 
 
“A scheme can be made available by more than one person such as by the 
scheme designer or those who provide the scheme under a licensing 
agreement with the designer.”301 
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The prevailing view that a tax avoidance scheme can only amount to cheating or fraud 
by poor implementation, which underpins the tax avoidance industry, was effectively 
rejected in Charlton. As Masters, who was called as an expert witness for Charlton, put 
it in his article:  
 
“I was asked about the types of tax saving schemes that were current at 
the time the Charlton transactions were implemented. This was relevant 
because the impression being given by the Inland Revenue was that the 
schemes themselves were illegal. This clearly was not the case. Whether 
the way they were implemented was illegal was another matter altogether 
(and one for the jury to decide). The Inland Revenue was, to say the least, 
not strenuous in its efforts to make this distinction clear. … The opening 
paragraph of the Crown’s Statement of Evidence is interesting:  
 
‘The prosecution case is that each of the defendants participated in 
one or more of a series of similar schemes to cheat the public revenue. 
The purpose and effect of each scheme was the same. The apparent 
taxable profits of a United Kingdom business would be reduced below 
their true level. An untaxed fund would accumulate in an offshore 
company for the use of the directors/proprietors of the United Kingdom 
business.’ 
 
This is not focusing on the true issue. The schemes might well have had 
the purpose and effect attributed to them, that certainly does not make them 
illegal. Any improper and dishonest implementation of such schemes or 
inaccurate reporting to the Inland Revenue might make them illegal but that 
is another matter.”302 
 
 
Benson J, with whom the jury and the Court of Appeal agreed, rejected these 
submissions, stating: 
 
“I do not accept the proposition, perhaps the jury will, that sales and 
purchases do not cease to be real if the objective is to seek the dishonest 
reduction of tax liability.”303 
 
 
As the object or purpose of a tax avoidance scheme is “to prejudice, or take the risk of 
prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question” (“The object of a tax avoidance 
scheme is to enable the taxpayer to enjoy a taxable event without paying the tax.”304) 
the question of illegality is completed by devising the scheme and does not turn on “the 
way they were implemented”, let alone on “inaccurate reporting to the Revenue”. To 
adopt the words of Gammie:  
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“Tax liabilities ... ought not to be capable of being negated by the simple 
expedient of passing papers round a table; it made no sense to impose a 
tax if tax could be so easily avoided.”305 
 
 
As if to confirm the principle that cheating is a conduct crime which means “that the 
actual result of the loss does not need to be proved”306, which underscores the 
irrelevance of “the way they were implemented”, Farquharson LJ stated that “there was 
no loss to the public purse”.307 
 
2.2.3. The Deceit: A Mismatch between the Tax and True Positions  
 
A tax avoidance scheme is a cheat and a fraud by design because of an in-built deceit 
or misrepresentation. The object – “to prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the 
Revenue’s right to the tax in question” or “to enable the taxpayer to enjoy a taxable 
event without paying the tax”308 – requires the creation of a mismatch between the true 
or economic position that exists in the real world for other purposes and the false or 
fiscal position that is presented to the Revenue for tax purposes.  
 
Under the GAAR, each of the “examples of something which might indicate that tax 
arrangements are abusive”309 involves such a mismatch or false representation:  
 
“(a) the arrangements result in an amount of income, profits or gains for tax 
purposes that is significantly less than the amount for economic purposes, 
(b) the arrangements result in deductions or losses of an amount for tax 
purposes that is significantly greater than the amount for economic 
purposes, and 
(c) the arrangements result in a claim for the repayment or crediting of tax 
(including foreign tax) that has not been, and is unlikely to be, paid”.310  
 
 
Bergin’s apt analogy of Starbucks’ scheme illustrates how “the arrangements result in 
an amount of ... profits ... for tax purposes that is significantly less than the amount for 
economic purposes”:  
 
“Starbucks’ coffee menu famously baffles some people. In Britain, it’s their 
accounts that are confusing. Starbucks has been telling investors 
the business was profitable, even as it consistently reported losses. This 
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apparent contradiction arises from tax avoidance, and sheds light on ... 
tactics used by multinationals the world over. Starbucks has told investors 
one thing and the taxman another. ...  
 
Accounts filed by its UK subsidiary show that since it opened in the UK in 
1998 the company has racked up over 3 billion pounds in coffee sales, and 
opened 735 outlets but paid only 8.6 million pounds in income taxes, largely 
due because the taxman disallowed some deductions. Over the past three 
years, Starbucks has reported no profit, and paid no income tax, on sales 
of 1.2 billion pounds in the UK. ... Yet transcripts of investor and analyst 
calls over 12 years show Starbucks officials regularly talked about the UK 
business as ‘profitable’, said they were very pleased with it, or even cited it 
as an example to follow for operations back home in the United States. ...  
 
You could think of Starbucks’ differing versions of its experience in the UK 
as two different coffees. To its investors, it sells an espresso - strong and 
vibrant. The UK taxman gets a watered-down Americano.”311 
 
 
To tell investors one thing and the taxman another to avoid tax is to cheat the public 
revenue.  
 
Lord Templeman’s summary in Ensign illustrates how “the arrangements result in a 
claim for the repayment ... that has not been, and is unlikely to be, paid”:  
 
“The scheme in the present case had the apparently magic result of 
creating for tax purposes an expenditure of $14,000,000 while incurring a 
real expenditure of only $3,250,000.”312 
 
 
The judicial review in Matrix-Securities v IRC313 turned similarly on what Lord 
Templeman described as “the contradiction between the letter dated 15 July 1993 to 
the inspector which refers to a price of £95m for the relevant interest and the letter 
dated 19 August 1993 to the receiver which refers to a price of £8m”314, which 
underpinned the scheme. As he put it: 
 
“The South Quay trust is a tax avoidance scheme because it aims to 
produce fiscal expenditure of £95m and a real expenditure of only £8m. 
The courts have long since insisted that fiscal consequences correspond 
to real consequences. 
 
Every tax avoidance scheme involves a trick and a pretence. It is the task 
of the Revenue to unravel the trick and the duty of the court to ignore the 
pretence.”315 
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It is the duty of the court to unravel every tax scheme which invariably involves a trick 
and a pretence.  
 
2.2.4. “Honest” Tax Avoidance Scheme 
 
The corollary of the proposition that a tax avoidance scheme is a cheat by design is 
that the apologist notion of “honest” tax avoidance scheme is a contradiction in terms.  
 
In Burmah Oil, Lord Fraser claimed that “the fact that the purpose of the scheme was 
tax avoidance does not carry any implication that it was in any way reprehensible or 
other than perfectly honest and respectable.”316  
 
In Furniss, Lord Brightman stated that the scheme is “a simple and honest scheme 
which merely seeks to defer payment of tax until the taxpayer has received into his 
hands the gain which he has made.”317 To “defer payment of tax” is to “to prejudice, or 
take the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question”.    
 
2.2.5. “Dishonest” Tax Avoidance Scheme 
 
The converse corollary of the proposition that a tax avoidance scheme is a cheat by 
design is that Lord Farquharson’s description of the scheme in Charlton as “a 
dishonest, tax-avoidance scheme”318 is tautology.  
 
2.3. CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD  
 
Paragraph 8 of the Information in USA v KPMG underscores the proposition that a tax 
avoidance scheme is a conspiracy to a cheat and defraud by design:   
 
“During the period from at least in or about 1996 through at least in or about 
2003, the defendant KPMG, and others known and unknown (hereinafter 
the ‘co-conspirators’), participated in a scheme to defraud the IRS by 
devising, marketing, and implementing fraudulent tax shelters, by preparing 
and causing to be prepared, and filing and causing to be filed with the IRS 
false and fraudulent U.S. individual income tax returns containing the 
fraudulent tax shelter losses, and by fraudulently concealing from the IRS 
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those shelters. This illegal course of conduct was deliberately approved 
and perpetrated at the highest levels of KPMG’s tax management, and 
involved dozens of KPMG partners and other personnel.” 
 
The underlined words show that what Commissioner Everson referred to as the “point 
such conduct passes from clever accounting and lawyering to theft from the people”319 
was when the scheme was devised.  
 
The two reasons given by the Government for rejecting the Law Commission’s 
recommendation to abolish conspiracy to defraud are particularly relevant to tax 
avoidance:  
 
“It was argued that conspiracy to defraud was well defined and is not tied 
to economic gain or loss, but only requires that the conduct prejudices 
another person’s rights. That makes it particularly useful in intellectual 
property cases and in cases where no economic loss has been suffered. ...  
 
It is also useful in dealing with cases where the fraudulent nature of a 
transaction only becomes apparent in the context of several other 
transactions. 
 
Some respondents referred to limitations on statutory conspiracy (under 
the Criminal Law Act 1977) - in particular that the parties to it must intend 
that the substantive offence will be perpetrated by one or more of the 
conspirators. This is not required for conspiracy to defraud. In 
Hollinshead320 for example the defendants conspired to market devices for 
use by third parties to avoid paying for electricity used. The Court of Appeal 
held that this did not amount to a conspiracy to commit offences under 
section 2 of the 1977 Act, as the defendants themselves were not practising 
the fraud on the electricity companies, but it did constitute conspiracy to 
defraud. One respondent said that this situation often arose in cases 
involving intellectual property: for example a group of people conspire to 
manufacture counterfeit goods but do not themselves commit any 
deception in selling them on to another person, who makes the actual 
public sale. ... Bearing in mind in particular the Hollinshead type of case, 
we decided to accept the view of the majority and retain common law 
conspiracy to defraud for the present.”321 
 
 
Tax avoidance schemes, which are cheats and frauds by design, are a “Hollinshead 
type of case” because the professional enablers that devise them “do not themselves 
commit any deception in selling them on to” the participating taxpayers who make the 
false representation in the tax returns submitted to the Revenue. This is why a conduct 
offence like cheating or conspiracy to defraud which “is not tied to economic gain or 
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loss, but only requires that the conduct prejudices [the Revenue’s] rights” is “particularly 
useful in [tax avoidance] cases where no economic loss has been suffered” just by 
devising and marketing the schemes.  
 
A tax avoidance scheme is also the paradigm of “cases where the fraudulent nature of 
a transaction only becomes apparent in the context of several other transactions.” The 
growth of the tax avoidance industry is attributable to the failure of judges to recognise 
this fact. As Lord Templeman put it in Fitzwilliam:   
 
“The earliest case in which a tax avoidance scheme appears to have been 
considered as a whole and held to be ineffective for the purpose of the tax 
sought to be avoided was Lupton v FA & AB. That was a dividend stripping 
device.  
 
Since the dividend stripping cases there have been several cases in which 
a tax avoidance scheme has been considered as a whole and in which the 
device of self cancelling or circulating payments has been held to be 
ineffective for the purpose of the tax sought to be avoided. These cases 
are Black Nominees v Nicol, Ramsay, Eilbeck v Rawling, Burmah and 
Moodie v IRC. The scheme in the present case with regard to the 
contingent moiety provides another example.  
 
There have been several cases in which a tax avoidance scheme has been 
considered as a whole and in which the device of dividing one transaction 
into two or more has been held to be ineffective for the purpose of the tax 
sought to be avoided. These cases are Floor v Davis, Chinn v Collins, 
Furniss v Dawson and Ensign Tankers v Stokes. The scheme in the 
present case with regard to the vested moiety provides another example....  
 
All decisions of this House are founded on justice, principle and precedent. 
If an individual taxpayer employs a device to avoid tax the result is unjust 
because the Revenue are deprived of money intended by Parliament to be 
available for the common good. ...  
 
On principle, transactions such as tax avoidance schemes which are 
intended to operate as a whole must be judged by the results of those 
transactions considered as a whole, not by the language of each 
transaction considered separately. ...  
 
In common with my predecessors I regard tax avoidance schemes of the 
kind invented and implemented in the present case as no better than 
attempts to cheat the Revenue.”322 
 
 
The highlighted principle is why it is important to recognise that a tax avoidance scheme 
requires more than one transaction and why it is defined in this thesis as two or more 
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interrelated transactions of a kind which had never taken place before the tax Act it 
was devised to cheat or defraud was passed devised as a result of it.  
 
2.4. FRAUD UPON AN ACT OR FRAUD ON THE LAW OR ABUSE OF LAW 
 
2.4.1. Fraud or Cheating  
 
The concept of fraud upon an Act or fraud on the law or abuse of law or evasion or 
avoidance of an Act originated from Roman law. According to Van der Stok:  
 
“In fraudem legis agere concerns, according to the Roman lawyer Paulus, 
the act of someone qui salvis verbis legis sententiam ejus circumvenit (who 
without infringing the words of the law, deceives the purport thereof).”323 
 
 
It is simply fraud which “acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent 
transaction” in the construction of statutes in civil proceedings. According to Bennion:  
 
“The courts have frequently held that a construction is to be preferred that 
prevents evasion of the intention evinced by Parliament to provide an 
effective remedy for the mischief against which the enactment is directed. 
When deliberately embarked on, such evasion is judicially described as a 
fraud on the Act.”324 
 
 
In Bills v Smith, Cockburn CJ explained that “the courts, from the time of Lord 
Mansfield, held that if a trader, in contemplation of bankruptcy, with a view to evade 
the bankruptcy law, preferred a particular creditor to the detriment of the rest, such a 
preference was a fraud upon the law.”325  
 
In the 1824 case of Fox v Bishop of Chester, Abbott CJ referred to “the well-known 
principle of law, that the provisions of an Act of Parliament shall not be evaded by shift 
or contrivance.”326  
 
2.4.2. Fraud Upon a Tax Act or Fraud on Tax Law or Abuse of Tax Law  
 
Phillimore translated the concept of fraud on the law as “contra legem facit qui id facit 
quod lex prohibet – in fraudem vero legis qui salvis verbis legis, sententiam ejus 
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circumvenit” (or “he violated the law who transgressed its meaning, though he 
kept within its letter.)”327  
 
A tax avoidance scheme or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind which had 
never taken place before the tax Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed, 
devised as a result of it is a fraud upon a Tax Act or a fraud on tax law or an abuse of 
tax law, hence the familiar expression embedded in HMRC’s and UK Government’s 
definition:  
 
“Tax avoidance involves bending the rules of the tax system to gain a tax 
advantage that Parliament never intended. It often involves contrived, 
artificial transactions that serve little or no purpose other than to produce 
this advantage. It involves operating within the letter – but not the spirit 
– of the law.”328 
 
 
As explained in chapter one, “bending the rules of the tax system to gain a tax 
advantage that Parliament never intended” constitutes “fraudulent conduct ... to 
prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question”; 
and “contrived, artificial transactions that serve little or no purpose other than to 
produce this advantage” amount to “deceitful practices, in defrauding or endeavouring 
to defraud [the Revenue] by means of some artful device, contrary to the plain rules of 
common honesty.” 
 
The false dichotomy between “the letter” and “the spirit” of the law involves the failure 
to “remember that the Tax Acts are but a part of the general law of the land.”329 To 
adopt the words of Lord Hoffmann in Norglen:  
 
“It is not that the statute has a penumbral spirit which strikes down devices 
or stratagems designed to avoid its terms or exploit its loopholes. There is 
no need for such spooky jurisprudence.”330 
 
 
The subversion of the rule of law by tax avoidance schemes is better understood by 
considering the notion of “legal” avoidance of tax law as a contradiction in terms that 
illustrates the Orwellian doublethink:  
 
“If you kept the small rules, you could break the big ones.”331 
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A tax avoidance scheme involves the use of the small rules (or particular provision(s) 
of the relevant tax Act) to break the big ones (or general principles like the pre-existing 
common law of cheating the public revenue and tax fraud). According to Monroe: 
 
“It may be difficult to identify comprehensively and with precision the factors 
which characterise such schemes for the schemes are many and varied. 
The categories of fiscal ingenuity are not closed. A common starting point 
is to find a statutory relief or other provision in the tax code normally invoked 
to obtain a reduction in a taxpayer’s liability in the context of some 
commercial transaction. A transaction bearing a marked resemblance to 
such a commercial transaction is then engineered and the relief or 
deduction is claimed.”332 
 
 
In Willoughby, Lord Nolan described a tax avoidance scheme as “a course of action 
designed to conflict with or defeat the evident intention of Parliament.”333 In Lupton, 
Lord Donovan described it as “the planning and execution of a raid on the Treasury 
using the technicalities of revenue law and company law as the necessary weapons.”334  
 
In Plummer335, Viscount Dilhorne described Rossminster’s Capital Income Plan 
masterminded by Roy Tucker as “an ingenious, complicated and well thought out 
scheme ... to avoid the payment of tax by those who participated and to raid the 
Treasury using the technicalities of revenue law as the necessary weapon.”336 
According to an associate:  
 
“Roy could take a piece of legislation and come up with a tax-avoidance 
idea in ten minutes”.337  
 
The House of Lords held that the scheme “worked” by a majority (Viscount Dilhorne 
and Lord Diplock dissenting). Lord Wilberforce concluded:  
 
“One final point: the familiar argument was used that Parliament can never 
have intended to exempt from the taxing provisions an arrangement solely 
designed to obtain fiscal advantages. But this is not the question, nor is a 
canon of interpretation of this kind admissible - or indeed a workable canon. 
The question is whether a certain series of transactions in a certain legal 
form do or do not fall within the taxing words. If they do not, and if 
Parliament dislikes the consequence, it can change the law - as in fact it 
                                                 
332 (1981) 74.  
333 [1997] 1003. 
334 [1972] 657.  
335 [1979] STC 793. 
336 54 TC 1, 44. 
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has done since the scheme in question was operated. The subject is 
entitled to be judged under the law as it stood at the relevant time.”338 
 
 
“The subject is entitled to be judged under the law as it stood at the relevant time” but 
the law includes both the tax Act which the tax avoidance scheme was devised to cheat 
and the pre-existing common law that prohibits the cheating.  
 
In an interview published by the Financial Times on 9 October 1979 (following the 
hearing of Plummer by the House of Lords in June but before the delivery of the 
judgment in November 1979) Tucker demonstrated how the notion that “if Parliament 
dislikes the consequence, it can change the law” sends Parliament and the Revenue 
on a fool’s errand in the context of “transactions ... of a kind which had never taken 
place before the Act was passed ... devised as a result of it”:  
 
“After working out the avoidance objective the Revenue was trying to ban, 
you start thinking of other ways of reaching the same result.” 
 
 
Writing in 2012, Roy Lyness (who masterminded the ‘K2’ scheme used by comedian 
Jimmy Carr and others) provided this up-to-date analogy:  
 
“It’s a game of cat and mouse. The Revenue closes one scheme, we find 
another way round it. It’s like a sat-nav. I’m driving to Manchester, get a 
message saying there’s a smash at Stoke, press this button to re-route. 
That’s all we do with tax avoidance. The Revenue puts a block in, we just 
go round the block.”339 
 
These brazen statements illustrate what Lord Eldon described in 1829 in Fox v Bishop 
of Chester as “a fraud on the law, or ... an insult to an Act of Parliament”.340  
 
2.4.3. Abuse of Right      
 
The common misconception that abuse of law or fraud upon an Act (which equates to 
fraude à la loi or fraus legis in civil law jurisdictions) has no place in the common law 
results from the failure to distinguish it from the different concept of abuse of right (or 
abus de droit in civil law jurisdictions).  
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Abuse of right also originated in Roman jurisprudence and was translated by Maule, J 
in Acton v Blundell thus: “if a man digs a well in his own field, and thereby drains his 
neighbour's, he may do so, unless he does it maliciously.”341 In other words, while 
abuse of law is concerned with “purpose”, abuse of right considers “motive”.  
 
In Mayor of Bradford v Pickles, Smith, L.J. explained that the law on abuse of right was 
“definitively settled”342 by the House of Lords in Chasemore v Richards where Lord 
Wensleydale held that:  
 
“The civil law deems an act, otherwise lawful in itself, illegal if done with a 
malicious intent of injuring a neighbour, animo vicino nocendi … but this 
principle has not found a place in our law.”343  
 
 
Following Bradford, the House of Lords emphasised through Lord Herschell in Allen v 
Flood that:  
 
“It is certainly a general rule of our law that an act prima facie lawful is not 
unlawful and actionable on account of the motive which dictated it.”344 
 
 
2.4.4. The Supposed Rejection of Abuse of Law in English Law   
 
In Bayliss v Gregory, which is one of the co-joined appeals in Craven v White that 
started the retreat from the Ramsay principle, Vinelott J rejected the Revenue’s 
argument for the extension of the inchoate fiscal nullity version that reached its high-
water mark in Furniss v Dawson into a full-fledged fraud principle by invoking abuse of 
right: 
 
“It is immaterial for this purpose that Mr Gregory, the majority shareholder 
in Holdings, had de facto control of Holdings and that the exchange was 
made with a view to the avoidance or the indefinite postponement of a 
liability to capital gains tax and for no other purpose. The doctrine of abuse 
of right by a taxpayer which obtains in some continental countries has no 
place in our jurisprudence.”345 
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Commenting on the application by the ECJ of the concept of ‘abusive practice’ it 
developed in non-tax cases to the Sixth VAT Directive in Halifax v Customs and Excise 
Commissioners346, Freedman cited Vinelott J’s statement and referred to abuse of law: 
 
“The concept of abuse of law has been rejected in UK tax law in the past 
but may now be entering into UK jurisprudence through this and other 
decisions of the ECJ. It is possible that the development of this 
jurisprudence in a European context could even have an influence on the 
development of the UK direct tax case law, although it is more likely that it 
will be confined to indirect tax. It could be that legislation will be needed to 
clarify the full effect of the Halifax case.”347  
 
 
Dixon and Cannon also argued that Vinelott J stated his rejection in Bayliss “far too 
emphatically so for us to suddenly embrace”348 the abuse doctrine.  
 
As abuse of law or fraud upon an Act is a bona fide common law principle that 
corresponds to the concept of fraud, there is no legal objection to the application of the 
abuse doctrine in tax avoidance cases in the UK.  
 
 
2.4.5. The Rejection of the Business Purpose Test in Canada  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada also rejected the business purpose test in Stubart 
Investments v The Queen349 by equating abuse of law to abuse of rights. Justice Estey 
stated:  
 
“What then is the law in Canada as regards the right of a taxpayer to order 
his affairs so as to reduce his tax liability without breaching any express 
term in the statute? Historically, the judicial response is found in Bradford 
v Pickles, where it was stated:  
 
‘If it was a lawful act, however ill the motive might be, he had a right to 
do it. If it was an unlawful act, however good his motive might be, he 
would have no right to do it.’350  
 
‘No use of property, which would be legal if due to a proper motive, 
can become illegal because it is prompted by a motive which is 
improper or even malicious.’351”352 
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As explained above, Bradford was concerned with abuse of right, and did not involve 
taxation. In fact, the misconception in Stubart originated from the judges’ reliance on 
an article by Ward and Cullity entitled “Abuse of Rights and the Business Purpose Test 
as Applied to Taxing Statutes’’353, which Justice Estey described as “the high water 
mark in the opposition to the introduction of a business purpose test.”354 When it was 
presented in The Cambridge Lectures355 in 1981 the French scholar André Tunc noted 
that it “depart[ed] from the proper field of abuse of right” into the territory of “a simulation 
or a fraude à la loi which are quite different concepts”356, and concluded:   
 
“It is a general doctrine of French law that, when people try to conceal an 
operation behind the appearance of another one, for instance, to conceal 
a gift under the appearance of a sale, the operation should be submitted as 
regards its substance, if not its form, to the rules governing the operation 
intended by the parties: this is the doctrine of simulation. Furthermore, 
people cannot evade the law by doing something for the sole purpose of 
avoiding a rule of law. For instance, married persons may not change their 
nationalities for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce: this would be a 
fraude à la loi. The distinction is very important if we now consider tax law. 
I understand from the Ward-Cullity paper that abuse of right is used in 
Canada in the field of tax law. As far as I know, it is not used in France in 
this field. ... Even the concept of fraude à la loi is very narrowly used. It is 
a well settled doctrine of the Conseil d’Etat that someone trying to reach a 
certain result may do what is necessary to attain it at the smallest possible 
tax cost as long as he does not violate the law or dissumulate as to what 
he is doing.”357 
 
 
Fraude à la loi corresponds to fraud on the law while simulation corresponds to the 
English doctrine of sham expounded in chapter eight. Both are different from abus de 
droit or abuse of right.  
 
2.5. FRAUD  
 
The fundamental difference between ‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ fraud is that whereas fraud or 
cheating or dishonesty will be the central issue in relevant criminal proceedings, it has to 
be pleaded and proved in civil proceedings. In his classic statement in Davy v Garrett 
Thesiger LJ stated:  
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“In the Common Law Courts no rule was more clearly settled than that fraud 
must be distinctly alleged and as distinctly proved, and that it was not 
allowable to leave fraud to be inferred from the facts. It is said that a 




More recent authority is consistent with the principle that fraud or dishonesty must be 
pleaded. As Gibson LJ put it in Wimpey v V. I. Construction:  
 
“It is trite law that dishonesty must be pleaded with full particulars and put 
to the person alleged to be dishonest. This is an essential procedural 
safeguard on which the courts insist. It is not open to the court to infer 
dishonesty from facts which have not been pleaded. Nor is it open to the 
court to infer dishonesty from facts which have been pleaded but are 
consistent with honesty.”359 
 
 
As a tax avoidance scheme is a fraud by design, the application of this procedural 
safeguard obscures its fraudulent nature as demonstrated in the Introduction. In the 
words of Lord Denning’s classic statement in Lazarus: 
 
“No court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he 
has obtained by fraud. ... Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful 
not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is 
proved, it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever.”360 
 
 
By being “careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved”, therefore, 
every “court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained 
by fraud” in tax avoidance litigation where fraud is not “distinctly pleaded and proved” 
by the Revenue.  
 
The procedural safeguard thus serves as a protective shield for the tax avoidance 
industry because members of the Revenue Bar acting on behalf of the Revenue fail to 
plead fraud in what can be described as doing everything possible to win the battle 
(against the impugned tax avoidance scheme) whilst doing everything possible not to 
win the war (against all tax avoidance schemes). This bars the investigation of the 
fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme and protects the dogma that “tax 
avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal”.  
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In Ramsay, Rossminster’s marketing letter to the participating taxpayers361 (in 
Appendix 3) shows that the scheme amounted to “prejudice, or ... the risk of 
prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question” when it was devised and thus 
made “capable of implementation in practice”, which was well before February 23, 1973 
when it was sold to the taxpayer-company and thus “made available for 
implementation”.  
 
The object of what the letter described as “the detailed steps to be taken to implement 
the Scheme”362, which are summarised in the letter as “transactions” “(a)” to “(o)”, was 
to create a mismatch between the true position at (a) that exists in the real world and 
the tax position at (o) that is presented to the Revenue. As Rossminster acknowledged:   
 
“The Scheme is a pure tax avoidance scheme and has no commercial 
justification insofar as there is no prospect of T making a profit; indeed he 
is certain to make a loss representing the cost of undertaking the 
Scheme.”363   
 
 
Nothing, therefore, turned on the way “transactions” (a) to (o) were actually 
“implemented”. According to the Special Commissioners:  
 
“The object of the tax avoidance scheme summarised in [the] letter was, as 
the Appellant Company admitted, to manufacture a loss which would 
reduce a chargeable gain of £187,977 which had accrued to the Appellant 
Company on the sale of a freehold farm.”364  
 
 
Again, “to manufacture a loss which would reduce a chargeable gain of £187,977 which 
had accrued to the Appellant Company on the sale of a freehold farm” is to cheat the 
public revenue or “to prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to 
the tax in question”.  
 
Lord Templeman’s famous speech in the Court of Appeal demonstrates how the 
procedural principle that “[t]he court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly 
pleaded and proved” overrides the substantive principle that “[f]raud unravels 
everything” and thus obscures the fraudulent nature of tax avoidance in civil 
proceedings:   
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“This is a Revenue appeal from Goulding J. The facts as set out in the Case 
Stated by the Special Commissioners demonstrate yet another circular 
game in which the taxpayer and a few hired performers act out a play; 
nothing happens save that the Houdini taxpayer appears to escape from 
the manacles of tax. The game is recognisable by four rules. First, the play 
is devised and scripted prior to performance. Secondly, real money and 
real documents are circulated and exchanged. Thirdly, the money is 
returned by the end of the performance. Fourthly, the financial position of 
the actors is the same at the end as it was in the beginning save that the 
taxpayer in the course of the performance pays the hired actors for their 
services. The object of the performance is to create the illusion that 
something has happened, that Hamlet has been killed and that Bottom did 
don an asses head so that tax advantages can be claimed as if something 
had happened. The audience are informed that the actors reserve the right 
to walk out in the middle of the performance but in fact they are the 
creatures of the consultant who has sold and the taxpayer who has bought 
the play; the actors are never in a position to make a profit and there is no 
chance that they will go on strike. The critics are mistakenly informed that 
the play is based on a classic masterpiece called ‘The Duke of 
Westminster’ but in that piece the old retainer entered the theatre with his 
salary and left with a genuine entitlement to his salary and to an additional 
annuity. The game now under appeal was put on the market by the tax 
consultants, Dovercliffe Consultants Ltd., and was bought by the taxpayer, 
W. T. Ramsay Ltd. The taxpayer arranged to borrow money from the 
bankers, Slater Walker Ltd., on terms that the money should be used only 
for the performance and with safeguards which ensured that the bankers 
would be reimbursed. The taxpayer and the consultants revolved and 
exchanged money through companies controlled by them or their directors 
and thereby at negligible cost to the taxpayer and without earning a gain or 
suffering a loss created for the taxpayer a claim for a non-taxable gain and 
for a tax deductible loss, thus achieving no result save a manufactured 
claim to entitlement to tax relief. 
 
The Crown assumed that the majority decision of this Court in Floor v Davis 
was indistinguishable and precluded them from relying on the fact that 
nothing happened in the present case except the manufacture of a tax 
advantage. They reserve the right to argue otherwise in the House of Lords. 
Therefore I concentrate on the capital gain as though it was independent 
of the capital loss and inspired by commerce.”365 
 
 
As expounded in chapter eleven, the two decisions of the Privy Council that established 
the tax dogma – Simms v Registrar of Probates366 and Bullivant and Others v Attorney-
General for Victoria367 – turned on the Revenue’s failure to plead fraud. As Lord 
Halsbury put it in Bullivant: 
 
“[I]n the parallel, but not exactly similar, case in the Privy Council where the 
word ‘evade’ was used, the Privy Council held that it must be understood 
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that where it was intended to be an allegation that a fraud had been 
committed you must allege it and prove it: Simms.”368 
 
 
More than a century later, the tax dogma continues to rely upon the failure by counsel 
for the Revenue to plead fraud. In Ingenious Games LLP v HMRC Henderson J 
reversed the decision of the FTT not to permit HMRC to allege dishonesty when 
questioning witnesses since it failed to make those allegations in its statement of case 
but acknowledged that:  
 
“There has also been a recurrent theme of assurances given to the FTT, 
sometimes in apparently unqualified terms, to the effect that HMRC were 
not alleging fraud or dishonesty against anybody. While it is true … that 
HMRC were under no obligation to plead a positive case of fraud or 
dishonesty … the impression given to a neutral observer by some of 
HMRC’s exchanges with the FTT could be one of ambivalence, even at 
times evasiveness, and a willingness to wound but not to strike, in an area 
where openness and clarity should be at a premium unless HMRC had 




Furthermore, judges occasionally go beyond the procedural safeguard that fraud must 
be pleaded and proved distinctly to reaffirm the dogma that “tax avoidance is legal” by 
attesting to the “honesty” of tax avoidance schemes where fraud or dishonesty is not 
in issue or in evidence. As demonstrated above, Lord Fraser described the scheme in 
Burmah as “perfectly honest” while Lord Brightman described the scheme in Furniss 
as “a simple and honest scheme”.  
 
In judicial review, the false representation cases - notably Preston v IRC370, MFK 
Underwriting v IRC371 and Matrix-Securities372 - resulted from the fact that the Revenue 
could not “rely on the taxpayer’s good faith, but more especially on the professional 
advisers they appoint to act for them” in the words of Lord Farquharson in Charlton. 
According to Simpson: 
 
“These cases begin to describe – in some detail it must be said – the 
obligations incumbent on the citizen who seeks clarification of the fiscal 
consequences of a planned transaction, or who otherwise relies on 
representations made on behalf of the Revenue. As at the subsequent 
stage of self-assessment of transactions once they have been carried into 
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effect, the representation cases recognise the obligations of the citizen to 
be open and honest when dealing with the taxing machinery.”373 
 
 
In all cases, however, the courts applied the pre-existing common law of cheating by 
reading the overriding duty of honesty into the administrative law doctrine of legitimate 
expectation despite the concessions by counsel to the Revenue to the contrary. In 
Preston, which involved a failed Rossminster scheme and a former Rossminster 
employee (Preston), counsel for the Revenue, Charles Potter QC (who acted on behalf 
of Rossminster in Ramsay), argued that Preston acted “innocently”. As Lord 
Templeman stated in his judgment:  
 
“[C]ounsel for the taxpayer made great play with what he described as a 
‘concession’ volunteered by counsel for the Crown in the course of 
argument in the Court of Appeal, namely that in the 1978 disclosures and 
correspondence the taxpayer acted ‘innocently’. But the state of mind of 
the taxpayer in 1978 is not in issue or in evidence in these proceedings. I 
decline to be influenced by a casual, courteous and irrelevant observation 




In Matrix-Securities, where the dishonesty of the applicant and its professional advisers 
was even more blatant, as demonstrated above, Lord Jauncey confirmed the principle 
established in Preston and MFK that “a breach of representation by the Revenue will 
not amount to an abuse of power if full disclosure of all relevant material had not been 
made by the taxpayer prior to the making of the representation”375 but concluded:  
 
“I should add that the Revenue have all along accepted both in the courts 




Lord Brown-Wilkinson applied the related principle that “a failure by the taxpayer to 
make full disclosure of the material circumstances is not the only case in which, 
notwithstanding that the Revenue have given an assurance, it will be no abuse of power 
for the Revenue to go back on the assurance given”377 but stated:  
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“However, no allegation of bad faith is made against the applicant or its 




As demonstrated above, the applicant’s claim for breach of legitimate expectation failed 
because the false representation built into the scheme by the professional advisers 
necessitated a false representation to the Revenue. The dishonesty that defeats a 
judicial review claim by a participating taxpayer for alleged breach of legitimate 
expectation should also defeat a tax avoidance appeal because it is the defining legal 
feature of the scheme. This is a corollary of the substantive principle that “Fraud 
unravels everything” but it is defeated by the procedural principle that:  
 




2.6. CONCLUSION     
 
This chapter fortified the proposed cheating or fraud approach of judging tax avoidance 
schemes in criminal and civil proceedings on the basis of the legal question whether 
the enabling professional advisers and the participating taxpayers cheated or 
defrauded the public revenue in law by demonstrating the inherently fraudulent nature 
of a tax avoidance scheme in criminal and civil law.  
 
It demonstrated that the corollary of the fundamental principle that cheating and fraud 
under the common law and fraud under the Fraud Act are ‘conduct’ offences committed 
by “deliberate dishonesty to the prejudice of another person’s proprietary right”379 
(rather than ‘result’ offences that require proof of actual loss) is that any professional 
adviser involved in devising a tax avoidance scheme cheats the public revenue or 
“prejudice[s], or take[s] the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question 
knowing that he has no right to do so” in the words of Hardy J’s classic definition.  
 
A tax avoidance scheme is, therefore, a fraud and a cheat by design as a matter of law 
regardless of whether it “works” as a matter of statutory construction under “the legal 
fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant.” 
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CHAPTER THREE                     
 
THE FRAUDULENT NATURE OF THE CONDUCT OF LAWYERS INVOLVED IN 
TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
Can it then be said that the communication should be protected because it 
may lead to the disclosure of an illegal purpose? I think that it cannot; and 
that evidence which would otherwise be admissible cannot be rejected upon 
such a ground. On the contrary, I am very much disposed to think that the 
existence of the illegal purpose would prevent any privilege attaching to the 
communication. Where a solicitor is party to a fraud no privilege attaches to 
the communications with him upon the subject because the contriving of a 
fraud is no part of his duty as solicitor; and I think it can as little be said that 
it is part of the duty of a solicitor to advise his client as to the means of 
evading the law. 
Sir G. J. Turner, VC, Russell v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387, 392-393. 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter develops the inherently fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme 
established in chapter two by demonstrating the inherently fraudulent nature of the 
conduct of lawyers involved in devising, marketing, implementing and otherwise 
facilitating the use of tax avoidance schemes.  
 
Sir George Turner’s seminal statement of the principle that where confidential 
communication between a lawyer and client is for the purpose of obtaining legal advice 
as to how to commit a fraud or an illegality or an iniquity it is not privileged is usually 
described as the fraud or illegality or iniquity exception to legal professional privilege 
(LPP), which comprises legal advice privilege (LAP) and litigation privilege (LP). In fact, 
such communication does not fall either within the terms of, or the rationale for, LPP 
because such a lawyer is not acting in his capacity as a lawyer but as a “party to a 
fraud”. The references to “illegal purpose” show that fraud is used in the widest sense 
that encompasses any illegality. Other authorities refer to “crime or fraud”380, “criminal 
or unlawful”381, “iniquity”382 and “all forms of fraud and dishonesty such as fraudulent 
breach of trust, fraudulent conspiracy, trickery and sham contrivances”.383  
 
As demonstrated in chapter two, a tax avoidance scheme is a “form of fraudulent 
conduct ... to prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in 
                                                 
380 R v Cox (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 153, 165. 
381 Bullivant, p.201. 
382 Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 1 W.L.R. 607, 611. 
383 Crescent Farm v Sterling Offices [1972] Ch. 553, 565. 
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question”384 in criminal law and a fraud upon an Act or evading an Act or avoiding an 
Act in civil law. The conduct of a lawyer involved in devising or marketing or 
implementing or otherwise facilitating the use of a tax avoidance scheme, therefore, 
falls within Sir George Turner’s statement “because the contriving of a fraud is no part 
of his duty as [a lawyer]; and it can as little be said that it is part of the duty of a [lawyer] 
to advise his client as to the means of evading the law” or avoiding the law or defrauding 
the law or cheating the public revenue.   
 
The prevailing approach to the role of lawyers in avoidance presumes that it is “legal” 
and thus misconceives its fraudulent nature in both the criminal and civil law. According 
to McBarnet:   
 
“Lawyers are not simply means to the implementation of statutory or other 
ready-made rights, but creators of legal techniques, definitions, and 
devices. Indeed, far from being means to the implementation of rights, it is 
lawyers who create the devices which obviate them and render them 
ineffective. The legal profession, in short, is as much geared to the 
avoidance of law as it is to its implementation. ... Indeed, it is the creative 
side of the lawyer’s job that is its most prestigious aspect and attracts the 
highest fees. It is important to give due emphasis to the active and creative 
role of lawyers in working against the spirit of the law. ...  
 
How can the law be used to avoid the law? This may seem rather a 
contradiction in terms. But law is a multifaceted phenomenon and one facet 
can often be used to contradict another. ... Avoidance devices use  the  
legal  techniques  of the  legal  profession  to work on the content  of  
statutes and cases, to produce a method of  literally  complying with the  
words of the  law  while  nonetheless  defeating  its purpose. This is  done 
in  a way  which meets the requirements  of  the  forms  and procedures of  
law, may even use the institutions  of  law for endorsement, and  justifies 
the whole process  via the ideology  of the rule  of law.”385  
 
 
As explained in chapter two, the law can be used to avoid the law because avoidance 
devices are frauds upon an Act which use the letters of an Act to cheat or defraud the 
general principles of cheating or fraud. The supposed distinction between “the spirit of 
the law” and “the letter of the law” misconceives the fact that Acts of Parliament are but 
one part of the law.  
 
The rest of this chapter uses the roles of lawyers in blessing tax schemes, concealing 
tax schemes, subverting anti-avoidance doctrines and defending tax schemes in 
                                                 
384 Hardy J, Less. 
385 ‘Law, Policy, and Legal Avoidance: Can Law Effectively Implement Egalitarian Policies?’, 
Journal of Law and Society (1988) 113, 118. 
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litigation to demonstrate that “working against the spirit of the law” is cheating the public 
revenue in law; and that it thus dis-applies LPP.  
 
3.2 THE BLESSING OF TAX SCHEMES  
 
In the US where the practice originated, legal opinions are used by the professional 
enablers to reassure the participating taxpayers that a scheme is “More Likely than Not 
(MLTN)” to succeed if challenged by IRS. According to paragraph 10 of the indictment 
in USA v KPMG:  
 
“In order to conceal the true nature of the tax shelter from the IRS and 
shield the wealthy clients from IRS penalties for underpaying of U.S. 
individual income taxes, KPMG, and/or a law firm provided the clients with 
opinion letters containing false and fraudulent representation and 
statements and claims that the tax shelter losses were ‘more likely than not’ 
to survive in court if challenged by the IRS. The law in effect from at least 
in or about August 1997 provided that if a taxpayer claimed a tax benefit 
that was later disallowed, the IRS would impose substantial penalties, 
usually at least 20% of the tax deficiency, unless the tax benefit was 
supported by an independent opinion relied on by the taxpayer in good faith 
that the tax benefit was ‘more likely than not’ to survive IRS challenge. 
Thus, the conspirators issued false and fraudulent opinions letters with the 
intent that the clients would provide the opinion letter and/or the false and 
fraudulent representations and statements containing therein to the IRS if 
and when the clients were audited.” 
 
The “Statement of Facts” accompanying the “Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
between Ernst & Young LLP and the US Department of Justice” dated February 26, 
2013, under which Ernst & Young paid $123 million in fines, restitution and penalties, 
underscores the pivotal role of lawyers in the tax avoidance industry:  
 
“Beginning in 1999 and ending in 2002, ‘E&Y’, in conjunction with various 
law firms, banks and investment advisers, developed, marketed and 
implemented four tax shelter products called COBRA, CDS, CDS Add-On, 
and PICO. Earlier and at or about the same time, other accounting firms 
developed similar tax shelter products and marketed them to their clients. 
E&Y implemented these four tax shelter products for approximately 200 
high net worth clients, intending to defer, reduce or eliminate tax liabilities 
for their clients of more than $2 billion in the aggregate. E&Y prepared tax 
returns reflecting tax losses claimed to have been derived from those tax 
shelter products and subsequently defended certain of its clients in 
connection with audits of those transactions by the IRS. E&Y received 





The tax shelter products were implemented with opinion letters from law 
firms. These legal opinions were intended to provide ‘penalty protection’ to 
individual clients in the event that the IRS audited their tax returns. The 
opinions were premised upon certain taxpayer representations that, in 
some instances, E&Y employees knew were false. E&Y did not issue 
opinions with regard to these transactions.”386 
 
 
Rossminster’s Exempt Debt Scheme in Ramsay provided an early example of the 
adoption of this American innovation in the UK. According to Gillard:  
 
“During the 1972 and 1973 avoidance seasons Tucker and Plummer – 
together with Nicholas Pilbrow and a new partner, the solicitor Jerrold 
Moser – came up with a new offering, devised to avoid capital gains tax. ... 
Moser provided the legal drafting. ... The concept came from Tucker, while 
Plummer involved Slater, Walker ... as the bankers. The marketing was to 
be handled by Pilbrow through his Mayfair tax consultancy, Dovercliffe 
Consultants. The fee, to be shared among the four partners, was to be 8 
per cent of the tax saved. ...  
 
The quartet began selling the latest tax-avoidance scheme in December 
1971, including a new sales gimmick – legal opinions from senior members 
of the Revenue Bar attesting to its likely success. This was to become a 
hallmark of the Tucker sales pitch, which when coupled with the promise to 
fight a test case against the Inland Revenue to prove counsel’s opinion 
correct amounted to an irresistible combination. To put a legal seal of 
approval on the Exempt Debt Scheme, the services were recruited of 
George Graham QC and a then leading junior barrister, Andrew Park – who 
was to become a familiar name in the legal opinions that accompanied 
Tucker sales packages – along with an opinion from a prominent company 
law-expert, Michael Wheeler QC. Such opinions were traditionally given 
privately to clients and their solicitors: their use by the clients as marketing 
tools to sell tax schemes was a novel approach. It seems that there were 
few objections from the Revenue Bar.”387 
 
 
Like Maugham’s exposition analysed in the Introduction, the following exchange 
between the chair of the PAC and the Director of NT [No Tax] Advisers Ltd on 
December 6, 2012 shows that there remains no real objections to this unlawful, but 
highly lucrative, practice from the Revenue Bar, the legal profession, the Revenue and 
the courts:  
 
“Q31 Chair: Can I tell you what really shocked me about you? I have 
another bit of paper here headed ‘Rushmore: the arrangement’. A client 
signs this document, which says, ‘Please accept this as my instruction to 
create gross tax relief of,’ in this case, ‘£250,000 through the Rushmore 
income tax and chargeable gains tax mitigation arrangement developed by 
NT (Jersey) Ltd’. In 2007-08, this person put down £125,000. In 2008-09, 
                                                 
386 Exhibit B. 
387 Gillard, pp.32–36.   
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they wanted £125,000, and they sign it. If the public knew that this was the 
sort of business you were in – deliberately avoiding tax – they would 
consider you to be completely, utterly and totally immoral in the work that 
you are doing.  
 
Aiden James: The product has been settled by an eminent QC. Perhaps 
the week before he settled that opinion, he was working for HMRC. ...  
 
Q36 Chair: Again, it seems completely, utterly and totally unacceptable that 
you just get a lawyer to sign this off, and that gives you the protection to 
run a business that makes money for you out of this, when this is, I repeat, 
purely about using tax law to get a tax advantage that Parliament never 
intended.  
 
Aiden James: As I say, the tax legislation is very complicated. It is 
complicated to the extent that it allows these products to work in the way 
that they do. As I am sure you are aware, these products have been 
challenged by HMRC, and the courts have, on a number of occasions, 




The most senior judges in the civil courts, many of whom rose to the Bench from the 
Revenue Bar like Andrew Park”389, “allow these products to work in the way that they 
do” by persisting with what Lord Diplock condemned in 1965 as “the legal fiction that 
the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant”, which 
enables them to find “for the taxpayer, despite the fact that these are blatantly tax 
avoidance arrangements.” 
 
By contrast, in the criminal prosecution in Charlton, Cunningham was convicted for 
“blessing” the schemes. Rejecting “his case that he acted in the best traditions of the 
Bar”390, Farquharson LJ stated:  
 
“The Crown case against Cunningham at the outset of the trial was that he 
had been active with Charlton in promoting the scheme from the time it was 
launched. ... There was evidence before the jury in the form of Mr Wheeler’s 
interview that he had been taken by Charlton to meet Cunningham to be 
reassured that the scheme as sold by Charlton was tax effective. The first 
conference was said to have taken place at Derby on 19 March 1982 and 
was relied on in opening by the Crown as being part of a pattern whereby 
Charlton used Cunningham to reassure any doubting participants. The 
Crown’s case against Cunningham had been that he advised Wheeler that 
the scheme was effective although to his knowledge it was not.”391 
                                                 
388 PAC (2013) EV2-EV3.  
389 Notable examples from the highest court in the land include Lord Templeman, Lord 
Wilberforce, Lord Nolan, Lord Brightman and Lord Walker.   
390 Charlton, p.516. 




3.3 THE SUBVERSION OF JUDICIAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE DOCTRINES   
 
In a letter to Lord Kames dated June 30, 1759, Lord Hardwicke reaffirmed the primacy 
of general principles like the pre-existing common law of cheating and fraud thus:  
 
“As to relief against frauds, no invariable rules can be established. Fraud is 
infinite, and were a court of equity to lay down rules, how far they would go, 
and no farther, in extending their relief against it, or to define strictly the 
species of evidences of it, the jurisdiction would be cramped, and 




In developing the American doctrines that inspired the Ramsay principle, such as the 
sham transaction doctrine, the step transaction doctrine and the business purpose test, 
the courts chose “to lay down rules, how far they would go, and no farther, in extending 
their relief against it, or to define strictly the species of evidences of it”. This enables 
the use of legal opinions to defeat them. According to Rostain:  
 
“Opinion letters are the stock in trade of tax lawyers. Although opinion will 
devote tens of pages to technical issues, often the critical question comes 
down to whether a taxpayer had a business reason for engaging in a 
transaction or was solely motivated by tax considerations. Since the 1930s, 
a handful of overlapping judicial doctrines have developed to distinguish 
between bona fide business and investment ventures and abusive tax 
shelters. These doctrines seek to find a balance between two 
countervailing principles underlying the American tax system: On one hand, 
taxpayers are allowed to arrange their affairs to minimize their taxes; on the 
other, they are not entitled to tax benefits obtained through formal 
manipulations of tax law that were not intended by Congress. As deals have 
become increasingly complex, it has become more and more difficult to tell 
when they are motivated by business rather than purely tax considerations. 
To be legal, tax products must resemble, as much as possible, bona fide 
investments. But if they entail significant risk, clients will not be interested 
in buying them.”393  
 
 
Paragraph 19(g) of USA v KPMG underscores the fundamental flaw in the use of legal 
opinions to meet the requirement that “[t]o be legal, tax products must resemble, as 
much as possible, bona fide investments”:  
 
“The opinion letters stated that the clients were ‘more likely than not’ to 
survive an IRS challenge to the transactions based on the ‘step 
                                                 
392 See Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke (Cambridge: The University Press, 
1913) p.554. 
393 Rostain, p.6. 
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transaction doctrine’ – a legal doctrine permitting the IRS to disregard 
certain transactions having no economic substance or business purpose 
and the purported tax effects of those disregarded transactions. The 
assertion was false, as the conspirators well knew. Indeed, a co-
conspirator not named as a defendant herein (‘CC 1’), who at the time was 
in charge of CaTS, instructed KPMG partners involved in marketing OPIS 
not to permit KPMG clients who were pitched OPIS to retain a copy of 
KPMG’s PowerPoint presentation describing the transaction ‘under any 
circumstances’ because to do so ‘DESTROY any chance the client may 
have to avoid the step transaction doctrine.’” 
 
The Ramsay principle was similarly undermined, particularly by the injection of the 
requirement of pre-ordainment. In Fitzwilliam, therefore, the lawyers devised and 
implemented the scheme without full prior explanation to, and express instructions 
from, the client because, to paraphrase KPMG, to do so would “DESTROY any chance 
the client may have to avoid the [Ramsay] doctrine.” As Lord Templeman put it:  
 
“This appeal concerns a tax avoidance scheme which involves two 
separate devices. The first device consists of self-cancelling payments. ... 
In Ramsay self-cancelling payments were held by this House to be 
ineffective. The second device consists of carrying out one transaction by 
means of two transactions. ... In Furniss transactions divided into two were 
held by this House to be ineffective; for the purpose of the tax sought to be 
avoided, the two transactions are to be regarded as one single transaction 
carried out by the person who possessed power to effect that one single 
transaction. 
 
The taxpayer in the present case sought to distinguish Ramsay and Furniss 
and other authorities to the same effect on the grounds that on the advice 
of counsel who drafted and recommended the scheme, no explanation was 
given to the taxpayer by her legal advisers until after the scheme had been 
partly implemented. An explanation and advice were then tendered by a 
second counsel who had not been concerned in the authorship of the 
scheme. The taxpayer decided to complete and did complete the scheme. 
The Special Commissioners were not impressed by these suggested 
distinctions which, however, found favour with Vinelott J and the Court of 
Appeal. The Crown now appeals.”394 
 
 
Lord Templeman’s dissenting speech is one the most powerful judicial affirmation of 
the fundamental thesis that tax avoidance is cheating the public revenue by the 
professional advisers that devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate the use 
of tax avoidance schemes in which the taxpayer using an individual scheme may or 
may not be complicit:  
  
                                                 
394 [1993] STC 502, 516-517.  
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“Capital transfer tax would be payable out of the estate before Lady 
Hastings came into her inheritance. The rate was 75%. Lady Fitzwilliam, 
Lady Hastings and the independent trustees hoped that their solicitors 
Currey & Co would find some way in which Lady Hastings could inherit the 
estate but avoid the payment of tax.  
 
Curreys consulted Mr Walker, now a Queen’s Counsel, practising at the 
Chancery Bar and specialising in trusts and tax avoidance to see if he could 
find a way. Curreys first consulted Mr Walker on 11 October 1979 with a 
proposal for a tax avoidance scheme. Counsel amended the scheme from 
time to time and finally advised the implementation of the scheme by steps 
to be taken in accordance with an arranged timetable. The scheme was 
accepted by Curreys and was carried out between 20 December 1979 and 
7 February 1980. On 18 January 1980, after step 3, Mr Herbert of counsel 
was asked by Curreys to advise Lady Hastings. Mr Herbert was a member 
of Mr Walker’s chambers. Mr Herbert was ... asked ... to ... advise only on 
steps 4 and 5 and to discuss the matter with Mr Walker. ...  
 
[Counsel for the taxpayers] submitted that the scheme was not a 
preordained series of transactions because Lady Hastings was ‘separately 
advised’ after step 3. ... The ‘separate advice’ given to Lady Hastings as 
part of Mr Walker’s scheme did not convert steps 2, 3, 4 and 5 from a 
preordained series of transactions into separate transactions. 
 
In my opinion a solicitor owes his client a duty not to embroil the client in a 
tax avoidance scheme or any other substantial transaction without full prior 
explanation and express instructions. A taxpayer who is kept in ignorance 
by his own solicitors when taking part in transactions which when 
completed form a preordained series of transactions for his benefit cannot 
thereafter claim that the transaction did not constitute a preordained series 
of transactions because of his initial ignorance. ...  
 
People should be judged by the results of their actions and not by the 
language of documents intended to mislead. ...  
 
Legal advisers should not conceal their activities from their clients in 
the hope of deceiving the Revenue. A client who subsequently adopts, 
ratifies and claims the benefit of the actions of his solicitors cannot deny 
the real consequences or avoid the fiscal consequences on the grounds of 
personal ignorance. Lord Keith does not condemn the concealment 
practised by Curreys with the approval of Mr Walker and does not even 
acknowledge that Lady Hastings was the client of Curreys and Mr Walker 
although the scheme was planned, concealed, implemented and 
completed for the benefit of Lady Hastings and nobody else. 
 
Mr Walker’s scheme which trembled on the brink of a sham employed the 
devices which proved ineffective in Ramsay and Furniss v Dawson. ...  
 
All decisions of this House are founded on justice, principle and precedent. 
If an individual taxpayer employs a device to avoid tax the result is unjust 
because the Revenue are deprived of money intended by Parliament to be 
available for the common good. A decision in favour of the taxpayer, Lady 
Hastings in this case, would enable an individual taxpayer to drive a coach 
and horses through any Revenue legislation by ingenious drafting and 




In common with my predecessors I regard tax avoidance schemes of the 
kind invented and implemented in the present case as no better than 
attempts to cheat the Revenue.”395 
 
 
The professional enablers did “cheat the Revenue” because honest people do not 
“conceal their activities from their clients in the hope of deceiving the Revenue.” As 
Lord Nicholls stated in his exposition of the test of “how an honest person would 
behave” in Royal Brunei:  
 
“Honest people do not intentionally deceive others to their detriment. Nor 
does an honest person in such a case deliberately close his eyes and ears, 
or deliberately not ask questions, lest he learn something he would rather 
not know, and then proceed regardless.”396 
 
 
The Special Commissioners, whose decision Lord Templeman upheld, based it upon 
strikingly similar findings of fact in relation to both the professional enablers and the 
participating taxpayers: 
 
“Non-disclosure of the circumstances in which each of the five steps was 
taken was, we find, an essential tactic adopted in an endeavour to secure 
the successful implementation of the overall tax-saving plan. There was no 
difficulty in this respect so far as Lady Fitzwilliam was concerned because 
she had such complete confidence in Currey & Co, whom she regarded as 
very erudite and whose advice she would follow implicitly, that she gave 
them carte blanche to make all necessary tax arrangements. She did not 
wish to be concerned with the details. As to Lady Hastings she was content 
that Currey & Co should proceed with the tax saving arrangements without 
reference to her where her participation was not required. ... Lady Hastings 
acknowledged that she knew that Mr Powell was looking into means of 
reducing CTT. The evidence as a whole, however, goes further than that 
and leads us irresistibly to the conclusion, and we so find, that Lady 
Hastings was at all relevant times aware that Mr Powell was putting into 
effect a tax-saving scheme and that she did not know what form that 
scheme took because she did not at any time inquire. She hoped, however, 




Lord Templeman, however, concluded that Mr Walker’s “blessing” immunised the 
taxpayer-trustees from complicity in the “attempts to cheat the Revenue”, stating:  
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“The advice of Mr Walker that such a scheme could properly be 
implemented for the purpose of avoiding capital transfer tax for the benefit 
of Lady Hastings was a complete protection for all the trustees.”398 
 
 
More significantly, his decision to “regard tax avoidance schemes of the kind invented 
and implemented in the present case as no better than attempts to cheat the Revenue” 
effectively reaffirms the fallacy that “tax avoidance is legal” because it maintains the 
possibility that tax avoidance schemes of the kind invented and implemented in other 
cases are not “attempts to cheat the Revenue”.  
 
It was precisely the same false distinction drawn by the judges between “tax avoidance 
schemes of the kind invented and implemented in” Ramsay and Furniss and other 
types of tax avoidance schemes that enabled the majority in Fitzwilliam to uphold it. To 
adopt the words of Lord Macnaghten in Reddaway v Banham: 
 
“That was a gross case, no doubt. But fraud is infinite in variety. Sometimes 
it is audacious and unblushing; sometimes it pays a sort of homage to 
virtue, and then it is modest and retiring; it would be honesty itself if it could 
only afford it. But fraud is fraud all the same; and it is the fraud, not the 
manner of it, which calls for the interposition of the Court.”399 
 
 
3.4 THE CONCEALMENT OF TAX SCHEMES   
 
Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Information in USA v KPMG demonstrate how KPMG 
failed to register the schemes as required by the taxpayer and material advisor 
disclosure provisions introduced by sections 6011 and 6112 of the US Internal 
Revenue Code 1986400:  
 
“Under the law in effect at all times relevant to this Information, an organizer 
of a tax shelter was required to ‘register’ the shelter by filing a form with the 
IRS describing the transaction. The IRS in turn would issue a number to 
the shelter, and all individuals or entities claiming a benefit from the shelter 
were required to include with their income tax return a form disclosing that 
they had participated in a registered tax shelter, and disclosed the assigned 
registration number. Notwithstanding these legal requirements, KPMG and 
its co-conspirators decided not to register as required any of the tax 
shelters KPMG devised, marketed and implemented, and thereby ensured 
that registration numbers would not be included on returns relating to 
unregistered shelters. 
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Thus, KPMG decided not to register FLIP, OPIS, or BLIPS based on a 
‘business decision’ that to register the shelters would hamper KPMG’s 
ability to sell them, and that the IRS penalties applicable to a failure to 
register would be dwarfed by the lucrative fees KPMG stood to collect from 
selling unregistered tax shelters. Indeed, CC 1 wrote a memorandum to a 
member of KPMG’s tax leadership arguing that, assuming OPIS was 
required to be registered, KPMG should make a ‘business decision’ not to 
register OPIS because (i) registering the shelters would put KPMG at a 
competitive disadvantage as compared to other accounting firms, law firms 
and other firms that were promoting tax shelters; and (ii) selling 
unregistered shelters would be so lucrative that the benefits outweighed 
the risk of civil penalties that might be imposed. Moreover, KPMG’s office 
of general counsel, among others, advised that by deciding not to register 
tax shelters, KPMG risked criminal prosecution, but like the CaTS group, 
advised that KPMG’s tax leadership could nevertheless ‘make a business 
decision to not register the activity as a tax shelter.’”401 
 
The memorandum referred to is The Concealment Letter in the KPMG Case in 
Appendix 4. 
 
The PAC’s report of the use of legal opinions to defeat the DOTAS legislation in Part 7 
of the Finance Act 2004, which originated in section 6011, shows that the same 
objective can be achieved in the UK without any penalty simply by procuring the 
“blessing” of leading counsel “who retail opinions”402 and “who prostitute themselves to 
these schemes”403:  
 
“The purpose of DOTAS was to provide early information about tax 
avoidance schemes to HMRC, identify the users of tax avoidance schemes 
and reduce the supply of avoidance schemes by altering the balance of 
financial advantage gained from avoidance. DOTAS requires the promoter 
of certain types of avoidance schemes to disclose information about the 
scheme to HMRC within five days of making it available for use. Taxpayers 
who use these schemes are required to report the scheme reference 
number on their tax return. ...  
 
HMRC has only issued 11 penalties for £5,000 to promoters for non-
disclosure of a scheme under DOTAS since its introduction. The maximum 
penalty was increased to £1 million in 2010, but HMRC has yet to apply 
this. HMRC has also yet to apply a penalty to an individual taxpayer for 
failing to disclose a scheme on their tax return. 
 
We were alarmed that promoters have been able to use some QCs’ 
opinions’ to protect themselves from fines for not disclosing schemes under 
DOTAS. HMRC is not able to fine promoters or taxpayers for not disclosing 
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a scheme where they have a legal opinion that the scheme does not need 
to be disclosed as it constitutes a ‘reasonable excuse’ for not disclosing.”404 
 
 
The KPMG case shows that HMRC can achieve its objective by taking enforcement 
actions against the lawyers involved.  
 
The Promoters of Tax Avoidance Schemes (POTAS) legislation in Part 5 and 
Schedules 34 to 36 Finance Act 2014, which originated in section 6012 of the IRC, 
does not achieve this objective.  
 
3.5 THE ENGLISH PRACTICE   
 
As part of the promise to fight a test case against the Revenue to vindicate counsel’s 
opinion, the absent professional enablers usually pull the strings of the participating 
taxpayers by, amongst other things, choreographing their witness statements under 
the so-called “English practice”.  
 
In her minority decision in Murray Group v HMRC (the “Rangers Big Tax Case”) Judge 
Poon stated:  
 
“A body of evidence that is not narrated in the majority decision, which 
seeks to give a judgment in principle on the efficacy of the trust 
arrangements as a tax avoidance scheme, is of critical relevance in forming 
my view of the transactions in their real terms. On the whole ... I place more 
reliance than my colleagues do, on the documentary evidence. As regards 
the oral evidence, so far as the corporate witnesses and the trustee 
representative of the appellants are concerned, their witness statements 
convey to me an element of choreography, perhaps due to the active 
involvement of counsel in their preparation. More specifically, I have 
reservations about the credibility of certain witnesses, namely, Mr Red, Mrs 
Crimson and Mr Scarlet. The oral evidence has already been narrated in 
the majority decision, and the respondents’ major concern is noted 
regarding ‘the English practice (followed here) of counsel drafting the initial 
form of witness statements’. In making my extra findings in fact, I have 
accorded greater coverage therefore to the admitted documentary 
evidence as providing a more realistic record of the nature of the 
transactions. Obliterated in some instances and by no means complete, 
none the less the documentary evidence that spans over a decade provides 
a contemporary record of the transactions as they happened at the time, 
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If the oral evidence prepared with “the active involvement of counsel” and other 
professional enablers and presented to the court by the participating taxpayer with a 
view to gaining a tax advantage is dishonest, that is a “form of fraudulent [or] dishonest 
conduct by the defendant to prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s 
right to the tax in question knowing that he has no right to do so”406 in the words of 
Justice  Hardy’s definition of cheating the public revenue.   
 
Justice Poon’s description of the role of the mastermind of the schemes shows that the 
supposed distinction between the conduct of the accountants, lawyers and other 
professional advisers involved in devising, marketing and implementing tax avoidance 
schemes and the conduct of members of the Revenue Bar and other lawyers whose 
“work involves acting in courts and tribunals for taxpayers who have engaged in what 
are called (in the trade) ‘marketed tax avoidance schemes’”407 is a distinction with no 
real difference in law:  
 
“The name of Paul Baxendale-Walker came up repeatedly in the course of 
the hearing. He loomed large in the background as the architect of the trust 
scheme with a continuing input into the operation of the scheme beyond its 
inception. Significantly, he was not called as a witness. References were 
made in the cross-examination of various witnesses to the fact that Mr 
Baxendale-Walker was suspended by the Law Society in England from 
practice for three years on 30 March 2003 and was eventually struck off on 
29 September 2006. According to the evidence from Mr Red and Mrs 
Crimson, the group continued to seek the advice of Baxendale-Walker 
during the period of his suspension through a firm of solicitors bearing his 
name that operated until 30 March 2006 (the end of the suspension period). 
Subsequent to Baxendale-Walker being struck off by the Law Society, the 
appellants sought his advice through a multi-disciplinary limited liability 
partnership bearing his name, and of which the legal profession was not 
one of the disciplines.”408 
 
 
As “the operation of the scheme beyond its inception” merges with the resultant 
litigation, each constitutes a “form of fraudulent [or] dishonest conduct by the defendant 
to prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question”.  
 
Despite the adverse findings of fact against the participating taxpayers and the 
professional enablers in Murray, the majority in the First-Tier Tribunal and the Upper 
                                                 
406 Less. 
407 Maugham (2015). 
408 Ibid, p.208. 
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Tribunal409 upheld the scheme under the constructional approach that “allows these 
products to work in the way that they do.” 
 
3.6 THE FRAUD EXCEPTION TO LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE   
 
3.6.1 The Principle  
 
The fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme extinguishes LPP because of “the 
principle that nobody may benefit from his own civil or criminal wrong”.  
 
3.6.2 Legal Advice Privilege (LAP) 
 
The leading case of Bullivant, which is one of the two decisions of the Privy Council 
that established the dogma “tax evasion is illegal but tax avoidance is legal”, originated 
from an information filed in the Supreme Court of Victoria by the respondent on behalf 
of the Queen against the executors of the testator on the grounds that he conveyed 
estates to certain persons (including the appellants) “with intent to evade the payment 
of duty” contrary to section 115 of the Administration and Probate Act, 1890 of the 
Colony of Victoria. The issue was whether the defendant was entitled to withhold 
relevant documents on the grounds of LAP. Judge Mathew held that the fraud 
exception to LAP applied to compel disclosure. The Court of Appeal agreed.410 
 
The House of Lords did not disturb the decision of the Court of Appeal in principle but 
reversed it on the procedural ground that fraud was not pleaded and proved distinctly. 
As Lord Halsbury put it:  
 
“I think the broad propositions may be very simply stated: for the perfect 
administration of justice, and for the protection of the confidence which 
exists between a solicitor and his client, it has been established as a 
principle of public policy that those confidential communications shall not 
be subject to production. But to that, of course, this limitation has been put, 
and justly put, that no Court can be called upon to protect communications 
which are in themselves parts of a criminal or unlawful proceeding. Those 
are the two principles. ... The line which the Courts have hitherto taken, and 
I hope will preserve, is this - that in order to displace the primâ facie right 
of silence by a witness who has been put in the relation of professional 
confidence with his client, before that confidence can be broken you must 
have some definite charge either by way of allegation or affidavit or what 
not. ... 
                                                 
409 [2014] UKUT 0292. 




I find no such definite charge at all. ... In the parallel, but not exactly similar, 
case in the Privy Council where the word ‘evade’ was used, the Privy 
Council held (I myself was a party to that judgment) that it must be 
understood that where it was intended to be an allegation that a fraud had 
been committed you must allege it and prove it: Simms. That being so, it 
appears to me that it would be an abandonment of the principle which has 
been held sacred in this country if, when a person has done that which in 
itself may be innocent, you should simply, because you choose to suggest 
that it was done with the view of evading the payment of a tax, require the 
witness to disclose the whole of his affairs, and enable the private 




The Keith Committee, which devoted a whole chapter to ‘Confidentiality and legal 
professional privilege’412, found that LAP was being used to prevent the Revenue from 
being aware of the facts by, for example, setting out the steps in a scheme in counsel’s 
opinion, but adopted a similar “balancing approach” because it worked on the basis of 
the fallacy that “tax avoidance is legal”:  
 
“26.6.1. The Committee accept that the general law about legal 
professional privilege, so far as it relates to contemplated or pending 
litigation, should continue to be as fully applicable to proceedings before 
Appeal Commissioners and the VAT Tribunal as it is to proceedings in a 
court of law. We are not, however, satisfied that the rationale which lies 
behind the extension of the privilege to all communications between a client 
and his legal advisers is fully applicable to the circumstances which exist in 
the tax context. As we have observed, the relationship between the 
revenue gathering Department and the taxpayer is materially different from 
that which prevails between two potential litigants. The Department starts 
with the disadvantage that it knows nothing about the affairs of the taxpayer 
except what the latter chooses to tell it. The Department’s information 
powers exist to secure that it can get to know matters which, in some 
instances at least, the taxpayer would prefer it not to know. Legal 
professional privilege is capable of being manipulated so as to assist 
in keeping the Department in a state of ignorance, and there is some 
evidence that this does occur in connection with tax avoidance 
schemes. We consider that in certain cases the privilege in its broader 
aspect can have the effect of denying to the Department access to factual 
material which it is reasonable that they should be permitted to know about. 
If, for example, facts relevant to tax liability are recorded only in a 
communication to the taxpayer’s solicitor, it is hard to perceive any 
substantial practical objection to allowing the Department to see such parts 
of the communication as are purely factual. There could be no question, 
of course, of allowing the Department access to the legal advice as 
such, even though this might reveal chinks in the taxpayer’s armour 
of which they might otherwise be unaware.  
 
                                                 
411 Ibid, pp.200-202.  
412 Chapter 26, pp.537-549.  
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26.6.2. It seems to the Committee that the most helpful approach to the 
broad problems raised by these considerations lie in devising mechanisms 
whereby the proper balance between the competing public interests 
involved can be developed on a case by case basis. This is a familiar 
exercise in the field of public interest immunity.”413 
 
LAP gives lawyers in the tax avoidance industry a huge advantage over other 
professional advisers involved in devising, marketing, implementing and otherwise 
facilitating the use of tax avoidance schemes precisely because it “is capable of being 
manipulated so as to assist in keeping the Department in a state of ignorance, and 
there is some evidence that this does occur in connection with tax avoidance schemes.” 
As the Association of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Taxes stated in its evidence to the 
Committee:  
 
“With highly complex tax avoidance schemes, deliberate attempts are often 
made to prevent the Inspector being aware of all the transactions in the 
scheme. Secrecy is often an important part of the scheme and there will be 
a reluctance to provide information and documentation on a voluntary 
basis.”414   
 
Contrary to the Committee’s conclusion, therefore, “there could be no question … of 
[not] allowing the Department access to the legal advice as such [because this would] 
reveal chinks in the taxpayer’s armour of which they might otherwise be unaware.” As 
the Committee, itself, stated:  
 
“It seems to us wrong in principle that a claim to relief from tax should 
depend in any way for its success upon the Inspector’s state of ignorance 
in regard to any part of it. All the cards should be placed upon the table by 
the taxpayer. The Inspector is then free either to accept the claim, secure 
in the knowledge that all the relevant circumstances have been drawn to 
his attention, or to challenge it on the grounds that he is not satisfied that 
the relief claimed is due.”415 
 
 
The way to give effect to the proposition that “All the cards should be placed 
upon the table by the taxpayer” is to insist that a taxpayer who chooses to get 
involved in a tax avoidance scheme forfeits the right to LAP in relation to that 
scheme.   
 
                                                 
413 Ibid, pp.544-545. Emphases supplied.  
414 The Quarterly Record, June 1981, pp.86-87.  
415 Keith, pp.161-162. Emphasis supplied.  
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The proposed approach is more analogous to public interest immunity (formerly known 
as Crown privilege). In the words of Rigby LJ in Attorney General v Mayor and 
Corporation of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne: 
 
“The law is that the Crown is entitled to full discovery, and that the subject 
as against the Crown is not. That is a prerogative of the Crown, part of the 
law of England, and we must administer it as we find it. I may say that in 
these days the prerogative of the Crown is about equivalent to the rights of 
the public, and, therefore, there is nothing so very hard in it.”416 
 
 
In other words, as the words imply, public interest immunity protects the public interest 
rather than a private right. According to Viscount Simon in Duncan v Cammell Laird:  
 
“The principle to be applied in every case is that documents otherwise 
relevant and liable to production must not be produced if the public interest 
requires that they should be withheld.”417 
 
Today, however, the question is no longer whether lawyers involved in cheating the 
public revenue by devising, marketing, implementing and otherwise facilitating the use 
of tax avoidance schemes should be allowed to continue to use LAP to conceal their 
fraud from the Revenue in the manner the Keith Committee reported, but whether 
accountants and other tax professionals should be permitted to participate in the 
lucrative practice. As Lord Neuberger put it in the landmark Prudential case: 
 
“The specific issue raised by this appeal is whether, following receipt of a 
statutory notice from an inspector of taxes to produce documents in 
connection with its tax affairs, a company is entitled to refuse to comply on 
the ground that the documents are covered by legal advice privilege (LAP), 
in a case where the legal advice was given by accountants in relation to a 
tax avoidance scheme.”418 
 
 
As a result of the inherently fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme 
demonstrated in chapter two and the fraud exception to legal professional 
privilege, the true issue should have been “whether, following receipt of a 
statutory notice from an inspector of taxes to produce documents in connection 
with its tax affairs, a company is entitled to refuse to comply on the ground that 
the documents are covered by legal advice privilege (LAP), in a case where the 
legal advice was given ... in relation to a tax avoidance scheme” whether the legal 
                                                 
416 [1897] 2 QB 384, 395.  
417 [1942] AC 624, 636. 
418 [2013] UKSC 1 [1]. Emphasis supplied.  
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advice was given by a member of the legal profession or a member of any other 
profession.  
 
Lord Nuerberger’s summary of the factual background is consistent with the Keith 
Committee’s report that “[l]egal professional privilege is capable of being manipulated 
so as to assist in keeping the Department in a state of ignorance, and there is some 
evidence that this does occur in connection with tax avoidance schemes” and shows 
why the fraud exception should override LAP regardless of whether the legal advice 
was given by a member of the legal profession or a member of any other profession:  
 
“PricewaterhouseCoopers (‘PwC’), devised a marketed tax avoidance 
scheme (‘the scheme’). In accordance with the requirements of Pt 7 of the 
Finance Act 2004, PwC disclosed the scheme to the Commissioners for 
Inland Revenue, or Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (‘HMRC’) as they 
became a year later and as I will refer to them. At about that time the 
Prudential group of companies instructed PwC to advise them in 
connection with certain overseas holdings, and PwC identified that the 
scheme could be adapted for their benefit. Thereafter the Prudential group 
implemented the scheme, which involved a series of transactions (‘the 
Transactions’). 
 
The details of the scheme and the Transactions do not matter for present 
purposes. It is enough to say that the aim of the scheme was to give rise to 
a substantial tax deduction in Prudential (Gibraltar) Ltd, a subsidiary 
company of Prudential plc, which could then be set off against the profits 
of that company, which profits were ordinarily chargeable to corporation tax 
in this country. 
 
Mr Pandolfo, the inspector of taxes responsible for this aspect of the 
Prudential group’s tax liabilities, considered it necessary to look into the 
details of the Transactions (for reasons which are not challenged). To that 
end, he served notices under s 20B(1) on Prudential (Gibraltar) Ltd and 
Prudential plc (together ‘Prudential’) giving them the opportunity to make 
available specified classes of documents in relation to the Transactions 
prior to his serving notices under s 20(1) and (3). Prudential disclosed many 
of the documents requested by Mr Pandolfo, but refused to disclose certain 
documents (‘the disputed documents’) on the ground that Prudential was 
entitled to claim legal advice privilege in respect of them. 
 
Mr Pandolfo considered that questions were raised by the documents 
which were disclosed, and he sought authorisation from the Special 
Commissioners under s 20(7) to require Prudential to disclose the disputed 
documents. Such authorisation was given, and, on 16 November 2007, Mr 
Pandolfo served notices under s 20(1) and (3) on Prudential (Gibraltar) Ltd 
and Prudential plc respectively, requiring disclosure of the disputed 
documents. 
 
Prudential then issued the present application for judicial review 
challenging the validity of those notices on the ground that they sought 
disclosure of documents which related to the seeking (by Prudential) and 
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the giving (by PwC) of legal advice in connection with the Transactions, 
which were therefore said to be excluded from the disclosure requirements 
of s 20 by virtue of LAP, in accordance with the decision of the House of 
Lords in Morgan Grenfell. 
 
That application came before Charles J, who rejected it on the ground that, 
although the disputed documents would have attracted LAP (and would 
have been thereby excluded from the disclosure requirements of s 20) if 
the advice in question had been sought from, and provided by, a member 
of the legal profession, no such privilege extended to advice, even if 
identical in nature, provided by a professional person who was not a 
qualified lawyer. His decision, [2009] EWHC 2494 (Admin), was upheld, 
substantially for the same reasons, by the Court of Appeal (Mummery, 
Lloyd and Stanley Burnton LJJ), [2010] EWCA Civ 1094.  
 
Prudential now appeal to this court.”419 
 
In other words, like the House of Lords and the Inland Revenue in R (Morgan Grenfell) 
v Special Commissioner of Income Tax420 and indeed all other cases since Bullivant, 
the Supreme Court (and all the courts below) and HMRC accepted the prevailing 
practice that “following receipt of a statutory notice from an inspector of taxes to 
produce documents in connection with its tax affairs, a company is entitled to refuse to 
comply on the ground that the documents are covered by LAP, in a case where the 
legal advice was given by [a lawyer] in relation to a tax avoidance scheme.”  
 
The only issue was, therefore, whether this licence to cheat should be extended to 
accountants and other professional advisers in the tax avoidance industry. In the words 
of Lord Neuberger: 
 
“The more general question raised by this issue is whether LAP extends, 
or should be extended, so as to apply to legal advice given by someone 
other than a member of the legal profession, and, if so, how far LAP thereby 
extends, or should be extended.”421 
 
As if to confirm the inestimable value of LAP in the tax avoidance industry, the Law 
Society of England and Wales, the General Council of the Bar of England and Wales 
and the Legal Services Board intervened to oppose the extension of LAP to other 
professionals while the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
intervened to support it.  
 
                                                 
419 Ibid [10]-[16].  
420 [2002] UKHL 21. 
421 [2013] UKSC 1 [1]. 
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By a majority, the Supreme Court decided to maintain the status quo. Lord Neuberger 
(with whom Lords Mance, Reed, Mance and Hope agreed) stated: 
 
“[I]t seems to me that this appeal gives rise to an issue, possibly a series 
of issues, of policy, which constitutes an area into which the courts should 
generally be reluctant to tread. Rather than extending LAP beyond its 
present accepted boundaries, we should leave it to Parliament to decide 
what, if anything, it wishes to do about LAP.  
 
Much of what is said in the preceding section of this judgment demonstrates 
that quite wide questions of public policy may be thrown up by Prudential’s 
argument. The general implications of extending the generally understood 
limits of LAP as suggested by that argument could clearly have significant 
implications, which, at least in my view, would be very difficult to identify, 
let alone to assess. To put it at its lowest, they may well have significant 
consequences which should be considered through the legislative process, 




On the other hand, Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Clarke agreed) held that LPP 
should be extended to every professional advising on tax law, including every 
professional adviser involved in devising, marketing, implementing and otherwise 
facilitating the use of tax avoidance schemes:  
 
“In my opinion the law is that legal professional privilege attaches to any 
communication between a client and his legal adviser which is made (i) for 
the purpose of enabling the adviser to give or the client to receive legal 
advice, (ii) in the course of a professional relationship, and (iii) in the 
exercise by the adviser of a profession which has as an ordinary part of its 
function the giving of skilled legal advice on the subject in question. The 
privilege is a substantive right of the client, whose availability depends on 
the character of the advice which he is seeking and the circumstances in 
which it is given. It does not depend on the adviser’s status, provided that 
the advice is given in a professional context. It follows, on the uncontested 
evidence before us, that advice on tax law from a chartered accountant will 
attract the privilege in circumstances where it would have done so had it 
been given by a barrister or a solicitor. They are performing the same 
function, to which the same legal incidents attach.”423 
 
In the US, the sort of tinkering envisaged by the majority in the Supreme Court in 
Prudential resulted in the principle in USA v Kovel424 under which communications by 
non-lawyers are protected under LPP when they are working under the direction of 
lawyers. Paragraph 31 of the indictment in USA v KPMG, which underscores the use 
                                                 
422 Ibid [61]-[62]. 
423 Ibid [114].   
424 296 F. 2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). 
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of LAP to conceal the fraudulent nature of tax avoidance schemes, shows how KPMG 
used this principle to defraud the IRS:    
 
“The conspirators also attempted to conceal their fraudulent tax shelters 
activities by attempting to cloak communications regarding those activities 
and certain of the activities themselves with the attorney-client privilege, 
although the communications in question were not privileged. For example, 
CC 2 attempted to conceal his activities in this manner by purporting to 
have KPMG clients engage a law firm to provide legal advice, which law 
firm would then purport to engage KPMG to work under the direction of the 
law firm. Under United States v. Kovel, communications by non-lawyers 
professionals such as accountants are protected under the attorney-client 
privilege when the accountant is in fact working under the direction of an 
attorney. Numerous Kovel arrangements established by CC 2 were sham 
arrangements because the clients did not directly engage the law firm, in 
many instances never even spoke to the lawyers who they had purportedly 
engaged, and CC 2’S work was done outside of the purported lawyer-client 
privilege. The purpose of this fraudulent conduct was to enable the client, 
with the assistance of CC 2 and the law firm, to conceal the fraudulent tax 
shelter from the IRS by attempting to cloak all of the work for the shelter in 
the attorney-client privilege.”425 
 
3.6.2 Litigation Privilege (LP) 
 
Because of the fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme, a lawyer involved in 
defending a scheme in court is also not entitled to LP. Indeed, conducts such as the 





This chapter underscored the inherently fraudulent nature of tax avoidance schemes 
and the inherently fraudulent nature of the conduct of the lawyers involved in devising, 
marketing, implementing and otherwise facilitating their use, including by defending 
them in court. In the words of IRS Commissioner Everson: 
 
“At some point such conduct passes from clever accounting and lawyering 
to theft from the people. ... Accountants and attorneys should be the pillars 
of our system of taxation, not the architects of its circumvention.”426 
 
 
Even in the cases involving accountancy firms, the “theft from the people” was 
masterminded by lawyers. According to Rostain:  
                                                 
425 Emphasis supplied.   




“Although KPMG is an accounting firm, it was lawyers at the firm, as at the 
other former Big Five, who were the main players in the shelter industry.”427  
 
 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the specious distinction between “legitimate” 
and “illegitimate” tax avoidance schemes, which underlies the fallacy that “tax 
avoidance is legal”, results from the fact that lawyers, whether practising lawyers or 
judges involved in tax avoidance while in practise, find it difficult to countenance the 
possibility that every tax avoidance scheme, including the ones they were involved in, 
could be fraudulent as a matter of law.  
 
Lord Templeman’s supposed distinction in Fitzwilliam between “tax avoidance 
schemes of the kind invented and implemented in the present case” which he regarded 
as “attempts to cheat the Revenue” and “tax avoidance schemes of the kind invented 
and implemented in” other cases which could conveniently be regarded as not 
“attempts to cheat the Revenue” effectively maintained the fallacy that “tax avoidance 
is legal” and put the schemes he was involved in the latter category. In an obituary, the 
Daily Telegraph newspaper noted that Lord Templeman “was promoted to the Court of 
Appeal in 1978, where he gained a reputation, among other things, for his implacable 
opposition to artificial tax avoidance schemes — although as a QC in the 1960s his 
practice had involved helping some of his clients to avoid estate duty.”428  
 
Lord Walker, who, as Mr Walker QC, was the subject of Lord Templeman’s stinging 
criticism in Fitzwilliam alluded to Lord Templeman’s tax avoidance practice in his 2004 
article ‘Ramsay 25 years on: some reflections on tax avoidance’429. Citing the case of 
IRC v Holmden430 he stated:  
 
“It is interesting to note that in Holmden the successful taxpayer was 
represented by two leading counsel, Mr John Brightman Q.C. and Mr 
Sydney Templeman Q.C.”431 
 
Mr John Brightman Q.C., was of course, the Lord Brightman that injected the ill-fated 
requirement of pre-ordainment into the Ramsay principle in his leading speech in 
Furniss v Dawson.432 
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In his commentary on Fitzwilliam in 1997, long before Lord Walker was appointed to 
the House of Lords, Venables noted that his career and that of his colleague (Mark 
Herbert) who provided the “separate advice” were not damaged by their involvement 
in the case:  
 
“The other four members of the Appellate Committee were so far from 
considering there to have been a sham that they found that both schemes 
worked. Nor do the counsel who advised on the schemes appear to have 
been in any way discredited, as Robert Walker QC has since been 
appointed a Chancery judge and Mark Herbert has taken silk.”433  
 
Mark Herbert not only provided the “independent advice” but also appeared for the 
taxpayers in the litigation, which was overseen by Currey & Co, the solicitors involved 
in the scheme. 
 
The fact that barristers and solicitors (and increasingly other professional advisers) who 
were involved in devising, marketing, implementing and otherwise facilitating the use 
of tax avoidance scheme in practice, including by defending them in court, go on to 
become the judges that decide tax avoidance cases, including in the highest court in 
the land, does not support the fallacy that “tax avoidance is legal”. To the contrary, it 
means that their decisions and dicta in support of the fallacy that “tax avoidance is 
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CHAPTER FOUR                                                                     
 
THE EQUATION OF ‘TAX EVASION’ AND TAX FRAUD TO CHEATING BY 
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT  
 
I shall not attempt to construct a definition which will meet every case which 
might be suggested, but there is little danger in saying that whenever the 
words ‘fraud’ or ‘intent to defraud’ or ‘fraudulently’ occur in the definition of 
a crime two elements at least are essential to the commission of the crime: 
namely, first, deceit or an intention to deceive or in some cases mere 
secrecy; and, secondly, either actual injury or possible injury or an intent to 
expose some person either to actual injury or to a risk of possible injury by 
means of that deceit or secrecy. 
Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (London: Macmillan, 1883) p. 121. 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION      
 
This chapter unravels the reliance of the dogma “tax evasion is illegal but tax avoidance 
is legal” on the equation of ‘tax evasion’ to tax fraud and the equation of both to cheating 
the public revenue by fraudulent concealment.  
 
“The classic statement of the nature of fraud”434 by Stephen cited above (which was 
analysed in chapter one) emphasises that fraud or cheating may be perpetrated by 
fraudulent misrepresentation (or false representation under section 2 of the Fraud Act) 
without fraudulent concealment (or failing to disclose information under section 3 of the 
Fraud Act) and that an intent to defraud or cheat need not necessarily involve an intent 
to conceal; and vice versa.  
 
Lord Templeman’s classic statement in Challenge, however, shows that the sole focus 
on the taxpayer and the failure to consider the role of the professional enablers of tax 
avoidance results in the equation of tax evasion and tax fraud to cheating by fraudulent 
concealment or cheating “accompanied with no manner of artful contrivance, but wholly 
depends on a bare naked lie”435 or fraud by failing to disclose information under section 
3 of the Fraud Act and the consequent substitution of the supposedly “legal” tax 
avoidance for cheating by fraudulent misrepresentation or cheating “by means of some 
artful device, contrary to the plain rules of common honesty”436 or fraud by false 
representation under section 2 of the Fraud Act: 
 
“Evasion occurs when the commissioner is not informed of all the facts 
relevant to an assessment of tax. ...  
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In an arrangement of tax avoidance the financial position of the taxpayer is 
unaffected (save for the costs of devising and implementing the 
arrangement) and by the arrangement the taxpayer seeks to obtain a tax 
advantage without suffering that reduction in income, loss or expenditure 
which other taxpayers suffer and which Parliament intended to be suffered 
by any taxpayer qualifying for a reduction in his liability to tax.”437 
 
 
The rest of this chapter unravels this misconception and uses legislation, administrative 
practice, and academic research to demonstrate it.   
 
4.2. TAX EVASION  
 
4.2.1. Failing to Make a Return by a Taxpayer  
 
Mavji shows that cheating by deliberately failing to make a return of the relevant tax 
liability is best described as fraudulent concealment or fraud by failing to disclose 
information under section 3 of the Fraud Act. The taxpayer was convicted of cheating 
the public revenue by deliberately failing to make a return of VAT liability, but contended 
in the Court of Appeal that:   
 
“At neither trial did the prosecution allege either in the particulars of offence, 
in its evidence or in its submissions that the appellant had used deception. 
The judge at the second trial erred in law in ruling that deception was not a 
necessary ingredient of the crime of cheating the revenue.”438  
 
 
Rejecting the defendant’s contention, Davies J emphasised that concealment was 
sufficient:  
 
“In our judgment, ‘cheating the revenue’ can take place without any positive 
act of deceit or, to adopt and respectfully endorse the words of Drake J. 
when ruling on this matter in the appellant's first trial: ‘the common law 
offence of cheating does not necessarily require a false representation, 
either by words or conduct. Cheating can include any form of fraudulent 
conduct which results in diverting money from the revenue and in depriving 
the revenue of money to which it is entitled.’  
 
This appellant was in circumstances in which he had a statutory duty to 
make value added tax returns and to pay over to the Crown the value added 
tax due. He dishonestly failed to do either. Accordingly, he was guilty of 
cheating HM The Queen and the public revenue. No further act or omission 
required to be alleged or proved.”439 
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4.2.2. Making a False Return by a Taxpayer 
 
Hudson shows that cheating by deliberately making a false return of the relevant tax 
liability without using a tax scheme is best described as fraudulent misrepresentation 
or fraud by false representation under section 2 of the Fraud Act. As Goddard CJ 
stated:  
 
“We think that the offence here consisted of sending in documents to the 
inspector of taxes which were false and fraudulent to the appellant’s 
knowledge ... for the purpose of avoiding the payment of tax. That is 
defrauding the Crown and defrauding the public.”440 
 
 
4.3. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TAX EVASION AND TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
The actus reus of a taxpayer who evades tax by deliberately making a false return 
without using a tax scheme (like the taxpayer in Hudson) and a taxpayer who avoids 
tax by making a false return on the basis of a tax avoidance scheme (like the directors 
of the taxpayer-companies in Charlton) is identical. Citing Hudson, Stuart-Smith LJ 
stated in Hunt:  
 
“In R v Hudson this court held that the offence of making a false statement 
tending to prejudice the Queen and the public revenue with intent to 
defraud the Queen is, and always has been, a common law misdemeanour 
and includes the offence of causing to be delivered to an inspector of taxes 
accounts relating to the profit of a business which falsely and fraudulently 
state the profits to be less than they actually were.”441 
 
 
In Charlton, where the professional enablers were prosecuted, the accounts and 
returns similarly did “falsely and fraudulently state the profits to be less than they 
actually were”. In the words of Farquharson LJ:   
 
“It was the case for the Crown that the accounts presented to the Revenue 
by the United Kingdom companies were false in that by using Charlton’s 
scheme to transfer part of their profits to the Jersey companies they were 
not disclosing the full extent of the profits they had made. It was this lack of 
disclosure which formed the basis of the false representations alleged in 
the indictment. Each of the Appellants was charged in the relevant counts 
with cheating the Revenue by ‘... falsely representing that the apparent 
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purchases (by the United Kingdom company) from (the Jersey company) 
were bona fide commercial transactions’.”442 
 
 
The underlined terms confirm that concealment and misrepresentation are not mutually 
exclusive, and that tax avoidance, like tax evasion, can be described in both terms. The 
difference is in the mens rea caused by the use of a tax scheme and the involvement 
of the enabling professional advisers which potentially protects the taxpayer involved 
in tax avoidance cases like Charlton from complicity in the fraud.  
 
4.4. TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
As demonstrated in chapter two, a defining feature of a tax avoidance scheme is the 
creation by the professional enablers of a mismatch between the true or economic 
position that exists for other purposes and the false or fiscal position that is presented 
to the Revenue for tax purposes. The full disclosure by the participating taxpayer to the 
Revenue of the false or tax position devised by the enabling professional advisers is, 
therefore, still a concealment or misrepresentation of the true or economic position that 
exists in the real world for other purposes.  
 
The frequent argument that tax avoidance could not be fraudulent because the 
participating taxpayer makes a full disclosure of the scheme to the Revenue 
misconceives the fundamental mismatch between the true and tax positions, which 
characterises every tax avoidance scheme, as demonstrated in chapter two.  
 
That inbuilt deceit that defines a tax avoidance scheme makes it a classic case of 
fraudulent misrepresentation. In Charlton, concealment or failing to disclose by the 
professional advisers was, therefore, just one actus reus. According to Farquharson 
LJ:  
 
“The case for the prosecution was that Charlton had devised a dishonest, 
tax-avoidance scheme for the benefit of some of the firm’s clients and that 
the Appellants were involved with the implementation of the schemes or 
the concealment from the Revenue of the existence of the fraud.”443 
 
 
This conviction of the professional advisers, who did not submit any returns or accounts 
to the Revenue, for “cheating the Revenue by ‘... falsely representing that the apparent 
                                                 
442 Charlton, p.506. Emphases supplied.  
443 Ibid, p.505. Emphases supplied. 
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purchases (by the United Kingdom company) from (the Jersey company) were bona 
fide commercial transactions’”444 shows that devising the scheme constituted the 
decisive false representation that consummated the offence. It also shows that the 
familiar argument that tax avoidance could not be fraudulent because the participating 
taxpayer makes a full disclosure of the scheme misconceives the fundamental fact that 
the scheme already constituted a cheat and a fraud when it was devised and long 
before the taxpayer disclosed it to the Revenue, as demonstrated in chapter two.  
 
4.5. LEGISLATION   
 
The statutory tax evasion offences encompass cheating by failing to make a return and 
cheating by making a false return, and refer to, but do not define, “fraudulent evasion”. 
Because they derive from Lord Templeman’s statement in Challenge, however, they 
are described in terms of failing to make a return or fraudulent concealment only.  
 
The “offence of fraudulent evasion of income tax” created by section 144 of Finance 
Act 2000, now section 106A of Taxes Management Act 1970, derived from the Grabiner 
report into “the informal, or hidden economy [where] people conceal their income or the 
record of what they have sold in order to evade income tax and VAT”.445 Section 144(1) 
provides that:  
 
“A person commits an offence if he is knowingly concerned in the fraudulent 
evasion of income tax by him or any other person.”446  
 
 
During the proceedings in the House of Commons the Paymaster General confirmed 
that “fraudulent evasion” originated from Lord Templeman’s statement:   
 
“People may ask why we have put the words ‘fraudulent’ and ‘evasion’ 
together. I am reliably informed by people who know better than I do that, 
in English usage, ‘to evade’ can mean to dodge, without any dishonest 
intent. Although ‘evasion’ has come to imply dishonesty in the context of 
tax, the Bill needs to be drafted tightly. ‘Fraudulent’ may not appear to add 
much to ‘evasion’, but the expression ‘fraudulent evasion’ is well 
precedented and subject to interpretation by the courts.”447 
 
 
                                                 
444 Ibid, p.507. 
445 The Informal Economy, p.ii.  
446 Repealed by Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010, Sch.10(12). 
447 HC Debs, Standing Committee H, June 29, 2000, col. 1010. 
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Section 114(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, which relates to national 
insurance contributions, provides that:  
 
“Any person who is knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of any 




Section 72(1) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 similarly provides that “any person ... 
knowingly concerned in, or in the taking of steps with a view to, the fraudulent evasion 
of VAT by him or any other person” shall be guilty of an offence. 
 
4.6. REVENUE PRACTICE 
 
4.6.1. The Inland Revenue and HMRC    
 
The Inland Revenue’s (and since 2005 HMRC’s) practice is based on the dogma that 
“tax avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal” because it equates tax evasion and 
tax fraud to fraudulent concealment by the taxpayer.  
 
Inland Revenue Tax Bulletin, Issue 49, which dealt with the proceedings in the House 
of Commons during the passage of section 144 of Finance Act that created the “offence 
of fraudulent evasion of income tax”, stated:  
 
“The borderline between avoidance and evasion  
 
In the same debate at least one Member raised the subject of the impact 
of the new offence on tax advisers, especially those involved in advising on 
arrangements which could be characterised as tax avoidance. We do not 
consider that the new offence has led to any change in the law in this area.  
 
Where a scheme labelled as ‘avoidance’ by its participants and their 
advisers admittedly fails, the key issue as a matter of criminal law would be 
whether they have been dishonest in the unsuccessful effort to reduce the 
relevant tax liability. It would be for the courts to decide as a question of 
fact whether that is the case.  
 
Concern has been expressed in some quarters that as a result the decision 
will not normally be taken by those with professional experience of tax 
matters and, given the highly technical nature of much tax law, that state of 
affairs may lead to injustice. That is an issue well beyond the scope of this 
article, but it may be helpful to remember that possible dishonesty becomes 
a consideration in this context only in certain circumstances. That is where 
there is some suggestion that the participants in an avoidance scheme are 
not merely relying on the intrinsic technical soundness of the arrangements 
actually put in place to reduce the liability, but also on concealment of the 
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true facts from the inspector. If so, then, if the scheme fails, it is perfectly 
possible that the criminal courts may find there has been an offence. But, 
conversely, where there is no trace of any concealment of the true facts of 
arrangements for which there is a respectable technical case, it is hard to 
imagine how a criminal offence can have been committed.”448 
 
 
Apart from the misconception of the meaning of a crime, as explained above Charlton 
demonstrates that the consideration of the role of the professional enablers of tax 
avoidance schemes shows that the full disclosure by the participating taxpayer of the 
false position devised by the professional enablers is still a concealment (“not 
disclosing” and “lack of disclosure”) or misrepresentation (“false representations” and 
“falsely representing”) of the true position in the words of Farquharson LJ:   
 
“It was the case for the Crown that the accounts presented to the Revenue 
by the United Kingdom companies were false in that by using Charlton’s 
scheme to transfer part of their profits to the Jersey companies they were 
not disclosing the full extent of the profits they had made. It was this lack of 
disclosure which formed the basis of the false representations alleged in 
the indictment. Each of the Appellants was charged in the relevant counts 
with cheating the Revenue by ‘... falsely representing that the apparent 
purchases (by the United Kingdom company) from (the Jersey company) 
were bona fide commercial transactions’.”449 
 
4.6.2. The Internal Revenue Service   
 
The Internal Revenue Manual of the Internal Revenue Service relies on the same 
misconceptions:  
 
“Avoidance Distinguished from Evasion 
 
Avoidance of taxes is not a criminal offense. Any attempt to reduce, avoid, 
minimize, or alleviate taxes by legitimate means is permissible. The 
distinction between avoidance and evasion is fine, yet definite. One who 
avoids tax does not conceal or misrepresent. He/she shapes events to 
reduce or eliminate tax liability and, upon the happening of the events, 
makes a complete disclosure. Evasion, on the other hand, involves deceit, 
subterfuge, camouflage, concealment, some attempt to color or obscure 
events or to make things seem other than they are.”450 
 
 
The IRS’s Information in KPMG shows that avoidance of taxes is “a criminal offense”. 
Paragraph 8 shows that the crime is committed by the professional enabler who 
“shapes events to reduce or eliminate tax liability” and enables the participating 
                                                 
448 (October 2000), p.783. Emphases supplied. 
449 Charlton, p.506. Emphases supplied.  
450 Internal Revenue Manual, (05-15-2008). https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-001-003.html  
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taxpayer to “conceal or misrepresent”. When the professional adviser “shapes events 
to reduce or eliminate tax liability” he does “misrepresent” by creating the mismatch 
between the true position that exists for other purposes and the false position that is 
presented to the Revenue. When the taxpayer, “upon the happening of the events, 
makes a complete disclosure” of the false position, the taxpayer does “conceal or 
misrepresent” the true position, and the professional advisers cause the taxpayer to 
“conceal or misrepresent” the true position.  
 
In all circumstances, therefore, both the professional advisers and the taxpayer do 
“conceal or misrepresent”. As the prosecution of the professional enablers in KPMG 
but not the taxpayers in KPMG shows, however, while the concealment or 
misrepresentation by the professional advisers is invariably fraudulent, the 
concealment or misrepresentation by the taxpayer can be honest or negligent or 
fraudulent depending on his knowledge, abilities and circumstances.  
 
The defining mismatch between the tax and true positions in tax avoidance means that, 
like tax evasion, it invariably “involves deceit, subterfuge, camouflage, concealment, 
some attempt to color or obscure events or to make things seem other than they are.”  
 
4.7 THE KEITH COMMITTEE  
 
The Committee’s terms of reference was based broadly on the fraud-negligence-
honesty trichotomy:   
 
“To enquire into the tax enforcement powers of the Board of Inland 
Revenue and the Board of Customs and Excise, including ... powers 




The Committee, however, did not base its work on these three legal concepts but on 
tax evasion and tax avoidance. Relying on the 1955 Royal Commission’s definitions 
which, as demonstrated in the Introduction, are fundamentally flawed by the sole focus 
on the taxpayer, it stated in the only chapter that dealt with tax avoidance:  
 
“This Report’s concern is principally with the Revenue Departments’ 
powers against tax evasion but here we consider tax avoidance. The 
distinction was defined by the 1955 Royal Commission as follows: 
 
                                                 
451 Keith, pp.3-4.  
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‘[Tax evasion] denotes all those activities which are responsible for a 
person not paying the tax that the existing law charges upon his income. 
Ex hypothesi he is in the wrong, though his wrong-doing may range 
from the making of a deliberately fraudulent return to a mere failure to 
make his return or to pay his tax at the proper time. By tax avoidance, 
on the other hand, is understood some act by which a person so 
arranges his affairs that he is liable to pay less tax than he would have 
paid but for the arrangement. Thus the situation which he brings about 
is one in which he is legally in the right, except so far as some special 
rule may be introduced that puts him in the wrong.’452 
 
The relevance of the topic concerns the means by which the Revenue can 
police such special rules which put the taxpayer in the wrong. ... Avoidance 
is, however, by no means confined to attempts to prevent the taxpayer 
falling foul of specific anti-avoidance provisions. Opportunities are taken in 
respect of the basic tax provisions, seeking to sidestep liabilities or attract 
relief. This means that policing must extend to any debatable area where, 
in attempting to avoid or reduce liability, the taxpayer may have given 




In its evidence to the Committee, the Association of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Taxes 
identified the pivotal role of concealment in devising, implementing and otherwise 
facilitating the use of tax avoidance schemes but, crucicially and characteristically, 
failed to specify that this is done primarily by the professional enablers:  
 
“With highly complex tax avoidance schemes, deliberate attempts are often 
made to prevent the Inspector being aware of all the transactions in the 
scheme. Secrecy is often an important part of the scheme and there will be 
a reluctance to provide information and documentation on a voluntary 
basis.”454   
 
By similarly focusing on the taxpayer and failing to consider the role of the professional 
enablers, the Committee equated “fraud” and “tax evasion” to fraudulent concealment 
by the taxpayer. As it put it in its recommendation that relied upon a wildly optimistic 
and ultimately misconceived view of the then recent decisions of the House of Lords in 
Ramsay and Burmah that invented the Ramsay principle had killed off marketed tax 
avoidance: 
 
“The reason why this change of approach is particularly significant for our 
consideration is that a number of witnesses confirmed that they considered 
that there was now no future for marketed tax avoidance schemes. In the 
circumstances some of the problems which they created can now be 
ignored. In particular, a taxpayer entering into such a transaction will no 
                                                 
452 Royal Commission, paras 1016-1017. 
453 Keith, p.155. Emphases supplied.  
454 The Quarterly Record, June 1981, pp.86-87.  
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longer be able to obtain clear advice that what he has done does not result 
in a charge to tax, and it will therefore be less easy for him to justify the 
omission of any reference to the transaction in his tax return. 
 
The fact that tax avoidance schemes no longer create a special problem 
does not remove the general problem of what a taxpayer should disclose 
in his return. A taxpayer may be advised by his accountant that certain 
items are probably allowable as business expenses, whereas if the full facts 
were known the Inspector might well challenge the deduction. ... One of our 
witnesses put it particularly graphically:  
 
‘the taxpayer builds a taxproof castle; if the Inspector could see inside 
it he would see the weaknesses in the castle’s structure, but the 
taxpayer does all he can to make sure that the Inspector never sees 
inside it.’ ...  
 
It seems to us wrong in principle that a claim to relief from tax should 
depend in any way for its success upon the Inspector’s state of ignorance 
in regard to any part of it. All the cards should be placed upon the table by 
the taxpayer. The Inspector is then free either to accept the claim, secure 
in the knowledge that all the relevant circumstances have been drawn to 
his attention, or to challenge it on the grounds that he is not satisfied that 
the relief claimed is due. The kind of obligation we have in mind might with 
advantage be particularized in the shape of a direct question incorporated 
in the tax return on the following lines:  
 
‘In making this return have you taken the benefit of any doubt about 
whether any item ought to be declared, or any relief or deduction 
allowed? If so give brief details.’ 
 
At present there is no legal basis for imposing an obligation to answer such 
a question. We recommend that such an obligation be enacted. ...  
 
This should serve as a further incentive to make returns ‘in utmost good 
faith’, and to emphasise that concealment of materials facts, leading to 
an underassessment, marks the point at which avoidance crosses the 
borderline and becomes evasion.” 455 
 
 
Clearly, the critical “concealment of materials facts, leading to an underassessment” is 
caused by the enabling professional adviser who ‘builds a taxproof castle” and who 
“does all he can to make sure that the Inspector never sees inside it.” 
 
Despite the subsequent retreat from the Ramsay principle and the consequent 
resurgence of marketed tax avoidance schemes, the Keith Committee’s 
recommendation was never enacted into law. The DOTAS legislation falls short of the 
recommendation.  
 
                                                 
455 Keith, pp.161-162. Emphasis supplied.  
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Farquharson LJ’s statement of the overriding duty of honesty imposed by the pre-
existing common law of cheating in Charlton, however, shows that it already provides 
the “obligation to answer such a question” and “to make returns ‘in utmost good faith’”, 
and that contrary to the Committee’s sole focus on the taxpayer, the duty of honesty 
extends a fortiori to the professional advisers:  
 
“It is a feature, no doubt, of the tax or Revenue law of any country that it 
must, to a large extent, in its tax-gathering activities, rely on the truthfulness 
of the taxpayer in indicating the extent of his income or whatever other 
matter is relevant to the particular statute being considered. It follows also 
that the Revenue not only have to rely on the taxpayer’s good faith, but 
more especially on the professional advisors they appoint to act for 
them.”456 
 
4.8 ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
 
In the 2004 article that emerged from her inaugural lecture, Freedman criticised Inland 
Revenue Tax Bulletin, Issue 49 but similarly equated tax evasion and tax fraud to 
fraudulent concealment by the taxpayer:  
 
“For many tax advisers and taxpayers, the line that is seen to matter is that 
to be drawn between avoidance and evasion, with only evasion being 
illegal. All forms of avoidance, be they described as aggressive, acceptable 
or unacceptable, are legal and for the adviser the question is whether or 
not they work technically. ...  
 
It has been uncontroversial in the past to describe the boundary between 
evasion and avoidance as a straightforward one, with evasion being illegal 
and avoidance being legal. In the past few years there has been a concern 
in the tax community that in Tiley’s words, tax evasion has developed 
frayed edges and that the revenue authorities are encouraging this 
development. 
  
It is understandable that the revenue authorities, concerned by criticism 
that they are not doing enough to combat revenue loss, are arguing that 
failed avoidance schemes could become evasion, but this is unhelpful in 
relation to the complaint majority without giving any teeth to the fight against 
the non-compliant. ... 
 
The common thread in all cases of evasion is concealment, but not all 
evasion is criminal. ...  
 
The Inland Revenue has indicated that there should be no criminal offence 
where there is no trace of any concealment of the true facts of 
arrangements for which there is a ‘respectable technical case’. The 
problem is, who is to decide whether there is a respectable technical case? 
                                                 




The complexity of the tax system is such that there may well be reasonable 
different views on whether a scheme will work. How definite must advisers 
be that there is a reasonable case? BMBF, was decided against the 
taxpayers by the Special Commissioners and a very experienced High 
Court Judge but the decision was reversed by an equally experienced 
Court of Appeal. How should a company director or even a tax adviser 




As demonstrated above, Charlton shows that “[t]he common thread in all cases of 
[avoidance] is concealment” or misrepresentation of the true position that exists for 
other purposes caused by the professional enablers that used the scheme to create 
the false position presented to the Revenue for tax purposes, which is criminal in 
criminal law and civil in civil law.   
 
The underlined contradictory expressions demonstrate the interaction between the 
legal fiction of statutory construction and the equation of tax evasion and tax fraud to 
fraudulent concealment by the taxpayer. In other words, the invariably “different views 
on whether a scheme will work” as a matter of statutory construction, which was 
underscored by BMBF, undermine the dogma that: “All forms of avoidance ... are legal 
... the question is whether or not they work technically.”  
 
The “concern in the tax community that in Tiley’s words, tax evasion has developed 
frayed edges and that the revenue authorities are encouraging this development”458, 
like Bowler’s claim that “increasingly the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion has been blurred, at least by the tax authorities, and tax avoidance has been 
treated with some of the disapproval previously reserved for tax evasion”459, reflects an 
apologist refusal to acknowledge the reliance of the dogma ‘tax avoidance is legal and 
tax evasion is illegal’ on the Revenue’s selective prosecution policy. As Rhodes et al 
pointed out in their 1998 article on Charlton which was the case that triggered the 
“concern in the tax community”: 
 
“There is no clear dividing line and there appears to be no reason why the 
Inland Revenue could not seek to apply the criminal law to many other 
types of tax avoidance scheme should they choose to do so. Charlton tells 
us clearly that sitting on top of a set of artificial arrangements waving a flag 
saying ‘tax avoidance scheme’ will not necessarily provide either the 
taxpayer or his professional advisers with immunity from prosecution.”460 
                                                 
457 Freedman [2004] pp.335-348. Emphases supplied. 
458 Freedman p.347. 
459 Bowler (2009) p.10. 




In 2012 the NAO commissioned the Oxford University Centre for Business (OUCBT) 
“to draw up an academic review of the DOTAS and the tax avoidance landscape.”461 
The review formed part of the evidence base behind the NAO’s report “Tax avoidance: 
tackling marketed avoidance schemes”462, which underpinned the PAC’s inquiry “Tax 
avoidance: tackling marketed avoidance schemes”.463 In the paper which “aims  to  
inform  the  important  debate  on  tax  avoidance  by  exploring the language used and 
setting this in context”464, Freedman et al effectively recognised that it is a legal 
nonsense but excluded tax evasion from consideration by equating it and tax fraud to 
concealment by the taxpayer and thus failing to consider the conduct of the 
professional enablers of marketed tax avoidance schemes:   
 
“‘Tax avoidance’ has no fixed legal meaning, although courts have sought 
to elucidate it in some cases and, for example, to distinguish tax avoidance 
from tax planning or tax mitigation. Matters are often complicated but not 
usually clarified by the addition of adjectives such as ‘aggressive’, ‘abusive’ 




Practically  every  media  report  on  avoidance  now  starts with  the  
statement  that  the activities it is discussing are legal but still amount to 
avoidance. It is well understood that there is a difference between evasion, 
which involves non‐disclosure or concealment, be it fraudulent or not and 
which is illegal; and avoidance, which is ‘legal’. Evasion needs to be tackled 
by strong enforcement of the existing law. This is an important topic, highly 
relevant to the Tax Gap figures, but is not the topic of this paper, which 
deals only with avoidance. ... By saying that avoidance is legal, we mean 




Farquharson’s statement in Charlton cited and analysed above shows that tax 
avoidance “involves non‐disclosure or concealment” by the taxpayer (which 
may be honest or negligent or fraudulent) caused by the professional enablers; 
and “involves ... criminal activity” by the professional enablers “and ... failure to 
make a required disclosure” by the taxpayer (which may be honest or negligent 
or fraudulent).  
 
                                                 
461 Freedman et al, Tax Avoidance, p.1.   
462 November 21, 2012. 
463 February 19, 2013. 
464 Freedman, p.3. 
465 Ibid.  
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4.9 CONCLUSION     
 
This chapter used the concepts of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent 
concealment to expound both tax avoidance (cheating the public revenue by the 
professional advisers that devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate the 
use of tax avoidance schemes in which the taxpayer using an individual scheme 
may or may not be complicit) and tax evasion (cheating the public revenue by a 
taxpayer who deliberately fails to make a return of the relevant tax liability or by 
a taxpayer who deliberately makes a false return of the relevant tax liability 
without using a tax scheme) to demonstrate the fundamental flaw in the orthodox 
equation of tax evasion and tax fraud to fraudulent concealment.  
 
It showed that the fundamental distinction is not between fraudulent misrepresentation 
and fraudulent concealment (which can be used interchangeably) but between the 
conduct of the taxpayer (which is invariably fraudulent in tax evasion but can be 
fraudulent or negligent or honest in tax avoidance) and the conduct of the professional 
advisers (which is invariably fraudulent in tax avoidance). In other words, the corollary 
of the proposition that a tax avoidance scheme is a cheat and a fraud by design 
established in chapter two is that the fraudulent nature of tax avoidance does not 
























CHAPTER FIVE                  
 
THE SELECTIVE PROSECUTION POLICY  
 
The Revenue operate a selective policy of prosecution. They do so for three 
main reasons: first their primary objective is the collection of revenue and 
not the punishment of offenders; second they have inadequate resources to 
prosecute everyone who dishonestly evades payment of taxes; and third and 
perhaps most importantly they consider it necessary to prosecute in some 
cases because of the deterrent effect that this has on the general body of 
taxpayers, since they know that if they behave dishonestly they may be 
prosecuted. It is inherent in such a policy that there may be inconsistency 
and unfairness as between one dishonest taxpayer and another who is guilty 
of a very similar offence. 





This chapter uses a historical analysis of the Revenue’s “highly selective” prosecution 
policy to demonstrate that the dogma “tax avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal” 
rests for its support upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the fact in all cases of tax 
fraud “it is entirely within the discretion of the tax authorities whether they take the 
procedural course of bringing a criminal tax-fraud case or imposing only civil tax-fraud 
penalties or simply establishing tax liability without fines or penalties”.466 
 
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith’s distinction between “the collection of revenue” and “the 
punishment of offenders” is artificial because of “the deterrent effect that [prosecution] 
has on the general body of taxpayers.” As the 1905 Departmental Committee on 
Income Tax stated:  
 
“Turning to the case of fraudulent evasion, we desire to record our opinion 
that energetic action should be taken wherever there is reasonable 
suspicion of fraud. The occasional failure of a prosecution would not be so 




In other words, tax morale, which can be defined as “the deterrent effect that 
[prosecution] has on the general body of taxpayers”, unites “the collection of revenue” 
and “the punishment of offenders”. According to the Keith Committee:  
 
“While the majority of taxpayers meet their obligations with fairly good 
grace, some do not. Enforcement powers are therefore necessary not only 
                                                 
466 Wisselink, p.203.   
467 Report, p.vii. 
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The level of prosecution “necessary not only to coerce the dishonest and the neglectful, 
but to encourage the honest and conscientious” does not seem to have ever been 
considered, let alone determined, but is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
These authorities referred to ‘evasion’ and ‘taxpayer’ because under the dogma that 
“tax avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal” the selective prosecution policy is 
applied to tax evasion (or cheating by a taxpayer who deliberately fails to make a return 
of the relevant tax liability or who deliberately makes a false return of the relevant tax 
liability without using a tax scheme) but not tax avoidance (or cheating by the 
professional advisers that devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate the use 
of tax avoidance schemes in which the taxpayer using a specific scheme may or may 
not be complicit). 
 
The rest of this chapter expounds the selective prosecution policy and uses its historical 
application to demonstrate that tax evasion and tax avoidance amount to cheating the 
public revenue in law.  
 
5.2 THE POLICY  
 
5.2.1 Inland Revenue  
 
The statutory basis of the Inland Revenue’s selective prosecution policy was section 1 
of the Taxes Management Act 1970, which provided that: 
 
“(1) It shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen to appoint persons to be 
Commissioners for the collection and management of inland revenue, and 
the Commissioners shall hold office during Her Majesty’s pleasure. 
 
(2) The Commissioners shall have all necessary powers for carrying into 
execution every Act of Parliament relating to inland revenue”. 
 
 
According to Lord Diplock’s classic statement of the nature and scope of this provision 
in IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses469 (‘the Fleet 
Street Casuals case’): 
                                                 
468 Final Report, p.3. 




“[T]he Board are charged by statute with the care, management and 
collection on behalf of the Crown of income tax, corporation tax and capital 
gains tax. In the exercise of these functions the Board have a wide 
managerial discretion as to the best means of obtaining for the national 
exchequer from the taxes committed to their charge the highest net return 




The Inland Revenue explained its selective prosecution policy to the 1978 Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure thus:  
 
“In England and Wales the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, known as 
the Board, are a prosecuting authority, deciding themselves whether or not 
to prosecute and attending themselves to the conduct of the prosecution. 
But ... some prosecutions for revenue matters are undertaken by the Police. 
 
In the main, however, the Department deals with the tax evader not by 
prosecution but by imposing money penalties graded according to the 
gravity of the offence. Moreover in the majority of cases the amount of the 
penalty is agreed informally between the Department and the taxpayer 
without recourse to formal proceedings. It follows that criminal prosecution 
for tax fraud is undertaken only in a small minority of cases.  
 
The Board’s practice of accepting pecuniary settlements in the majority of 
cases is widely known amongst accountants and taxation advisers. But if 
an investigation is dealt with by Enquiry Branch ... the Board’s practice is 
explained by handing to the taxpayer a leaflet referred to in the Department 
as the ‘Hansard Extract’ [that] contains a reference to section 34 of the 
Finance Act 1942 which makes provision for the admissibility in evidence 
of a disclosure notwithstanding that it has been drawn to the taxpayer’s 
attention that the Board may accept pecuniary settlements instead of 
instituting proceedings and may be influenced by a full confession. Section 
34 was replaced by section 504 of the Income Tax Act 1952, which was 
replaced by section 105 of the Taxes Management Act 1970.”471 
 
 
Like the Royal Commission, the Keith Committee considered and approved the policy 
on the basis that it applies only to tax evasion:  
 
“Departmental views  
 
22.1.4. The Inland Revenue explained and justified their prosecution policy 
to us in the same terms as they had used to the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Proceedings. They noted first, that the tax legislation contains 
(civil) money penalties for many offences, up to and including fraud. As they 
said: ‘It clearly envisages that severe money penalties will be the common 
punishment of the tax evader’. They also fully acknowledged ‘the practical 
consideration that the burden of preparing a large number of prosecutions 
                                                 
470 Ibid, p.269. 
471 EV No 145.  
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to the required standard and of seeing them through the courts would 
require many more trained and qualified staff’. They stressed the 
importance of prosecution as a deterrent, and that there should be no 
categories of offence where the weapon was never deployed ‘because it is 
the possibility of prosecution which prevents the spread of tax fraud to 
unacceptable limits’. They pointed out that ‘simple objective criteria such 
as the amount of tax evaded’ might be used to set de minimis limits to 
exclude the smaller cases, but were unsuited to be the sole basis for 
decisions to prosecute. While recognising, therefore, the possible pitfalls in 
selectivity, the Department sought to avoid them by reserving the decision 
to prosecute to officials at Under Secretary or Deputy Secretary level. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
22.1.5. We had no hesitation in rejecting the extreme alternatives of 
‘prosecute all or none’. We found no reason to disturb the settled practice 
of over fifty years of Inland Revenue taking civil money penalties for the 
overwhelming majority of detected offences of tax evasion. We regard as 
justified the Department’s view that an ultimate sanction of prosecution is 
essential to protect the integrity of a tax system which is primarily 
dependent upon the accuracy of information passed to it by its taxpayers 
and others. When asked to sign a declaration on a tax return, the taxpayer 
is faced with the admonitory statement ‘false statements can result in 
prosecution’. It follows that, if the deterrent is to retain its credibility, 
prosecution ought to follow in, as the Department put it, ‘some examples of 
all classes of tax fraud’.”472 
 
 
5.2.2 HMRC     
 
HMRC’s powers are provided by section 5 of the Commissioners for Revenue and 
Customs Act 2005 (‘CRCA’). Section 51, which provides that “responsibility for 
collection and management of revenue has the same meaning as references to 
responsibility for care and management of revenue in enactments passed before this 
Act”, effectively preserved the principle derived from the Fleet Street Casuals case. 
The principle was reaffirmed explicitly by the House of Lords in Wilkinson v IRC”473 and 
by the Supreme Court in Davies v HMRC; Gaines-Cooper v HMRC.474 
 
Section 206 of Finance Act 2003 amended section 105 TMA to substitute the prevailing 
Code of Practice 9. According to HMRC Criminal Investigation Policy:  
 
“HMRC aims to secure the highest level of compliance with the law and 
regulations governing direct and indirect taxes and other regimes for which 
they’re responsible. Criminal investigation, with a view to prosecution by 
the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales, the Crown Office 
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and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland, and the Public Prosecution 
Service Northern Ireland is an important part of HMRC’s overall 
enforcement strategy.  
 
It’s HMRC’s policy to deal with fraud by use of the cost effective civil fraud 
investigation procedures under Code of Practice 9 wherever appropriate. 
Criminal investigation will be reserved for cases where HMRC needs to 
send a strong deterrent message or where the conduct involved is such 
that only a criminal sanction is appropriate.”475 
 
 
5.3 TAX EVASION  
 
5.3.1 Criminal Prosecution  
 
According to the Inland Revenue’s evidence to the 1978 Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure:  
 
“It is not known when the Board started to institute criminal proceedings 
against taxpayers for offences in relation to Inland Revenue. The principle 
that in relation to such proceedings tax law is not something apart, but is 
an integral part of the general legal code, received statutory recognition in 
Section 14 of the Revenue Act 1899, now section 104 of the Taxes 
Management Act 1970, which stipulates: ‘The provisions of the Taxes Acts 
shall not, save so far as is otherwise provided, affect any criminal 
proceedings for any misdemeanour.’ ...  
 
Only since 1916 have criminal proceedings for tax offences reached a 
significant level. In that year the Board first used the provisions of the 
Perjury Act 1911 in cases of false returns. But the Act could not be used to 
catch false statements made in company accounts delivered to an 
Inspector of Taxes to evade Excess Profits Duty (a widespread problem 
during the 1914-18 War) or only made in a letter or orally to the Department.  
 
From 1917 onwards, therefore, in cases that could not be brought within 
the Perjury Act, it became the practice to charge the taxpayer with cheating 
in relation to the Public Revenue, i.e. with the common law misdemeanour 
of making or causing to be made, with intent to defraud, a false statement 
tending to prejudice the Crown and the Inland Revenue. A charge in this 
form was based on precedents and dicta stretching back for centuries and 
its validity was upheld by Justice Bray in R v Bradbury and Edlin and by the 
Court of Appeal in R v Hudson.”476 
 
 
In Bradbury and Edlin477, the defendants were charged at Winchester Assizes in July 
1920 on separate indictments with conspiracy to cheat the public revenue of income 
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tax, excess profits duty and super-tax by making false statements and returns; making 
false statements in returns of income tax contrary to section 5 of the Perjury Act; and 
delivering false returns tending to prejudice the public revenue contrary to the common 
law. Five of the common law charges were alternatives to the Perjury Act charges. Two 
related to the submission of false trading and profit and loss accounts of the business 
of a company of which the defendants were directors. They objected to the counts of 
cheating on the ground that it is not an indictable offence. Bray J rejected the 
objections, and confirmed that the common law offence operates on a juristic basis 
independent of the civil fraud penalty legislation:  
 
“All these cases affecting the Crown and the public at large are indictable, 
and in my opinion, therefore, these common law counts stand, save for one 
other argument. By section 178 of the Income Tax Act, 1842, it is provided 
that if there is such a fraudulent representation a certain penalty is provided. 
The penalty is that an offender shall, on proof before the commissioners 
acting for the district, be charged in excess treble the amount of duty 
escaped by the fraudulent representation. It is suggested that because 
there was an additional penalty imposed upon persons who offended 
against the Act, in their having to pay treble the duty evaded, that that 
repealed the common law of England. In my opinion it certainly did not. It 
added an additional burden or obligation if you like, but it never did take 
away the right to proceed against an offender by indictment under the 
common law of England, and therefore these objections fail.”478 
 
 
In Hudson the taxpayer was convicted at Nottingham Assizes in December 1955 on an 
indictment containing eight counts of cheating the public revenue. He appealed on the 
ground that while the submission of false accounts ought to be an offence, Parliament 
had not made it so. The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. Goddard CJ stated:  
 
“It seems to me perfectly clear that the communis opinio among lawyers has 
been that Bray J.’s decision was right, and I cannot see any ground upon 
which we can say that the authorities upon which he acted, and upon which 
we are acting today, have ever been limited or dissented from. In Northern 
Ireland the same view was taken in Rex v. ‘J.,’479 ... We think that the offence 
here consisted of sending in documents to the inspector of taxes which were 
false and fraudulent to the appellant's knowledge. That is a material part of 
the offence, and the jury found it proved. They had a very clear summing-
up from Slade J., who took the same view as Bray J. took, and as this court 
is taking. The jury must be taken to have found that the documents sent in 
by the appellant were not only false and fraudulent to his knowledge, but 
they must have taken the view, and the only possible view, that he did it for 
the purpose of avoiding the payment of tax. That is defrauding the Crown 
and defrauding the public. ... This is and has always been a common law 
offence. It is not necessary for this court to make a new offence and we are 
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not doing so. We are merely reaffirming what the common law has, in our 
judgment, always been on this matter.”480 
 
 
Hudson highlighted the subversion of the rule of law by the selective prosecution policy. 
As “Watchful” put it in a commentary:  
 
“All taxation is the creature of statute, and so far as income tax is concerned 
the relevant statutes are comparatively modern. Yet in the recent case of 
R v Hudson, which was a criminal prosecution arising out of acts alleged to 
have been done by the defendant in relation to his income tax affairs, all 
the counts of the indictment were laid at common law under a precedent 
traceable to the fourteenth century. This is not quite the paradox it seems 
if we remember that the Tax Acts are but a part of the general law of the 
land. Just as, on the one hand, nobody can be taxed otherwise than in 
accordance with the law, so it can and should be insisted that the whole of 
that law is relevant in any question concerning taxation.”481 
 
 
5.3.2 Contract Settlement and Civil Litigation 
 
According to the Inland Revenue’s evidence to the 1978 Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure: 
 
“When a tax fraud is discovered, the Board are not bound to prosecute but 
may effect a pecuniary settlement instead. The main legislation about 




In R v IRC, ex parte Knight, where the taxpayer cheated by failing to make a return and 
making a deliberately false return without using a tax scheme like the taxpayers in 
Bradbury and Hudson, the Revenue chose not to prosecute but to “effect a pecuniary 
settlement instead.” Rejecting the taxpayer’s appeal, Russell LJ stated: 
 
“This is an appeal from a refusal of the Divisional Court to accede to an 
application for a writ of prohibition directed to the General Commissioners 
for the Havering District, to prevent those commissioners from adjudicating 
on a summons dated 11 June 1971, demanding penalties under s 95 of the 
Taxes Management Act 1970 on the ground that the taxpayer, in submitting 
in November 1956 accounts of his trade as a cattle dealer in the four years 
1950-51 to 1953-54, had fraudulently or negligently submitted incorrect 
accounts. ... These assessments, being otherwise out of time, were based 
on allegations of fraud or wilful default by the taxpayer; and, as we 
understand it, those allegations were related to those same incorrect 
November 1956 submitted accounts. On an appeal by the taxpayer, the 
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Special Commissioners found wilful default. They made, as I understand it, 
no finding one way or the other as to fraud. ...  
 
Then it is said ... that wilful default is not within s 95; it is neither fraud nor 
negligence. I think ... that when s 95 refers to fraud or negligence, it cannot 
sensibly be thought to exclude wilful default in that bracket. It would be, in 
my view, quite absurd to hold under s 95 that it embraces careless breach 
of duty – that is to say, negligence – but not careful breach of duty – that is 
to say, wilful default.”483 
 
 
5.3.3 The Tax Dogma  
 
Lord Hodge’s restatement of the dogma in his recent lecture demonstrates its reliance 
on the failure to consider the professional enablers of tax avoidance and the Revenue’s 
selective prosecution policy: 
 
“One of the principles which I was taught when reading law at Edinburgh 
University in 1978 was that tax avoidance was legal, while tax evasion was 
not. Avoidance is obtaining a tax advantage within the rules. Acting in the 
genuine but mistaken belief that a tax advantage can legally be obtained 
may be seen as avoidance or at least not criminal evasion. Knowingly 
acting to evade taxes is often a criminal offence. ... But some forms of 
evasion, while illegal, are dealt with by civil penalties rather than the 
criminal law.”484  
 
 
“Knowingly acting to evade taxes is often a criminal offence” where the taxpayer is 
prosecuted as was the case in Bradbury and Hudson. “But some forms of evasion, 
while illegal, are dealt with by civil penalties rather than the criminal law” as was the 
case in Knight.  
 
“Acting in the genuine but mistaken belief that a tax advantage can legally be obtained 
may be seen as avoidance or at least not criminal evasion” because of the principle 
that “if a taxpayer reasonably relies on a reputable accountant for advice in relation to 
the content of his tax return, he will not be liable” for negligence or fraud if the advice 
proves to be wrong. 
 
5.4 TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
5.4.1 Criminal Prosecution 
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The prosecution in Charlton highlighted the inherently fraudulent nature of a tax 
avoidance scheme and showed that criminal prosecution can be brought in every case. 
As Cunningham put it in his article:  
 
“From February 1994 until August 1994, the writer had the inglorious 
distinction of being a participant in the longest ever prosecution by the 
Inland Revenue ... as a defendant! He was convicted on two counts of 
cheating the Inland Revenue. ... There was an assessment under appeal 
in relation to the United Kingdom company when Enquiry Branch raided the 
premises of the accountants and the company and others (not the writer’s 
chambers). The result was that the pending appeal hearing was replaced 
by a criminal trial.”485 
 
 
A fortiori, a criminal trial can be brought after a successful civil litigation. According to 
Ormerod:  
 
“Could schemes which have been held to be ineffective tax avoidance 
really be prosecuted? Consider Ramsay in which the House of Lords held 
ineffective a scheme which created a loss to offset chargeable gains. There 
is no doubt that the planners had but one aim: to reduce the amount of tax 
paid. Moreover, it could be said that the steps inserted into the scheme 
which created the loss were of such an artificial nature as to be almost 
illusory. Lord Wilberforce alluded to this in his speech: ‘although sums of 
money, sometimes considerable, are supposed to be involved in individual 
transactions, the taxpayer does not have to put his hand in his pocket.’ 
 
Given the admitted intention of those involved to attempt to reduce the tax 
paid, it is not unimaginable that a jury of ordinary people would find such 
behaviour to be dishonest. ... This is exacerbated by the fact that the 
activities of the tax planners will often appear to be artificial and unreal to 
the average lay person. As Lord Bridge noted in another leading avoidance 
case, Furniss v Dawson: ‘It would need no more than a cursory exposition 
of the avoidance scheme in Ramsay … to lead any intelligent layman [read 
juror] to the conclusion that the scheme was not designed to achieve any 
substantial effect in the real world.’486 Although expert evidence may be 
received on revenue practices, the dishonesty issue is within the common 
experience and understanding of the jury and ought not to be the subject 
of expert evidence.”487 
 
 
There is, however, no record of any such post-litigation prosecution in the UK. The 
Revenue does not seem to have ever exercised its discretion to do so. The Courts do 
not seem to have referred any case for prosecution in the exercise of their inherent 
jurisdiction, despite the clear findings of fraud in many cases. Parliament has never 
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legislated for post-litigation prosecution, and did not include it in the civil penalty regime 
for the enablers and users of defeated schemes introduced by Finance (No. 2) Act 
2017.  
 
5.4.2 Contract Settlement and Civil Litigation 
 
5.4.2.1 Inland Revenue  
 
In his article that “examine[d] the meaning of tax avoidance and the future role of the 
Revenue in preventing it”488, Gribbon (then Director of the Inland Revenue’s 
Compliance Division) demonstrated that the Revenue’s policy and practice rest upon 
the fallacy that “tax avoidance is legal”:  
 
“How might tax avoidance be defined? 
 
The question requires us to draw a distinction between tax avoidance and 
tax planning. Many schemes which the Courts strike down clearly fall within 
the former category. But so – as Judges themselves have frequently 
recognised – do many schemes which the Courts feel unable to strike down 
under the law as it stands. The Government’s remedy for these is to ask 
Parliament to change the law. There are many schemes which do not reach 
the Courts because it is clear to the Inland Revenue that the Courts are 
likely to find in the taxpayer’s favour (just as there are others where 
taxpayer and their advisers concede without litigating). 
 
A universally accepted definition of avoidance does not exist and one 
cannot therefore be offered to provide a touchstone in determining what 
schemes the Government ought to consider stopping through new 
legislation. ... 
 
What is the distinction between avoidance and evasion? 
 
If there is a grey area between the two, as has been suggested by some 
recent commentators, this arises not from confusion, on the part of the 
Inland Revenue, between legality and illegality but from the means adopted 
by some to achieve what they describe as tax avoidance. If an ‘avoidance’ 
scheme relies on misrepresentation, deception and concealment of the full 
facts, then avoidance is a misnomer; the scheme would be more accurately 
described as fraud, and would fall to be treated as such. Where fraud is 
involved, it cannot be recharacterised as avoidance by cloaking the 
behaviour with artificial structures, contrived transactions and esoteric 
arguments as to how the tax law should be applied to these structures and 
transactions. Fraud is fraud, common cheat is common cheat and the 
application of tax law to ‘pretend’ situations is something of an 
irrelevance....  
 
What is the role of the Inland Revenue? 
                                                 




As far as the Inland Revenue is concerned, in the context of its 
responsibilities for countering avoidance, its role is to administer the 
legislation enacted by Parliament, and to inform and advise Ministers where 
the purpose of the legislation is being or appears to be undermined.  
 
In relation to tax avoidance the Inland Revenue’s role involves ascertaining 
the facts (which may require full and detailed investigation) and exercising 
first judgment as to the interpretation of law and its application to those 
facts. The determination of the facts and law is, of course, ultimately for the 
Appeal Commissioners and Courts, but it is very much the minority of cases 
that come before the Commissioners and the Courts and in practice, 
therefore, they operate as a check on the Inland Revenue’s function.  
 
Just as the Courts, in interpreting legislation, will not confine themselves to 
a close literal interpretation, so the Inland Revenue will seek to ascertain 
the intention of Parliament when applying legislation to novel situations. ... 
 
The Inland Revenue’s role of advising Ministers is twofold. On the one 
hand, the impetus for advice and reform may come from the Government 
and here the Inland Revenue’s function is to advise Ministers on how their 
policy objectives may be pursued and implemented, and to provide 
information on their likely effects. On the other hand, advice may emanate 
from the Inland Revenue as it draws to the attention of Ministers matters 
emerging from its day-to-day experience of dealing with taxpayers’ affairs 
and from its contacts with outside organisations. As part of its advice the 
Inland Revenue will draw the attention of Ministers to those areas where 
behavioural patterns and perceived inadequacies in the law are having an 
adverse effect on the yield to the Exchequer.”489 
 
 
Regarding the distinction between avoidance and evasion, the underlined sentence 
shows that the Revenue’s practice and the tax dogma involve the failure to “remember 
that the Tax Acts are but a part of the general law of the land”. “Fraud is fraud, common 
cheat is common cheat and the application of tax” legislation, which is but one part of 
tax law, to tax avoidance schemes that amount to fraud and common cheat under the 
general tax law, is not just “something of an irrelevance” but a subversion of the rule of 
law. As demonstrated in chapters three and four, every tax avoidance scheme “relies 
on misrepresentation, deception and concealment of the full facts” caused by the 
enabling professional advisers and “would be more accurately described as fraud”. As 
demonstrated in this chapter, therefore, contrary to Gribbon’s assertion, “[w]here fraud 
is involved” invariably in tax avoidance, it is “recharacterised as avoidance by cloaking 
the behaviour with artificial structures, contrived transactions and esoteric arguments 
as to how the tax law should be applied to these structures and transactions.”  
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By purporting “to ascertain the intention of Parliament when applying legislation to 
novel situations” the Revenue facilitates tax avoidance like the courts. In the words of 
Lord Diplock:  
 
“Do not let us deceive ourselves with the legal fiction that the Court is only 
ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant. Anyone who has 
decided tax appeals knows that most of them concern transactions which 
Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the Act had not anticipated, 
about which they had never thought at all. Some of the transactions are of 
a kind which had never taken place before the Act was passed: they were 
devised as a result of it.”490 
 
 
By concluding that “[t]he Government’s remedy for these is to ask Parliament to change 
the law”, the Revenue perpetuates tax complexity. In the words of Lord Diplock: 
 
“This should be borne in mind when one complains of the complexity of 
taxing statutes. They should be drafted so as to leave no room for dispute 
as to the application to particular transactions. The history of tax legislation 
is thus the history of an attempt to deal specifically with the liability to tax of 




5.4.2.2 HMRC   
 
Tailby (the pioneer Director of HMRC’s Anti-avoidance Group) confirmed that HMRC 
adopted the Inland Revenue’s ineffectual approach rather than the Customs & Excise’s 
more effective approach: 
 
“At the end of December 2004 the Revenue and Customs & Excise formed 
the Anti-Avoidance Group to develop and deliver the HMRC anti-avoidance 
strategy. ... 
 
Merging the anti-avoidance work of the two Departments led to the 
exposure of differences in approach. In VAT, the approach to avoidance 
schemes was not to settle for less than the full amount of tax due and to 
challenge any scheme which the Department considered to be abusive. 
This approach, together with the development of innovative technical 
challenges such as the Halifax ‘abuse’ principle has had a notable effect 
on reducing the appetite for avoidance in the indirect tax field. One key 
drawback, though, to the uncompromising approach taken in indirect tax 
was the huge number of cases litigated, leading to a combative relationship 
between taxpayer and tax administration. 
 
In direct tax the approach to resolving avoidance cases was more 
settlement-driven. Customers who were serial avoiders would carry out a 
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number of schemes and then offer the Inland Revenue a ‘deal’. Some 
schemes would be conceded by both sides so that a compromise would be 
reached. The difficulty with this approach from an anti-avoidance strategy 
point of view is that it does not change behaviour on either side. The 
Revenue might be tempted to pursue a weak case in the hope of getting 
some ‘go away’ money, and promoters and avoiders might be tempted to 
continue to promote and execute schemes even if the chances of ultimate 
success are low because there is no ‘downside’ for failure. If there is a 
discount of 10% or 20% of the tax given with every scheme which the 
Revenue believes does not work, there is no cost to the customer (actually 
a bonus) and therefore no incentive to stop avoidance.  
 
The potential downsides of both the direct and indirect tax approaches 
needed to be addressed, taking into account the effects on avoidance 
behaviours. Work on this was taken forward, eventually informing HMRC's 
Litigation and Settlement Strategy (LSS). But although the LSS recognises 
the importance of obtaining a full settlement where appropriate, it is equally 




With the introduction of DOTAS, therefore, HMRC exacerbates the vicious cycle of tax 
avoidance and tax complexity in its role of advising Ministers. According to Tailby:  
 
“The introduction of DOTAS has really sharpened up HMRC’s act. Changes 
in legislation can now be made extremely swiftly. In January 2009 
intelligence was received by HMRC about a scheme which would deplete 
the Exchequer of some £200 million. A team of specialists from HMRC and 
HMT worked on the scheme and amendments to relevant legislation were 
quickly identified. As a result, the Financial Secretary was able to announce 
blocking legislation to take effect on 12 January, a mere five days from 
when the information was received. Work on further information led to a 




The NAO’s 2012 assessment of the DOTAS regime highlighted the scale of tax 
avoidance in the UK and the fundamental flaw in this approach:  
 
“DOTAS has been effective in providing early warning of large numbers of 
schemes. A total of 2,289 schemes had been disclosed under DOTAS by 
the end of 2011-12. After a high number of initial disclosures, the number 
of schemes disclosed has levelled off at between 118 and 177 a year since 
2008-09. When HMRC receives a disclosure about a scheme that exploits 
a specific aspect of tax law, it is often able to address it by making a simple 
change to the legislation.  
 
Advised by HMRC, Parliament have initiated 93 changes to tax law to 
tackle avoidance since the introduction of DOTAS in 2004, though some of 
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these may have been introduced without the early warning that DOTAS 
provided. ...  
 
Introducing narrowly targeted changes to legislation that stop particular 
schemes is not always effective and has disadvantages, such as increasing 




5.4.3 The Tax Dogma 
 
Masters, who based his expert evidence in Charlton on the tax dogma, was right to 
argue that the Revenue deviated from its policy and practice, but wrong to conclude 
that it could not do so in law:  
 
“I can see a general move to blur what is a very clear distinction between 
illegal evasion and legal avoidance, a move in which the Inland Revenue 
itself has had a hand as can be seen from the case. ...  
 
During the case I was at great pains to point out the distinction between 
tax-avoidance and tax evasion, whereas the Inland Revenue appeared to 
be doing its best to confuse the two concepts in the minds of the judge and 
jury. It was one of the bizarre aspects of the whole process that I could not 
directly give evidence as to the true distinction between avoidance and 
evasion because that is a matter of law and the court is presumed to know 
the law. ...  
 
A large number of tax mitigation arrangements of many types were 
implemented in the period covered by the Charlton transactions: from 1978 
to 1990 (and indeed in the years before and after that period). Many were 
accepted by the Inland Revenue as effective, and some were endorsed by 
the courts. In fact, schemes using structures set up in Jersey and 
elsewhere were so widespread and so successful that a great deal of 
specific anti-avoidance legislation has to be introduced over the past two 
decades. ...  
 
Most major firms of solicitors and accountants advised clients on tax haven 
operations during the period covered by the indictment. Many would have 
been involved in arrangements similar to Mr Charlton’s schemes. A lot of 
schemes failed to achieve their objective but that was because they were 
caught by one or more of the many anti-avoidance provisions now to be 
found in the tax legislation, or because of the unfavourable approach of the 
courts to what is now perceived as ‘unacceptable’, albeit legal, tax 
avoidance. 
 
Yet, in the Charlton case, the impression given by the Inland Revenue, who 
knew that the matter would be put before a judge and jury who were not 
versed in the intricacies of tax law, is that the taxpayers and their advisers 
were involved in crafty tax dodges and that it should not be allowed.”495 
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Charlton simply demonstrated that “the true distinction between avoidance and evasion 
... is a matter of law” and not a matter of dogma. According to Rhodes et al:  
 
“It is a commonly held belief among professional advisers that tax 
avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal. Tax avoidance schemes may 
fail but the taxpayers and their advisers have, until now, been secure in the 
knowledge that the worst that can happen is the receipt of a large bill for 
tax and interest. ... 
 
Amongst professional tax advisers, alarm and concern have been 
expressed at the approach of the Revenue and the conduct of the case. It 
has been argued that there is a general move to ‘blur’ the ‘very clear’ 
distinction between legal tax avoidance and illegal evasion. However, it 
might well be suggested that the distinction is not and has never been as 
clear as many professional advisers (and their clients) would like to believe. 
Where avoidance arrangements are wholly artificial and have no substance 
then clearly it is and always has been open to the Revenue and the courts 
to consider whether they are in fact ‘devices to cheat the public revenue’. 
What perhaps has confused the issue is the Revenue’s highly selective 
policy on prosecutions. Although the Revenue are a law enforcement 
agency, their principal purpose is to collect taxes. Accordingly, historically, 
they have only been interested in invoking the criminal law where they 
consider that they will be successful and the case will generate publicity 
which will serve as a warning to other taxpayers or professional advisers. 
Should this attitude change, and should the Revenue seek to act as a law 
enforcement agency on the lines adopted so successfully many years ago 
by the US Internal Revenue Service, then many more taxpayers and their 
professional advisers may find that they are at risk.”496 
 
 
The fact that schemes “were accepted by the Inland Revenue as effective, and some 
were endorsed by the courts” under “the legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining 
and giving effect to what Parliament meant” does not mean that they do not amount to 
cheating under the law.  
 
As demonstrated in chapter one, the fact “that a great deal of specific anti-avoidance 
legislation has to be introduced” means that they amount to cheating because anti-
avoidance legislation codifies and decriminalises cheating. According to Rhodes et al:  
 
“It has also been argued that the Revenue and the court were in error in 
seeking to apply criminal law instead of challenging the arrangements 
under civil revenue law, such as the transfer pricing provisions of s 770 
Income & Corporation Taxes Act 1988. Again, such an argument is 
fallacious as it would be a cardinal error to assume that, simply because an 
arrangement can either be challenged under civil law or prosecuted under 
criminal law, the Inland Revenue and the courts have some overriding 
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obligation to deal with the matter under the former category. Indeed, 




The fallacious notion of “‘unacceptable’, albeit legal, tax avoidance” cited by Masters 
results from the absence of the post-litigation prosecution of the enablers of defeated 




This chapter underscored the proposition that the dogma that “tax avoidance is legal 
and tax evasion is illegal” does “involve substituting ‘the incertain and crooked cord of 
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CHAPTER SIX                      
 
SWEETHEART TAX DEALS  
 
The primary duty of the Revenue is to collect taxes which are properly 
payable in accordance with current legislation but it is also responsible for 
managing the tax system: section 1 of the Taxes Management Act 1970. 
Inherent in the duty of management is a wide discretion. Although the 
discretion is bounded by the primary duty, it is lawful for the Revenue to 
make concessions in relation to individual cases or types of case which will, 
or may, result in the non-collection of tax lawfully due provided that they are 
made with a view to obtaining overall for the national exchequer the highest 
net practicable return: IRC v National Federation of Self-employed and Small 
Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617, 636 per Lord Diplock.  




6.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter uses HMRC’s recent sweetheart tax deals to demonstrate that the dogma 
“tax avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal” rests for its support upon a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the fact in all cases of tax fraud “it is entirely within 
the discretion of the tax authorities whether they take the procedural course of bringing 
a criminal tax-fraud case or imposing only civil tax-fraud penalties or simply establishing 
tax liability without fines or penalties”.499 
 
Sweetheart tax deals can be defined as, and are used in this thesis to refer to, 
“concessions in relation to individual cases or types of case which will, or may, result 
in the non-collection of tax lawfully due provided that they are made with a view to 
obtaining overall for the national exchequer the highest net practicable return.” It should 
be noted that in order to be “lawful” in administrative law, it is sufficient that a sweetheart 
tax deal was “made with a view to obtaining overall for the national exchequer the 
highest net practicable return.” The authorities show that there is no requirement to 
prove that a deal succeeded in “obtaining overall for the national exchequer the highest 
net practicable return.” 
 
Despite the differences in the facts and decisions in both cases, the proposition 
used by Lord Diplock to uphold the Revenue’s sweetheart tax deal in National 
Federation was precisely the same proposition used by Lord Diplock to overrule the 
Revenue’s assessment in Vestey v IRC where he stated:  
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“Taxes are imposed on subjects by Parliament. A citizen cannot be taxed 
unless he is designated in clear terms by a taxing Act as a taxpayer, and 
the amount of his liability is clearly defined. A proposition that whether a 
subject is to be taxed or not, or that, if he is, the amount of his liability is to 
be decided (even though within a limit) by an administrative body, 
represents a radical departure from constitutional principle. It may be that 
the Revenue could persuade Parliament to enact such a proposition in such 
terms that the courts would have to give effect to it; but unless it has done 
so, the courts, acting on constitutional principles, not only should not, but 
cannot validate it. ... This would be taxation by self asserted administrative 
discretion and not by law.”500 
 
 
As the cases analysed in this chapter demonstrate, sweetheart tax deals or 
“concessions in relation to individual cases or types of case which will, or may, result 
in the non-collection of tax lawfully due provided that they are made with a view to 
obtaining overall for the national exchequer the highest net practicable return” rest upon 
the “proposition that whether a subject is to be taxed or not, or that, if he is, the amount 
of his liability is to be decided (even though within a limit) by an administrative body” 
and thus constitute “taxation by ... administrative discretion and not by law” and 
“represent a radical departure from constitutional principle.” 
 
On December 16, 2011, HMRC’s then Permanent Secretary for Tax (Mr Hartnett) 
highlighted the significance of sweetheart tax deals in a memorandum to the Exchequer 
Secretary to the Treasury: 
 
“In 2006 HMRC adopted a new approach to reaching tax settlements with 
large business, through building constructive relationships and 
encouraging mutual openness and transparency, increasing certainty for 
business and reducing the time taken to resolve issues. Alongside this 
general strategy we introduced the intensive High Risk Corporates 
Programme for the most aggressive companies, which has already secured 
well over £9bn of additional revenue for the UK that might not otherwise 
have been secured. Settlements of above £1bn are now not uncommon, 
and £4.5bn (in addition to the £9bn) has come from just four settlements 
with bespoke governance.”501 
 
 
The frequent claim that any amount recovered in a tax deal is “additional revenue for 
the UK that might not otherwise have been secured” is disingenuous and leads to the 
absurd conclusion that it would have been appropriate for the High Risk Corporates 
Programme to accept £9 instead of £9 billion merely because £9 is better than nothing. 
                                                 
500 [1980] STC 10, 18-19.  
501 ‘Strong Statement in Support of HMRC when the PAC Report on Large Business Settlements 
is Released next Tuesday 20th December 2011’. See Syal, ‘Revealed: 'Sweetheart' tax deals 
each worth over £1bn’, The Guardian, April 29, 2013. 
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As the chair of the PAC stated in relation to the “four settlements made with bespoke 
governance” (which are deals Hartnett struck without following HMRC’s rules):   
 
“If we got £4.5bn in, how much did we not get? That is what taxpayers will 
want to know. ... Whilst it is in the interest of the government to collect 
monies, these are huge sums. If there were deals involved, we need to 
know that the companies paid a fair amount on the profits they made from 
their businesses in the UK.”502 
 
As explained in chapter one, Lord Mansfield upheld the conviction in Bembridge by 
applying the common law offence of cheating the public revenue to misconduct in a 
public office in order to protect the public interest in tax deals, stating: 
 
“In 6 Modern, folio 96, the court says: ‘If a man be made an officer by act 
of parliament, and misbehave himself in his office, he is indictable for it at 
common law; and any public officer, is indictable for misbehaviour in his 
office,’ and there is no doubt but at all times, more especially in this, they 
whose offices give them such power over the public revenue, the public are 
extremely interested in; therefore I am of opinion, that the crime found by 
the jury is an indictable offence.”503 
 
The fortification of the common law protection of the public interest in tax settlements 
by fraud by abuse of position under section 4 of the Fraud Act underscores the 
proposition that “they whose offices give them such power over the public revenue 
[“Settlements of above £1bn are now not uncommon, and £4.5bn ... has come from 
just four settlements with bespoke governance”], the public are extremely interested 
in”. 
 
The rest of this chapter critiques the legal bases of sweetheart tax deals; demonstrates 
that they breach HMRC’s Criminal Investigation Policy; and uses the offshore tax 
evasion settlement with HSBC and the offshore tax avoidance settlements with 
Vodafone and Google to demonstrate that tax evasion and tax avoidance amount to 
cheating the public revenue in law.  
 
6.2. REVENUE’S DISCRETION 
 
The landmark judicial review in National Federation involved a tax evasion sweetheart 
deal. As Lord Wilberforce explained:  
 
                                                 
502 Syal, ibid. 
503 Bembridge, p.157. Emphasis supplied.  
196 
 
“The respondent federation ... is asking for an order on the Commissioners 
of Inland Revenue to assess and collect arrears of income said to be due 
by a number of people compendiously described as ‘Fleet Street casuals’. 
These are workers in the printing industry who, under a practice sanctioned 
apparently by their unions and their employers, have for some years been 
engaged in a process of depriving the Inland Revenue of tax due in respect 
of their casual earnings. This they appear to have done by filling in false or 
imaginary names on the call slips presented on collecting their pay. The 
sums involved were very considerable. The Inland Revenue, having 
become aware of this, made an arrangement ... under which these workers 
are to register in respect of their casual employment, so that in the future 
tax can be collected in the normal way. Further, arrears of tax from 1977-
78 are to be paid and current investigations are to proceed, but 
investigations as to tax lost in earlier years are not to be made.  
 
This arrangement, described inaccurately as an ‘amnesty’, the federation 
wishes to attack. It asserts that the Revenue acted unlawfully in not 
pursuing the claim for the full amount of tax due. It claims that the Board 
exceeded its powers in granting the ‘amnesty’; alternatively that, if it had 
power to grant it ... the Board ought to act fairly as between taxpayers and 
has not done so; and that the Board is under a duty to see that income tax 
is duly assessed, charged and collected.”504 
 
 
In the courts below, the issue was whether the federation had standing to bring a 
judicial review. The High Court held that it did not. The Court of Appeal disagreed. The 
House of Lords considered it relevant to decide whether the Revenue acted beyond its 
powers under section 1 of TMA in the context of section 13(1) which provided that:  
 
“The Commissioners shall collect and cause to be collected every part of 
inland revenue, and all money under their care and management”.  
 
 
Their lordships found for the Revenue on both grounds, without any evidence that 
Parliament has ever qualified section 13(1) of TMA. According to Lord Diplock’s classic 
statement applied by Lord Wilson in Gaines-Cooper: 
 
“[T]he Board are charged by statute with the care, management and 
collection on behalf of the Crown of income tax, corporation tax and capital 
gains tax. In the exercise of these functions the Board have a wide 
managerial discretion as to the best means of obtaining for the national 
exchequer from the taxes committed to their charge the highest net return 
that is practicable having regard to the staff available to them and the cost 
of collection. ... I do not doubt, however, and I do not understand any of 
your Lordships to doubt, that if it were established that the Board were 
proposing to exercise or to refrain from exercising their powers not for 
reasons of ‘good management’ but for some extraneous or ulterior reason 
that action or inaction of the Board would be ultra vires and would be a 
proper matter for judicial review if it were brought to the attention of the 
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court by an applicant with ‘a sufficient interest’ in having the Board 
compelled to observe the law.”505 
 
 
The decision of Justice Nicol in the recent judicial review in UK Uncut Legal Action v 
HMRC, which resulted from Hartnett’s decision to let Goldman Sachs off some £20 
million due in interests after the company had lost its appeal and without consulting the 
lawyers dealing with the matter506, underscores the breadth of this judge-made “wide 
managerial discretion”:  
 
“The settlement with Goldman Sachs was not a glorious episode in the 
history of the Revenue. The HMRC officials who negotiated it had not been 
briefed by the lawyers who were litigating against Goldman Sachs. They 
relied on their belief or recollection that there was a barrier to the recovery 
of interest on the unpaid NICs. That was erroneous. HMRC accepts now 
that there was no such barrier. The officials who negotiated the agreement 
overlooked the need for approval from the Programme Board in relation to 
an agreement over £100 million. HMRC now accepts that they should have 
appreciated this. Because the officials did not have this requirement to 
mind, they said nothing about it to Goldman Sachs and created the 
impression that the agreement was a done deal by the end of the meeting 
on 19th November. HMRC accepts that was an error. Furthermore, HMRC 
did not appear to have taken a contemporaneous note as to the agreement 
which was reached on 19th November. That allowed a degree of uncertainty 
to prevail for a time as to what precisely had been agreed. In the end that 
has been resolved but in the course of the hearing, HMRC accepted that it 
would have been a good idea for a contemporaneous record to have been 
kept. Next, by his own admission, when he decided to approve the 
settlement on 9th December 2010, Mr Hartnett took into account the 
potential embarrassment to the Chancellor of the Exchequer if Goldman 
Sachs were to withdraw from the Tax Code. HMRC accepts that was an 
irrelevant consideration and should not have featured in his decision-
making process. 
 
However, my task is to decide whether the decisions of HMRC under 
challenge were unlawful. As Simon J. said when granting permission to 
apply for judicial review, ‘maladministration and illegality are separate 
issues.’ He was echoing the sentiments expressed by Lord Scarman in the 
Fleet Street Casuals case. ...   
 
But it is worth remembering that Lord Scarman’s rhetoric was directed at 
the argument that the National Federation’s claim could not be examined 
because it lacked standing to apply for judicial review. When the claim was 
examined, he, like the other members of the House of Lords, concluded 
that it was not sustainable. Similarly, [counsel for HMRC] did not suggest 
that I should retreat from the ‘commanding heights of the law’, but rather I 
should conclude that the Claimant’s arguments that HMRC had erred in 
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law, as well as making the errors which he admitted, were not made out. 
For all of the reasons which I have given above, I agree.”507 
 
 
Just like a decision that a scheme “works” as a matter of statutory construction, a 
decision that a tax deal is within the Revenue’s “wide managerial discretion” as a matter 
of administrative law does not justify the blanket label that it is “lawful” because it does 
not decide the question of cheating the public revenue or misconduct in a public office 
under the common law or fraud by abuse of office under section 4 of the Fraud Act.  
 
There is no suggestion of the commission of a crime, but, leaving aside the question of 
dishonesty, failing to collect tax because of “the potential embarrassment to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer” is within the ambit of section 4 of the Fraud Act because 
it is not necessary for the defendant “to make a gain for himself” in terms of section 
4(1)(c)(i); it is sufficient “to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss” 
in terms of section 4(1)(c)(ii). In the words of Goddard CJ’s summary of Bembridge in 
Hudson:  
 
“The matter came before the Court of King’s Bench in Rex v. Bembridge in 
1783, when a public officer, one Charles Bembridge, was indicted for a 
fraud on the Crown because he had knowingly and wrongly certified the 
amount due from the late Paymaster-General, Lord Holland, to the Crown. 
It does not appear that he had gained anything from it, but he did it and did 
it fraudulently, as the jury found.”508 
 
 
6.3. TREASURY DIRECTIONS    
 
Section 11 of the CRCA, which enacted the provision for treasury directions embodied 
in section 1(3) TMA, provides that:  
 
“In the exercise of their functions the Commissioners shall comply with any 
directions of a general nature given to them by the Treasury.”  
 
 
During the passage of the CRCA, the Attorney-General explained in a letter to the 
Chairman of the House of Lords’ Constitution Committee that:  
 
“[I]t is intended that the Treasury – as currently – should have an overall 
power to give general direction to the Commissioners in the exercise of 
their functions. This recognises that Treasury Ministers retain overall 
accountability for the UK tax system as a whole and must retain oversight 
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of HMRC, but that this is subject to the vital principle that Ministers should 
not intervene in the affairs of individual taxpayers and should not attempt 
to influence the way a particular taxpayer is dealt with.”509 
 
 
HMRC’s “light touch” approach to the taxation of large businesses reflects the policies 
of successive governments which it is bound to enforce under Treasury directions.510 
In fact, the sweetheart tax deals Hartnett described are traceable to the famous speech 
by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Confederation of British Industry on 
November 28, 2005:  
 
“In the old regulatory model – and for more than one hundred years – the 
implicit principle from health and safety to the administration of tax and 
financial services has been, irrespective of known risks or past results, 100 
per cent inspection whether it be premises, procedures or practices. ...  
 
This approach, followed for more than a century of regulation by 
governments of all parties is outdated. The better, and in my opinion the 
correct, modern model of regulation – the risk based approach – is based 
on trust in the responsible company, the engaged employee and the 
educated consumer, leading government to focus its attention where it 
should: no inspection without justification, no form filling without 
justification, and no information requirements without justification, not just 
a light touch but a limited touch. 
 
The new model of regulation can be applied not just to regulation of 
environment, health and safety and social standards but is being applied to 
other areas vital to the success of British business: to the regulation of 
financial services and indeed to the administration of tax.”511 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008, which resulted from the “light touch” approach “to the 
regulation of financial services”, was a major contributing factor to the emergence of 
the Coalition Government in 2010. The Corporate Tax Road Map published by the 
Treasury under that Government, however, stated: 
 
“The administration of business tax  
 
The Government sees continuing to develop an enhanced relationship 
between HMRC and large businesses as a priority. Openness and 
transparency are not just important when considering policy issues but also 
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play a role in tax administration, in building an understanding of the 
framework within which businesses operate and make decisions on tax. ...  
 
A stable and sustainable corporate tax system will also require responsible 
judgements from both large businesses and HMRC as to how the law is 
interpreted on a day-to-day basis.”512 
 
 
Taxation on the basis of “responsible judgements from both large businesses and 
HMRC as to how the law is interpreted on a day-to-day basis” is “taxation by ... 
administrative discretion and not by law” and “represents a radical departure from 
constitutional principle.”   
 
6.4. HMRC’S CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION POLICY  
 
6.4.1. Criminal Attacks  
 
As the exposition in chapter one shows, marketed tax avoidance masterminded by the 
tax avoidance industry and offshore tax evasion masterminded by the private banking 
or wealth management industry fall within HMRC’s description of ‘criminal attacks’: 
 
“Organised criminal gangs undertake co-ordinated and systematic attacks 
on the tax system. This includes smuggling goods such as alcohol or 




6.4.2. Marketed Tax Avoidance  
 
The Information in USA v KPMG (Appendix 1) proves that in marketed tax avoidance 
“[o]rganised criminal gangs undertake co-ordinated and systematic attacks on the tax 
system.” As IRS Commissioner Everson stated while announcing the deferred 
prosecution of KPMG: 
 
“Today’s actions demonstrate our resolve to hold accountable those who 
play fast and loose with the tax code. At some point such conduct passes 
from clever accounting and lawyering to theft from the people. ... 
Accountants and attorneys should be the pillars of our system of taxation, 
not the architects of its circumvention.”514 
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To “play fast and loose with the tax code” or to circumvent the “system of taxation” is 
to “undertake co-ordinated and systematic attacks on the tax system”, which is cheating 
the public or “theft from the people” as a matter of law. According to Baker: 
 




6.4.3. Offshore Tax Evasion   
 
The Information in USA v Sethi (Appendix 2) proves that in offshore tax evasion 
“[o]rganised criminal gangs undertake co-ordinated and systematic attacks on the tax 
system.”  
 
HMRC’s specific reference to “smuggling goods such as alcohol or tobacco, VAT 
repayment fraud and VAT MTIC fraud” perpetrated by low level criminals in its definition 
but not offshore tax evasion perpetrated by respectable professional advisers in the 
private banking industry such as the “senior vice president” and “high-ranking 
executive” of HSBC referred to in paragraphs 17 and 18, which is universally accepted 
as a crime, underscores the double standard that underlies the administration of the 
UK’s tax system. 
 
6.4.4. HMRC’s Policy 
 
The proposition that marketed tax avoidance and offshore tax evasion constitute 
conspiracies in which “[o]rganised criminal gangs undertake co-ordinated and 
systematic attacks on the tax system” is highly significant because according to HMRC 
Criminal Investigation Policy: 
 
“Examples of the kind of circumstances in which HMRC will generally 
consider starting a criminal, rather than civil investigation are in cases of 
organised criminal gangs attacking the tax system or systematic frauds 




The sweetheart tax deals HMRC concluded in the cases of offshore tax evasion and 
offshore tax avoidance analysed in this chapter show that HMRC does not comply with 
this policy, which is a ground for judicial review. 
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6.5. OFFSHORE TAX AVOIDANCE   
 
6.5.1. HMRC’s Practice   
 
The “Luxembourg Leaks” – the disclosure in November 2014 by the ICIJ of 548 letters 
between PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and the Luxembourg Inland Revenue 
showing that PwC secured tax deals or advance planning arrangements for 343 
multinational companies between 2002 and 2010 – confirms that offshore tax 
avoidance amounts to marketed tax avoidance. According to the PAC:  
 
“Large accountancy firms advise multinational companies on complex 
strategies and contrived structures which do not reflect the substance of 
their businesses and are instead designed to avoid tax. In light of the 
publication of leaked documents detailing some of the tax advice it has 
given to its multinational clients, we took evidence from PwC. PwC did not 
convince us that its widespread promotion of schemes to numerous clients, 
based on artificially diverting profits to Luxembourg through intra-company 
loans, constituted anything other than the promotion of tax avoidance on 
an industrial scale. ... The tax arrangements PwC promoted in Luxembourg 
bear all the characteristics of a mass-marketed tax avoidance scheme.”516 
 
 
The PAC’s 2012 report fortifies the proposition that HMRC should be “starting a 
criminal, rather than civil investigation”:  
 
“In 2011-12, £474.2 billion of total tax revenue accrued to HMRC which was 
£4.5 billion higher than for 2010-11.Yet there was a decrease in corporation 
tax revenue of £6.3 billion. ...  
 
We were not sufficiently convinced by the Department’s assertion that it 
was pursuing all the tax due from big businesses given the reduction in 
corporation tax revenue from last year. There is genuine public anger and 
frustration because there is an impression that rigorous action is taken 
against ordinary people and small businesses and British companies based 
wholly in the UK but, apparently, lenient treatment is given to big 
corporations, of which almost half have a head office overseas. ... 
 
HMRC acknowledged that it has to maintain broad confidence and 
credibility in its administration of the tax system to maintain the very high 
levels of compliance that there is in the UK. However, we felt that this was 
undermined by the Department’s use of selective prosecutions; a practice 
which it could not clearly justify to the Committee. HMRC had not carried 
out any analysis into the effect high-profile cases of large companies 
avoiding tax could be having on the compliance rate of individuals and 
small and medium companies. Multinational companies appear to be using 
transfer pricing, payment of royalties for intellectual property or franchise 
payments to other group companies to artificially reduce their profits in the 
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UK or to remove them to lower tax jurisdictions. We were not convinced 




6.5.2. The Vodafone Deal     
 
The Vodafone deal is one of Hartnett’s “four settlements with bespoke governance.” 
According to a newspaper report:  
 
“Controversial tax boss Dave Hartnett agreed a deal to let Vodafone off a 
£6bn tax bill. ... The agreement between HMRC and Vodafone came after 
negotiations between revenue officers and John Connors, Vodafone’s head 
of tax. Until 2007, Mr Connors was a senior official at HMRC, where he 
worked closely with Mr Hartnett. 
 
The saga began a decade ago when Vodafone bought German engineering 
firm Mannesmann for 180bn euros. Wanting to route the purchase through 
an offshore company to avoid paying UK taxes, it set up a subsidiary in 
Luxemburg where profits would be taxed at less than 1%. But it was ruled 
that the deal broke anti-tax avoidance rules. 
 
Nevertheless, Mr Hartnett took the Vodafone case away from his team of 
lawyers and gave it to another negotiating team, which said the phone 
company could get away with paying a lump sum of £800,000 and a further 
£450,000 over five years. HMRC also agreed that the firm would no longer 
have to pay tax on its Luxembourg subsidiary’s profits. The deal is 
understood to include some other tax avoidance ruses by Vodafone. One 




Vodafone’s annual report for the year ended March 31, 2010 provided this technical 
background:  
 
“In October 2004, one of our subsidiaries, Vodafone 2, instigated a legal 
challenge to an enquiry (‘the Vodafone 2 enquiry’) by HMRC with regard to 
the UK tax treatment of its Luxembourg holding company, Vodafone 
Investments Luxembourg SARL (‘VIL’), under the CFC Regime. Vodafone 
2 argued that the CFC Regime was incompatible with EU law and the 
Vodafone 2 enquiry ought to be closed. 
 
In September 2006, the European Court of Justice determined in the 
Cadbury Schweppes case (C-196/04) that the CFC Regime would be 
incompatible with EU law unless it could be interpreted as applying only to 
wholly artificial arrangements intended to escape national tax normally 
payable (‘wholly artificial arrangements’). On 22 May 2009, the Court of 
Appeal (‘CoA’) held that the CFC Regime could be so interpreted by 
reading a new exemption into the CFC Regime in respect of subsidiaries 
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which are ‘actually established’ in another EU Member State and carry on 
‘genuine economic activities’ there. The CoA ruled that the Vodafone 2 
enquiry should be allowed to continue on this basis. The CoA’s decision 
became final when, on 17 December 2009, the Supreme Court refused 
Vodafone 2 permission to appeal.  
 
The Vodafone 2 enquiry and other enquiries involving similar holding 
companies in Luxembourg are ongoing. The outcome of these enquiries, 
including whether further legal proceedings will be required to ultimately 
resolve them, is uncertain at this stage. We carried provisions of £2.2 billion 




On July 23, 2010 Vodafone issued an Interim Management Statement disclosing the 
details of the settlement:  
 
“On 22 July 2010 Vodafone reached agreement with the UK tax authorities 
with respect to the UK Controlled Foreign Company (‘CFC’) tax case. 
Vodafone will pay £1.25 billion to settle all outstanding CFC issues from 
2001 to date and has also reached agreement that no further UK CFC tax 
liabilities will arise in the near future under current legislation.  
 
Longer term, no CFC liabilities are expected to arise as a consequence of 
the likely reforms of the UK CFC regime due to the facts established in this 
agreement. The settlement comprises £800m in the current financial year 
with the balance to be paid in instalments over the following five years. ”520 
 
 
Whether or not Hartnett “let Vodafone off £6bn bill”, by accepting “£1.25 billion to settle 
all outstanding CFC issues from 2001 to [22 July 2010]” when Vodafone “carried 
provisions of £2.2 billion in respect of the potential UK corporation tax exposure at 31 
March 2010”, and by accepting “instalments over the following five years” without 
interest, it is difficult to see how HMRC can be said to have succeeded in “obtaining for 
the national exchequer ... the highest net return that is practicable”. 
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the terms – “no further UK CFC tax liabilities will arise in 
the near future under current legislation” and “no CFC liabilities are expected to arise 
as a consequence of the likely reforms of the UK CFC regime” – arguably makes the 
agreement “an example of a ‘forward tax agreement’ which, in the present context, is 
an agreement in terms of which an individual will pay, and the [Revenue] will accept, a 
specified sum in respect of designated future years of assessment in full and final 







settlement of ... tax to which the individual might otherwise have been liable” in the 
words of Lord Cullen in Al Fayed v Advocate General for Scotland521 where such an 
agreement was held ultra vires.  
 
6.5.3. The Google Deal     
 
Google’s statement illustrates the taxation on the basis of “responsible judgements 
from both large businesses and HMRC as to how the law is interpreted on a day-to-
day basis”:  
 
“After a six-year audit we are paying the full amount of tax that HM Revenue 
& Customs agrees we should pay, including £130m in additional back tax. 
Governments make tax law, the tax authorities independently enforce the 
law, and Google complies with the law.”522 
 
 
There is, of course, a fundamental distinction between “the full amount of tax that 
HMRC agrees” and the full amount of tax determined by a court of law. As the Financial 
Times stated in an editorial: 
 
“These so-called commissionaire arrangements depend on the polite fiction 
that the business is genuinely done in Ireland. Yet this is hard to square 
with Google’s large British payroll. It is also undermined by the 2013 
admission of Matt Brittin, its European boss, before a parliamentary 
committee that Google’s UK staff not only talk regularly to big clients but do 
much of the marketing, including the negotiation and agreement of sales. 
Other countries are increasingly questioning the legitimacy of these tactics. 
France is said to be pursuing a settlement with Google worth three times 
the UK’s amount, even though the company’s operations there are smaller. 
Were Britain to follow Paris and argue that Google had a ‘permanent 
establishment’ in Britain, the tax position could be transformed. It would 
raise the possibility of taxing a greater proportion of Google’s notional £1bn 
of UK profits. ...  
 
This deal may indeed be the best that Britain can get. But before signing 
up to it, HMRC should test the real extent of Google’s UK liabilities. Public 
confidence would be served were it to bring a case before the courts to 
judge whether the company has a UK permanent establishment and what 
impact this might have on its tax liabilities.”523 
 
 
The PAC’s 2013 report underscored the absence of any judicial involvement in the 
process:   
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“HMRC has not been sufficiently challenging of multinationals’ 
manifestly artificial tax structures. We accept that HMRC is limited by 
resources but it is extraordinary that it has not been more challenging of 
Google’s corporate arrangements given the overwhelming disparity 
between where profit is generated and where tax is paid. Inconsistencies 
between the form of the company’s structure and the substance of its 
activities only came to light through the efforts of investigative journalists 
and whistleblowers. Any common sense reading of HMRC’s own guidance 
and tests suggests HMRC should vigorously question Google’s claim that 
it is acting lawfully. We note that HMRC has never challenged an internet-




HMRC’s written submission to the PAC for the purposes of its hearing on 11 February 
2016 (Appendix 4) shows that it decided that Google “is not resident in the UK for tax 
purposes” on the basis of “legal advice”:  
 
“HMRC formally opened an enquiry into Google UK Ltd (GUK)’s returns in 
March 2010 after having carried out a detailed risk review. We concluded our 
enquiry in January 2016, when we reached agreement with GUK about 
additional tax that was due. There were two agreements between GUK and 
HMRC; one covered the period 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2004, and 
the second covered 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2015.  
 
We examined whether there was a permanent establishment of 
Google lnc or Google lreland Ltd (GlL) in the UK. We also examined the 
transfer pricing methodology applied to transactions between GUK and other 
group companies. ...  
 
For each year covered by the enquiry, we secured additional tax reflecting the 
full value of the economic activities carried on by Google in the UK.  
 
In the course of our enquiry, we: 
 
 questioned senior Google executives, managers, customer-facing staff, 
customers and intermediaries, such as advertising agencies 
 
 visited Google lreland Ltd’s Dublin offices to understand better the 
business being carried on there and to talk to lrish employees 
 
 analysed information from many sources about the business, its profits 
and activities in the UK, including documents provided by a whistle-blower 
 
 exchanged information with tax authorities in other countries to 
obtain information and documents to help us understand Google’s 
global arrangements and profitability in relation to the UK business 
 
                                                 
524 Tax Avoidance–Google, June 13, 2013, p.5. Emphasis supplied.  
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 took extensive legal advice, including consulting external leading 
Counsel on matters such as whether the activities of Google’s staff in the 
UK gave rise to a permanent establishment of Google lreland Ltd.”525 
 
 
Michel Sapin, French finance minister, said that the settlement “seems more the 
product of a negotiation than the application of the law” and added that: 
 
“The French tax administration does not negotiate the amount of taxes 
owed. It applies the rules.”526 
 
 
Indeed, on May 24, 2016 dozens of French police raided Google’s Paris headquarters 
as part of an investigation into aggravated tax fraud and the organized laundering of 
the proceeds of tax fraud.527 
 
The PAC’s report effectively concluded that HMRC did not succeed in “obtaining for 
the national exchequer ... the highest net return that is practicable”:  
 
“A six year investigation by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) has resulted 
in Google paying a further £130 million to settle its corporation tax liabilities 
over the last 10 years. This vindicates the previous Committee’s concerns 
in 2012 and 2013 that Google did not appear to be paying the full tax it 
owed in the UK. However, in the absence of full transparency over the 
details of this settlement and how it was reached we cannot judge whether 
it is fair to taxpayers. The sum paid by Google seems disproportionately 
small when compared with the size of Google’s business in the UK, 
reinforcing our concerns that the rules governing where corporation tax is 
paid by multinational companies do not produce a fair outcome. Google’s 
stated desire for greater tax simplicity and transparency is at odds with the 
complex operational structure it has created which appears to be directed 
at minimising its tax liabilities. Google admits that this structure will not 
change as a result of this settlement.”528 
 
 
6.5.4. The Profit Diversion Compliance Facility  
 
The Profit Diversion Compliance Facility published on January 10, 2019 (which is an 
‘amnesty’ for multinational companies that used Transfer Pricing (TP) to cheat the 
public revenue) vindicates the PAC’s criticisms which HMRC and the Treasury had 
hitherto denied. In the Profit Diversion Compliance Facility Guidance HMRC stated: 
                                                 
525 Supplementary written evidence from HM Revenue and Customs, 10 February 2016. 
Emphasis supplied. 
526 Bowers, ‘French finance minister blasts UK's £130m Google tax deal’, The Guardian, 
February 2, 2016.  
527 Rose, ‘Investigators raid Google Paris HQ in tax evasion inquiry’, Reuters, May 24, 2016.  




“Our investigations into Profit Diversion to date have established that in a 
large number of cases the factual pattern outlined to HMRC at the start of 
an enquiry does not stand up to scrutiny once tested. That may be a result 
of a careless error (for example individuals within a group being unaware 
of what the actual facts are) but it may also be a result of a deliberate 
behaviour, that is a group knowingly submitting a TP methodology in a 
Corporation Tax Return based on a false set of facts. A common issue is 
an overstatement of functions performed, assets used and risks assumed 
in entities taxed at lower rates, and an understatement of the functions 
performed, assets used and risks assumed in the UK. 
 
Where HMRC suspects there has been an attempt by a group to 
deliberately mislead, then we will refer the issue to Fraud Investigation 




The first paragraph shows that these are “cases of organised criminal gangs attacking 
the tax system or systematic frauds where losses represent a serious threat to the tax 
base, including conspiracy” and thus “the kind of circumstances in which HMRC will 
generally consider starting a criminal, rather than civil investigation” under HMRC 
Criminal Investigation Policy.  
 
The carefully-worded second paragraph, however, shows that this policy is not 
complied with.  
 
6.6. OFFSHORE TAX EVASION    
 
6.6.1. HMRC’s Practice  
 
The “Swiss Leaks” – the disclosure by the ICIJ of some 30,000 secret bank accounts 
holding almost £78 billion of assets in HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) – underscores the 
proposition that offshore tax evasion constitutes ‘criminal attacks’. According to the 
ICIJ:  
 
“The bank repeatedly reassured clients that it would not disclose details of 
accounts to national authorities, even if evidence suggested that the 
accounts were undeclared to tax authorities in the client’s home country. 
Bank employees also discussed with clients a range of measures that 
would ultimately allow clients to avoid paying taxes in their home countries. 
This included holding accounts in the name of offshore companies to avoid 
                                                 
529 Para. 4.4.1.  
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the European Savings Directive, a 2005 Europe-wide rule aimed at tackling 
tax evasion through the exchange of bank information.”530 
 
 
More than 3,600 bank accounts belonged to UK taxpayers. The PAC’s 2015 report 
shows why HMRC should deal with cases of offshore tax evasion by “starting a criminal, 
rather than civil investigation”:  
 
“The number of criminal prosecutions for offshore tax evasion is still 
woefully inadequate. HMRC’s investigations do not lead to sufficient 
prosecutions to provide an effective deterrent, particularly for wealthy 
individuals who hide their assets offshore. In December 2013, we argued 
that HMRC needed to demonstrate that it deals robustly with individuals 
and companies who deliberately mislead it and that HMRC should be more 
willing to pursue prosecutions against both individuals and businesses. 
Regrettably, since then HMRC appears either to have ignored our 
recommendation or to have made little progress.  
 
Incredibly, there have been only 11 prosecutions in relation to offshore tax 
evasion since 2010, and only one individual from the Falciani list (of some 
3,600 potential UK tax evaders whose Swiss bank account details were 
leaked by a former employee of HSBC) has been prosecuted. HMRC told 
us that it had now exhausted its use of the Falciani data, which did not meet 
the standards required for UK evidence. It said that offshore tax evasion is 
one of the toughest areas to prosecute, with people deliberately disguising 
their activities, while those who facilitate this form of tax evasion were 
careful not to enter the United Kingdom.  
 
HMRC has offered disclosure facilities with reduced penalties for people 
who come forward and provide information on assets held offshore. We are 
in no doubt that the use of these disclosure facilities is not an adequate 
substitute for the deterrent effect of prosecution.”531 
 
 
In fact, the “one individual from the Falciani list” or “Swiss Leaks”, who pleaded guilty 
to one count of cheating the public revenue at Wood Green Crown Court on July 4, 
2012, was prosecuted because he lied to HMRC in a previous civil investigation. 
According to HMRC’s press release dated July 5, 2012:  
 
“Michael Shanly previously failed to disclose a Swiss offshore account to 
HMRC, during a civil enquiry where he was found to owe HMRC around 
£1∙5m. This was discovered when information about UK taxpayers with 
HSBC bank accounts in Geneva was handed over to HMRC. Checks were 
then made to establish whether these account holders had declared and 
paid what they owed.” 
 
                                                 
530 ICIJ.  






Furthermore, paragraph 18 of the Information in Sethi, which revealed the involvement 
of “a high-ranking executive of [HSBC] and the head of a cross-border banking group 
within its private bank division that focused on developing and servicing clients 
worldwide ... based in [HSBC]’s London ... office” shows that, contrary to HMRC’s claim 
“that offshore tax evasion is one of the toughest areas to prosecute” because “those 
who facilitate this form of tax evasion were careful not to enter the United Kingdom”, 
the pivotal role of London in the private banking industry means that “those who 
facilitate this form of tax evasion” worldwide tend to operate from the UK.  
 
6.6.2. The HSBC Deal   
 
Contrary to HMRC’s protestations, including the claim that “the Falciani data ... did not 
meet the standards required for UK evidence”, none of the other “3,600 potential UK 
tax evaders” was prosecuted because, unlike the IRS that conducted “more than 100 
prosecutions of evaders and 50 of their banking facilitators”532, including Sethi, HMRC 
granted HSBC, their accomplices and customers immunity from prosecution.  
 
The “Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Swiss Confederation on Cooperation in the area of Taxation” was signed in 
London on October 6, 2011. The Treaty533, comprising the Agreement and the related 
Protocol and Exchange of Notes, entered into force on January 1, 2013 when the 
enabling UK legislation at Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2012 took effect.  
 
The “Side Letter of the Competent Authority of the United Kingdom on Criminal 
Investigation”, which HMRC issued presumably under Treasury direction, states: 
 
“In view of the signing of the Agreement between the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Swiss Confederation on 
cooperation in the area of taxation, the competent authority of the United 
Kingdom (the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs – 
hereinafter referred to as ‘HMRC’) wishes to set out its position in relation 
to the criminal investigation of relevant persons for past liabilities incurred 
before the date of this Agreement in respect of relevant assets.  
 
Provided that a relevant person agrees either to make a one-off payment 
in accordance with Article 9 of this Agreement or to make a voluntary 
disclosure in relation to his/her relevant assets in accordance with Article 
10 of this Agreement and fully cooperates with HMRC, that person is highly 
unlikely to be subject to a criminal investigation by HMRC for a tax-related 
                                                 
532 Private Eye, 2 October 2015, page 37.   
533 Treaty Series No. 9 (2013). Cm 8579. 
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offence for past liabilities in respect of relevant assets from the date he or 
she irrevocably opted for one of the options, unless either his/her relevant 
assets represent the proceeds of crime (other than crime connected to a 
tax-related offence) or represent the proceeds of crime connected to 
criminal tax-related offences punishable by two years or more 
imprisonment.  
 
Professional advisers, Swiss paying agents and their employees will need 
to comply with their legal obligations in respect of money laundering. Whilst 
it is never possible to provide an absolute assurance against a criminal 
investigation, it is highly unlikely to be in the public interest of the United 
Kingdom that professional advisers, Swiss paying agents and their 
employees will be subject to a criminal investigation by HMRC.”534 
 
 
No reason was given for the conclusion that, unlike other countries like the US, France, 
Belgium and Argentina, it was “highly unlikely to be in the public interest of the United 
Kingdom” for HSBC, its employees and co-conspirators to be subjected “to a criminal 
investigation by HMRC”. In a letter to the Chairman of The Federal Reserve System on 
September 10, 2012, however, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (George Osborne) 
stated:  
 
“The ongoing US investigations into HSBC and SCB for breaches of US 
anti-money laundering (AML) and sanctions regulations have attracted 
significant market attention in the UK and elsewhere. Following publication 
of the Order by the New York Department for Financial Services (DFS) on 
6 August, SCB’s share price fell by almost 30% in a single day of trading. 
Even though SCB’s market value has now recovered much of this loss, the 
incident raises broader concerns, and gives us an opportunity to reflect 
more generally on how we might collectively ensure that regulatory and 
enforcement action does not lead to unintended consequences.  
 
 
The letter (Appendix 6) described each bank as “a systemically important financial 
institution”. Even if HSBC was considered to be beyond prosecution as “a systemically 
important financial institution”, however, HMRC could have entered into a deferred 
prosecution agreement to extract fines and an undertaking for better behaviour. Under 
the agreement between the IRS and KPMG: 
 
“The agreement provides that prosecution of the criminal charge against 
KPMG will be deferred until Dec. 31, 2006 if specified conditions – including 
payment of the $456 million in fines, restitution, and penalties – are 
met.  The $456 million penalty includes: $100 million in civil fines for failure 
to register the tax shelters with the IRS; $128 million in criminal fines 
representing disgorgement of fees earned by KPMG on the four shelters; 
and $228 million in criminal restitution representing lost taxes to the IRS as 
a result of KPMG’s intransigence in turning over documents and 
                                                 
534 Emphases supplied. 
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information to the IRS that caused the statute of limitations to run.  If KPMG 
has fully complied with all the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement 
at the end of the deferral period, the government will dismiss the criminal 
information. 
 
To date, the IRS has collected more than $3.7 billion from taxpayers who 
voluntarily participated in a parallel civil global settlement initiative.”535 
 
 
By 2014, it had become clear that the HSBC deal did not succeed in “obtaining for the 
national exchequer ... the highest net return that is practicable”. According to the 
International Business Times: 
 
“Britain is failing to rake in as much money as Chancellor George Osborne 
had promised from taxpayers who are sheltering their money in 
Switzerland’s secretive banking system, with a shortfall of £2.3bn. Under 
the deal between the UK and Switzerland, British domiciles started to be 
taxed on their banking deposits in Swiss institutions. Just £818m was 
collected during the whole of 2013 after the tax agreement started on 1 
January, according to the Office for National Statistics (ONS). This is 
against a forecast in Osborne’s 2012 Autumn Statement of £3.12bn being 
raised during the 2013/14 financial year. When announcing the deal, 
Osborne said it would raise £5bn for the Treasury’s coffers over the six 
years to the end of 2018.”536  
 
 
Following the media coverage of the “Swiss Leaks” in 2015, HMRC claimed that it 
“requested copies of the data from The Guardian, BBC Panorama and the ICIJ.”537 But 
according to the Declaration of the United Kingdom concerning the acquisition of 
customer data stolen from Swiss banks dated October 6, 2011:   
 
“The Government of the United Kingdom declares on the occasion of the 
signing of the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Swiss Confederation on cooperation in the area 




The timeline of the Swiss Leaks provided by The Guardian shows the need to consider 
the criminal law implications of sweetheart tax deals:  
 
“Early 2010 
French tax authorities begin informing other tax authorities around the 
world of the existence of the HSBC files.  
 
                                                 
535 IRS. 
536 Croucher, ‘UK-Swiss Tax Deal Falls £2.3bn Short of George Osborne Promise’, January 22, 
2014. 




Dave Hartnett, head of tax at HMRC, meets HSBC. He refuses to say what 
was discussed at the meeting. 
 
April 2010 
HMRC receives the HSBC files. 
 
July 2010 
The Financial Times reports that HSBC had asked the French courts to 
prevent the country’s tax authority handing files to HMRC. 
 
September 2011 
Hartnett informs the Treasury select committee: ‘I think the whole nation 
probably knows that our department has a disc from the Swiss – from the 










This chapter demonstrated that sweetheart tax deals obscure the fraudulent nature of 
tax avoidance and tax evasion because they constitute “taxation by ... administrative 
discretion and not by law” and “represent a radical departure from constitutional 
principle” in the words of Lord Wilberforce in Vestey. In the words of Walton J which he 
cited with approval:   
 













                                                 
538 See Leigh, ‘HSBC files timeline: from Swiss bank leak to fallout’, March 13, 2015.  


























































CHAPTER SEVEN               
 
THE EQUALITY OF TAXATION    
 
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; 
that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the 
protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals of a 
great nation is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great 
estate, who are obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective 
interests in the estate. In the observation or neglect of this maxim, consists 
what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. 




This chapter demonstrates that the proposed cheating or fraud approach to tax 
avoidance will give effect to the principle of the equality of taxation.  
 
Adam Smith propounded the equality of taxation as the first maxim of taxation because 
it is the basis of taxation. According to his famous classification “OF THE SOURCES 
OF THE GENERAL OR PUBLIC REVENUE OF THE SOCIETY”540:  
 
“The revenue which must defray, not only the expense of defending the 
society and of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, but all the other 
necessary expenses of government, for which the constitution of the state 
has not provided any particular revenue may be drawn, either, first, from 
some fund which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, 
and which is independent of the revenue of the people; or, secondly, from 
the revenue of the people.”541 
  
“Taxes”542 or “the revenue of the people” corresponds to “the king’s extraordinary 
revenue” under Blackstone’s earlier exposition ‘OF THE KING’S REVENUE’543:   
 
“The king’s ordinary revenue ... was very large formerly, and capable of 
being increased to a magnitude truly formidable. ... But, fortunately for the 
liberty of the subject, this hereditary landed revenue [became] alienated 
from the crown: in order to supply the deficiencies of which we are now 
obliged to have recourse to new methods of raising money, unknown to our 
early ancestors; which methods constitute the king’s extraordinary 
revenue. For, the public patrimony being got into the hands of private 
subjects, it is but reasonable that private contributions should supply the 
public service. 
 
                                                 
540 Title of Chapter II of Book V. 
541 Emphasis supplied.  
542 Part II of Chapter II is entitled “Of Taxes”.  
543 Commentaries, p.281. 
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The thing therefore to be wished and aimed at in a land of liberty is by no 
means the total abolition of taxes, which would draw after it very pernicious 
consequences, and the very supposition of which is the height of political 
absurdity. For as the true idea of government and magistracy will be found 
to consist in this, that some few men are deputed by many others to preside 
over public affairs, so that individuals may the better be enabled to attend 
their private concerns, it is necessary that those individuals should be 
bound to contribute a portion of their private gains, in order to support that 
government, and reward that magistracy, which protects them in the 
enjoyment of their respective properties.”544 
 
 
The second paragraph justified “the king’s extraordinary revenue” or taxes on the basis 
of the equality of taxation.  
 
The rest of this chapter demonstrates that the equality of taxation underpins the 
proposed cheating or fraud approach to tax avoidance and demonstrates that the 
prevailing constructional approach enforces the inequality of taxation by explaining its 
manifestations in the perverse ‘certainty’ argument, the objections to retrospective anti-
avoidance legislation and the fallacy of profit maximisation.  
 
7.2 THE PRESUMPTION FOR EQUALITY  
 
Blackstone’s statement of the equality of taxation above is consistent with his 
subordination of the individual’s right to property to the public revenue or taxation:  
 
“The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: 
which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his 
acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the 
land. ...  
 
For no subject of England can be constrained to pay any aids or taxes, 
even for the defence of the realm or the support of government, but such 




These statements correspond to the two classic paragraphs of modern human rights 
legislation, such as Protocol 1 to Article 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: 
 
“(1) Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the 
                                                 
544 Blackstone, pp. 306-307. Emphases supplied.  
545 Ibid, pp.138-140.  
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public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the 
general principles of international law. 
 
(2) The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right 
of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment 
of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
 
 
The interpretation of this provision by the European Court of Human Rights in Gasus 
Dosier-und Fördertechnik GmbH v Netherlands corresponds to Blackstone’s and 
Smith’s statements of the equality of taxation:  
 
“According to the Court’s well-established case law, the second paragraph 
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 must be construed in the light of the principle 
laid down in the Article’s first sentence. Consequently, an interference must 
achieve a ‘fair balance’ between the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights. The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the 
structure of Article 1 as a whole, including the second paragraph: there 
must therefore be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim pursued.”546 
 
 
Adam Smith’s third and fourth maxims are also reformulations of Blackstone’s 
statement of the equality of taxation:   
 
“Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is 
most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. ...  
 
Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of 
the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings 
into the public treasury of the state.” 
 
 
Following the commencement of appeal to the High Court by way of case stated in 
1874, the first volume of the resultant official Reports of Tax Cases published in 1875 
contained two decisions that recognised the equality of taxation as an overriding 
principle of statutory construction despite the fact that no scheme or arrangement was 
involved.  
 
In Case Stated on the Appeal of the Scottish Widows’ Fund and Life Assurance 
Society, Lord Ardmillan said:  
 
“When a court of law is called to decide a question affecting the incidence 
and distribution of taxation, the question is necessarily important. We have 
                                                 
546 (1995) 20 EHRR 403, 435, para 62. 
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been told that a taxing statute must be construed liberally and favourably 
to the subjects. In one sense that is true, and the remark is well founded, 
but on the other hand equality and impartial justice in the incidence of 
taxation are of greater moment, and the statute should be construed so as 
to promote that equality and that impartiality of justice. There is no 
presumption in favour of the exemption of the few from the incidence of the 
general tax. I think the presumption is for equality, and rather against the 
partiality which is involved in special exemptions.”547 
 
 
Rejecting the taxpayer’s argument in Captain H. Young, Master Mariner, Lord Ardmillan 
stated:   
 
“There is no doubt that an Act which taxes is to be strictly construed. Where 
there is an Act taxing a particular body, or laying a tax upon a particular 
article, of course that Act is to be strictly construed, but where there is an 
Act taxing the whole of Her Majesty’s subjects, and the question is, whether 
it is to be construed so as to sustain the equality of the incidence of the tax, 
I think there is no presumption in favour of that exemption and against the 
equality of the incidence of the taxation. It is the next and soundest principle 
of taxation to be as equal as possible, and I cannot recognize, as a 
presumption against that equality, what has been urged today, or that from 
what has been urged we are to favour the Appellant with exemption.”548  
 
 
In his judgement in Partington v Attorney General, which “[t]he books tend to cite ... as 
delivering the first authoritative guidance on how to construe a taxing statute”549, Lord 
Cairns applied the equality of taxation to impose tax. According to Monroe:  
 
“The claim was for probate duty. Two ladies had died intestate, the second 
to die being the next-of-kin of the first. The children of the second sought 
to recover the assets of the first and the Revenue sought probate duty, 
twice over. The claim sounded harsh, though reasonable enough by 
reference to the scheme of the tax.”550 
 
 
Delivering the judgment of the House of Lords in favour of the Revenue, Lord Cairns 
said in response to the distinction sought to be drawn between ‘form’ and ‘substance’: 
 
“I do so both upon form and also upon substance. I am not at all sure that, 
in a case of this kind – a fiscal case – form is not amply sufficient; because, 
as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation it is this: If the person 
sought to be taxed comes within the letter or the law he must be taxed, 
however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the 
other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the 
subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently 
                                                 
547 1 TC 7, 10. 
548 1 TC 57, 62. Emphasis supplied.  
549 Intolerable Inquisition, p.49. 
550 Ibid.  
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within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other 
words, if there be admissible, in any statute, what is called an equitable 
construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing 
statute, where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute.”551 
 
 
In Pryce v Monmouthshire Canal and Railway Companies, Lord Cairns refused to apply 
“the principle that no charge could be imposed on the public but by the clearly 
expressed intention of the Legislature.”552 He clarified that:  
 
“The cases which have decided that Taxing Acts are to be construed with 
strictness, and that no payment is to be exacted from the subject which is 
not clearly and unequivocally required by Act of Parliament to be made, 
probably meant little more than this, that, inasmuch as there was not any à 
priori liability in a subject to pay any particular tax, nor any antecedent 
relationship between the tax-payer and the taxing authority, no reasoning 
founded upon any supposed relationship of the tax-payer and the taxing 
authority could be brought to bear upon the construction of the Act, and 
therefore the tax-payer had a right to stand upon a literal construction of 
the words used, whatever might be the consequence. I cannot think that 
this principle applies.”553 
 
 
In Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel, where the House of 
Lords rejected the taxpayer’s contention for exemption, Lord Halsbury stated:  
 
“There is no purpose in a Taxing Act but to raise money, and an exemption 
is just as much within this criticism as any other part of the Act, since every 
exemption throws an additional burden on the rest of the community.”554 
 
 
It should be noted that none of the cases involved a tax avoidance scheme or two or 
more interrelated transactions of a kind which had never taken place before the tax Act 
it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed devised as a result of it. A fortiori, the 
equality of taxation should be applicable in cases that involve tax avoidance schemes 
devised to cheat the public revenue.  
 
7.3 THE PERVERSE ‘CERTAINTY’ ARGUMENT   
 
The authorities cited in support of the inequality of taxation undermine, rather than 
support, it. According to Adam Smith’s second maxim of taxation:  
 
                                                 
551 (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 100, 122.  
552 (1879) 4 AC 197.  
553 Ibid, pp.202-203.  
554 [1891] AC 531, 551.  
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“The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and not 
arbitrary. The form of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be 
paid ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor and to every other 
person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more 
or less in the power of the tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax 
upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, 
some present or perquisite to himself.” 
 
 
The uncertainty under criticism concerned the then widely abused practice of tax 
farming.555 As judges are not tax administrators, let alone corrupt tax gatherers, this 
maxim cannot be regarded as a derogation from the equality of taxation expounded in 
the first maxim.  
 
Dicey’s statement, which is also cited in support of the inequality of taxation, shows 
that the relevant certainty is settled by the enactment of the tax Act:  
 
“Taxes are made payable in two different ways, i.e. either by permanent or 
by yearly Acts. ... This distinction between revenue depending upon 
permanent Acts and revenue depending upon temporary Acts is worth 
attention, but the main point, of course, to be borne in mind is that all taxes 
are imposed by statute, and that no one can be forced to pay a single 
shilling by way of taxation which cannot be shown to the satisfaction of the 
judges to be due from him under Act of Parliament.”556 
 
 
Dicey’s statement “that no one can be forced to pay a single shilling by way of taxation 
which cannot be shown to the satisfaction of the judges to be due from him under Act 
of Parliament” does not impel the corollary that in the words of Wheatcroft:  
 
“There is no common law of taxation: all taxes derive their authority from 
statute law.”557  
 
This is, however, the non sequitur that is used to justify the perverse ‘certainty’ 
argument. According to Simpson: 
 
“There is one further level to which the argument against judicial 
involvement has been taken, which is almost to suggest that there can be 
no judge-made, common law of taxation at all. There are, of course, 
particular judicial statements which at first sight lend some credence to the 
point of view. Perhaps most notable is a passage from the judgment of 
Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC that has frequently been cited 
since. The role of the judge is: ‘… to look merely at what is clearly said. 
                                                 
555 It originated in Rome and was adopted by mediaeval English kings who frequently made 
grants “in fee-farm”. 
556 Dicey, pp.200-202. 
557 ‘The Present State of the Tax Statute Law’ [1968] B.T.R. 377.  
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There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There 
is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be 
implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.’558   
 
This dictum, however, needs to be handled with considerable care, and 
certainly cannot be taken too readily to suggest that there can be no judge-
made tax law at all. To begin with, Rowlatt J.’s remarks deserve to be read 
in full. What he in fact said was this:  
 
‘It is urged by Sir William Findlay that in a taxing Act clear words are 
necessary in order to tax the subject. Too wide and fanciful a 
construction is often sought to be given to that maxim, which does not 
mean that words are to be unduly restricted against the Crown, or that 
there is to be any discrimination against the Crown in those Acts. It 
simply means that in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is 
clearly said. There is no … [see above]’   
 
Vitally, therefore, Rowlatt J. was in fact seeking to restrict ‘too wide and 
fanciful’ a view of the ‘clear words’  requirement, and it is unfortunate should 
his words ever be used as part of such a fanciful argument. Certainly today 
it is very difficult, without pulling the wool over one’s own eyes, to maintain 
that there is no common law of taxation.”559  
 
 
Indeed, Rowlatt J. described the taxpayer-company’s contention as “reducing the 
whole thing to the most artificial construction of an Act of Parliament that is to be found 
even in an age when artificial constructions by reference in this sort of way are, with 
increasing frequency, imposed upon us.”560 He then held that the taxpayer-company 
was liable to tax.  
 
The statement by Lord Wilberforce in Vestey shows that the question of certainty is 
settled by the enactment of the relevant tax legislation:  
 
“Taxes are imposed on subjects by Parliament. A citizen cannot be taxed 
unless he is designated in clear terms by a taxing Act as a taxpayer, and 
the amount of his liability is clearly defined.”561 
 
 
“Taxes are imposed on subjects by Parliament.” The perverse ‘certainty’ argument, 
however, converts cheating the public revenue by tax avoidance into a right to property 
by perverting Dicey’s statement “that no one can be forced to pay a single shilling by 
way of taxation which cannot be shown to the satisfaction of the judges to be due from 
him under Act of Parliament” to contend that a taxpayer “designated in clear terms by 
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a taxing Act as a taxpayer” but who deliberately uses a tax avoidance scheme (or two 
or more interrelated transactions of a kind which had never taken place before the 
taxing Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed devised as a result of it) to 
cheat the public revenue of “the amount of his liability” is entitled to succeed because: 
“A citizen cannot be taxed unless he is designated in clear terms by a taxing Act as a 
taxpayer, and the amount of his liability is clearly defined.”  
 
In his article entitled “Unacceptable Discretion: Countering Tax Avoidance and 
Preserving the Rights of the Individual”562 and headlined with a quote of Adam Smith’s 
second maxim, Troup acknowledged that the constructional approach is the recipe for 
the judge-induced disease of tax avoidance and tax complexity but justified it on the 
grounds of this perverse certainty argument despite the fact that it creates tax 
uncertainty. Citing Rowlatt J in the manner rebutted by Simpson, he stated:  
 
“The existence of the concept of tax avoidance in the UK is itself indicative 
of the approach to tax collecting here. The implication of the word 
‘avoidance’ is that there is something to avoid – in this case an intention of 
the law to catch the taxpayer which has failed. While such an intent 
undoubtedly exists behind every taxing statute, its existence is studiously 
ignored by the Courts. This apparently curious result has grown out of the 
approach of the UK Courts to the interpretation of tax law.  
 
Judges have been quite categorical that the collection of tax must be by the 
clear words of the taxing statute regardless of any purpose or mischief 
which may lie behind it. The stated rationale for this approach was the need 
for certainty – a taxpayer must be clear as to what his liability to tax is. In 
one very well-worn phrase, ‘There is no room for any intendment; there is 
no equity about a tax: there is no presumption as to a tax; you read nothing 
in; you imply nothing.’ 
 
This approach – although perhaps slightly modified in recent years – has 
formed the basis for all tax avoidance arrangements and has, no doubt, led 
to the frustration of legislators and administrators. 
 
It has also led to the somewhat complicated games of avoidance schemes 
and countering legislation which has characterised the development of so 
much tax legislation this century. These games are played in somewhat 
slow time – not least because of the speed (or lack of it) of the legislative 
process, but also because of the slow reaction of the legislature to 
countering specific avoidance schemes which ... meant that for many years 
the boot tended to be firmly on the taxpayer’s foot.”563 
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The continued existence of tax avoidance and the tax avoidance industry shows that, 
just as the boot has always been firmly on the foot of sports cheats and their medical 
and legal advisers under the prevailing approach of banning specified performance 
enhancing substances in sports, the boot has always been firmly on the foot of the tax 
avoidance industry and their clients under “the somewhat complicated games of 
avoidance schemes and countering legislation”. As Lyness put it in 2012:  
 
“It’s a game of cat and mouse. The Revenue closes one scheme, we find 
another way round it. It’s like a sat-nav. I’m driving to Manchester, get a 
message saying there’s a smash at Stoke, press this button to re-route. 
That’s all we do with tax avoidance. The Revenue puts a block in, we just 
go round the block.”564 
 
 
The ‘certainty’ argument is manifestly perverse because a taxpayer who does not use 
a tax avoidance scheme (or two or more interrelated “transactions ... of a kind which 
had never taken place before the Act was passed ... devised as a result of it”) to cheat 
the public revenue in law and “to increase pro tanto the load of tax on the shoulders of 
the great body of good citizens who do not desire, or do not know how, to adopt these 
manoeuvres” in fact, will “be clear as to what his liability to tax is.” In the words of 
O’Donnell J in O’Flynn:  
 
“Certainty in tax matters is difficult to achieve and the desire to provide 
certainty to those who wish to avoid a taxation regime which applies to 
others similarly situated to them, is something which ranks low in the 
objectives which statutory interpretation seeks to achieve. The tax payer 




The taxpayer that achieves a high level of certainty, but at the price of paying tax will 
not need a tax scheme. The perverse ‘certainty’ argument, which is dressed up piously 
as “Preserving the Rights of the Individual” is simply a licence to cheat the public 
revenue for the tax avoidance industry who cannot sell tax avoidance schemes without 
the expectation that the Revenue and the courts will accept them as legitimate. As Lord 
Templeman stated (citing Ramsay, Burmah and Furniss): 
 
“It is sometimes alleged that the trio of cases which introduced the judicial 
approach to tax avoidance schemes in 1982 and 1984 led to uncertainty. It 
is true that corporations and their advisers were deterred from inventing 
fresh artificial steps for fear of their being unsuccessful. But there never 
was any difficulty in identifying steps which had no business purpose save 
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for the avoidance of tax which would otherwise be payable, until the 
Westmoreland case muddied the waters.”566 
 
 
Any real uncertainty is the inevitable price of cheating. In the words of Lord Hoffmann 
in Carreras Group v The Stamp Commissioner:  
 
“Such uncertainty is something which the architects of such schemes have 
to accept.”567  
 
 
There is no objection to the real uncertainty resulting from the constructional approach 
because it effectively increases the possibility of success of every tax avoidance 
scheme from zero percent under the proposed cheating or fraud approach to at least 
fifty percent under the constructional approach which Lord Diplock described aptly as 
“the legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament 
meant”. As he put it: 
 
“The Court may describe what it is doing in tax appeals as interpretation. 
So did the priestess of the Delphic oracle.” 
 
 
7.4 RETROSPECTIVE ANTI-AVOIDANCE LEGISLATION 
 
The perverse certainty argument converts cheating the public revenue by tax 
avoidance into a right to property and requires the justification of every anti-avoidance 
measure under human rights principles.  
 
This is best illustrated by the objections to retrospective legislation, which is the only 
legislation that is capable of counteracting a tax avoidance scheme or two or more 
interrelated transactions of a kind which had never taken place before the Act it was 
devised to exploit was passed devised as a result of it.  
 
In National & Provincial Building Society v United Kingdom the ECtHR held that 
legislation which retrospectively validated certain regulations that imposed a tax liability 
on building societies in respect of past interest payments did not violate article 1 of 
Protocol 1 to the ECHR because: 
 
“Having regard to a contracting state’s margin of appreciation in the tax field 
and to the public interest considerations at stake, it could not be said that 
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the decisions taken by Parliament to enact these measures with 
retrospective effect were manifestly without reasonable foundation or failed 
to strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the protection of the rights of the applicant societies.”568 
 
 
In fact, contrary to conventional wisdom, the legality and constitutionality of 
retrospective legislation are beyond question. According to Fletcher:  
 
“It is a recognised ingredient of parliamentary sovereignty. No objection can 
be taken in a court of law to an Act of Parliament on the ground that it is of 
retrospective operation. ... In the Middle Ages, and before the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty was recognised in its modern from, Parliament 
and, earlier still, the King frequently promulgated charters and statutes with 
retrospective operation. ...  
 
Whatever solution the future may hold, it has to be recognised that 
retrospective legislation after due and specific warning is regarded as the 
most effective deterrent against tax avoidance that offends the public 




There should be no legal or moral objection to the use of retrospective legislation to 
counteract a tax avoidance scheme or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind 
which had never taken place before the Act it was devised to exploit was passed 
devised as a result of it. As Neville Chamberlain stated while introducing the 
retrospective provision in section 14 of Finance Act 1937, “if people persisted in devising 
these ingenious contrivances for defeating the intentions of the legislature, they must 
not expect that they would escape retrospective legislation.”570  
 
It is telling that the apologist and self-serving protests that follow the occasional 
retrospective anti-avoidance legislation that actually counters specific tax avoidance 
schemes do not extend to the routine and uncertain retrospective judicial legislation 
that facilitates tax avoidance under the constructional approach.  
 
Retrospective legislation, like every other legislation, is still inferior to the pre-existing 
common law of cheating. In the words of the NAO:  
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“While the legislative change may be effective in stopping the particular 
scheme targeted, variants of the scheme may be introduced which get 
round the conditions in the new legislation.”571 
 
 
7.5 THE FALLACY OF PROFIT MAXIMISATION 
 
The recognition that tax avoidance is cheating the public revenue, rather than a right 
to property, undermines the argument that the supposed duties of directors to maximise 
profits justifies it.   
 
The Revenue is a stakeholder (on behalf of the public) in every trade, business or 
enterprise. Monroe concluded that it was “reassuring that the judges showed a sturdy 
bias towards property and a refined hostility towards taxation”572 but as he asked in the 
beginning of the essay:  
 
“Is not the Inland Revenue a partner in every trade, business or 
enterprise?”573 
 
This means that the Revenue is entitled to the same true representation that 
corresponds to the economic reality as other stakeholders, and that the failure to 
comply with this legal and moral obligation of honesty is cheating the public revenue. 
According to Bergin’s apt analysis of Starbucks’ scheme:  
 
“Starbucks has been telling investors the business was profitable, even as 
it consistently reported losses. … Starbucks has told investors one thing 
and the taxman another.”574 
 
 
The constructional approach to tax avoidance reflects a grave misconception of this 
notion. Lord Oliver stated:    
 
“I have never ... made any secret of my dislike of the legitimate business 
purpose approach. That is principally because I have never been able to 
understand why, if the making of profits is a legitimate business purpose, 
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There is no inconsistency between the making of profits, which is a legitimate business 
purpose, and the paying of tax, which is equally a legitimate business purpose. The 
making of a profit is followed by an honest return to investors and should also be 
followed by an honest return to the Revenue. But according to Begin: 
 
“You could think of Starbucks’ differing versions of its experience in the UK 
as two different coffees. To its investors, it sells an espresso - strong and 
vibrant. The UK taxman gets a watered-down Americano.”576 
 
 
The misconception of the notion of the Revenue as a stakeholder in every business 
underpins the idea that tax is an unnecessary cost a business is required to avoid as a 
matter of law and practice, but which it can volunteer to pay as a matter of morality; 
rather than a necessary contribution to the public revenue that a business is bound to 
make as a matter of law, business practice and morality. According to Baker: 
 
“There is ... a ... truth which is not necessarily accepted by all governments. 
Tax is a cost. That classic, 20th Century concept - the homo economicus - 
will always act to reduce costs. Tax goes straight to the bottom line and it 
is entirely rational behaviour to take all lawful and advisable steps to reduce 
that cost. This is particularly true, for example, for the managers of widely-
owned public companies, one of whose duties is to act to reduce the costs 
in the company for the benefit of the shareholders.”577 
 
 
If “Starbucks ... told investors one thing and the taxman another”, it breached the 
overriding duty of honesty imposed by cheating, which unites the legal and moral 
obligations to pay tax, and cannot be said to have taken “all lawful and advisable steps 
to reduce that cost.”  
 
Troup’s famous statement that “taxation is legalised extortion” reflects this failure to 
“remember that the Tax Acts are but a part of the general law of the land”:   
 
“Tax avoidance is a normal market reaction. Faced with the opportunity to 
devote resources to increasing sales or minimising tax bills, business will 
make a risk/return evaluation ... This judgment is not immoral, it is inevitable 
in a market economy. The aim of government should not be to adopt a high 
moral tone but to do its best to ensure that the ‘return’ from tax planning is 
as low as possible. ...The popular idea is too often confused with the claim 
that ‘tax avoiders are paying less tax than they should’, even though is no 
objective way of determining how much they ‘should’ be paying.  
 
Tax law does not codify some Platonic set of tax-raising principles. Taxation 
is legalised extortion and is valid only to the extent of the law. Tax 
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avoidance is not paying less tax than you ‘should’. Tax avoidance is paying 
less tax than Parliament would have wanted. Avoidance is where 




Avoidance is not “where Parliament got it wrong, or didn’t foresee all possible 
combinations of circumstance” but where the enablers devised “transactions ... of a 
kind which had never taken place before the Act was passed ... devised as a result of 
it.”579  
 
The legal and moral duty of honesty imposed by the general law of cheating and fraud, 
which determines “the extent of the law”, provides the “objective way of determining 
how much [every taxpayer] ‘should’ be paying. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION   
 
This chapter demonstrated that the proposed cheating approach to tax avoidance is an 
affirmation of the principle of the equality of taxation. In the words of Lord Templeman: 
 
“If an individual taxpayer employs a device to avoid tax the result is unjust 
because the Revenue are deprived of money intended by Parliament to be 
available for the common good. ... I regard tax avoidance schemes ... as 
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CHAPTER EIGHT                     
 
THE PRIMACY OF THE PUBLIC REVENUE LAW  
 
Where there is a breach of trust, a fraud, or an imposition in a subject 
concerning the public, which, as between subject and subject, would only be 
actionable by a civil action, yet as that concerns the King and the public, it 
is indictable. ... I should think the principle so essential to the existence of 
the country and the constitution, that, without any authority, I may fairly say 
the constitution would not exist without it, but I think there are authorities 
that support that principle. 




This chapter proposes and expounds the concept of the primacy of the public revenue 
law to demonstrate that it corresponds to cheating the public revenue and thus 
underpins the proposed cheating or fraud approach to tax avoidance.  
 
Lord Mansfield’s seminal statement of the common law offence of cheating the public 
revenue reflects the fact that the public revenue (which is “so essential to the existence 
of the country and the constitution, that ... the constitution would not exist without it”) is 
concerned with the relationship “as concerns ... the King and the public” in public 
revenue or tax law rather than “as between subject and subject” in private law.  
 
Seligman’s ‘compulsory revenue’, which corresponds to Adam Smith’s ‘revenue of the 
people’ or taxes, underscores its public (as opposed to private) nature: 
 
“From the standpoint of the individual all contributions to government are 
either gratuitous, contractual or compulsory. Every government revenue 
must fall within one of these three classes. Individuals may make the 
government a free gift, they may agree or contract to pay, or they may be 
compelled to pay. ... The second and third methods correspond to the 
widely adopted classification suggested by Adam Smith. ... That is, the 
government may in the first place act like a private individual, possessing 
lands or other revenue-yielding property, and engaging in mercantile, 
financial or industrial pursuits. ... The government here puts itself in the 
position of a private person making a contract with another person. Such 
payments all rest on an agreement between the two contracting parties, in 
sharp contrast to the payments which the government demands by virtue 
of the sovereign powers delegated to it.”581 
 
 
                                                 




Revenues raised from the sale of government assets and the granting of licences (such 
as the auction for the third generation mobile phone licences that raised £22.47bn for 
the Exchequer in 2000) are examples of contractual revenue. Subject to any express 
legislation to the contrary, principles of contract law govern contractual revenues 
because “[t]he government here puts itself in the position of a private person making a 
contract with another person.”  
 
By contrast, the notion of the primacy of the public revenue law advanced in this chapter 
simply means that the public revenue or tax law governs the relationship between the 
taxpayer and the Revenue in relation to compulsory revenue or taxes or “the payments 
which the government demands by virtue of the sovereign powers delegated to it”.  
 
In tax avoidance, the primacy of the public revenue law means that cheating the public 
revenue is concerned with cheating or fraud “as concerns the Revenue and the public” 
in tax law and not with cheating or fraud or sham “as between subject and subject” in 
private law. As Lord Steyn stated in McGuckian:  
 
“Neither the individual steps nor the composite transaction were simulated 
or sham transactions in the sense in which those terms are understood in 
contract law or trust law (see Snook v London and West Riding 
Investments). On the contrary, tax avoidance was the spur to executing 
genuine documents and entering into genuine arrangements. But this 
appeal is concerned with a different question, namely the fiscal 
effectiveness of the composite tax avoidance scheme.”582 
 
 
In other words, to cheat the public revenue “as concerns the Revenue and the public” 
in tax law by devising and implementing a tax avoidance scheme, transactions that are 
real “as between subject and subject” in contract or trust law are required. The absence 
of sham or fraud “as between subject and subject” in private law is, if at all relevant, 
prima facie evidence of the intent to cheat the public revenue “as concerns the 
Revenue and the public” in tax law.  
 
On the other hand, the primacy of the private law means that the private law relationship 
of the parties to a tax avoidance scheme “as between subject and subject” overrides 
their tax law relationship “as concerns the Revenue and the public” for tax purposes. 
In his article entitled ‘Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private 
Law to the Law of Taxation’, Fuller stated:  
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“Aside from the great differences in legislative technique, the Internal 
Revenue Code differs from a civil code such as that of Germany or France 
in that it is not self-contained. ... Instead, the law of federal income, gift and 
estate taxation largely derives its meaning from definitions and 
conceptualizations that have developed over many years in the private law. 
But the dependence of the taxing statute on an existing body of private law 
definitions and concepts, inevitable though it may be, is an unceasing 
source of conflicts between taxpayers and the taxing authority. Private law, 
both Anglo-American and civilian, rests fundamentally on the principle of 
autonomy of wills. Thus in the law of contracts, it is traditional that the 
content of an obligation arising from a declaration of will is to be determined 
explicitly or implicitly by the will of the declarant. Outside the area of those 
prohibitions and mandates promulgated by the sovereign as commands, it 
has been thought that the parties were free to give whatever content they 
chose to any legal transaction consummated by an agreement of wills. ... 
 
A high progressive tax on incomes creates in the taxing sovereign a direct 
interest in many and various legal transactions between private parties, 
particularly those transactions in which gain is realized or loss incurred. 
Moreover, the sovereign’s interest is likely to be opposed to the interests of 
the parties whose manifested wills shape the nature of the transaction. 
Since the tax consequences of the transaction may depend on the category 
or classification in which the transaction falls, the parties may seek to frame 
their act to avail themselves of a private law category which appears 
advantageous for tax purposes. On the other hand, the taxing authority will 
desire to reclassify the transaction in order to protect the revenue and to 
prevent the taxpayer from obtaining a tax advantage not corresponding with 
what the tax authority regards as the economic reality of the transaction.”583 
 
 
Taxes, which Seligman defined as, “the payments which the government demands by 
virtue of the sovereign powers delegated to it” is clearly inside “the area of those 
prohibitions and mandates promulgated by the sovereign as commands” and thus 
wholly outside “the principle of autonomy of wills”. The primacy of the private law or 
“the dependence of the taxing statute on an existing body of private law definitions and 
concepts” is, therefore, not necessary let alone “inevitable”. There is no need for an 
additional, self-contained tax code to give effect to the primacy of the public revenue 
law because the pre-existing common law of cheating the public revenue, which 
corresponds to tax fraud in all jurisdictions, provides the requisite overlay upon the tax 
legislation.  
 
The rest of this chapter demonstrates that the primacy of the public revenue law 
corresponds to cheating the public revenue and thus underpins the proposed cheating 
or fraud approach to tax avoidance; and critiques the primacy of the private law that 
underlies the prevailing constructional approach using the English Snook sham 
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doctrine, the Duke of Westminster principle, the Ramsay principle, and the American 
private law sham doctrine and tax sham transaction doctrine.  
 
8.2 CHEATING THE PUBLIC REVENUE   
 
The landmark decision of the Court of Appeal in Charlton upheld the primacy of the 
public revenue law. According to Farquharson LJ:  
 
“It was the case for the Crown that the accounts presented to the Revenue 
by the United Kingdom companies were false in that by using Charlton’s 
scheme to transfer part of their profits to the Jersey companies they were 
not disclosing the full extent of the profits they had made. It was this lack of 
disclosure which formed the basis of the false representations alleged in 
the indictment. Each of the Appellants was charged in the relevant counts 
with cheating the Revenue by ‘... falsely representing that the apparent 
purchases (by the United Kingdom company) from (the Jersey company) 
were bona fide commercial transactions’.  
 
The defence argued that on the evidence the individual purchases by the 
United Kingdom company were bona fide commercial transactions. ... It is 
implied in this argument that the sale transactions between the United 
Kingdom and Jersey companies were genuine and that the accounts of the 
United Kingdom companies, as submitted to the Revenue, were accurate, 
that is to say that they were arm’s-length transactions and a proper 
consideration was paid by the United Kingdom companies for the goods 
represented by each purchase. 
 
The learned Judge rejected the defence submissions, saying: ‘I do not 
accept the proposition ... that sales and purchases do not cease to be real 
if the objective is to seek the dishonest reduction of tax liability.’... The 
learned Judge was right to reject the submissions.”584 
 
 
In other words, as the objective of a tax avoidance scheme “is to seek the dishonest 
reduction of tax liability” in tax law “as concerns the Revenue and the public” by 
executing transactions which are real “as between subject and subject” in private law, 
they “cease to be real” in tax law “as concerns the Revenue and the public” for tax 
purposes.  
 
In his article Cunningham, the convicted barrister, reasserted the prevailing argument 
that the absence of sham “as between subject and subject” in private law overrides the 
dishonesty or cheating “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law:  
 
“The above statement of the trial judge, Benson J, cited by his Lordship is 
startling. He seems to be saying that sales and purchases which otherwise 
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would be real ceases to be so if the objective is to seek the dishonest 
reduction of tax liability. The statement is illogical. If the purchases and 
sales are real they cannot be shams and therefore the reduction of tax 
liability by use of the interposed companies, by itself, cannot be dishonest. 
Even if there was an attempt to seek a dishonest reduction in tax liability by 




Rhodes et al rebutted this fallacious argument that underpins every tax avoidance 
scheme, but without specifying the distinction between tax law and private law: 
 
“Another line of argument which has been suggested is that if the 
purchases and sales by the Jersey companies were real then they could 
not be shams, and therefore the reduction of the UK corporation tax 
liabilities by the use of interposed offshore companies could not be 
dishonest. In the Charlton case, it is arguable whether the purchases and 
the sales were real. However, allowing this to be the case, the argument is 
still missing the fundamental point. Just because individual transactions 
executed as part of an arrangement are real does not mean that the overall 
arrangement is either real or legal.”586 
 
 
More precisely, just because individual transactions executed as part of a scheme 
devised to cheat the public revenue are real “as between subject and subject” in private 
law, that does not mean that the overall arrangement is either real or legal “as concerns 
the Revenue and the public” in tax law. 
 
Venables’ criticism of Charlton underscores the reliance of the tax avoidance industry 
and the tax dogma that legitimises it on the primacy of the private law:  
 
“In my view, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is a blot on our system of 
jurisprudence and can only be described as ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’. It 
makes a fundamental confusion between criminal tax evasion and lawful, 
albeit possibly ineffective, tax-avoidance. It fails to distinguish between 
steps which have no commercial purpose or justification, being undertaken 
purely for tax-avoidance purposes yet which are nonetheless real, and 
between mere shams, frauds and smokescreens, which have no reality and 
which are simply intended to deceive. If this judgment is allowed to stand, 
no man seeking to mitigate or avoid taxation by lawful means, and no 
professional advising him how to do so, can be sure of preserving his 
property, his liberty and his reputation. 
 
Avoidance and evasion  
 
Most of us are sure we know the difference between criminal evasion and 
lawful avoidance of tax. ... This fundamental distinction is mirrored in the 
                                                 




concept of a sham. A sham is a fraud, a pretence, something which 
pretends to be other than it really is. A forged document, for example, is a 
sham in that it tells a lie about itself. A scheme or arrangement might be 
highly artificial; it might have no purpose other than tax avoidance, it might 
or might not be effective to that end, but, provided that transactions involved 
are intended to be genuine, and not merely a smokescreen for the reality, 
it is not a sham.  
 
Now it will be readily perceived that the participants in virtually every tax 
avoidance scheme have not the slightest incentive to produce a sham. The 
strategies depend for their effectiveness on the steps taken being real. And 
that is none the less the case if those steps are artificial and are contrived 
purely for the purpose of tax avoidance. Given that there is no difficulty in 
taking the artificial steps, there is no point whatsoever in not taking them 
but merely pretending to take them. Indeed, there is every point in taking 
them; as otherwise the scheme certainly will not work and will depend for 
its de facto effectiveness on a criminal fraud which is totally unnecessary 
and the discovery of which will normally give rise not only to the tax which 
continues to be due, being in fact collected but the perpetrators being 
indicted on serious charges. 
 
The learning on the nature and limits of the concept of a sham was firmly 
established in English law well before Ramsay. A classic case, which had 
nothing to do with tax, was Snook. ... As well as introducing the new anti-
avoidance rule, Ramsay also firmly and authoritatively reasserted the 
traditional learning on the meaning of a sham.”587 
 
 
The underlined paragraph shows that the object of every tax avoidance scheme is to 
cheat the public revenue “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law by 
executing transactions which are real “as between subject and subject” in private law. 
 
The primacy of the private law also misconceives the nature of a tax avoidance scheme 
or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind which had never taken place before 
the tax Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed devised as a result of it as 
the paradigm of “cases where the fraudulent nature of a transaction only becomes 
apparent in the context of several other transactions.”588 As Lord Templeman stated it 
Fitzwilliam:   
 
The earliest case in which a tax avoidance scheme appears to have been 
considered as a whole and held to be ineffective for the purpose of the tax 
sought to be avoided was Lupton v FA & AB. That was a dividend stripping 
device.  
 
Since the dividend stripping cases there have been several cases in which 
a tax avoidance scheme has been considered as a whole and in which the 
device of self cancelling or circulating payments has been held to be 
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ineffective for the purpose of the tax sought to be avoided. These cases 
are Black Nominees v Nicol, Ramsay, Eilbeck v Rawling, Burmah and 
Moodie v IRC. The scheme in the present case with regard to the 
contingent moiety provides another example.  
 
There have been several cases in which a tax avoidance scheme has been 
considered as a whole and in which the device of dividing one transaction 
into two or more has been held to be ineffective for the purpose of the tax 
sought to be avoided. These cases are Floor v Davis, Chinn v Collins, 
Furniss v Dawson and Ensign Tankers v Stokes. The scheme in the 
present case with regard to the vested moiety provides another example....  
 
All decisions of this House are founded on justice, principle and precedent. 
If an individual taxpayer employs a device to avoid tax the result is unjust 
because the Revenue are deprived of money intended by Parliament to be 
available for the common good. ...  
 
On principle, transactions such as tax avoidance schemes which are 
intended to operate as a whole must be judged by the results of those 
transactions considered as a whole, not by the language of each 
transaction considered separately. ...  
 
In common with my predecessors I regard tax avoidance schemes of the 
kind invented and implemented in the present case as no better than 
attempts to cheat the Revenue.”589 
 
 
The primacy of the public revenue law or cheating the public revenue means that 
“transactions such as tax avoidance schemes which are intended to operate as a whole 
must be judged by the results of those transactions considered as a whole [‘as 
concerns the Revenue and the public’ in tax law], not by the language of each 
transaction considered separately [‘as between subject and subject’ in private law].” 
 
8.3 THE SNOOK SHAM DOCTRINE  
 
Lord Diplock’s statement in the hire purchase case of Snook v London and West 
Riding, which Lord Nicholls described in MacNiven as “the classic definition”590 of 
sham, was concerned with the relationship of the parties “as between subject and 
subject” in private law. Rejecting Snook’s argument, he stated:  
 
“As regards the contention of the plaintiff that the transactions between 
himself, Auto Finance and the defendants were a ‘sham,’ it is, I think, 
necessary to consider what, if any, legal concept is involved in the use of 
this popular and pejorative word. I apprehend that, if it has any meaning in 
law, it means acts done or documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ 
which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the 
                                                 
589 [1993] STC 502, 534-535. 
590 [2001] UKHL 6 [4]. 
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appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations 
different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the 
parties intend to create.  
 
But one thing, I think, is clear in legal principle, morality and the authorities, 
that for acts or documents to be a ‘sham,’ with whatever legal 
consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a common 
intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and 
obligations which they give the appearance of creating. No unexpressed 
intentions of a ‘shammer’ affect the rights of a party whom he deceived. 
There is an express finding in this case that the defendants were not parties 
to the alleged ‘sham.’ So this contention fails.”591 
 
 
As demonstrated below, if a disappointed taxpayer whose scheme was declared 
ineffective “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law by the courts contends 
that the constituent transactions between him and the promoters were a sham “as 
between subject and subject” in private law and should be set aside in an action in 
contract or the tort of deceit, the question whether the constituent transactions 
constitute “acts done or documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are 
intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating 
between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights 
and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create” will arise. The taxpayer will, 
therefore, be in the same position as Snook.  
 
By contrast, in relation to the relationship between the taxpayer and the Revenue “as 
concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law, the requirement that “for acts or 
documents to be a ‘sham’ ... all the parties thereto must have a common intention that 
the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they give 
the appearance of creating” makes the Snook sham test a licence to cheat when 
applied as the ultimate test of legality of tax avoidance schemes under the prevailing 
primacy of the private law. This is because, as the statements by Lord Steyn and 
Venables cited above show, the purpose of entering into genuine transactions “as 
between subject and subject” in private law and thus avoiding “acts done or documents 
executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are intended by them to give to third parties 
or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and 
obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations which the parties intend 
to create” is to cheat the public revenue “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in 
tax law. As Parker J put it in Hitch v Stone: 
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“In a case involving a complex and artificial tax-avoidance scheme, where 
the scheme documentation is sloppily executed, where the evidence of the 
taxpayer and of his legal adviser (the deviser of the scheme) is found to be 
unreliable, and where their dealings with the Revenue have been less than 
straightforward, there must be a strong temptation for any tribunal to, in 
effect, throw up its hands and cry ‘Sham!’. But in the instant case - and so 
long as the Snook definition of sham remains the accepted definition - that 
temptation has, in my judgment, to be resisted.”592 
 
In other words, provided that the individual transactions that comprise a tax avoidance 
scheme are not shams “as between subject and subject” in private law, the fact that 
the scheme cheats the public revenue “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax 
law (and thus makes the professional enablers and the participating taxpayer to cheat 
or defraud or act dishonestly towards the Revenue because “the evidence of the 
taxpayer and of his legal adviser (the deviser of the scheme) is found to be unreliable, 
and ... their dealings with the Revenue have been less than straightforward”) does stop 
the scheme from being “legal” in civil litigation. 
 
By contrast, Farquharson LJ’s seminal statement of the overriding legal and moral duty 
of honesty imposed by the pre-existing common law of cheating in the criminal 
prosecution in Charlton, which corresponds to Lord Mansfield’s statement in 
Bembridge, underscores the primacy of the public revenue law: 
 
“It is a feature, no doubt, of the tax or Revenue law of any country that it 
must, to a large extent, in its tax-gathering activities, rely on the truthfulness 
of the taxpayer in indicating the extent of his income or whatever other 
matter is relevant to the particular statute being considered. It follows also 
that the Revenue not only have to rely on the taxpayer’s good faith, but 
more especially on the professional advisors they appoint to act for them 
and, accordingly, when professional advisors are found to have acted 
dishonestly towards the Revenue, it is almost inevitable, as I think each 
counsel before us has recognised, that sentences of imprisonment must 
follow and we adhere to that position.”593 
 
 
8.4 THE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER PRINCIPLE  
 
The true Duke of Westminster principle is that the reality or legality of transactions “as 
between subject and subject” in private law is decisive and binding “as concerns the 
Revenue and the public” in tax law.  
 
                                                 
592 [1999] STC 431, 466. 
593 Charlton, p.531. 
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Each scheme in Duke of Westminster comprised the minimum two transactions 
required to constitute a tax avoidance scheme, in this case a deed of covenant and a 
letter of explanation. 
 
The Special Commissioners applied the principle that “transactions such as tax 
avoidance schemes which are intended to operate as a whole must be judged by the 
results of those transactions considered as a whole, not by the language of each 
transaction considered separately”, which meant the fraudulent nature of the deed of 
covenant became apparent in the context of the related letter of explanation:  
 
“We, the Commissioners who heard the appeal, held that, in construing the 
true effect and substance of the deeds under which payments are made to 
the Appellant’s employees, we were entitled to consider together with these 
deeds the letters of explanation and form of acknowledgment which were 
sent to the covenantees.”594 
 
 
By contrast, the Court of Appeal and the majority in the House of Lords judged each 
scheme by the language of the deed considered separately and thus failed to 
recognise that the fraudulent nature of the deed only becomes apparent in the context 
of the related letter of explanation. As Lord Wright put it:  
 
“If the case were one in which it was found as a fact in regard to each of 
the deeds in question that it was never intended to operate as a legal 
document between the parties, but was concocted to cover up the payment 
of salary or wages and to make these payments masquerade as annuities 
in order to evade Sur-tax, it may well be that the Court would brush aside 
the semblance and hold that the payments were not what they seemed. But 
there is no such finding by the Commissioners; indeed no such case was 
even suggested; on the contrary, it is admitted that the deeds are genuine 
and carry an obligation according to their tenor, irrespective of whether the 
various payees are or are not in the Respondent’s service at any material 
date. ...  
 
On the footing that the deed is genuine, I do not see any possibility of going 
behind what appears on the face of the document, or qualifying its effect by 
documents dehors the deed and in no way embodied in it, or regarding the 
payments as other than annual payments, as it is admitted that ex facie 
they are. What the legal effect is as between the covenantor and the 
covenantee must determine for Revenue purposes the character of 
the payments actually made. That character is not to my mind changed 
if the letter of explanation and the letter of acknowledgment can be taken 
into account. ... 
 
                                                 
594 Westminster, p.493. 
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And once it is admitted that the deed is a genuine document, there is in my 
opinion no room for the phrase ‘in substance’. Or, more correctly, the true 
nature of the legal obligation and nothing else is ‘the substance’.”595 
 
 
The statement in bold is the true Duke of Westminster principle and an affirmation of 
the primacy of the private law.  
 
The preceding underlined statement refers to the parole evidence rule which applies in 
contract law. In Collins v Blantern counsel for the defendant argued, and the court 
agreed, that  
 
“[T]he general rule that you cannot plead any matter dehors the deed, doth 
not apply to this case; the true meaning of that rule is, that you cannot 
alledge any thing inconsistent with and contrary to the deed, but you may 
alledge matter consistent with the deed”.596  
 
 
As the constituent transactions in any scheme are necessarily consistent with each 
other, this rule has no application. Even in a two-transaction scheme like Duke of 
Westminster, the deed and accompanying letter of explanation were necessarily 
consistent with each other.   
 
8.5 THE RAMSAY PRINCIPLE   
 
8.5.1 The Scheme  
 
Lord Oliver’s summary of the scheme in Ramsay (which involved at least fourteen 
transactions) in Craven v White reflects the principle that tax avoidance schemes are 
“cases where the fraudulent nature of a transaction only becomes apparent in the 
context of several other transactions”:  
 
“Ramsay was concerned with a scheme of a particular but familiar type, 
that is to say, an artificially contrived concatenation of individual 
transactions linked together with the purpose of producing an end result 
entirely different from that which, on the face of it, would have been 
achieved by each successive link in the preconceived chain if such a link 
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596 (1767) 2 Wilson, K. B. 347, 348. 
597 [1988] STC 476, 498. 
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8.5.2 The Special Commissioners’ Decision  
 
The following paragraphs of the marketing letter (Appendix 3) underscore the reliance 
of the scheme on the primacy of the private law and show that the object of the scheme 
was to cheat the public revenue:  
 
“The Scheme is a pure tax avoidance scheme and has no commercial 
justification insofar as there is no prospect of T making a profit; indeed he 
is certain to make a loss representing the cost of undertaking the Scheme.  
 
Nevertheless, every transaction in the Scheme will be genuinely carried 
through, and will in fact be exactly what it purports to be.”598 
 
 
As the fraudulent nature ‘as concerns the Revenue and the public’ in tax law of 
individual transactions (a) to (o) only becomes apparent in the context of the whole 
transactions, the fact that “every transaction in the Scheme will be genuinely carried 
through, and will in fact be exactly what it purports to be” ‘as between subject and 
subject’ in private law does not stop the scheme from amounting to cheating “as 
concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law.  
 
The Special Commissioners, who were bound by the true Duke of Westminster 
principle on the primacy of the private law, held that the admitted object of the scheme 
“as concerns the Revenue and the public” was immaterial:  
 
“The object of the tax avoidance scheme ... was, as the Appellant Company 
admitted, to manufacture a loss which would reduce a chargeable gain of 
£187,977 which had accrued to the Appellant Company on the sale of a 
freehold farm. 
 
We deal first with the Crown’s contention that the scheme should be looked 
at as a whole; that ... when the scheme had been implemented the 
Appellant Company owned nothing that it did not own before, and so far as 
that company was concerned the scheme achieved nothing inasmuch as it 
produced nothing. ... We take the view that it is not open to us to ignore the 
several steps in the scheme and so treat it as ineffective. The requisite 
payments were duly made. ... The relevant statutory provisions must 
accordingly be applied to the several dealings with those assets as though 
those dealings were independent of one another. We reject the Crown’s 
first contention. 
 
We proceed to consider the matter on the basis that each step must be 
taken at its face value and to have taken effect as it purported to take 
effect.”599 
                                                 
598 Ramsay, p.111. 





The object of the scheme set out in the first paragraph, which was to cheat the public 
revenue, required “that the scheme should be looked at as a whole” as the Revenue 
contended. The Special Commissioners, however, ignored the principle that tax 
schemes are “cases where the fraudulent nature of a transaction only becomes 
apparent in the context of several other transactions” by maintaining that the 
transactions should be “taken at its face value and to have taken effect as it purported 
to take effect” in company law for tax purposes.  
 
 
8.5.3 The Revenue’s Case in the House of Lords  
 
When counsel for the Revenue (Mr Millett QC as he then was) pleaded fraud in the 
House of Lords, he also failed to specify that he was asking their lordships to apply the 
pre-existing common law of cheating, by failing to use the legal concept of cheating or 
fraud and by resorting to legal nonsense (‘paper transactions’) and “the legal fiction 
that the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant”:    
 
“The present schemes have a single purpose and effect; to create an 
allowable loss in the course of a transaction in which neither gain nor loss 
is made. It is of the essence of each scheme that the taxpayer ends up in 
the same position from which he has started. The only difference is that at 
the end of the journey he is out of pocket in respect of the fees payable for 
the scheme and he has a bundle of documents to present to the Revenue. 
It cannot have been in Parliament’s contemplation that such disposals as 
are in question here were to give rise to allowable losses.  
 
Diplock L.J. in Snook, defined the word ‘sham’ as follows: ‘it means acts 
done or documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are 
intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of 
creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the 
actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create.’  
 
It is conceded that the present schemes are not shams in that narrow 
sense. They are, however, ‘paper transactions’ without any objective 
economic reality. They are incapable of having fiscal consequences.”600 
 
 
The fundamental flaw in Millett’s pleading, which emasculated the Ramsay principle at 
birth, was the invitation to their lordships to affirm, rather than overrule, the true Duke 
of Westminster principle on the primacy of the private law:    
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“The Crown concede that the subject is to be taxed by Parliament and not 
by the courts; that he is to be taxed on the basis of what he has done, and 
not on the basis of what he might have done; and that he is to be taxed in 
accordance with the legal consequences of his act, and not in accordance 
with some supposed ‘substance of the transaction’: Duke of Westminster. 
None of these necessary concessions requires the House to hold that a 
taxpayer is able to create a tax deduction by entering into schemes such 
as the present. Considerations of public policy and the manifest intention 
of Parliament alike require a finding to the contrary. It is the province of the 
courts to distinguish between those transactions which have reality and 
substance and those which have none, and between those transactions 
which are capable of having fiscal consequences and those which are not. 
As to the cases relied on by the taxpayers in these appeals, Duke of 




The concession that the taxpayer “is to be taxed in accordance with the legal 
consequences of his act, and not in accordance with some supposed ‘substance of the 
transaction’” (which is the primacy of the private law) is inconsistent with the request 
“to distinguish between those transactions which have reality and substance and those 
which have none, and between those transactions which are capable of having fiscal 
consequences and those which are not” (which is the primacy of the public revenue or 
fiscal law). As Mr Beattie QC, counsel for the taxpayer in Rawling, submitted correctly:     
 
“The Crown are attempting here to overrule the Duke of Westminster case 
in one of its aspects although they contend that they are only distinguishing 
it. The Duke of Westminster case governs every case except the sham 
transaction in the sense that that word is used by Diplock L.J. in Snook.”602 
 
 
Leaving aside the question whether the concession as to sham by Millett was made 
correctly, the argument required to overrule the true Westminster principle on the 
primacy of the private law, expressed in legal concepts, will include the added 
highlighted expressions:   
 
It is conceded that the present schemes are not shams in that narrow sense 
in which that word was used by Diplock L.J. in Snook “as between 
subject and subject” in private law. They are, however, frauds or 
cheats “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law. They are 
incapable of having fiscal consequences. They are frauds and cheats in 
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8.5.4 Lord Wilberforce’s Judgment    
 
Lord Wilberforce accepted the Revenue’s invitation to reaffirm the true Westminster 
principle on the primacy of the private law:  
 
“It is for the fact-finding Commissioners to find whether a document, or a 
transaction, is genuine or a sham. In this context to say that a document or 
transaction is a ‘sham’ means that while professing to be one thing, it is in 
fact something different. To say that a document or transaction is genuine, 
means that, in law, it is what it professes to be, and it does not mean 
anything more than that. ... 
 
Given that a document or transaction is genuine, the court cannot go 
behind it to some supposed underlying substance. This is the well-known 
principle of Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Duke of Westminster. This 
is a cardinal principle but it must not be overstated or overextended. While 
obliging the court to accept documents or transactions, found to be 
genuine, as such, it does not compel the court to look at a document or a 
transaction in blinkers, isolated from any context to which it properly 
belongs. If it can be seen that a document or transaction was intended to 
have effect as part of a nexus or series of transactions, or as an ingredient 
of a wider transaction intended as a whole, there is nothing in the doctrine 
to prevent it being so regarded: to do so is not to prefer form to substance, 
or substance to form. It is the task of the court to ascertain the legal nature 
of any transaction to which it is sought to attach a tax or a tax consequence 
and if that emerges from a series or combination of transactions, intended 




To say that provided the transactions (a) to (o) set out in the marketing letter in 
Appendix 3 were “genuine” ‘as between subject and subject’ in private law, “the court 
cannot go behind it to some supposed underlying substance” in tax litigation, which is 
concerned with the genuineness of transactions “as concerns the Revenue and the 
public” in tax law, is to reaffirm the primacy of the private law.  
 
“It is the task of the court to ascertain the legal nature of any transaction to which it is 
sought to attach a tax or a tax consequence” but this can only be fraud or negligence 
or honest. Therefore, “if that emerges from a series or combination of transactions, 
intended to operate as such” as a fraud and an example of “cases where the fraudulent 
nature of a transaction only becomes apparent in the context of several other 
transactions”, “it is that series or combination which may be regarded.”  
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8.5.5 Lord Fraser’s Judgment  
 
Lord Fraser, who delivered the other significant judgment, followed a similar process 
of reasoning, stating: 
 
“Wider question - Was there a disposal in either of these cases?  
  
The Crown maintain that they are entitled to succeed in both these appeals 
on the wider ground that in neither case should the disposal of the loss-
making asset be considered separately from the scheme of which it formed 
part. On behalf of the taxpayer in each case reliance was placed on the 
finding by the Special Commissioners that the various steps in the scheme 
were not shams. The meaning of the word ‘sham’ was considered by 
Diplock LJ in Snook. ... Although none of the steps in these cases was a 
sham in that sense, there still remains the question whether it is right to 
have regard to each step separately when it was so closely associated with 
other steps with which it formed part of a single scheme. The argument for 
the Crown in both appeals was that that question should be answered in 
the negative and that attention should be directed to the scheme as a 
whole. 
 
In my opinion the argument of the Crown is well-founded and should be 
accepted. Each of the appellants purchased a complete pre-arranged 
scheme, designed to produce a loss which would match the gain previously 
made and which would be allowable as a deduction for corporation tax 
(capital gains tax) purposes. In these circumstances the court is entitled 
and bound to consider the scheme as a whole. The essential feature of 
both schemes was that, when they were completely carried out, they did 
not result in any actual loss to the taxpayer. The apparently magic result of 
creating a tax loss that would not be a real loss was to be brought about by 
arranging that the scheme included a loss which was allowable for tax 
purposes and a matching gain which was not chargeable. ...  
 
The taxpayer in both cases bought a complete scheme for which he paid a 
fee. Thereafter he was not required to produce any more money, although 
large sums of money were credited and debited to him in the course of the 
complicated transactions required to carry out the scheme. The money was 
lent to the taxpayer at the beginning of the scheme, by Thun in the Rawlings 
case and by a finance company, Slater Walker, in the Ramsay case, and 
was repaid to the lender at the end. ...  
 
In Rawlings there was not even any need for real money to be involved at 
all. ... There was apparently no evidence before the Special Commissioners 
that Thun actually possessed the sum of £543,600 which they lent to the 
taxpayer to set the scheme in motion, not to mention any further sums that 
they may have lent to other taxpayers for other similar schemes which may 
have been operating at the same time, and it might well have been open to 
the Special Commissioners to find that the loan, and all that followed upon 




In Ramsay ‘real’ money in the form of a loan from Slater Walker was used 
so that a finding of sham in that respect would not have been possible.”604 
 
 
The conclusion that a finding of sham in the Snook sense was possible in Rawling 
shows that Millett’s concession to the contrary was wrong.  
 
In relation to Ramsay, it was widely-known that the similar use of non-existent money 
was a characteristic of Rossminster’s schemes. Gillard reported that this triggered the 
resignations of their in-house lawyer and auditors following the commercial success of 
the One Year High Income scheme that eventually failed in Cairns v MacDiarmid605:    
 
“The lawyer Henry Scrope had joined Roy Tucker & Co in 1973 as the in-
house legal adviser on drafting tax-scheme documents. Scrope wrote the 
instructions to counsel designed to elicit the legal opinions that ‘sold’ the 
schemes. Despite its acceptance by prominent tax counsel, he had become 
concerned about the concept of ‘circular money’, which was integral to 
almost every Tucker scheme but might not be considered real money as 
required by statutes, and by the growing scale of the Rossminster 
operations, which increased the possibility of something going wrong. By 
autumn 1974 Scrope had decided to resign. ...  
 
Scrope’s exit was followed in January 1975 by that of the Rossminster 
auditors, Deloitte, who notified Plummer that they no longer wanted to act 
for the company. ... Accounting for the movement of huge sums of 
Monopoly money as if it were real posed a dilemma for any auditor required 
to produce a clean audit certificate attesting that the accounts presented a 
‘true and fair view of the state of affairs and of the profit for the period’, as 
required by law.”606 
 
 
Crucially, Lord Fraser also affirmed the true Duke of Westminster principle by 
effectively denying the fraudulent nature of the scheme:  
 
“Counsel for the taxpayer naturally pressed upon us the view that if we were 
to refuse to have regard to the disposals which took place in the course of 
these schemes, we would be departing from a long line of authorities which 
required the courts to regard the legal form and nature of transactions that 
have been carried out. I do not believe that we would be doing any such 
thing. I am not suggesting that the legal form of any transaction should be 
disregarded in favour of its supposed substance. Nothing that I have said 
is in any way inconsistent with the decision in the Duke of Westminster’s 
case where there was only one transaction - the grant of an annuity - and 
there was no question of its having formed part of any larger scheme.”607 
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As demonstrated above, there were two transactions – the grant of an annuity and the 
accompanying letter of explanation – which formed part of a larger scheme devised to 
cheat “the Revenue and the public” in tax law.  
 
8.5.6 Lord Hoffmann’s Speech in MacNiven 
 
In MacNiven, Lord Hoffmann used the failure by counsel for the Revenue and the 
judges to distinguish what is “genuine” or “real” “as between subject and subject” in 
private law from what is “genuine” or “real” “as ... concerns the King and the public” in 
tax law to reassert the primacy of the private law and thus the true Duke of Westminster 
principle: 
 
“The speeches in Ramsay and subsequent cases contain numerous 
references to the ‘real’ nature of the transaction and to what happens in 
‘the real world’. These expressions are illuminating in their context, but you 
have to be careful about the sense in which they are being used. Otherwise 
you land in all kinds of unnecessary philosophical difficulties about the 
nature of reality and, in particular, about how a transaction can be said not 
to be a ‘sham’ and yet be ‘disregarded’ for the purpose of deciding what 
happened in ‘the real world’. The point to hold onto is that something may 
be real for one purpose but not for another. When people speak of 
something being a ‘real’ something, they mean that it falls within some 
concept which they have in mind, by contrast with something else which 
might have been thought to do so, but does not.  
 
Thus in saying that the transactions in Ramsay were not sham transactions, 
one is accepting the juristic categorisation of the transactions as individual 
and discrete and saying that each of them involved no pretence. They were 
intended to do precisely what they purported to do. They had a legal reality. 
But in saying that they did not constitute a ‘real’ disposal giving rise to a 
‘real’ loss, one is rejecting the juristic categorisation as not being 
necessarily determinative for the purposes of the statutory concepts of 
‘disposal’ and ‘loss’ as properly interpreted. The contrast here is with a 
commercial meaning of these concepts. And in saying that the income tax 
legislation was intended to operate ‘in the real world’, one is again referring 
to the commercial context which should influence the construction of the 
concepts used by Parliament.”608 
 
 
The point to hold onto is that two or more interrelated transactions devised to cheat the 
public revenue may be real “as between subject and subject” in private law but not in 
tax law “as concerns the Revenue and the public”.  
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“Thus in saying that the transactions in Ramsay were not sham transactions, one is 
accepting the juristic categorisation of the transactions as individual and discrete and 
saying that each of them involved no pretence” [‘as between subject and subject’ in 
private law]. “They were intended to do precisely what they purported to do. They had 
a legal reality.”  
 
“But in saying that they did not constitute a ‘real’ disposal giving rise to a ‘real’ loss, one 
is rejecting the juristic categorisation [‘as between subject and subject’ in private law] 
as not being necessarily determinative [‘as concerns the Revenue and the public’] for 
the purposes of” [tax law], which includes the pre-existing common law of cheating.  
 
8.6 THE AMERICAN TAX SHAM TRANSACTION DOCTRINE   
 
Like the Ramsay principle, which they inspired, the sham transaction and step 
transaction doctrines and the business purpose test, are applications of the pre-existing 
general law of cheating or fraud. As Millett stated in Ramsay:  
 
“The Crown adopt the approach of Templeman L.J. in Eilbeck which is 
given a defensible and logical basis by the American cases. In matters of 
taxation, it is not normally possible to derive assistance from cases decided 
in other jurisdictions, since they are likely to turn upon particular provisions 
of the local tax code. In the United States, however, the Federal Courts 
have been concerned to formulate general principles of law to enable a 
distinction to be drawn between ‘real’ and ‘sham’ transactions, and they 
have done so without relying upon the wording of the relevant tax legislation 
or upon any doctrines which would be rejected as contrary to established 
principles in the United Kingdom. There can be no doubt that the Federal 
Courts would dismiss the transactions in the present case as a ‘sham’. 
They would do so on the simple ground that they were without any objective 
economic reality, being designed from the outset to return all parties within 
a few days to the position from which they started; see Gilbert v CIR609; 
Knetsch v USA610; Rubin v USA611; Goldstein v CIR612, and General Motors 
Corporation v USA613. The House is invited to adopt the approach of Judge 
Learned Hand in Gilbert where the logical basis on which these cases 
proceed is explained.”614 
 
 
To “formulate general principles of law ... without relying upon the wording of the 
relevant tax legislation” is to apply the pre-existing common law of cheating or fraud. In 
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the said words of Judge Leaned Hand in Gilbert which Lord Wilberforce cited with 
approval:  
 
“It is a corollary of the universally accepted canon of interpretation that the 
literal meaning of the words of a statute is seldom, if ever, the conclusive 
measure of its scope. Except in rare instances statutes are written in 
general terms and do not undertake to specify all the occasions they are 
meant to cover; and their interpretation demands the projection of their 
expressed purpose upon occasions not present in the minds of those who 
enacted them. The Income Tax Act imposes liabilities upon taxpayers 
based upon their financial transactions, and it is of course true that the 
payment of the tax itself is a financial transaction. If, however, the taxpayer 
enters into a transaction that does not appreciably affect his beneficial 
interest except to reduce his tax, the law will disregard it; for we cannot 
suppose that it was part of the purpose of the Act to provide an escape from 
the liabilities it sought to impose.”615 
 
 
As a matter of law, “a transaction that does not appreciably affect his beneficial interest 
except to reduce his tax” cheats the public revenue and in the absence of anti-
avoidance legislation “the law [that] will disregard it” is the pre-existing common law of 
cheating which “acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction” in 
civil proceedings.  
 
Rubin and Goldstein, which Millett cited, and related cases which he did not cite, such 
as Lynch v CIR616, Julian v CIR617, Sonnabend v CIR618, Broome v United States619, 
Becker v CIR620, Lewis v CIR621, Dooley v CIR622 and Bornstein v CIR623 involved 
schemes devised and implemented by one Eli Livingstone. These cases were 
particularly relevant to the Ramsay principle because the schemes provided the 
blueprint for such Rossminster schemes as the Capital Income Plan in Plummer and 
Moodie, the Exempt Debt Capital Loss scheme in Ramsay and the One Year High 
Income Plan in Cairns v MacDiarmid624.  
 
The schemes in all the American cases were held to be shams or cheats or frauds as 
between the taxpayer and the Commissioner in tax law but this was disguised by “the 
                                                 
615 248 Fed. 2nd 299, 411 (1957). 
616 31 T.C. 990 (1959).  
617 31 T.C. 998 (1959).  
618 267 F.2d 319 (1959). 
619 170 F.Supp. 613 (1959). 
620 277 F.2d 146 (1960). 
621 328 F. 2d 634 (1964).  
622 332 F. 2d. 463 (1964). 
623 334 F.2d 779 (1964). 
624 [1983] S.T.C. 178.  
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legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament 
meant.” In Lynch, for example, Judge Bruce stated:  
 
“The only issue is whether petitioner, pursuant to section 23(b), I.R.C. 1939, 
is entitled to deduct $117,677.11 as interest paid on an indebtedness in 
1953. Respondent disallowed petitioner’s interest deduction. He contends 
that the transactions entered into by petitioner were not significant for tax 
purposes because what was done, apart from the tax motive, was not within 
the intendment of the statute. He further contends that the transactions 
should be ignored for tax purposes because they were a sham, or if not a 
sham, because their characterization lacked in commercial or economic 
reality. ...  
 
Respondent’s determination may be sustained on yet another basis, for it 




In other words, “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law “for tax purposes”, 
“the transactions herein involved were nothing but a sham.”  
 
8.7 THE AMERICAN PRIVATE LAW SHAM DOCTRINE  
 
The American private law sham doctrine is concerned with sham or fraud or cheating 
“as between subject and subject” in private law and thus corresponds to the English 
Snook sham doctrine. 
 
The issue in Miles v Livingstone626 was whether the scheme was a sham as between 
the disappointed taxpayer and professional enabler. According to Judge Hartigan:  
 
“Plaintiff-appellant’s complaint is in three counts: the first count alleging a 
scheme or artifice to defraud under federal securities regulations; the 
second count alleging an action in common-law deceit and the third count 
alleging a breach of the three contracts. ...  
 
The type of transaction which forms the basis of the present action has 
been a source of a great deal of litigation. ... Unlike the instant case, the 
type of transactions usually involved here have been analyzed in the 
context of a dispute involving the deductibility of interest payments under 
the federal income tax laws. In such a context, courts have unvaryingly held 
that the purported interest payments could not be deducted as their 
underlying events lacked substance. ... 
 
After plaintiff’s attempt to deduct the interest which he had prepaid on the 
‘loans’ was disallowed, he initiated the instant action. His central position is 
                                                 
625 31 T.C. 990, 990-997.  
626 301 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1962).  
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that until the attempted deductions were disallowed, he was unaware that 
these transactions lacked substance. Relying on the line of cases of which 
Goodstein is an example, he argues that neither a sale of the bonds nor a 
loan of money ever took place and that the paper shuffling of the defendant 
was a fraudulent device or artifice as to him.”627 
 
 
In other words, Miles’s scheme was declared unlawful ‘as concerns the Revenue and 
the public’ in tax law for tax purposes but he contended in an action for the tort of deceit 
that it “was a fraudulent device or artifice as to him” because the constituent 
transactions between him and Livingstone should be set aside as a sham “as between 
subject and subject” in private law. 
 
This raised the question whether the transactions constituted “acts done or documents 
executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are intended by them to give to third parties 
or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and 
obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties 
intend to create” in the words of Lord Diplock in Snook.  
 
Miles was, therefore, in the same position as Snook. Because of his common intention 
with Livingstone to execute genuine transactions “as between subject and subject” in 
private law in order to cheat the IRS “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax 
law, his case failed because “for acts or documents to be a ‘sham’ ... all the parties 
thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the 
legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating”. As Judge 
Hartigan put it:  
 
“[S]o far as the sale aspects of the transactions went, viz., the sale of bonds 
from Livingstone to Miles, this phase of the transactions was sufficiently 
viable that Miles could and did claim a capital gain on each of these 
transactions and duly recorded the gain on his income tax returns. If the 
sales were valid to this extent it is extremely difficult for us to see how 
plaintiff can now claim that there was in fact no sale.”628 
 
 
                                                 
627 Ibid, pp.99-100. Emphases supplied. 
628 Ibid, p.100. 
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Similar private law sham claims against Livingstone by the disappointed taxpayers in 
Grace v Livingstone629, Livingstone v Fatima Charities630, Industrial Research Products 
v IRC631, and Martin v Livingstone632 also failed for the same reason. 
 
8.8 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter expounded the concept of the primacy of the public revenue law and 
demonstrated that it corresponds to cheating the public revenue and thus underpins 




































                                                 
629 195 F. Supp. 933 (1961).  
630 297 F. 2d. 836 (1962). 
631 40 TC 578 (1963).  
632 219 F. Supp. 200 (1963).  
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CHAPTER NINE                   
 
THE MISCHIEF RULE  
 
Pro-taxpayer literalism was not an inevitable development in English law. 
The famous 1584 Heydon’s Case prevented subjects from avoiding the 
impact of a statute seizing church property, in much the same way that 
taxpayers now try to avoid tax. In the 18th century Lord Mansfield did not 
hesitate to interpret a tax statute to prevent avoidance. Even late 19th 
century statutory interpretation, though tending towards the literal, was not 
especially pro-taxpayer. The case cited in Westminster to establish the 
taxpayer’s right to rely on the letter of the law was actually an 1869 decision 
applying the letter of the law to impose tax. 
William Popkin, ‘Judicial anti-tax avoidance doctrine in England: a United States 





This chapter demonstrates that the mischief rule, which “marks the first and indeed 
only attempt by the judges fully to rationalise that important part of their function which 
concerns statutory interpretation”633 and “embodies the necessary legal policy of any 
democratic state”634, provides original authoritative judicial support for the proposed 
cheating or fraud approach to tax avoidance.  
 
As Cohen’s statement indicates, the development of the mischief rule by the Barons of 
the Exchequer in Heydon’s Case635 is a seminal recognition of the pre-existing common 
law of cheating or fraud, which “acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent 
transaction”636 in civil proceedings, as what Lord Hoffmann described in MacNiven as 
“an overlay upon the tax legislation”637, “an overriding legal principle, superimposed 
upon the whole of revenue law without regard to the language or purpose of any 
particular provision”638, “some paramount provision subject to which everything else 
must be read”639 and thus “a broad spectrum antibiotic which killed off all tax avoidance 
schemes, whatever the tax and whatever the relevant statutory provisions.”640 
 
                                                 
633 Bennion, p.918.  
634 Ibid, p.1009.  
635 (1584) 3 Coke 7a. 
636 Blackstone, p.89. 
637 [2001] UKHL 6 at [29].  
638 Ibid.       
639 Ibid. 
640 Ibid [49]. 
253 
 
The departure from the mischief rule was established by the 1909 decision of the 
House of Lords in Attorney General v Duke of Richmond641, which was decided by Lord 
Loreburn’s casting vote in favour of the taxpayer. Citing earlier cases where he decided 
in favour of the Revenue642 and insisted on looking at “the substance” of the 
transaction643 or finding out what “in reality” was the position644, Stevens concluded:  
 
“Loreburn, presiding, no doubt found himself in a quandary. As Speaker of 
the House of Lords he was at this time both fighting for Lloyd George’s 
budget and presiding over the debates on it. Perhaps he felt that politically 
it would be unwise to provoke still further the hostility of the Tory peers. ...  
 
Whatever inspired this change of approach in the Lord Chancellor is not 
certain; but it is clear that his vote on this occasion had a profound impact 
on the interpretation of tax laws in the United Kingdom. ...  
 
The formalistic approach toward tax legislation that the law lords developed 
turned English tax law for decades to come into a type of crossword puzzle, 
with the courts and the legislature playing an often unseemly game of cat 
and mouse. Politically and economically the semanticism of the English 
judicial approach to tax problems that developed during these years, 
although in later years quaintly dressed up as the protection of civil liberties, 
in fact enabled the extremely wealthy to avoid the undisputed rigors of the 
English tax system.”645 
 
 
The rest of this chapter expounds the development of the mischief rule in Heydon’s 
Case under the cheating or fraud approach and the primacy of the public revenue law, 
and the retreat from it under the Duke of Richmond and Duke of Westminster principles 
that substituted the constructional approach and the primacy of the private law. 
 
9.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MISCHIEF RULE 
 
9.2.1 The Primacy of the Common Law   
 
Plucknett suggested that the abuse of the common law “for the purposes of fraud and 
dishonesty ... gave a strong impetus to the movement for a written statutory law.”646 In 
a cautionary tale of the futility of anti-avoidance legislation, he stated:  
                                                 
641 [1909] A.C. 466. 
642 Strong & Woodifield [1906] AC 448; De Beers v Howe [1906] AC 455, 458; IRC v Maple & 
Co [1908] AC 22, 26.   
643 London & India Docks Co v Attorney-General [1909] AC 7, 12. 
644 Blakiston v Cooper [1909] AC 104, 107. 
645 Law and Politics: The House of Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800 – 1976 (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1979), pp.174-176.    
646 Statutes & their Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century (Cambridge: 




“At first, perhaps, it was thought that precise, written, legislation would 
remove the evil, but the event proved the contrary. No sooner was a statute 
made, than we find reported in the Year Books numerous ingenious 
attempts to evade or circumvent the Act. Originally, perhaps the result of 
legal chicanery, the new written and published statutes themselves rapidly 
became the cause of further artifice, and the battle of wits between the 
legislature and the smart litigant has continued until our own day.”647 
 
In Omychund v Barker, therefore, Lord Mansfield reaffirmed the primacy of the common 
law thus:  
 
“All occasions do not arise at once; ... a statute very seldom can take in all 
cases, therefore the common law, that works itself pure by rules drawn from 
the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior to an act of parliament.”648 
 
 
9.2.2 The Primacy of the Public Revenue Law    
 
Heydon’s Case involved an anti-avoidance legislation enacted to counteract the 
avoidance of the 1539 Act for the Dissolution of all Monasteries and Abbies. According 
to Eskridge: 
 
“A statute adopted by Henry VIII listed specific property transfer devices that 
would be disregarded if used to avoid the king’s seizure of Church property. 
The statute did not list copyhold interests, which had been used to transfer 
Church property in the case at hand. ... Because the statute of Henry VIII 
sought to block evasions of the royal confiscations, the judges extended its 
ambit to include property interests that had been inadvertently omitted. The 
judges in Heydon’s Case followed equitable interpretation to help the 
legislator accomplish all he was trying to accomplish, but no more than was 
justified by his original goal.” 649 
 
 
The fact that the statute is but one part of the law means that any “gap” in the statute 
is filled by the pre-existing common law of cheating and the question of extending the 
“ambit” of the statute does not arise. Indeed, contrary to Eskridge’s assertion, copyhold 
had not “been inadvertently omitted” by the Act because, like every tax avoidance 
scheme (or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind which had never taken place 
before the tax Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed devised as a result 
of it), the scheme comprised two copyholds “devised as a result of it”. According to the 
summary in Coke’s Report: 
 
                                                 
647 Ibid.  
648 (1744) 1 Atkyns 21, 33. 
649 ‘All About Words’ (2001) Columbia Law Review, 991, pp.1003-1004. 
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“The statute 31 H. 8. c. 13. avoids cases of lands whereof any estate for 
life, &c. was then in being, made by religious persons within a year before; 
a copyhold was granted by copy for life, and then the religious house made 
a lease of it to another for 80 years; held that the lease was void, the 
copyhold estate being an estate for life within the statute.”650 
 
 
The transactions were not cheats or frauds or shams “as between subject and subject” 
in private law but were declared void because their object was to cheat “as concerns 
the King and the public” in tax law. Referring to a specific part of the common law, 
rather than the overriding common law of cheating, Coke reported:  
 
“And it was said, that in this case the common law was, that religious and 
ecclesiastical persons might have made leases for as many years as they 
pleased, the mischief was that when they perceived their houses would be 
dissolved, they made long and unreasonable leases: now the stat of 31 H. 
8. doth provide the remedy, and principally for such religious and 
ecclesiastical houses which should be dissolved after the Act (as the said 
college in our case was) that all leases of any land, whereof any estate or 
interest for life or years was then in being, should be void; and their reason 
was, that it was not necessary for them to make a new lease so long as a 
former had continuance; and therefore the intent of the Act was to avoid 
doubling of estates, and to have but one single estate in being at a time: 
for doubling of estates implies in itself deceit, and private respect, to 
prevent the intention of the Parliament. And if the copyhold estate for two 
lives, and the lease for eighty years shall stand together, here will be 




The unravelling of the scheme on the ground of deceit confirms that the mischief rule 
involved the application of the pre-existing common law of cheating which “acts upon 
the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction” in civil proceedings. According 
to Coke:  
 
“And it was resolved by them, that for the sure and true interpretation 
of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or 
enlarging of the common law,) four things are to be discerned and 
considered:—  
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.  
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did 
not provide.  
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure 
the disease of the commonwealth. 
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the 
Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the 
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions 
                                                 
650 Ibid. 
651 Ibid, p.7b. Emphasis supplied.  
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and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato 
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according 
to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono public.”652 
 
 
In order “to suppress subtle inventions and evasions” of the Act, the court necessarily 
invoked the pre-existing common law of cheating or deceit. In the words of Simpson’s 
directly applicable summary of the Ramsay principle: 
 
“This judge-made move towards regulating the conduct of citizens certainly 
goes beyond anything expressly demanded by the legislation. To that 
extent, it clearly involves the recognition that there is, after all, some 
common law (in the widest sense of that term) of taxation.”653 
 
 
9.2.3 The Equality of Taxation  
 
The primacy of the public good (“pro bono public”) over private advantage (“pro privato 
commodo”) shows that the mischief rule gives effect to the equality of taxation. 
According to Coke: 
 
“And in this case it was debated at large, in what cases the general words 
of Acts of Parliament shall extend to copyhold or customary estates, and in 
what not; and therefore this rule was taken and agreed by the whole Court, 
that when an Act of Parliament doth alter the service, tenure, interest of the 
land, or other thing, in prejudice of the lord, or of the custom of the manor, 
or in prejudice of the tenant, there the general words of such Act of 
Parliament shall not extend to copyholds: but when an Act of Parliament is 
generally made for the good of the weal public, and no prejudice can accrue 
by reason of alteration of any interest, service, tenure, or custom of the 
manor, there many times copyhold and customary estates are within the 
general purview of such Acts.”654 
 
 
As explained in chapter seven, three hundred years later, Lord Ardmillan based his 
application of the equality of taxation in Master Mariner on strikingly similar proposition:  
 
“Where there is an Act taxing a particular body, or laying a tax upon a 
particular article, of course that Act is to be strictly construed, but where 
there is an Act taxing the whole of Her Majesty’s subjects, and the question 
is, whether it is to be construed so as to sustain the equality of the incidence 
of the tax, I think there is no presumption in favour of that exemption and 
against the equality of the incidence of the taxation. It is the next and 
soundest principle of taxation to be as equal as possible”.655  
 
                                                 
652 Ibid, pp.7b-8a. Emphasis supplied.  
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654 Heydon, p.8a. Emphasis supplied.  




9.3 THE DUKE OF RICHMOND PRINCIPLE  
 
In Duke of Richmond the Revenue failed to distinguish the legality of the relevant 
transactions “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law from their legality “as 
between subject and subject” in private law, and thus failed to plead fraud to the 
required procedural standard in civil proceedings and effectively facilitated the 
substitution of the constructional approach for the pre-existing cheating approach.  
 
The opening two paragraphs of Lord Shaw’s speech, which refer to the two minimum 
transactions required to constitute a scheme and the Act the scheme was devised to 
cheat show that there was a scheme or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind 
which had never taken place before the tax Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was 
passed devised as a result of it: 
 
“My Lords, on October 6, 1897, the late Duke of Richmond granted a bond 
and disposition in security over his estates after mentioned for 415,000l. in 
favour of his son the present Duke. On the same date he granted a bond 
over the same estates for 287,000l. in favour of his grandson, the present 
Earl of March. The question in the present case is whether, in determining 
the value of these estates for the purpose of estate duty, allowances should 
be made for these incumbrances. 
 
The provisions of s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Finance Act, 1894, applicable to the 
present case are as follows:  
 
‘In determining the value of an estate for the purpose of estate duty 
allowance shall be made … for debts and incumbrances; but an 
allowance shall not be made—(a) for debts incurred by the deceased 
or incumbrances created by a disposition made by the deceased unless 
such debts or incumbrances were incurred or created bona fide for full 
consideration in money or money's worth wholly for the deceased's own 
use and benefit and take effect out of his interest.’”656 
 
The hallmark of his judgment in favour of the Revenue was, therefore, the recognition 
that a tax avoidance scheme is the paradigm of “cases where the fraudulent nature of 
a transaction only becomes apparent in the context of several other transactions.”657  
Putting the two transactions he cited above in their wider context, he stated:   
 
“I am of opinion that in order to arrive at a just determination upon the 
elements for consideration presented by this clause it is necessary to 
consider not merely the transaction of creating incumbrances by itself, 
but the entire transaction of which they form a part. I think that this 
                                                 
656 Richmond, pp.483-487. Emphases supplied. 
657 Law Commission. 
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must be done if mistake is to be avoided. It is for that reason that I give 
the brief narrative which follows. 
 
Among the Scotch Entail Acts cited in these proceedings the Rutherfurd Act 
(11 & 12 Vict. c. 36) and the Act of 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 61) are those 
outstanding. By the former of these Acts, an heir of entail in possession 
received for the first time in the law of Scotland power to disentail on 
obtaining the necessary consents of succeeding heirs. By the latter statute, 
such consents, if not given, might in the case of new entails, of which this is 
one, namely, entails executed after August 1, 1848, be dispensed with by 
the Court on payment of the value of the expectancy or interest of the heir 
or heirs of entail.  
 
The beginning of the series of transactions after mentioned was made 
on April 12, 1897, when a petition was presented to the Court of Session 
by the Duke of Richmond, Gordon, and Lennox, the prayer of which was for 
disentail of what may be comprehensively termed the Gordon Richmond 
estates lying in six counties in Scotland. The petition necessarily craved for 
service upon the succeeding heirs of entail, and in the event of any of those 
whose consent was necessary refusing or failing to give such consents, then 
for the ascertainment of the value in money of such heirs’ expectancy or 
interest, and the payment of the amount or the giving of proper security 
therefor over the entailed estates. Upon such payment or security the Court 
was asked to dispense with consent and to approve of the instrument of 
disentail tendered in the course of the proceedings. The parties were at one 
as to the object to be achieved: the consent of the heirs of entail was not 
given: mortgages were accordingly granted for their interests, and after 
various steps of procedure the petition was granted.  
 
So far, my Lords, as the proceedings are concerned they appear to have 
been in proper form. This observation applies not only to the valuation of the 
interests of those heirs whose consent was necessary, but also to the bonds 
and dispositions in security granted over the estates and to the instrument 
of disentail. The procedure is accurately summed up and ratified in the 
interlocutor of Lord Pearson of October 20, 1897. 
 
As already stated, the finance of the transaction was arranged by security 
being given over the estates to the next heirs for the ascertained value of 
their interests, that value being in the case of the Earl of March, now the 
present Duke, 415,000l., and of Baron Settrington, now the Earl of March, 
287,000l., together a sum of 702,000l. As the late Duke of Gordon was at 
the date of his petition seventy-nine years of age, it is plain that actuarially 
the value of the succeeding heirs’ interest, for which bonds and dispositions 
in security had to be granted, went a long way towards evacuating the entire 
value of the entailed estates. As it turned out, this evacuation was completed 
prior to the Duke’s death on September 27, 1903. In the interval between 
the disentail proceedings and his death instalments of interest became due 
on the bonds and dispositions in security. These were not, however, paid: 
from beginning to end of the series of transactions no money passed. At 
certain dates balances of overdue interest were struck, and further bonds 
and dispositions in security over the estates were granted to the amount of 
88,000l. The result was that, so far as the financial interest of the late Duke 
of Richmond and Gordon in the Scotch Gordon Richmond entailed estates 
was concerned, that interest had at the date of his death been reduced to 
nothing. Indeed, in the estate duty account presented by the solicitors to the 
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Inland Revenue it is expressly stated that there is an excess of debts and 
incumbrances over the value of the heritable property of 47,092l.  
 
So far for finance. But as the statute under construction deals not only with 
bona fides and full consideration, but provides that the incumbrances are to 
be created bona fide for full consideration ‘in money or money’s worth wholly 
for the deceased’s own use and benefit and take effect out of his interest,’ it 
becomes necessary to inquire what became of the Gordon Richmond 
estates, thus left unentailed but depleted in value in the hands of the late 
Duke; and, secondly, what became of the sum of over 700,000l., for which, 
as stated, his Grace granted incumbrances in favour of his son and 
grandson. With regard to the estates themselves, the late Duke of 
Richmond, on April 20, 1898, executed a mortis causa deed of entail in 
favour of the same line of succession as that favoured by the entail of 1872. 
With regard to the 700,000l., that was settled by an assignation and deed of 
trust, dated November 11 and 15, 1897, and recorded November 18, 1897. 
Substantially the result arrived at by these deeds was to put the money 
represented upon trust for the same line of succession, namely, the old heirs 
of entail. 
 
It will be seen, accordingly, that at the end of these transactions the 
parties affected thereby were, for practical purposes, restored pretty 
nearly to the identical position which they occupied at the beginning. 
This, I think, was exactly what was sought to be achieved. Whatever 
may have happened to others, it is at all events fairly clear that the one man 
who had not benefited was precisely the petitioner for disentail, the grantor 
of repeated mortgages, and the re-entailor of the reversion, the late Duke 
himself. For myself I can see no benefit produced to the late Duke of 
Richmond and Gordon by this series of transactions, and I am unable to 
affirm that the incumbrances which formed the essential items of the series 




The facts that “from beginning to end of the series of transactions no money passed” 
and “that at the end of these transactions the parties affected thereby were, for practical 
purposes, restored pretty nearly to the identical position which they occupied at the 
beginning” show that in reality the Duke did not diminish his actual assets and thus did 
not suffer the actual loss to his personal estate that he was claiming. 
 
Despite the fact that court was engaged in statutory construction, the essence of his 
judgment, which used ‘motive’ (which is irrelevant) and ‘purpose’ or ‘object’ (which is 
decisive) synonymously, supports the definition of tax avoidance as cheating by the 
professional advisers that devise, implement and otherwise facilitate the use of tax 
avoidance schemes in which the taxpayer using an individual scheme may or may not 
be complicit:   
 
                                                 
658 Richmond, pp.483-486. Emphases supplied. 
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“What the motive for the transaction was is not denied. Answering the 
learned judge who tried the case, his Grace speaks with perfect frankness 
to a conversation with his father. ‘You had a conversation with your father 
before he began this transaction?—Yes. He told you what his motive was?—
Yes; his motive, as I think I said yesterday, was to lessen the amount of the 
death duties if he could.’ The interests of all the three parties to the 
transaction were ably attended to by the same firm of solicitors. They 
accepted the task of endeavouring to give effect to the motive of the late 
Duke. In doing so they incurred no risk of prejudicing the interest of his son 
or grandson. On the contrary the result, if it could be legally accomplished, 
would benefit them, as, under the judgments appealed against, it has 
benefited them by a saving in estate duty to the amount of 55,000l. 
 
My Lords, that saving of estate duty (I purposely do not use the term evasion 
or even avoidance of estate duty) formed the object and purpose of the 
transaction. It was for this that the incumbrances were created, and not ‘for 
full consideration in money or money’s worth wholly for the deceased’s own 
use and benefit’ or to ‘take effect out of his interest.’ The saving was not to 
take effect till he was dead, and then could be for the benefit only of those 
who would have the estate duty to pay.” 659  
 
As a matter of law, the purpose of the scheme was to cheat the Revenue of estate 
duty, whether it is described as “evasion or even avoidance of estate duty” or “to lessen 
the amount of the death duties”. 
 
In his conclusion, he criticised the courts below, which found in favour of the taxpayers, 
for failing to give effect to the principle that a tax avoidance scheme is archetype of 
“cases where the fraudulent nature of a transaction only becomes apparent in the 
context of several other transactions” despite the Revenue’s failure to plead fraud: 
 
“With reference to the judgments in the Courts below, I will only say that they 
do not appear to me to give effect to the strong and carefully worded 
language of the statute. When, for instance, Bray J. reasons that ‘It is a 
mistake to assume that to free one's heir from estate duty is necessarily an 
act done for his benefit,’ and that ‘it does not necessarily follow that the 
present Duke will reap the whole benefit if he escapes the payment of estate 
duty,’ the point of the provision appears to have been missed, namely, that 
escape is not permissible unless the incumbrance was created inter alia 
‘wholly for the use and benefit,’ not of the present Duke, but of the late Duke, 
the grantor of the deed. And with reference to the decision of the learned 
judges in the Court of Appeal I think (1.) that it was too confined to the 
one item of the transaction as a purchase of a reversion without taking 
into account the fact appearing from other parts of the transaction that 
the reversion was purposely reduced to a shadow, and (2.) that too much 
stress was laid upon argument, possible but not put forward, as to fraud. The 
deeds make no attempt at concealment, but disclose quite openly the 
interrelation of the facts, deeds, and transactions which go to make up 
the scheme. To view these, so interrelated, as if they were in isolation, 
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would be for me—and I speak of course only for myself—to shut out 
the light, to lose their true meaning, and to produce a risk of failure to 
get down to the reality and substance of the case. I think that the creation 
of these incumbrances was not for the use and benefit of the late Duke of 
Richmond and Gordon, but was simply part of a plan for saving death duties 
to his heirs. I do not think that the scheme was in this case accomplished 
without a contravention of the letter as well as a very plain violation of the 
spirit of the statute.” 660 
 
As the exposition of the fraudulent nature of a tax avoidance scheme in chapter two 
shows, “a very plain violation of the spirit of the statute” is fraud upon a tax statute and 
cheating the public revenue. 
 
“The deeds make no attempt at concealment, but disclose quite openly the interrelation 
of the facts, deeds, and transactions which go to make up the scheme” because, as 
expounded in chapter seven, in order to cheat the public revenue “as concerns the 
Revenue and the public” in tax law, “deeds, and transactions” that are genuine “as 
between subject and subject” in private law are required.  
 
Despite the constraints of statutory construction and the Revenue’s failure to plead 
fraud “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law, Lord Collins, who also 
confused ‘motive’ with ‘purpose’, also effectively held that the scheme cheated the 
public revenue by “Looking … at the transaction as a whole:  
 
“I accept unreservedly the conclusions of fact found by Bray J., and 
adopted by the Court of Appeal, and I do not at all question the right of an 
owner of property so to dispose of it, if he can, as to keep it outside the 
meshes of a taxing statute. But the real question here is whether he has 
succeeded in doing so. In my opinion he has not. It is common ground and 
expressly found by the learned judge that ‘it was the intention of the late 
Duke to bar the entail and to make himself owner in fee simple of the 
Gordon Richmond estates subject to the incumbrances, including the 
bonds, but that the motive which mainly actuated him in taking the steps 
which he did for that purpose was that he would thereby diminish his estate 
and lessen the estate duty payable on his death.’ Can an incumbrance 
created mainly from such a motive be fairly said to be ‘incurred or created 
wholly for the deceased’s own use and benefit,’ and not in whole or in part 
for that of his successor? I think not. … 
 
But even if the grammatical construction put on the section by the Courts 
below be adopted, I am far from satisfied that ‘full consideration in 
money or money’s worth’ was received by the deceased in return for 
the incumbrances. In fact, if it had been, it might have defeated the 
main purpose of the transaction, which involved a diminution in the 
value of the estate to be left in the hands of the settlor at the close of 
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the transaction. In fact, the machinery put in operation by the elaborate 
processes adopted would have failed in its main object if it had left the 
estate which it was contemplated would pass on the death of the settlor of 
the same value at the close of the proceedings as it would have been had 
no settlement been made. It was through the means of allowable 
deductions only that the intended diminution of the taxable value of the 
estate could be brought about, and to the extent of such deductions the 
consideration was less than full. Looking, as we are entitled to do, at the 
transaction as a whole, there is no doubt that the interests of Lord March 
and his son in the estate which the late Duke was to buy up were carefully 
assessed at the sum for which the incumbrances were created, but the 
proper equivalent in return for the incumbrances to such an amount would 
have been an estate equivalent to the sum total of those interests and 
unencumbered by a charge for the purchase-money. But it was part of the 
arrangement that the purchase-money was to be secured on the estate not 
paid, and therefore the consideration intended to be given, and actually 
given, was less than full by the value of the incumbrances, and thus 
furnished ground for claiming the deduction which has been allowed.  
 
There is no evidence that the dominion acquired over the fee was really 
desired with a view to altering the succession, or had any special value for 
that reason. In point of fact, the property was at once resettled as 
nearly as possible on the old lines. I cannot think that a claim thus 
manufactured can be held good. For these reasons, I think, the appeal 
should be allowed.”661 
 
If “[i]n point of fact, the property was at once resettled as nearly as possible on the old 
lines” then the Duke did not diminish his actual assets; and if it was not established 
“that ‘full consideration in money or money’s worth’ was received by the deceased in 
return for the incumbrances”, then he did not suffer the actual loss to his personal estate 
that he was claiming. 
 
Like the judges below, however, the majority refused to recognise that tax schemes 
are “cases where the fraudulent nature of a transaction only becomes apparent in the 
context of several other transactions” because of the Revenue’s failure to plead fraud 
“as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law.   
 
In his speech in the House of Lords, which underscores the departure from the equality 
of taxation, Lord Macnaghten stated: 
 
“The question involved in this appeal has at last been brought within a very 
narrow compass. In the case as originally presented on behalf of the Crown 
there were charges and insinuations of bad faith which ought never to have 
been made. Those charges and insinuations were disproved at the hearing, 
and they have been abandoned or dropped, somewhat grudgingly I think, 
and with some appearance of reluctance. However, they are out of the way 
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now, and the only question remaining is a question of construction, a 
question perhaps of some difficulty, arising as it does on one of the least 
intelligible sections in an Act of Parliament not remarkable for perspicuity. 
 
In 1897, three years after the passing of the Finance Act, 1894, the late 
Duke of Richmond was minded to acquire in fee simple certain estates in 
Scotland known as the Gordon Richmond estates, of which he was then 
institute of entail in possession. There is no doubt about the motive which 
influenced him. He was advised by the solicitor of the family, a gentleman 
of the highest standing (and advised, I suppose, rightly), that if the entail 
were subsisting at the time of his death the principal value of the entailed 
estates would be aggregated with the rest of the property passing on his 
death so as to form one estate, but that it was competent for him under the 
law of Scotland, with the consent of the next two heirs of entail, his eldest 
son, then Earl of March, who is the present Duke, and his grandson, Lord 
Settrington, or failing their consent on paying or securing to the satisfaction 
of the Court the ascertained value of their respective interests, to acquire 
the estates in fee simple. He was further advised (but the soundness of this 
advice is questioned in these proceedings) that if he acquired the fee 
simple, then, although the principal value of the Gordon Richmond estates 
would still fall to be aggregated with the rest of his property, the value of 
the estate subject to duty would be diminished by the sums paid or secured 
as purchase-money or compensation for the interests of his son and 
grandson. 
 
The Duke acted on the advice of his solicitor, conceiving, rightly or wrongly, 
that he was not under any obligation, legal or moral, to keep his property in 
a form peculiarly and unnecessarily obnoxious to an impost which I am 
afraid many people still think unequal and unfair. Everything was done in 
an open and straightforward manner, without subterfuge or concealment of 
any kind or any attempt to make the transaction appear other than what it 
was in reality. The sanction of the Court was applied for on the footing that 
Lord March and Lord Settrington failed to consent. The procedure was 
regular and proper throughout. The interests of the next two heirs of entail 
were valued under the direction of the Court, and the amount of the 
valuation in each case was secured on the fee simple of the Gordon 
Richmond estates to the satisfaction of the Court. 
 
On the death of the late Duke, which occurred in 1903, his executor, the 
present Duke, who succeeded under the late Duke's will or trust disposition, 
claimed an allowance in respect of the sums secured in his favour and in 
favour of his son on the fee simple of the Gordon Richmond estates. The 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue rejected the claim. An information was 
brought by the Attorney-General to enforce their view. Bray J. dismissed 
the information with costs, and the Court of Appeal sustained his decision. 
I think the judgment of the Court of Appeal is right.”662 
 
 
The fact that the transactions that constituted the scheme were implemented “three 
years after the passing of the Finance Act, 1894” makes them “transactions which 
Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the Act had not anticipated, about which 
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they had never thought at all”663 and “transactions … of a kind which had never taken 
place before the Act was passed … devised as a result of it” 664, and underscores “the 
legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament 
meant”665 involved in said “question of construction”.  
 
 
Again, in order to cheat the public revenue “as concerns the Revenue and the public” 
in tax law, it is necessary that “[e]verything was done in an open and straightforward 
manner, without subterfuge or concealment of any kind or any attempt to make the 
transaction appear other than what it was in reality” in private law “as between subject 
and subject”. In order to identify the cheating or fraud “as concerns the Revenue and 
the public” in tax law, therefore, it is necessary to recognise that tax schemes are 
“cases where the fraudulent nature of a transaction only becomes apparent in the 
context of several other transactions.”  
 
Lord Atkinson, who also confused ‘motive’ with ‘purpose’ or ‘object’, however, also 
refused to do so because of the Revenue’s failure to plead fraud:  
 
“[I]n this case, the facts of which have already been stated with sufficient 
fullness, fraud is not relied upon by the Crown. It is on the contrary 
admitted that the transactions ... were real and genuine as opposed to 
colourable transactions. If so, the incumbrances on these estates created 
by the late Duke were ... created bona fide within the meaning of s. 7. It is 
admitted that the motive which prompted the late Duke to enter into these 
transactions was to relieve from the payment of estate duty those estates 
which upon his death would pass to another or to others. That motive does 
not, however, vitiate the transactions. ...  
 
I further think that the case must be determined solely with regard to the 
legal rights and interest which the respective parties had acquired in 
October, 1897, the date of execution of the impeached securities. What 
they did afterwards, how they chose to dispose of those legal interests or 
to exercise those legal rights, is ... irrelevant. It might have been legitimate 
to inquire into these matters subsequent, if the transactions which were 
concluded on that day had been impeached as unreal, colourable, or sham 
transactions; but they have been admitted to be real and genuine in their 
character, and, if so, all the subsequent dealing with the estate and the 
interest created in it lie outside the field of inquiry, even though by their 
operation they practically restore the status quo ante. ... 
 
Were they created bona fide? They cannot, for the reasons already given, 
be held ... to have been created mala fide, simply because they constituted 
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one step in proceedings designed to provide a means of escape from the 
payment of estate duties.”666 
 
 
As explained above, “fraud [was] not relied upon by the Crown” because of the failure 
to argue that while the constituent transactions could not be “impeached as unreal, 
colourable, or sham transactions” in private law ‘as between subject and subject’, they 
could be “impeached as unreal, colourable, or sham transactions” ‘as concerns the 
Revenue and the public’ in tax law or as not “created bona fide within the meaning of 
s. 7” because they were devised to cheat the public revenue or “designed to provide a 
means of escape from the payment of estate duties.”  
 
Lord Loreburn decided the case in this one-paragraph judgment that concluded with 
an effective repudiation of the mischief rule:  
 
“I have had the advantage of reading in print the opinions of my noble and 
learned friends Lord Macnaghten and Lord Atkinson, and I agree with the 
conclusion at which they have arrived. It is not necessary to decide finally 
whether the words ‘wholly for the deceased’s own use and benefit’ are to 
be read with the word ‘created’ in s. 7, sub-s. 1 (a), of the Act of 1894, or 
relate only to the ‘consideration.’ If the latter, then no doubt the 
consideration for the incumbrance was received wholly for the late Duke. If 
the former, I think the incumbrance was created wholly for the late Duke’s 
use and benefit, in the sense that this was the direct and immediate 
purpose. And this suffices where the other conditions of the section are 
satisfied. I see no other arguable point in the case. It is not my province 
either to censure or to commend the transaction itself. It was within 
the law and without dishonesty. If this case has disclosed a way by 
which settled property may largely escape the estate duty, that is an 




In principle the assertion that the scheme “was within the law and without dishonesty” 
affirmed the overriding duty of honesty imposed by the pre-existing common law of 
cheating. In practice, however, it is misleading on two grounds. First, he was concerned 
with dishonesty “as between subject and subject” in private law rather than “as 
concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law. Secondly, as Lord Shaw’s reference 
to “argument, possible but not put forward, as to fraud” and Lord Atkinson’s statement 
that “fraud is not relied upon by the Crown” show, fraud or dishonesty was not pleaded 
by the Revenue or considered by the courts. By concluding that the scheme “was within 
the law and without dishonesty” when dishonesty was not in issue or in evidence, 
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therefore, Loreburn went beyond the procedural safeguard that: “It is not open to the 
court to infer dishonesty from facts which have not been pleaded.”668  
 
Most significantly, the notion that “the office of all the Judges ... always to make such 
construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress 
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato 
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent 
of the makers of the Act, pro bono public” under the mischief rule was now “an affair 
for the Legislature to consider, in which Courts of law have no concern” under the Duke 
of Richmond principle induced the vicious cycle of tax avoidance, tax complexity and 
tax uncertainty that continues to this day. In the words of Lord Diplock:  
 
“The history of tax legislation is thus the history of an attempt to deal 
specifically with the liability to tax of every kind of financial transaction which 
people enter into. And it is a history of failure. ... [I]n the face of human 
ingenuity in devising new variants of transactions, this aim is impossible of 
achievement. It is worse. It is self-defeating.”669 
 
 
9.4. LORD CLYDE’S CHARTER FOR TAX CHEATS 
 
9.4.1. Background  
 
Like Lord Loreburn, Lord Clyde was also a leading politician. By the time he appeared 
in the High Court for the taxpayers in Duke of Richmond in 1907, he had served as 
Solicitor General for Scotland and stood unsuccessfully as a Tory Parliamentary 
candidate. His evidence resulted in Lord Macnaghten’s claim that the Revenue’s 
“charges and insinuations were disproved at the hearing”. As Bray J put it: 
 
“The first witness called was Mr. Clyde, an advocate of the Scottish Bar, 
holding the rank of King’s Counsel and Solicitor-General in the time of the 
last Government. His evidence was given with admirable lucidity, and 
helped to remove many of the difficulties I felt in dealing with a question so 
largely dependent upon Scotch law. His evidence was not really disputed 




By the time Lord Clyde presided over the taxpayers’ appeal in the First Division of the 
Court of Session as Lord President in Ayrshire Pullman in 1929, he had served as an 
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MP and as the Lord Justice General. His son (James Clyde), who would later also 
become Lord Advocate and Lord Justice General, appeared as one of the two counsel 
for the taxpayers. 
 
9.4.2. Lord Clyde’s Judgment      
 
Like Lord Loreburn’s judgement in Richmond, Lord Clyde’s famous speech in Ayrshire 
shows that references to honesty in civil proceedings are to the private law and does 
not extend to the overriding common law duty of honesty imposed by the pre-existing 
common law of cheating the public revenue:    
 
“This is an appeal against assessments to Income Tax ... imposed in 
respect of the profits of a business ... made upon, and in the name of, the 
firm ... and on a Mr Ritchie who, according to the contentions of the 
Revenue both before the Commissioners and before this Court, is the sole 
owner of that business and, therefore, solely entitled to the profits upon 
which the assessments were made. The appeal is taken against these 
assessments upon the ground that the business in question ... was not 
during the years in question a business which belonged to Mr Ritchie but, 
on the contrary, was a business carried on by a partnership under a written 
contract of co-partnery. ...  
 
There is no doubt at all that there was a contract of co-partnery under which 
this business was carried on, and there is no doubt that that contract of co-
partnery managed its business with regard to its books and with regard to 
its balance sheets and the like, exactly as any other contract of co-partnery 
manages its affairs, but it is true that it has certain salient and striking 
features of its own. 
 
To begin with, it was a contract of co-partnery between Mr Ritchie and five 
of his children, two of whom at the date of the contract of co-partnery itself 
were actually minors. It provides that the capital of the Company is to be 
provided by a loan of £1,600 from Mr Ritchie, and that upon that loan he is 
to get 5 per cent interest. Furthermore, he has no share in the profits, 
although he is the exclusive manager of the concern. The profits are to go 
in equal shares to his children, and his children, who earn these profits and 
to whom they are allotted from year to year, are not to draw any part of 
those profits until the capital debt of £1,600 due to Mr. Ritchie is paid off. I 
do not know that there is anything else in the contract of co-partnery which 
differs from the ordinary style of such documents, but these are indeed 
peculiarities and they show, as plainly as words can show, that the object 
of this contract of co-partnery was to enable the children of Mr. Ritchie to 
acquire the substantial interests in this business as time went on - at any 
rate, if they chose - and incidentally to secure repayment of Mr. Ritchie’s 
capital advance of £1,600, and, I think one may reasonably add, to create 
a state of legal relations between the family and this business which would 
render the position of the family, as entitled to its profits, favourable in 
relation to the Inland Revenue both with regard to Income Tax to some 
extent, certainly with regard to Super-tax, and still more clearly with regard 




So far as my point of view is concerned, the agreement is neither better nor 
worse for that reason.  
 
No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or 
other, so to arrange his legal relations to his business or to his 
property as to enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest possible 
shovel into his stores. The Inland Revenue is not slow - and quite 
rightly - to take every advantage which is open to it under the taxing 
statutes for the purpose of depleting the taxpayer's pocket. And the 
taxpayer is, in like manner, entitled to be astute to prevent, so far as 
he honestly can, the depletion of his means by the Revenue.”671 
 
 
The paragraph in bold is described in this thesis as Lord Clyde’s charter for tax cheats. 
Because of the two minors, it is debatable whether the contract was real “as between 
subject and subject” in contract law. More significantly, the underlined expression, 
which is a legal nonsense for cheating the public revenue of Super-tax and Death 
Duties, shows that the object of the contract was to cheat “as concerns the Revenue 
and the public” in tax law. Under the primacy of the private law, however, “the 
agreement is neither better nor worse for that reason.”  
 
9.4.3. Lord Morison’s Dissenting Judgement  
 
In his lesser-known dissenting speech, Lord Morison rejected the primacy of the private 
law thus:   
 
“It was contended that the terms of the contract of co-partnery are such as 
to render the assessments ineffectual. I am quite unable to assent to this 
view. ... Nor am I able to find anything in the contract of co-partnery which 
affects the assessments. The terms of this document may be of value in 
ascertaining the rights of the partners inter se. It makes Mr. Ritchie the 
trustee for the members of his family in holding and dividing among them 
the profits of the business for the years in question. He had the sole control 
of these profits. In my opinion this has no bearing on the assessment and 
recovery of Income Tax from the trading profits of the business. That matter 
is, in my opinion, regulated solely by the terms of the statute. I think it only 




Regrettably, however, he referred to the charging provision of the statute rather than 
the civil fraud penalty provision. 
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9.4.4. The Cheating or Fraud Approach  
 
The courts could have discharged “the office of all the Judges ... always to make such 
construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress 
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato 
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent 
of the makers of the Act, pro bono public” as established by the mischief rule by 
applying section 30 of the Income Tax Act 1918 which effectively codified the pre-
existing common law of cheating and fraud thus:  
 
“Penalty for fraudulent claims. 
 
(1) A person who in making a claim for or obtaining any exemption, 
abatement, or relief hereinbefore described, or in obtaining any certificate 
as aforesaid— 
(a) is guilty of any fraud or contrivance; or  
(b) fraudulently conceals or untruly declares any income or any sum 
which he has charged against or deducted from, or was entitled to 
charge against or to deduct from another person; or  
(c) fraudulently makes a second claim for the same cause,  
shall forfeit the sum of twenty pounds and treble the tax chargeable in 
respect of all the sources of his income and as if such claim had not been 
allowed.  
 
(2) A person who knowingly and wilfully aids or abets any person in 




If the Revenue did “take every advantage which [was] open to it under the taxing 
statutes”, as Lord Clyde suggested, it would have applied section 30. The issue would 
have been whether the participating taxpayer was “guilty of any fraud or contrivance” 
or “fraudulently conceal[ed] or untruly declare[d] any income or any sum”; and whether 
his professional enablers were “guilty of any fraud or contrivance” by “knowingly and 
wilfully aid[ing] or abet[ing]” him.   
 
Furthermore, as the tax statutes are but one part of the law, the rule of law required the 
Revenue “to take every advantage which [was] open to it under the” common law by 
bringing a criminal prosecution for cheating. Indeed, when the same issue under the 
same legislation came before Andrews L.J. in the Northern Ireland case of R v ‘J’, he 
made precisely the same point:  
 
“The ... reason for my opinion is founded on the express words in section 
224 of the Income Tax Act, 1918, which provides that the provisions of that 
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Act ‘shall not affect any criminal proceedings for any felony or 
misdemeanour.’ Therefore, no enactment which provides for the imposition 
of treble charge or for power to have the matter considered at petty 
sessions, in any way interferes with the common law rights of the King.673 
 
 
Contrary to the common belief derived from Lord Clyde’s statement that the taxpayer 
acted “so far as he honestly can”, therefore, the fact is that the Revenue failed to 
enforce the relevant statutory and common law duties of honesty. Furthermore, by 
effectively concluding that the taxpayer acted “so far as he honestly” could, when 
dishonesty was not in issue or in evidence, Lord Clyde went beyond the procedural 
safeguard that: “It is not open to the court to infer dishonesty from facts which have not 
been pleaded.”674  
 
9.5. THE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER PRINCIPLE   
 
9.5.1. Lord Atkin’s Failure to Identity the Cheating  
 
The real difference between Lord Atkin and the majority was that, like the 
Commissioners and Finlay J, he recognised that tax schemes are “cases where the 
fraudulent nature of a transaction only becomes apparent in the context of several other 
transactions” by judging the deeds and the letters of  acknowledgment together.  
 
Like the majority, however, he failed to identify the fraud “as concerns the Revenue 
and the public” in tax law by agreeing that the case turned on the construction of the 
transactions “as between subject and subject” in contract law:  
 
“It is agreed between the parties that the question in this case is whether 
the payments were for remuneration of services or not; if the former the 
Respondent is chargeable, otherwise not. It is unnecessary, therefore, to 
trouble your Lordships with the various relevant Sections and Rules of the 
Income Tax Act, 1918, and subsequent Finance Acts. It is sufficient to say 
that your Lordships were satisfied that the admission was correct. It was 
not, I think, denied, at any rate it is incontrovertible, that the deeds were 
brought into existence as a device by which the Respondent might avoid 
some of the burden of Sur-tax. I do not use the word device in any sinister 
sense: for it has to be recognised that the subject, whether poor and 
humble or wealthy and noble, has the legal right so to dispose of his capital 
and income as to attract upon himself the least amount of tax. The only 
function of a court of law is to determine the legal result of his dispositions 
so far as they affect tax.”675 
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In law, “a device by which the Respondent might avoid some of the burden of Sur-tax” 
amounts to cheating “so far as they affect tax.” While “the subject ... has the legal right 
so to dispose of his capital and income as to attract upon himself the least amount of 
tax” nobody has the right to cheat the public revenue.   
 
9.5.2. Lord Tomlin’s Charter for Tax Cheats  
 
The so-called doctrine of the primacy of “form over substance” is more accurately 
described as the primacy of the form and substance of the legal position “as between 
subject and subject” in private law over the form and substance of the legal position 
“as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law. As Lord Tomlin put it in his famous 
speech:  
 
“Apart ... from the question of contract with which I have dealt it is said that 
in Revenue cases there is a doctrine that the Court may ignore the legal 
position and regard what is called ‘the substance of the matter’ and that 
here the substance of the matter is that the annuitant was serving the Duke 
for something equal to his former salary or wages and that, therefore, while 
he is so serving, the annuity must be treated as salary or wages. This 
supposed doctrine (upon which the Commissioners apparently acted) 
seems to rest for its support upon a misunderstanding of language used in 
some earlier cases. The sooner this misunderstanding is dispelled and the 
supposed doctrine given its quietus the better it will be for all concerned, 
for the doctrine seems to involve substituting ‘the uncertain and crooked 
cord of discretion’ for ‘the golden and straight mete wand of the law’ (4 Inst. 
41).  
 
Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax 
attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would 
be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, 
however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his 
fellow tax-payers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to 
pay an increased tax.  
 
This so-called doctrine of ‘the substance’ seems to me to be nothing more 
than an attempt to make a man pay notwithstanding that he has so ordered 
his affairs that the amount of tax sought from him is not legally claimable.... 
So here the substance is that which results from the legal rights and 
obligations of the parties ascertained upon ordinary legal principles, and 
having regard to what I have already said, the conclusion must be that each 
annuitant is entitled to an annuity which, as between himself and the payer, 
is liable to deduction of Income Tax by the payer and which the payer is 
entitled to treat as a deduction from his total income for Sur-tax purposes. 
 
There may, of course, be cases where documents are not bona fide nor 
intended to be acted upon but are only used as a cloak to conceal a 
different transaction. No such case is made or even suggested here. The 
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deeds of covenant are admittedly bona fide, and have been given their 
proper legal operation. They cannot be ignored or treated as operating in 
some different way because as a result less duty is payable than would 
have been the case if some other arrangement - called for the purpose of 
the Appellants’ argument ‘the substance’ - had been made.”676 
 
 
The underlined sentences confirm that the true Duke of Westminster principle is that 
the reality or legality of transactions “as between subject and subject” in private law is 
decisive and binding “as concerns the Revenue and the public” in tax law as explained 
in chapter eight. The paragraph in bold is more accurately described as the false Duke 
of Westminster principle.  
 
9.5.3. The Cheating or Fraud Approach  
 
As Duke of Westminster was also decided in the context of the Income Tax Act 1918, the 
courts could have discharged “the office of all the Judges ... always to make such 
construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress 
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato 
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent 
of the makers of the Act, pro bono public” as established by the mischief rule by 
applying section 30. 
 
The application of section 30 would have shown that the Duke “untruly declare[d]”, rather 
than “fraudulently conceal[ed]”, his tax liability under section 30(1)(b) but this was still 
be a “fraud or contrivance” under section 30(1)(a). The Duke’s advisers “knowingly and 
wilfully aid[ed] or abet[ed] [him]” in the words of section 30(2). As Gammie put it:   
  
“[T]he Duke of Westminster could not deduct for tax purposes the wages 
that he paid his private household, so his advisers came up with a 
tremendous wheeze: reduce the servants’ wages and pay them a tax 
deductible annuity instead. The Duke agreed by deed to make payments 
over a specified period and his employees acknowledged that so long as 
they remained in his employment they would forego an equivalent amount 
of their wage. ... 
 
Now it is obvious that in this case there was no concealment: the Duke told 
the Inland Revenue everything about his payments. Nor was there any ‘lie’: 
the Duke did not claim that the payments reimbursed non-existent 
expenses. But was there an element of misrepresentation? He claimed that 
the payments were annuities but the Commissioners concluded that they 
were really payments for work done. Misrepresentation may seem a rather 
harsh characterisation; it was instead, perhaps, a case of ‘pull the other leg, 
                                                 
676 Ibid, pp.520-521. Emphases supplied.  
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it’s got bells on’. Or as Lord Templeman said in Ensign Tankers v Stokes, 
‘gardeners do not work for Dukes on half-wages’.”677 
 
 
As explained in chapter four, misrepresentation, which encompasses implied 
concealment, is a lie. There was a lie because “the Duke told the Inland Revenue 
everything about his payments” but concealed or misrepresented his true tax liability 
by using “a tremendous wheeze” which “his advisers came up with”.  
 
Under the fraud approach, therefore, the payments could have been declared void in 
tax law and thus not deductible in arriving at the Duke’s liability for surtax. The Duke 
could have “forfeit[ed] the sum of twenty pounds and treble the tax chargeable in 
respect of all the sources of his income and as if such claim had not been allowed” 
under section 30(1) while his advisers “who knowingly and wilfully aid[ed] or abet[ed]” 
him could have “forfeit[ed] the sum of fifty pounds” under section 30(2).  
 
The Revenue also failed to exercise the power preserved by section 224 to bring 
“criminal proceedings for any felony or misdemeanour.” The Duke’s success, therefore, 




This chapter demonstrated that the mischief rule provides authoritative judicial support 
for the proposed cheating or fraud approach to tax avoidance and contradicts Lord 
Hoffmann’s claim that “the courts have no constitutional authority to impose such an 
overlay upon the tax legislation and ... have not attempted to do so.”678  
 
It also demonstrated how the application of the proposed cheating or fraud approach 
would have prevented the emergence of the Duke of Richmond and the Duke of 
Westminster principles, and Lord Clyde’s and Lord Tomlin’s charters for tax cheats. 
Gammie’s statement analysed in the Introduction underscores the enduring influence 
of those misleading statements:  
 
“I have an enduring memory of attending a meeting as a newly-qualified 
solicitor nearly forty years ago at the office of a firm that specialized in 
devising and implementing tax schemes. On that occasion it was the office 
of Emson & Dudley rather than that of Rossminster or Bradman 
organizations. ...  
                                                 
677 Gammie, ‘Moral taxation, immoral avoidance - what role for the law?’ [2013] B.T.R. 577, 578.  




The meeting rooms were adorned with framed quotations from famous 
cases designed to provide assurance to potential clients that the business 
in which the firm was engaged was a legitimate one. Two quotations stood 
out — 
 
No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, 
so to arrange his legal relations to his business or to his property as to 
enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest possible shovel into his 
stores. The Inland Revenue is not slow - and quite rightly - to take every 
advantage which is open to it under the taxing statutes for the purpose 
of depleting the taxpayer’s pocket. And the taxpayer is, in like manner, 
entitled to be astute to prevent, so far as he honestly can, the depletion 
of his means by the Revenue.  
 
Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax 
attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. 
If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, 
however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his 
fellow tax-payers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to 


























                                                 
679 Simpson (ed) p.211.    
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CHAPTER TEN                                              
 
THE RAMSAY PRINCIPLE 
 
I think the turning-point in tax cases was caused by the realisation by the 
judges that the narrow semantic approach led inevitably to tax avoidance. 
The courts were faced with lots of cases about tax avoidance schemes, 
which they alone had caused. Doctors have a word for it: iatrogenic, or 
doctor-induced, disease; my Greek is not up to it, but there should be a word 
for the judge induced disease of tax avoidance, for that is what it was. The 
only way out of hearing an eternal diet of artificial tax avoidance cases was 
for the judiciary to invent a principle, a principle so strong that it could 
overrule a previous House of Lords decision on the same facts. Ramsay and 
then Furniss v Dawson, by applying an extraneous principle to the 
interpretation of tax legislation, came as something of a shock. 





This chapter shows that the Ramsay principle provides a modern authoritative judicial 
support for the proposed cheating or fraud approach to tax avoidance.  
 
As Avery Jones’s statement indicates, like the mischief rule, the development of the 
Ramsay principle that reached its high-water mark in Furniss v Dawson by the House 
of Lords is a seminal reaffirmation of the pre-existing common law of cheating or fraud, 
which “acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction”680 in civil 
proceedings, as what Lord Hoffmann described variously in MacNiven as “an overlay 
upon the tax legislation”681, “an overriding legal principle, superimposed upon the whole 
of revenue law without regard to the language or purpose of any particular provision”682, 
“some paramount provision subject to which everything else must be read”683 and thus 
“a broad spectrum antibiotic which killed off all tax avoidance schemes, whatever the 
tax and whatever the relevant statutory provisions.”684 
 
The departure from the Ramsay principle, which started in Craven v White and involved 
the denial that the courts were “applying an extraneous principle to the interpretation 
of tax legislation” was completed in MacNiven. As Lord Hoffmann put it:  
 
“In choosing the constructional approach rather than the Furniss v Dawson 
formula, the House had to rewrite history in a way which struck some 
people as a little disingenuous. We said that the formula was not a 
                                                 
680 Blackstone, p.89. 
681 MacNiven [29].  
682 Ibid.       
683 Ibid. 
684 Ibid [49]. 
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freestanding principle but rather the effect of construing a taxing provision 
in a particular way. ...  
 
The sleight of hand which covered this retreat to constitutional propriety did 
not deceive Lord Templeman, who wrote a brilliant article for the Law 
Quarterly Review685 accusing the House of Lords of having deserted the 
true faith and opened the door to tax avoidance. ... Lord Templeman said, 
correctly, that MacNiven satisfied the Furniss v Dawson formula and was 
therefore in his opinion wrongly decided. ... 
 
The primacy of the construction of the particular taxing provision and the 
illegitimacy of rules of general application has been reaffirmed by the recent 
decision of the House in BMBF v Mawson. Indeed it may be said that this 
case has killed off the Ramsay doctrine as a special theory of revenue law 
and subsumed it within the general theory of the interpretation of statutes, 
perhaps the interpretation of utterances of any kind.”686 
 
 
Mayes v HMRC disproved the supposed “constitutional propriety” and “primacy of the 
construction of the particular taxing provision” and proved the constitutional propriety 
and primacy of rules of general application. Upholding the “SHIPS 2” scheme, 
Proudman J, with whom the Court of Appeal agreed, stated:  
 
“I sympathise with the instinctive reaction that such an obvious scheme 
ought not to succeed. However, I cannot extract from the legislation any 
underlying or overriding purpose enabling me to conclude that parts of the 
scheme may be ignored. To do so would ... revert to an acceptance of the 
type of submission that was roundly rejected in MacNiven. I am bound by 
the ratio of the decision in MacNiven and in my judgment it points only one 
way on the facts of this case.”687 
 
 
The rest of this chapter expounds the development of the Ramsay principle in Ramsay, 
the arrested development of the principle in Craven and McGuckian, and the retreat 
from the principle in MacNiven, BMBF, Mayes and the GAAR. 
 
10.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RAMSAY PRINCIPLE  
 
10.2.1. Lord Wilberforce’s Judgment     
 
10.2.1.1 Application of the Pre-Existing Common Law of Cheating   
 
                                                 
685 (2001) 117 LQR 575. 
686 ‘Tax avoidance’ [2005] B.T.R. 197, 202. 
687 [2010] STC 1 at [45].  
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In Plummer Lord Wilberforce effectively reaffirmed the Duke of Richmond principle (“If 
this case has disclosed a way by which settled property may largely escape the estate 
duty, that is an affair for the Legislature to consider, in which Courts of law have no 
concern”688) by upholding Rossminster’s Capital Income Plan and concluding:  
 
“One final point: the familiar argument was used that Parliament can never 
have intended to exempt from the taxing provisions an arrangement solely 
designed to obtain fiscal advantages. But this is not the question, nor is a 
canon of interpretation of this kind an admissible, or indeed a workable 
canon. The question is whether a certain series of transactions in a certain 
legal form do or do not fall within the taxing words. If they do not, and if 
Parliament dislikes the consequence, it can change the law”.689 
 
In Ramsay eighteen months later, however, he rejected the Duke of Richmond principle 
and accepted the exact argument he rejected in Plummer by effectively affirming the 
mischief rule (“the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall 
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and 
evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force 
and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, 
pro bono public”) while disallowing the similar Rossminster’s Capital Loss Scheme 
thus:  
 
“Before I come to examination of the particular schemes in these cases, 
there is one argument of a general character which needs serious 
consideration. For the taxpayers it was said that to accept the Crown’s wide 
contention involved a rejection of accepted and established canons, and 
that, if so general an attack upon schemes for tax avoidance as the Crown 
suggest is to be validated, that is a matter for Parliament. The function of 
the courts is to apply strictly and correctly the legislation which Parliament 
has enacted: if the taxpayer escapes the charge, it is for Parliament, if it 
disapproves of the result, to close the gap. General principles against tax 
avoidance are, it was claimed, for Parliament to lay down. ... I have full 
respect for the principles which have been stated but I do not consider that 
they should exclude the approach for which the Crown contends. That does 
not introduce a new principle: it would be to apply to new and sophisticated 
legal devices the undoubted power and duty of the courts to determine their 
nature in law and to relate them to existing legislation. While the techniques 
of tax avoidance progress are technically improved, the courts are not 
obliged to stand still. Such immobility must result either in loss of tax, to the 
prejudice of other taxpayers, or to Parliamentary congestion or (most likely) 
to both. To force the courts to adopt, in relation to closely integrated 
situations, a step by step, dissecting, approach which the parties 
themselves may have negated, would be a denial rather than an affirmation 
of the true judicial process. In each case the facts must be established, and 
a legal analysis made: legislation cannot be required or even be desirable 
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689 Plummer, p.801.  
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to enable the courts to arrive at a conclusion which corresponds with the 
parties’ own intentions. 
 
The capital gains tax was created to operate in the real world, not that of 
make-belief. As I said in Aberdeen Construction v CIR690, it is a tax on gains 
(or I might have added gains less losses), it is not a tax on arithmetical 
differences. To say that a loss (or gain) which appears to arise at one stage 
in an indivisible process, and which is intended to be and is cancelled out 
by a later stage, so that at the end of what was bought as, and planned as, 
a single continuous operation, is not such a loss (or gain) as the legislation 
is dealing with, is in my opinion well and indeed essentially within the 
judicial function. 
 
We were referred, on this point, to a number of cases in the United States 
of America in which the courts have denied efficacy to schemes or 
transactions designed only to avoid tax and lacking otherwise in economic 
or commercial reality. ... It is probable that the U.S. courts do not draw the 
line precisely where we with our different system, allowing less legislative 
power to the courts than they claim to exercise, would draw it, but the 
decisions do at least confirm me in the belief that it would be an excess of 
judicial abstinence to withdraw from the field now before us.”691 
 
 
This reaffirms that the Ramsay principle and the American sham transaction doctrine 
are applications of the pre-existing law of cheating or fraud, which is the antidote to tax 
avoidance (“loss of tax, to the prejudice of other taxpayers”) and tax complexity 
(“Parliamentary congestion”). Lord Wilberforce’s substitution of ‘fiscal nullity’ and other 
legal nonsenses for fraud and cheating fortifies this proposition:   
 
“The first of these appeals is an appeal by W. T. Ramsay Ltd., a farming 
company. In its accounting period ending 31 May 1973 it made a 
‘chargeable gain’ for purposes of corporation tax by a sale-leaseback 
transaction. This gain it desired to counteract, so as to avoid the tax, by 
establishing an allowable loss. The method chosen was to purchase from 
a company specialising in such matters a ready-made scheme. The 
general nature of this was to create out of a neutral situation two assets 
one of which would decrease in value for the benefit of the other. The 
decreasing asset would be sold, so as to create the desired loss; the 
increasing asset would be sold, yielding a gain which it was hoped would 
be exempt from tax. 
 
In the courts below, attention was concentrated upon the question whether 
the gain just referred to was in truth exempt from tax or not. The Court of 
Appeal, reversing the decision of Goulding J., decided that it was not. In 
this House, the Crown, while supporting this decision of the Court of 
Appeal, mounted a fundamental attack upon the whole of the scheme 
acquired and used by the appellant. It contended that it should simply be 
disregarded as artificial and fiscally ineffective.  
 
                                                 
690 [1978] AC 885. 
691 Ramsay, pp.186-188. Emphases supplied. 
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Immediately after this appeal there was heard another taxpayer’s appeal - 
Eilbeck v Rawling. This involved a scheme of a different character 
altogether, but one also designed to create a loss allowable for purposes 
of capital gains tax, together with a non-taxable gain, by a scheme acquired 
for this purpose. Similarly, this case was decided, against the taxpayer, in 
the Court of Appeal upon consideration of a particular aspect of the 
scheme: and similarly, the Crown in this House advanced a fundamental 
argument against the scheme as a whole. ...  
 
I will first state the general features of the schemes which are relevant to 
the wider argument. In each case we have a taxpayer who has realised an 
ascertained and quantified gain: in Ramsay £187,977, in Rawling 
£355,094. He is then advised to consult specialists willing to provide, for a 
fee, a preconceived and ready-made plan designed to produce an 
equivalent allowable loss. The taxpayer merely has to state the figure 
involved i.e. the amount of the gain he desires to counteract, and the 
necessary particulars are inserted into the scheme. 
 
The scheme consists, as do others which have come to the notice of the 
courts, of a number of steps to be carried out, documents to be executed, 
payments to be made, according to a timetable, in each case rapid (see the 
attractive description by Buckley L.J. in Rawling). In each case two assets 
appear, like particles in a gas chamber with opposite charges, one of which 
is used to create the loss, the other of which gives rise to an equivalent gain 
which prevents the taxpayer from supporting any real loss, and which gain 
is intended not to be taxable. Like the particles, these assets have a very 
short life. Having served their purpose they cancel each other out and 
disappear. At the end of the series of operations, the taxpayer’s financial 
position is precisely as it was at the beginning, except that he has paid a 
fee, and certain expenses, to the promoter of the scheme.  
 
There are other significant features which are normally found in schemes 
of this character. First, it is the clear and stated intention that once started 
each scheme shall proceed through the various steps to the end - they are 
not intended to be arrested half-way. This intention may be expressed 
either as a firm contractual obligation (it was so in Rawling) or as in Ramsay 
as an expectation without contractual force. Secondly, although sums of 
money, sometimes considerable, are supposed to be involved in individual 
transactions, the taxpayer does not have to put his hand in his pocket. The 
money is provided by means of a loan from a finance house which is firmly 
secured by a charge on any asset the taxpayer may appear to have, and 
which is automatically repaid at the end of the operation. In some cases 
one may doubt whether, in any real sense, any money existed at all. It 
seems very doubtful whether any real money was involved in Rawling: but 
facts as to this matter are for the Commissioners to find. I will assume that 
in some sense money did pass as expressed in respect of each transaction 
in each of the instant cases. Finally, in each of the present cases it is 
candidly, if inevitably, admitted that the whole and only purpose of each 
scheme was the avoidance of tax.  
 
In these circumstances, your Lordships are invited to take, with regard to 
schemes of the character I have described, what may appear to be a new 
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approach. We are asked, in fact, to treat them as fiscally, a nullity, not 
producing either a gain or a loss.”692 
 
 
This shows that even where fraud is pleaded and proved, the relevant schemes can 
still be described conveniently as ‘legal’ and the tax dogma can still remain intact if the 
court does not use the legal concepts of fraud, cheating and dishonesty. To adopt the 
words of Venables:  
 
“I am particularly concerned with the problems which arise when the courts 
are less than candid in explaining what they are doing and why they are 
doing it and, to cover their tracks, resort to legal fictions which are apt to 
confuse all but the inner initiates.”693 
 
 
10.2.1.2. Unnecessary Reference to the Statutes  
 
The corollary of the principle that “fraud unravels all”, is that “to apply to new and 
sophisticated legal devices the undoubted power and duty of the courts to determine 
their nature in law” is to determine whether they are fraudulent or honest; and if they 
are fraudulent they are unravelled and it cannot be required or even be desirable “to 
relate them to existing legislation.”  
 
Lord Wilberforce’s references to the legislation (“to relate them to existing legislation” 
and “... not such a loss (or gain) as the legislation is dealing with”) were in response to 
Millett’s formulation:  
 
“It cannot have been in Parliament’s contemplation that such disposals as 
are in question here were to give rise to allowable losses.”694 
 
 
10.2.2. Lord Fraser’s Judgment     
 
As demonstrated in chapter eight, Lord Fraser also followed a similar process of 
reasoning by dealing with classic statutory construction and “the wider question” 
separately.695  
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693 Venables (1997) pp.25-26.  
694 Ramsay, pp.175-176.  
695 Ramsay, pp.197-198. 
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If the answer to “the wider question” was that there was no “disposal in either of these 
cases”696 then there was cheating in law. Like Lord Wilberforce, however, Lord Fraser 
responded to Millett’s contention by referring to the statutes in his conclusion:  
 
“Accordingly I would refuse both appeals on the additional ground that the 




10.3. THE ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT OF THE RAMSAY PRINCIPLE   
 
10.3.1. Lord Goff’s Misinterpretation of Ramsay  
 
In Craven v White, Lord Goff relied on the unnecessary references by Lord Wilberforce 
and Lord Fraser to the legislation to deny that the Ramsay principle involved the 
application of the pre-existing common law of cheating which embodies the legal and 
moral duty of honesty, stating:   
 
“These appeals raise in an acute form the question of the true scope of 
what has come to be known as the Ramsay principle.  
 
It would be naive in the extreme to imagine that that principle is not 
concerned with the outlawing of unacceptable tax avoidance. It plainly is. 
But it would be equally mistaken to regard the principle as in any sense a 
moral principle, or having any foundation in morality. It plainly is not. ...  
 
Any idea that the principle in Ramsay is a moral principle, or that it is 
designed to catch any step taken to avoid tax, is, in my opinion, destroyed 
by the recognition of the Ramsay principle as a principle of statutory 
construction. Indeed the principle cannot be independent of the statute, for 
the obvious reason that your Lordships have no power to amend the 
statute. That it is essentially a principle arising from the construction of the 
statute appears from a number of passages in the speeches in the cases. 
For example, in Ramsay itself Lord Wilberforce stated that it was within the 
judicial function to conclude that there was not such a loss (or gain) as the 
legislature was dealing with; see also an earlier passage in his speech in 
that case. In the same case, Lord Fraser stated that he was prepared to 
dismiss the appeals on the ground that the relevant asset was not disposed 
of in the sense required by the statute. ... But that being so, it follows that 
tax avoidance schemes are only unacceptable for present purposes if, on 
a true construction of the statute, they are held to be so.”698 
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To say that a tax avoidance scheme, which amounts to cheating and fraud by design  
under the common law, is unravelled in toto and thus outside the scope of the terms of 
the statute it was devised to cheat and defraud ab initio is not “to amend the statute”. 
It is to preserve the integrity of the statute and uphold Parliamentary sovereignty and 
the rule of law.  
 
 
10.3.2. Lord Steyn’s Judgment in McGuckian  
 
In McGuckian, however, Lord Steyn cited Lord Goff and the cases he misinterpreted 
and concluded:  
 
“The new Ramsay principle was not invented on a juristic basis 
independent of statute. That would have been indefensible since a court 
has no power to amend a tax statute. The principle was developed as a 
matter of statutory construction. That was made clear by Lord Wilberforce 
in the Ramsay case and is also made clear in subsequent decisions in this 




By maintaining that “[t]he new Ramsay principle was not invented on a juristic basis 
independent of statute”, therefore, their lordships effectively reverted to the Duke of 
Richmond principle which Lord Wilberforce reasserted in Plummer.  
 
10.4. THE RETREAT FROM THE RAMSAY PRINCIPLE   
 
10.4.1. Lord Hoffmann’s Judgment in MacNiven  
 
In MacNiven, Lord Hoffmann relied on McGuckian to reject the Revenue’s contention 
that falls within the ambit of the mischief rule and indeed the Ramsay principle:  
 
“Everyone agrees that Ramsay is a principle of construction. The House of 
Lords said so in McGuckian. But what is that principle? Mr McCall 
formulated it as follows in his printed case: 
 
‘When a Court is asked 
(i) to apply a statutory provision on which a taxpayer relies for the sake 
of establishing some tax advantage 
(ii) in circumstances where the transaction which is said to give rise to 
the tax advantage is, or forms part of, some pre-ordained, circular, self-
cancelling transaction 
                                                 
699 McGuckian, p.916. 
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(iii) which transaction though accepted as perfectly genuine (i.e. not 
impeached as a sham) was undertaken for no commercial purpose 
other than the obtaining of the tax advantage in question 
then (unless there is something in the statutory provisions concerned to 
indicate that this rule should not be applied) there is a rule of construction 
that the condition laid down in the statute for the obtaining of the tax 
advantage has not been satisfied.’ 
 
I am bound to say that this does not look to me like a principle of 
construction at all. There is ultimately only one principle of construction, 
namely to ascertain what Parliament meant by using the language of the 
statute. All other ‘principles of construction’ can be no more than guides 
which past judges have put forward, some more helpful or insightful than 
others, to assist in the task of interpretation. But Mr McCall’s formulation 
looks like an overriding legal principle, superimposed upon the whole of 
revenue law without regard to the language or purpose of any particular 
provision, save for the possibility of rebuttal by language which can be 
brought within his final parenthesis. This cannot be called a principle of 
construction except in the sense of some paramount provision subject to 
which everything else must be read, like s 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972. But the courts have no constitutional authority to 
impose such an overlay upon the tax legislation and, as I hope to 
demonstrate, they have not attempted to do so.”700 
 
 
Lord Hoffmann failed “to demonstrate” that “the courts have no constitutional authority 
to impose such an overlay upon the tax legislation and ... have not attempted to do so”, 
not least because that was what the Barons of the Exchequer did in Heydon’s Case 
when they developed the mischief rule and what the House of Lords did when they 
developed the Ramsay principle in Ramsay.  
 
As demonstrated throughout, what Lord Hoffmann hailed as the “only one principle of 
construction” in 2001 was demolished by Lord Diplock in 1965 thus: 
 
“Whenever the Court decides that kind of dispute it legislates about 
taxation. It makes a law taxing all gains of the same kind or all documents 
of the same kind. Do not let us deceive ourselves with the legal fiction that 
the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant. 
Anyone who has decided tax appeals knows that most of them concern 
transactions which Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the Act 
had not anticipated, about which they had never thought at all. Some of the 
transactions are of a kind which had never taken place before the Act was 
passed: they were devised as a result of it. The Court may describe what it 
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Lord Hoffmann’s exposition shows that to purport “to ascertain what Parliament meant 
by using the language of the statute” is “deceive ourselves with the legal fiction that the 
Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant”:  
 
“[I]t has occasionally been said that the boundary of the Ramsay principle 
can be defined by asking whether the taxpayer’s actions constituted 
(acceptable) tax mitigation or (unacceptable) tax avoidance. In IRC v 
Willoughby Lord Nolan described the concept of tax avoidance as ‘elusive’. 
In that case, the House had to grapple with what it meant, or at any rate 
what its ‘hallmark’ was, because the statute expressly provided that certain 
provisions should not apply if the taxpayer could show that he had not acted 
with ‘the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation’. The same question arises 
on the interpretation of the anti-avoidance provisions to which Lord Cooke 
referred in IRC v McGuckian. But when the statutory provisions do not 
contain words like ‘avoidance’ or ‘mitigation’, I do not think that it helps to 
introduce them. The fact that steps taken for the avoidance of tax are 
acceptable or unacceptable is the conclusion at which one arrives by 
applying the statutory language to the facts of the case. It is not a test for 
deciding whether it applies or not. If I may be allowed to repeat what I said 
in Norglen v Reeds702: 
 
‘If the question is whether a given transaction is such as to attract a 
statutory benefit, such as a grant or assistance like legal aid, or a 
statutory burden, such as income tax, I do not think that it promotes 
clarity of thought to use terms like stratagem or device. The question 
is simply whether upon its true construction, the statute applies to the 
transaction. Tax avoidance schemes are perhaps the best example. 
They either work (Duke of Westminster) or they do not (Furniss.) If 
they do not work, the reason, as Lord Steyn pointed out in McGuckian, 
is simply that upon the true construction of the statute, the transaction 
which was designed to avoid the charge to tax actually comes within 
it. It is not that the statute has a penumbral spirit which strikes down 




Whatever its merits in other cases, “such as a grant or assistance like legal aid, or a 
statutory burden, such as income tax” where no scheme or “stratagem or device” is 
involved, “[t]he question ... whether upon its true construction, the statute applies to the 
transaction” is completely without merit in cases of tax avoidance schemes or 
“transactions ... of a kind which had never taken place before the Act was passed ... 
devised as a result of it.”  
 
“The fact that steps taken for the avoidance of tax are acceptable or unacceptable” or 
more precisely amount to cheating or fraud as a matter of law is not “the conclusion at 
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which one arrives by applying the statutory language to the facts of the case.” The 
corollary of the principle that “fraud unravels all” is that it is “a test for deciding whether 
it applies or not.” To say that a tax avoidance scheme that amounts to cheating or fraud 
under the general law is unravelled in toto and thus outside the scope of the terms of 
the statute it was devised to cheat or defraud ab initio does not mean “that the statute 
has a penumbral spirit which strikes down devices or stratagems designed to avoid its 
terms or exploit its loopholes”. It simply affirms “the principle that the courts would not 
lend their assistance to the achievement of an unlawful purpose”704 which was put to 
Lord Hoffmann in Norglen. 
 
The cases Lord Hoffmann cited in support of the notion that “[t]ax avoidance schemes 
... either work (Duke of Westminster) or they do not (Furniss)” underscores its reliance 
upon “the legal fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what 
Parliament meant.” In Westminster the Special Commissioners, with whom Finlay J 
and Lord Atkin agreed, held that the scheme did not “work” but the Court of Appeal and 
the majority in the House of Lords held that it “worked”. In Furniss the Special 
Commissioners, Vinelott J and the Court of Appeal held that the scheme “worked” but 
the House of Lords held unanimously that it did not “work”. In the words of Lord Diplock: 
 
“The Court may describe what it is doing in tax appeals as interpretation. 
So did the priestess of the Delphic oracle.”705 
 
 
10.4.2. BMBF v Mawson  
 
The joint opinion of the House of Lords in BMBF endorsing the “new approach” was 
delivered by Lord Nicholls thus: 
 
“The essence of the new approach was to give the statutory provision a 
purposive construction in order to determine the nature of the transaction 
to which it was intended to apply and then to decide whether the actual 
transaction (which might involve considering the overall effect of a number 
of elements intended to operate together) answered to the statutory 
description. Of course this does not mean that the courts have to put their 
reasoning into the straitjacket of first construing the statute in the abstract 
and then looking at the facts. It might be more convenient to analyse the 
facts and then ask whether they satisfy the requirements of the statute. But 
however one approaches the matter, the question is always whether the 
relevant provision of statute, upon its true construction, applies to the facts 
as found. As Lord Nicholls said in MacNiven: 
 
                                                 
704 Norglen, p.13. 
705 Diplock.   
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‘The paramount question always is one of interpretation of the 




Again, the “interpretation of the particular statutory provision and its application to the 
facts of the case” cannot work in the context of “transactions ... of a kind which had 
never taken place before the Act was passed ... devised as a result of it”. 
 
10.4.3. HMRC v Mayes   
 
As explained above, Mayes proved this. The Court of Appeal, which was also bound 
by MacNiven and BMBF, agreed with Proudman J and refused to grant the Revenue 
permission to appeal.  
 
Toulson LJ similarly expressed his “reluctant concurrence in a result which instinctively 
seems wrong, because it bears no relation to commercial reality and results in a windfall 
which Parliament cannot have foreseen or intended.”708 In a clear abdication of the 
mischief rule (“the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall 
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and 
evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force 
and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, 
pro bono public”709), he concluded:  
 
“Unattractive as the result is for other taxpayers and the rest of society, I 
agree with Proudman J. and Mummery L.J. that the Court cannot lawfully 
hold, as a matter of proper construction of the statute, that because the sole 
purpose of steps 3 and 4 was to avoid tax by the creation of a 
corresponding deficiency unrelated to any underlying commercial loss, 
those events are therefore to be treated as if they had not occurred.”710 
 
 
Thomas LJ similarly embraced the Duke of Richmond principle (“If this case has 
disclosed a way by which settled property may largely escape the estate duty, that is 
an affair for the Legislature to consider, in which Courts of law have no concern”711) in 
his equally one-paragraph judgment:  
 
                                                 
706 MacNiven [8].  
707 [2004] UKHL 51 [32]. 
708 Ibid, p.316. 
709 Richmond, p.470.  
710 Heydon, p.8a. 
711 Richmond, p.470.  
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‘I agree with the judgment of Mummery LJ which sets out with great clarity 
why the appeal and cross appeal have to be dismissed. However, for the 
reasons given by Toulson LJ, my concurrence is reluctant. The higher-rate 
taxpayers with large earnings or significant investment income who have 
taken advantage of the scheme have received benefits that cannot possibly 
have been intended and which must be paid for by other taxpayers. It must 
be for Parliament to consider the wider implications of the decision as it 
relates to the way in which revenue legislation is structured and drafted.’712 
 
 
10.5. THE GAAR  
 
In the wake of public and Parliamentary disquiet over tax avoidance and the tax 
avoidance industry, the Government commissioned Aaronson in 2010 “to lead a study 
programme to establish whether a General Anti Avoidance Rule (GAAR) could be 
framed that would be effective in the UK tax system and, if so, how the provisions of 
the GAAR might be framed.”713  
 
Aaronson cited the failure of the “new approach” in Mayes as the reason for the 
introduction of a GAAR in the UK:   
 
“There is no doubt that the combination of purposive interpretation, specific 
anti-avoidance rules and DOTAS substantially reduces the scope for tax 
avoidance. Accordingly, the UK context is very different from that which 
applied in other common law jurisdictions, such as Australia and Canada, 
when GAARs were first introduced there. ...  
 
Regrettably, however, it is clear that purposive interpretation, specific anti-
avoidance rules and DOTAS are not capable of dealing with some of the 
most egregious tax avoidance schemes. Such schemes focus on 
prescriptive tax rules which are not susceptible to contextual interpretation. 
A recent example is the ‘SHIPS 2’ scheme, which gave UK taxpayers a 
seven step route to creating an artificial tax loss which could be used to set 
off against their other tax liabilities. In the High Court Proudman J 
sympathised ‘with the instinctive reaction that such an obvious scheme 
ought not to succeed’. However given the prescriptive nature of the 
statutory rules in question she was unable to find a purposive interpretation 
sufficient to defeat it. ...  
 
I agree with Thomas LJ that it would be appropriate for Parliament to 
consider the implications of that decision. SHIPS 2 shows the inadequacy 
of the existing means of combating highly artificial tax avoidance schemes. 
It, and other schemes like it, provide the answer to the question ‘does the 
UK need a GAAR?’. The answer is that it does.”714 
 
 
                                                 
712 Mayes, p.315. 
713 HMRC (2010) p.2. 
714 Aaronson, pp.19-20. 
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Aaronson misrepresented the reason Proudman J stated for her inability to find a 
purposive interpretation sufficient to defeat the scheme:  
 
“I am bound by the ratio of the decision in MacNiven and in my judgment it 
points only one way on the facts of this case.”  
 
 
The GAAR Study Group, which included Lord Hoffmann, therefore, failed to tackle “the 
ratio of the decision in MacNiven”. Consequently, as demonstrated in chapter two, the 
resultant GAAR in Part 5 of Finance Act 2013 falls short of both the pre-existing 
common law of cheating and the Ramsay principle. 
 
In 2005 Freedman, who was also a member of the Study Group, compared the 
application of the “broad spectrum general anti avoidance rule” in section 245 of 
Canada’s Income Tax Act715 (which was introduced in 1987 in response to the rejection 
of the business purpose test by the Supreme Court in Stubart) by the Supreme Court 
in Canada Trustco716 and Mathew717 to the application of the Ramsay principle by the 
House of Lords in BMBF and Scottish Provident718 and concluded:  
 
“What is curious is that, despite the existence of a statutory general anti-
avoidance rule (GAAR) in Canada, the most recent judgments of the 
Supreme Court are, arguably, rather more conservative than the latest tax-
avoidance decisions of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom, where 
there is no GAAR. One might have expected that the GAAR would give a 
legislative signal to judges to be bold, but it seems to have had the opposite 
effect of making them all the more careful to protect the taxpayer. In the 
United Kingdom, certainly, some will see this as a vindication of the policy 





This chapter demonstrated that the Ramsay principle provides a modern authoritative 
judicial support for the proposed pre-existing common law of cheating or fraud 
approach to tax avoidance. In the words of Lord Scarman in Furniss:  
 
“The limits within which this principle is to operate remain to be probed and 
determined judicially. Difficult though the task may be for judges, it is one 
which is beyond the power of the blunt instrument of legislation. Whatever 
a statute may provide, it has to be interpreted and applied by the courts: 
                                                 
715 RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended.  
716 2005 SCC 54. 
717 2005 SCC 55. 
718 [2004] UKHL 52. 
719 Freedman (2005) p.1039.  
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and ultimately it will prove to be in this area of judge-made law that our 



















































                                                 
720 Craven, p.156.  
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CHAPTER ELEVEN                                   
 
THE HISTORY OF TAX EVASION, TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX MITIGATION 
 
The terms ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ have been created by the legal 
and accountancy professions as convenient generic terms to distinguish 
what is legal from what is illegal, and the fact that they have also been 
adopted by the courts should not blind us to what they actually are. 





This chapter expounds the origins and developments of the concepts of tax evasion, 
tax avoidance and tax mitigation. 
 
It uses the landmark cases analysed in chapters nine and ten to prove the proposition 
advanced in the Introduction that “the terms ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ have 
been created by the legal and accountancy professions as convenient generic terms” 
or legal nonsenses to disguise the fraudulent nature of “the judge induced disease of 
‘tax avoidance’”721 and the resultant tax avoidance industry.  
 
It demonstrates that the dogma that “tax evasion is illegal but tax avoidance is legal” 
(or that “the terms ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ … distinguish what is legal from 
what is illegal”) originated in the metamorphoses of cheating the public revenue by the 
use of a tax scheme (or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind which had never 
taken place before the tax Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed devised 
as a result of it), which corresponds to cheating “by means of some artful device, 
contrary to the plain rules of common honesty”722, cheating by fraudulent 
misrepresentation and fraud by false representation under section 2 of the Fraud Act 
(as opposed to cheating “accompanied with no manner of artful contrivance, but wholly 
depends on a bare naked lie”723, cheating by fraudulent concealment and fraud by 
failing to disclose information under section 3 of the Fraud Act) from tax evasion to tax 
avoidance by the division of tax avoidance into unacceptable tax avoidance and 
acceptable tax avoidance or tax mitigation. It also shows how the dogma is sustained 
by the invention of new legal nonsenses, such as ‘aggressive tax planning’, ‘abuse’ 
                                                 
721 Avery Jones.   




and ‘Base Erosion and Profits Shifting (BEPS)’, which similarly serve to legitimise “the 
judge induced disease of ‘tax avoidance’” and the resultant tax avoidance industry.  
 
11.2. TAX EVASION 
 
11.2.1. Statutes  
 
As demonstrated in chapter one, a fraud on an Act (or transactions of a kind which had 
never taken place before the Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed devised 
as a result of it) was described as ‘evasion’ in the statutes against fraud. According to 
Bennion: 
 
“Sometimes Parliament inserts special provisions in an Act for the purpose 
of countering evasion of its requirements. ... The presence or absence of 




A statute against fraud enacted by Edward III in 1366 shows that HMRC’s supposed 
distinction between ‘evasion’, ‘avoidance’ and ‘legal interpretation’ is a distinction with 
no difference:   
 
“And every man ... shall keep and observe the aforesaid ordinances and 
statutes ... without addition, or fraud, by covin, evasion, art or contrivance, 
‘ou par interpretation des paroles’ (or by interpretation of the words).”725  
 
 
11.2.2. Case Law   
 
As “[t]he presence or absence of such provisions does not affect the general duty of 
the courts to counter evasion”, the courts similarly used ‘evasion’ to describe a fraud 
on an Act. According to Bennion:  
 
“The courts have frequently held that a construction is to be preferred that 
prevents evasion of the intention evinced by Parliament to provide an 
effective remedy for the mischief against which the enactment is directed. 
When deliberately embarked on, such evasion is judicially described as a 
fraud on the Act.”726 
 
 
                                                 
724 Bennion, p.1014.  
725 10 Edw. III, stat 3 (1366). Emphases supplied. 
726 Bennion, p.1010.  
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In Heydon’s Case, therefore, the Barons of the Exchequer voided the scheme that 
comprised two copyhold estates on the grounds that “doubling of estates implies in 
itself deceit, and private respect, to prevent the intention of the Parliament”727, and held 
that: 
 
“[F]or the sure and true interpretation of all statutes ... the office of all the 
Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, 
and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions 
for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force 
and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers 
of the Act, pro bono public.”728 
 
 
Lord Mansfield’s effective application of the pre-existing common law of cheating and 
the primacy of the public revenue law in Magistrates and Town Council of the City of 
Glasgow v Messrs Murdoch, Warren & Co729 involved an appeal from the Court of 
Session in Edinburgh heard in the House of Lords in 1783. According to Ferrier:  
 
“For many years the City of Glasgow had enjoyed the right to levy a duty of 
two pence Scots ... on ‘every pint of ale or beer brewed, inbrought, vended, 
tapped or sold within the said city and suburbs.’ The city experienced a 
problem in collecting the duty, particularly in the case of breweries located 
outside its boundaries. There was difficulty in tracing the movement of beer 
into Glasgow. Accordingly, when an Act [28 Geo. II, c. 29] was passed 
renewing the duty, the opportunity was taken to insert an anti-avoidance 
provision, making it unlawful after May 1, 1755 for ‘any brewer or seller of 
beer or ale’ outside Glasgow ‘to import or sell any beer ... into or in the said 
city ... unless he or she do previously give notice to the magistrates.’ 
 
The respondents owned a brewery at Anderston, just outside Glasgow. For 
some time they did not dispute their liability to the duty. Then they opened 
up an export trade to Ireland and the West Indies. They asked for an 
exemption in respect of these sales and the magistrates agreed to allow 
them a draw-back on the duty. They then asked for exemption for sales 
made outside the city. When this was refused, they gave notice that they 
would not sell any more to Glasgow. They made a contract with a Mr Munro 
in which he agreed to purchase all the beer previously supplied to the city 
and then advertised that they have discontinued furnishing ales to 
customers in Glasgow, but indicated that they would be dealt with on the 
premises. The customers came out to Anderston and were supplied by 
Munro. It may be assumed that Munro proved a somewhat elusive person. 
Nothing daunted, the magistrates brought the matter to court by suing the 
brewery in the Court of Session for the payment of the duties. They alleged 
that the contract with Munro was a mere device to evade the Act, the object 
of it being to get free of the charge of duty as brewers. The defence was 
                                                 
727 Heydon, p.8a.  
728 Ibid, p.7b. Emphasis supplied. 
729 (1783) 2 Paton 615; House of Lords Journal, May 9. 
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that ‘since July 1, 1780, they had not imported into, or sold ale in the city, 
and therefore were not liable.’”730 
 
 
The essence of the appellants’ contention was that the object of the scheme was to 
cheat the public revenue and that the principle that “fraud unravels all” applied:  
 
“[T]he only reason and motive of the agreement with Munro was to escape 
the duty, and to deprive the revenue of the city of the impost which they 
were entitled to exact from them as brewers, within the intent and meaning 
of the Act. Such being the obvious character of the transaction, law will not 
lend its sanction to support such a device.”731  
 
 
Lord Mansfield agreed that the scheme was a fraud upon a tax Act or a cheat or fraud 
in tax law, stating:   
 
“The agreement with Munro was a device to elude the meaning of the 




As in Heydon’s Case, there was no question of the agreement being a fraud or a sham 
“as between subject and subject” in private law. The basis of the decision must, 
therefore, be the pre-existing common law of cheating “as concerns the Revenue and 
the public” rather than “the Act of the 28 Geo II”. According to their lordships:  
 
“It is declared, that the respondents selling beer and ale to Munro upon the 
express condition of his selling the whole in the town of Glasgow, and 
making discounts and allowances to him accordingly, is a manifest evasion 
of the Act of the 28 Geo II and ought to be considered as a selling within 
the town of Glasgow by the respondents themselves.”733 
 
 
Cases of Appellants relating to the Duties on Houses, Windows, or Lights, with the 
Opinion of the Judge thereon reported this 1757 case of evasion that exemplifies 
cheating “by means of some artful device, contrary to the plain rules of common 
honesty”:  
 
“The Appellant is by the Assessors of the Parish charged Two Shillings for 
his House; by the Surveyor he is charged with ten Windows; he saith he 
hath but nine windows, having fixed between two of the Windows a Piece 
                                                 
730 ‘The Meaning of the Statute: Mansfield on Tax Avoidance’ [1981] B.T.R., 303-304. Emphasis 
supplied. 
731 2 Paton 615.  
732 Ibid.   
733 House of Lords Journal. Emphasis supplied. 
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of Glass about four inches in Breadth, and eleven inches in Length. We are 
of Opinion, That this is a manifest Evasion of the Act.”734  
 
 
The rate of the tax on windows in houses that applied in England and Wales from 1696 
to 1851 increased sharply from two shillings for less than ten windows to six shillings 
for ten to twenty windows.735 By this “artful device” and “contrary to the plain rules of 
common honesty”, therefore, the taxpayer with ten windows cheated the public revenue 
by obtaining the same tax advantage obtained by a taxpayer that blocked one window 
in order to reduce his tax from six to two shillings, but without actually suffering the loss 
of light and other basic amenities suffered by that taxpayer. 
 
11.3. TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
11.3.1. Rejection of ‘Evasion’   
 
By the late nineteenth century, the appeal judges started rejecting the concept of 
‘evasion’ to “enable the extremely wealthy to avoid the undisputed rigors of the English 
tax system.”736 
 
In the 1898 case of Attorney-General v Beech, where the Court of Appeal approved a 
complex scheme devised to evade estate duty, Chitty LJ deployed this disingenuous 
analogy:  
 
“Much was said upon opening the door to evasion. Would these be cases 
of evasion? Certainly not. Indeed, the whole argument on evasion of the 
Act is fallacious. The case either falls within the Act or it does not. If it does 
not, there is no such thing as an evasion. If a tax is imposed on using a 
crest or coat-of-arms and a man who has previously used them ceases to 
use them in order to be free from the tax, there is no evasion of the Act in 
any sense of the term legitimately used.”737 
 
 
“If a tax is imposed on using a crest or coat-of-arms and a man who has previously 
used them ceases to use them in order to be free from the tax” no scheme is required. 
Beech, however, turned on a scheme or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind 
                                                 
734 Adams, ‘The Early History of Surveyors of Taxes’, The Quarterly Report of the Association 
of Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes, July 1956, p.297.  
735 Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England from the Earliest times to the year 1885 
(London: Longmans, 1888) Volume 3, p.168.  
736 Stevens, p.176.    
737 [1898] 2 Q.B. 147, 157. 
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which had never taken place before the tax Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was 
passed devised as a result of it. As Smith L.J. put it:  
 
“By deed bearing date December 21, 1886, Eliza Beech, who had a life 
interest in certain trust funds, over which she had a power of appointment, 
appointed the funds, subject to her life interest therein, to the 
remainderman, her son Howard Beech. In the year 1894 Eliza Beech was 
desirous of surrendering her life interest in the trust funds for the benefit of 
her son Howard Beech, and by deed bearing date December 18, 1894, she 
surrendered her life interest in these funds ‘to the end and intent that such 
life interest might merge in the interest in remainder of her son Howard 
Beech’. ... Upon the surrender of this life interest to Howard Beech he 
became absolute owner of these funds. Eliza Beech died upon August 27, 
1896. These are the facts.”738 
 
 
In the 1889 case of CIR v Angus, where the Court of Appeal upheld a scheme devised 
to evade stamp duty by rejecting the concept of ‘evasion’, Lord Esher effectively 
repudiated the mischief rule (“the office of all the Judges is always to make such 
construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress 
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato 
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent 
of the makers of the Act, pro bono public”) thus:  
 
“If a vendor can convey the property sold to the purchaser without the 
execution of any instrument, he can convey it without paying any stamp 
duty under s. 70. The subject may have the good fortune to escape the 
stamp duty, if he can get a conveyance of property sold to him without the 
execution of any instrument. But it is said that if the appeal be decided 
against the Commissioners purchasers will rest satisfied with an agreement 
of which specific performance would be decreed, and will not go on to 
execute a conveyance, and so the Crown will lose the stamp duty, and it is 
rather suggested that this would be cheating the Crown and committing a 
fraud. The Crown, however, must make out its right to the duty, and if there 
be a means of evading the stamp duty, so much the better for those who 
can evade it. It is no fraud upon the Crown, it is a thing which they are 
perfectly entitled to do.”739 
 
 
11.3.2. Invention of the Evasion-Avoidance Dichotomy     
 
The cases that established the dogma that “tax evasion is illegal but tax avoidance is 
legal” involved statutes that referred to ‘evade’, which forced the courts to distinguish, 
                                                 
738 Ibid, p.149-150. 
739 (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 579, 589-593. 
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rather than dismiss ‘evasion’, in order to “enable the extremely wealthy to avoid the 
undisputed rigors of the English tax system.” 
 
Lindley LJ’s statement in Yorkshire Railway Wagon v Maclure, which involved a fraud 
on the Railway Regulation Act 1844, shows that the wider distinction between ‘evading 
an Act’ and ‘avoiding an Act’, which was adopted in tax cases, rested upon the primacy 
of the private law:  
 
“It is said to be an evasion of the Act of Parliament really to borrow the 
money. There is always an ambiguity about the expression ‘evading an Act 
of Parliament.’ In one sense you cannot evade an Act of Parliament; that is 
to say, the Court is bound so to construe every Act of Parliament as to take 
care that that which is really prohibited may be held void. On the other hand, 
you may avoid doing that which is prohibited by the Act of Parliament and 
you may do something else equally advantageous to you which is not 
prohibited by the Act of Parliament. It appears to me that the transaction 
falls under the last of these two classes, it is a transaction as useful for the 
Railway Company as the other, but it is a real transaction, and is not struck 
at by the Act of Parliament at all.”740 
 
 
The two decisions of the House of Lords (sitting as the Privy Council) that established 
the supposed distinction between ‘unacceptable tax evasion’ and ‘acceptable tax 
avoidance’ - Simms v Registrar of Probates741 and Bullivant and Others v Attorney-
General for Victoria742 - similarly turned on the fact that the relevant transactions, which 
were devised to cheat the public revenue “as that concerns the Crown and the public” 
in tax law, were real and not shams or frauds or colourable “as between subject and 
subject” in private law. As Lord Hobhouse put it in Simms:  
 
“The whole question is whether the transaction was colourable or real.”743 
 
 
The question before the Supreme Court of South Australia in Simms was whether a 
deed was executed by the deceased “with intent to evade payment of duty” under 
section 27 of the South Australian Succession Duties Act, 1893. A majority (Bundey J 
and Boucaut J) held that it was. Way C.J., who disagreed, effectively confirmed that 
‘evade’ referred to cheating “by means of some artful device, contrary to the plain rules 
of common honesty” despite his focus on legality in private law:  
 
                                                 
740 (1882) 21 Ch D 309, 318. Emphases supplied. 
741 [1900] A.C. 323. 
742 [1901] A.C. 196. 
743 Simms, p.324. 
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“I am thus driven to the conclusion that the word ‘evade’ in s. 27 means to 
avoid by some direct means, by some device or stratagem. Without 
attempting, what is probably impracticable, to give an exhaustive definition 
of the phrase ‘with intent to evade the payment of duty hereunder,’ I am of 
opinion that the phrase would cover some arrangement, trust or other 
device, whether concealed, or apparent on the face of the non-
testamentary disposition by which what is really a part of the estate of the 
deceased is made to appear to belong to somebody else in order to escape 
payment of duty.”744 
 
 
The House of Lords agreed with Way C.J. Citing Yorkshire Railway, Lord Hobhouse 
used the specious evasion-avoidance dichotomy applied in that case to relieve what 
he considered to be “great harshness”:  
 
“Bundey J. lays it down in this case that to impose succession duty the 
Court must find fraud; and Boucaut J. says that s. 27 says substantially that 
an attempt to evade duty is a fraud. ...  
 
It does not appear to their Lordships that an examination of the decisions 
in which the word ‘evade’ has been the subject of comment leads to any 
tangible result. Everybody agrees that the word is capable of being used in 
two senses: one which suggests underhand dealing, and another which 
means nothing more than the intentional avoidance of something 
disagreeable. Beyond this, nothing is to be found having much bearing on 
the construction of the word, which depends entirely upon its use in the 
Colonial Acts. ...  
 
But where there are two meanings each adequately satisfying the 
language, and great harshness is produced by one of them, that has 
legitimate influence in inclining the mind to the other.”745 
 
 
In Bullivant, where the House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal 
that the fraud exception to legal professional privilege applied to compel the disclosure 
of legal advice because the relevant transactions were executed “with intent to evade 
the payment of duty” under section 115 of the Administration and Probate Act, Lord 
Halsbury stated:  
 
“If, for the purpose of evading the payment of duty to which the man was 
liable, he entered into some secret and covinous arrangement whereby, 
although he should still retain the property during his lifetime, nevertheless 
colourable deeds should be executed which would shew that the property 
was not liable to duty, that would undoubtedly be a fraud, and I should think 
there would be no doubt that a person who was engaged in such a 
transaction could be compelled either to produce the correspondence or to 
state the conversation shewing how that alleged fraud was intended to be 
carried out. But there is no such allegation. ...  
                                                 
744 Ibid, p.331. Emphasis supplied. 




[I]n the parallel, but not exactly similar, case in the Privy Council where the 
word ‘evade’ was used, the Privy Council held (I myself was a party to that 
judgment) ... that it was no fraud for a man to make a voluntary conveyance 
of his estates, not having say secret trust, and not having any arrangement 
whereby the deed could say one thing and the voluntary arrangement mean 
another; that the fact that he did intend to make a gift during his lifetime 
was no offence and no breach of the Act of Parliament, and nothing that 
could be considered tainted with the character of fraud: Simms.”746 
 
 
In other words, by failing to distinguish cheating “as concerns the Crown and the public” 
in tax law from cheating “as between subject and subject” in private law, the courts 
substituted “unacceptable evasion of a Tax Act” for cheating by fraudulent concealment 
or “accompanied with no manner of artful contrivance, but wholly depends on a bare 
naked lie” and “acceptable avoidance of a Tax Act” for cheating by fraudulent 
misrepresentation or “deceitful practices, in defrauding or endeavouring to defraud 
another of his known right by means of some artful device”.  
 
11.3.3. Basis of the Tax Avoidance Industry 
 
In Simms, counsel for the taxpayer and the courts based the supposed distinction 
between unacceptable tax evasion and acceptable tax avoidance upon the temporal 
question whether the tax liability had been incurred or not. Relying on the primacy of 
the private law, Counsel contended, and the Board agreed, that:  
 
“The deed ... was unimpeached. No evidence was given or producible to 
shew that it was not a bonâ fide operative deed according to its terms. 
There was no evidence or allegation that there was any secret or other 
engagement, trust, or arrangement not in accordance with or contradicting 
its terms. The registrar had not made out a primâ facie case or any case 
for relief under s. 27, sub-s. 2, of the Act. If W. K. Simms, the covenantor, 
had died within three months of executing the deed, duty would have been 
payable. As he lived for more than three months afterwards, it was not 
payable. If one of his motives for executing it was to avoid liability to duty, 
that was within his rights. He had a right to avoid liability, but not to incur 
liability and then evade discharging it. No duty was ever payable in respect 
of the deed in the events which had happened, and, therefore, there was 
no payment which could be or was evaded.”747 
 
 
In Bullivant, where the House of Lords used this distinction to reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeal that the fraud exception to LPP applied, Lord Lindley stated:  
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“[T]here are two ways of construing the word ‘evade’: one is, that a person 
may go to a solicitor and ask him how to keep out of an Act of Parliament - 
how to do something which does not bring him within the scope of it. That 
is evading in one sense, but there is nothing illegal in it. The other is, when 
he goes to his solicitor and says, ‘Tell me how to escape from the 
consequences of the Act of Parliament, although I am brought within it.’ 
That is an act of quite a different character. ...  
 
[I]t appears to me that the Court of Appeal have overlooked the fact that 
the word ‘evade’ has the double meaning to which I have referred. They 
seem to have assumed that what was done here must have been a 
conspiracy to do something forbidden by the Act and to avoid the 
consequences of illegal conduct.”748 
 
 
Gammie’s historical overview analysed in the Introduction shows that tax avoidance as 
presently understood is clearly a conspiracy to do an act of precisely the same 
character as tax evasion of old. 
 
In fact, the history of the tax avoidance industry boils down to the inevitable 
development of classic tax avoidance, which relied upon the notion that a taxpayer 
“had a right to avoid liability, but not to incur liability and then evade discharging it”, into 
marketed tax avoidance which rests upon the revised proposition that any taxpayer 
that can afford the cost of a scheme has a right to incur liability and then evade 
discharging it. According to Lord Millett:  
 
“The classic form of tax avoidance consists in the deliberate fashioning of 
a transaction into which the taxpayer proposes to enter so that it does not 
attract the tax which it would do if it were entered into in the normal and 
straightforward manner. Thus, capital gains tax is chargeable only where 
there is a ‘disposal.’ If a vendor can transfer an asset to a purchaser and 
receive the purchase price, not by a single transaction, but as the result of 
a series of separate and independent transactions, none of which 
constitutes a ‘disposal,’ then according to the classic view no charge arises.   
  
In the early 1970s, however, a new form of tax avoidance appeared on the 
scene, prompted by the large profits which had been made in the property 
boom of 1972-73, and given added encouragement by the advent of a 
Labour government in February 1974. In these cases, it was too late to 
resort to traditional forms of avoidance. By the time the taxpayer consulted 
his advisers, the transaction had already been carried out: the gain had 
been made; the charge to tax had been incurred. It was too late to refashion 
the transaction and avoid the charge. All that could be done was to create 
an artificial loss which could be set off against the liability. ...  
 
Tax avoidance had become big business. Schemes were devised and 
commercially marketed by specialist companies whose principal or only 
activity consisted in the sale and operation of such schemes. In return the 
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taxpayer paid a fee, usually calculated as a proportion of the tax he hoped 
to save, and payable at the outset. Schemes tended to be very 
complicated, and to require the participation of numerous parties and the 
circulation of substantial sums of money. In return for a fee, the scheme-
vendor provided not only the scheme, but the necessary funds and the 
participation of other parties, usually his own associated companies. The 
taxpayer had merely to state the figure involved, i.e. the amount of the gain 
he desired to counteract. From that the fee was calculated, and all the 
necessary particulars were inserted in the scheme. The taxpayer paid the 
fee, and received in return a timetable and a bundle of documents. All he 
had to do was to sign the documents and take the various steps described 
in the timetable. This would enable him to claim to have entered into a 
bewildering series of complicated transactions; but these all cancelled each 
other out. ... 
 
In any jurisdiction less sophisticated than ours, such schemes would simply 
be laughed out of court. Transparently artificial, they are merely ‘paper 
transactions,’ intended to be self-cancelling. But according to the classic 
approach allegedly based on Duke of Westminster, each step in the 
scheme had to be examined separately. ... Until Ramsay, it was generally 
accepted that this was the correct approach”.749 
 
 
Indeed, the counter-argument by counsel for the taxpayer-company in Ramsay was 
the exact opposite of the successful arguments and dicta in Simms and Bullivant (“He 
had a right to avoid liability, but not to incur liability and then evade discharging it”):     
 
“In the courts below the present proceedings were decided on a narrow 
issue. But in their printed case before this House, there is an attempt by the 
Crown to change entirely the approach of the courts towards tax avoidance 
schemes. … The short question is that the Appellant Company having 
realised a very substantial chargeable gain (that is capital gain) and being 
faced with paying corporation tax on that gain contemplated making an 
allowable loss in the same accounting period. The allowable loss to be 
created was in the region of £170,000.”750 
 
 
11.3.4. Emasculation of the Tax Dogma    
 
The development of the Ramsay principle against the background of the evasion-
avoidance dichotomy meant that a scheme it caught amounted to unacceptable tax 
evasion.  
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Of the fifteen speeches that established the principle in Ramsay, Burmah and Furniss, 
however, only Lord Scarman’s prescient statement of the primacy of the pre-existing 
common law of cheating in Furniss acknowledged this inconvenient truth:  
 
“I would allow the appeals for the reasons given by ... Lord Brightman. I add 
a few observations only because I am aware, and the legal profession (and 
others) must understand, that the law in this area is in an early stage of 
development. Speeches in your Lordships’ House and judgments in the 
appellate courts of the United Kingdom are concerned more to chart a way 
forward between principles accepted and not to be rejected than to attempt 
anything so ambitious as to determine finally the limit beyond which the 
safe channel of acceptable tax avoidance shelves into the dangerous 
shallows of unacceptable tax evasion.  
 
The law will develop from case to case. Lord Wilberforce in Ramsay 
referred to ‘the emerging principle’ of the law. What has been established 
with certainty by the House in Ramsay is that the determination of what 
does, and what does not, constitute unacceptable tax evasion is a subject 
suited to development by judicial process. The best chart that we have for 
the way forward appears to me, with great respect to all engaged on the 
map-making process, to be the words of Lord Diplock, in Burmah, which 
Lord Brightman quotes in his speech. These words leave space in the law 
for the principle enunciated by Lord Tomlin in Duke of Westminster that 
every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as to diminish the 
burden of tax. The limits within which this principle is to operate remain to 
be probed and determined judicially. Difficult though the task may be for 
judges, it is one which is beyond the power of the blunt instrument of 
legislation. Whatever a statute may provide, it has to be interpreted and 
applied by the courts: and ultimately it will prove to be in this area of judge-
made law that our elusive journey’s end will be found.”751 
 
 
This judicial confirmation that tax avoidance schemes caught by the Ramsay principle 
constituted unlawful unacceptable tax evasion meant that “the legal profession (and 
others)” in the tax avoidance industry could no longer use the dogma that “tax 
avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal” to sell tax schemes and to legitimise their 
fraudulent enterprise.  
 
11.3.5. Revival of the Tax Dogma    
 
The retreat from the Ramsay principle, which started with the rejection of the Revenue’s 
argument in Craven, therefore, involved the revival of the tax dogma by the unanimous 
rejection of Lord Scarman’s clarification.  
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In his majority speech, Lord Oliver relied on Lord Brightman’s description of the scheme 
in Furniss as “honest” to reassert the tax dogma by rejecting “evasion” and the 
Revenue’s argument:  
 
“[T]here appears to be introduced in the speech of Lord Scarman at least, 
a moral dimension by which the court is to identify what he described as 
‘unacceptable tax evasion’. On the face of it this might be taken to suggest 
that the long accepted distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion 
is to be elided and that the fiscal effect of a transaction is no longer to be 
judged, as in Ramsay and Burmah, by the criterion of what the taxpayer 
has actually done, but by whether what he has done is ‘acceptable’. It may 
be doubted whether this was indeed what Lord Scarman intended to 
suggest, but if it was, he was, I think, alone in expressing this view. Indeed 
Lord Brightman, who delivered the leading speech from which the ratio of 
the decision is to be deduced, expressly affirmed: 
 
‘The scheme before your Lordships is a simple and honest scheme 
which merely seeks to defer payment of tax until the taxpayer has 
received into his hands the gain which he has made.’”752 
 
 
As demonstrated in chapter two, the corollary of the proposition that a tax avoidance 
scheme is a cheat by design is that the apologist notion of an “honest” tax avoidance 
scheme is a contradiction in terms.  
 
In his minority speech, however, Lord Goff also relied on Lord Brightman’s description 
of the scheme in Furniss as “honest” to reassert the tax dogma  by rejecting “evasion” 
and, crucially, by substituting “unacceptable avoidance” (which is supposedly different 
from both “unacceptable tax evasion” and “acceptable tax avoidance”):   
 
“These appeals raise in an acute form the question of the true scope of 
what has come to be known as the Ramsay principle. 
 
It would be naive in the extreme to imagine that that principle is not 
concerned with the outlawing of unacceptable tax avoidance. It plainly is. 
But it would be equally mistaken to regard the principle as in any sense a 
moral principle, or having any foundation in morality. It plainly is not. We 
can see this clearly from Lord Brightman’s description of the scheme in 
Furniss as an honest scheme; and I would likewise so describe the 
schemes in the present three appeals. What the courts have established, 
however, is that certain tax avoidance schemes, although not shams in the 
sense of not being what they purport to be, are nevertheless unacceptable 
because they embrace transactions which are not ‘real’ disposals or do not 
generate ‘real’ losses (or gains) and so are held not to attract certain fiscal 
consequences which would normally be attached to disposals or losses (or 
gains) under the relevant statute. It is these unacceptable tax avoidance 
schemes which Lord Scarman described as ‘tax evasion’ - a label which is 
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perhaps better kept for those transactions which are traditionally so 
described because they are illegal.”753 
 
 
To paraphrase, “[w]hat the courts have established ... is that certain tax avoidance 
schemes, although not shams [“as between subject and subject”] in the sense of not 
being what they purport to be, are nevertheless unacceptable [“as concerns the 
Revenue and the public”] because they embrace transactions which are not ‘real’ 
disposals or do not generate ‘real’ losses (or gains) and so are held not to attract certain 
fiscal consequences which would normally be attached to disposals or losses (or gains) 
under the relevant statute [because they amount to cheating the public revenue].” “It is 
these unacceptable tax avoidance schemes which Lord Scarman described as ‘tax 
evasion’ – a label which is [now used to describe cheating “by means of some artful 
device, contrary to the plain rules of common honesty”] because they are illegal.” 
 
11.4. TAX MITIGATION   
 
11.4.1. Reinvention of the Tax Dogma    
 
The retreat from the Ramsay principle was completed, and the tax avoidance industry 
secured, by the substitution of the conveniently vague evasion-avoidance-mitigation 
trichotomy (which divides avoidance into “unacceptable avoidance” that is supposedly 
different from unacceptable evasion, and “acceptable avoidance” that is also called 
mitigation) for the evasion-avoidance dichotomy rendered inconvenient by the Ramsay 
principle. According to Bennion’s restatement of the tax dogma in his cryptic summary 
of the developments explained above: 
 
“The large amounts of money at stake in the tax field have led to some 
confusion over nomenclature. Earlier it was clearly established that 
escaping a statutory obligation was termed ‘evasion’ when it constituted a 
breach of the obligation (and was therefore unlawful) and ‘avoidance’ when 
it meant that the obligation was never incurred because the case narrowly 
missed fitting the statute (and was therefore lawful). This is a convenient 
distinction, which still generally obtains. In the tax field however the term 
avoidance is now equivocal. This is because the huge sums at stake in a 
vast number of cases have led to the emergence of what is sometimes 
called the tax avoidance industry. Professional experts devise elaborate 
schemes designed to allow taxpayers to escape tax in cases where 
Parliament intended tax to be charged. When this happens on a large scale 
in relation to a particular charging enactment it may lead to counter 
measures in the form of an equally elaborate anti-avoidance provision 
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inserted in a Finance Act. The experts then seek to devise ways around the 
provision, and so the chase goes on. In these circumstances, the term 
‘avoidance’ has come to be used in two senses in the tax field. What may 
be called unacceptable tax avoidance, while not unlawful, is countered by 
the application of the Ramsay principle. The rest, that is ‘acceptable’ 
avoidance, is now sometimes called tax mitigation.”754 
 
As demonstrated throughout, the fallacy that “unacceptable tax avoidance [is] not 
unlawful” is required to legitimise tax avoidance and the tax avoidance industry.  
 
11.4.2. Invention of the Evasion-Avoidance-Mitigation Trichotomy  
 
Like the evasion-avoidance dichotomy, the evasion-avoidance-mitigation trichotomy 
was developed in Challenge by the Privy Council and in the context of an antipodean 
legislation. Entitled “Agreements purporting to alter incidence of tax to be void”, the 
GAAR in section 99 of New Zealand’s Income Tax of 1976 provided, so far as material: 
 
“(2) Every arrangement made or entered into, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, shall be absolutely void as against the 
Commissioner for income tax purposes if and to the extent that, directly or 
indirectly, its purpose or effect is tax avoidance.   
 
(3) Where an arrangement is void in accordance with subsection (2) of this 
section, the assessable income and the non-assessable income of any 
person affected by that arrangement shall be adjusted in such manner as 
the Commissioner considers appropriate so as to counteract any tax 
advantage obtained by that person from or under that arrangement.” 
 
 
Subsection (2) shows that the legislation was concerned with cheating or fraud “as 
against the Commissioner for income tax purposes” in tax law as opposed to cheating 
or fraud or sham “as between subject and subject” in private law.  
 
Subsection (3) confirms that the legislation is a statute against fraud which “acts upon 
the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction.”  
 
Like his subsequent extra-judicial statement analysed in the Introduction, Lord 
Templeman’s original statement in Challenge, which was a firm and authoritative 
rejection of the perverse ‘certainty’ argument, is consistent with the definitions of tax 
evasion, tax avoidance and tax mitigation proposed in this thesis, and confirms the 
substitution of ‘tax evasion’ for cheating by fraudulent concealment or “accompanied 
                                                 




with no manner of artful contrivance, but wholly depends on a bare naked lie” or fraud 
by failing to disclose information under section 3 of the Fraud Act and the substitution 
of ‘tax avoidance’ for cheating by fraudulent misrepresentation or “deceitful practices, 
in defrauding or endeavouring to defraud another of his known right by means of some 
artful device, contrary to the plain rules of common honesty” or fraud by false 
representation under section 2 of the Fraud Act: 
 
“Challenge advanced the threat that if their chosen method of tax 
avoidance is not rendered effective by the courts, any commercial 
transaction or family arrangement will be fraught with uncertain, capricious 
or harsh fiscal consequences and will be vulnerable to action by the 
commissioner under s 99. It was suggested before the Board that a seven-
year covenant or a settlement of capital might be void against the 
commissioner under s 99 as an arrangement entered into for two or more 
purposes or effects one of which would be tax avoidance, namely a 
reduction in the tax payable by the covenantor or the settlor. Indeed the 
Solicitor-General on behalf of the commissioner seemed inclined to agree. 
In the judgments in the courts of New Zealand there are references to other 
disturbing suggestions, for example that the purchase of life insurance in 
order to qualify for tax exemption would incur the wrath of the commissioner 
under s 99. Barker J speculated that ‘a company carrying on business to 
obtain export incentives could find its business threatened by the use of 
section 99 by the commissioner’. The frequent argument by the tax avoider 
that he seeks to protect the interests of a taxpayer who does not indulge in 
tax avoidance requires serious but sceptical consideration.  
 
There are however discernible distinctions between a transaction 
which is a sham, a transaction which effects the evasion of tax, a 
transaction which mitigates tax and a transaction which avoids tax. 
 
In the present case Barker J pointed out that the transaction was not 
a sham. It was not so constructed as to create a false impression in 
the eyes of the tax authority. The appearance created by the 
documentation was precisely the reality. In other words Challenge 
purchased the shares of Perth; Challenge did not pretend to purchase the 
shares of Perth. The question is whether that purchase was also an 
arrangement under s 99. 
 
Tax evasion also can be dismissed. Evasion occurs when the 
commissioner is not informed of all the facts relevant to an 
assessment of tax. Innocent evasion may lead to a reassessment. 
Fraudulent evasion may lead to a criminal prosecution as well as 
reassessment. In the present case Challenge fulfilled their duty to inform 
the commissioner of all the relevant facts. 
 
The material distinction in the present case is between tax mitigation and 
tax avoidance. A taxpayer has always been free to mitigate his liability to 
tax. In the oft quoted words of Lord Tomlin in Duke of Westminster ‘Every 
man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching 
under the appropriate Act is less than it otherwise would be’. In that case 
however the distinction between tax mitigation and tax avoidance was 




Section 99 does not apply to tax mitigation where the taxpayer obtains 
a tax advantage by reducing his income or by incurring expenditure 
in circumstances in which the taxing statute affords a reduction in tax 
liability. 
 
Section 99 does apply to tax avoidance. Income tax is avoided and a tax 
advantage is derived from an arrangement when the taxpayer reduces 
his liability to tax without involving him in the loss or expenditure 
which entitles him to that reduction. The taxpayer engaged in tax 
avoidance does not reduce his income or suffer a loss or incur 
expenditure but nevertheless obtains a reduction in his liability to tax 
as if he had.”755 
 
 
“Tax evasion … occurs when the commissioner is not informed of all the facts relevant 
to an assessment of tax” because it is cheating the public revenue by a taxpayer 
who deliberately fails to make a return of the relevant tax liability or by a taxpayer 
who deliberately makes a false return of the relevant tax liability without using a 
tax scheme.  
 
Tax avoidance is cheating the public revenue by the professional advisers that 
devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate the use of tax avoidance 
schemes in which the taxpayer using an individual scheme may or may not be 
complicit. According to Lord Templeman’s sole focus on the taxpayer:  
 
“In an arrangement of tax avoidance the financial position of the 
taxpayer is unaffected (save for the costs of devising and 
implementing the arrangement) and by the arrangement the taxpayer 
seeks to obtain a tax advantage without suffering that reduction in 
income, loss or expenditure which other taxpayers suffer and which 
Parliament intended to be suffered by any taxpayer qualifying for a 
reduction in his liability to tax. 
 
In IRC v Duke of Westminster, the Duke avoided tax by reducing his 
assessable income without reducing his income by the method of 
substituting an annuity for a wage payable to his gardener. So long as the 
gardener continued to work, the Duke gained a tax advantage over other 
taxpayers who paid wages to their working gardeners. 
 
In Black Nominees Ltd v Nicol756 an actress sought to avoid income tax by 
reducing her assessable income without reducing her income. She 
converted her earnings into instalments of capital by a number of 
transactions each designed to take advantage of some specific exemption 
or relief provision of the taxing statute. She attempted to obtain a tax 
advantage over other actresses and other taxpayers who paid tax on their 
earnings. 
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In Chinn v Collins757 the trustees and beneficiaries under a settlement 
attempted to avoid capital gains tax payable on the distribution of trust 
property. By a number of transactions each designed to take advantage of 
some specific exemption or relief provision of the taxing statute, the 
beneficiary entitled to trust shares was converted into a purchaser of the 
shares without involving him in the expenditure of a purchase price. The 
beneficiary attempted to obtain a tax advantage over other beneficiaries 
who paid capital gains tax when they became entitled to trust property. 
 
In Ramsay v IRC and Eilbeck v Rawling758 the taxpayers attempted to avoid 
capital gains tax by making a deductible loss matched by a non-chargeable 
gain and setting off the loss against a pre-existing chargeable gain. In 
reality the taxpayer did not make any loss. The taxpayer attempted to 
obtain a tax advantage over other taxpayers who paid capital gains tax on 
chargeable gains. 
 
In IRC v Burmah Oil759 the House of Lords refused to accept that the 
taxpayer ‘had achieved the magic result of creating a tax loss that was not 
a real loss’. 
 
In New Zealand section 99 would apply to all the cited English cases of 
income tax avoidance. Section 99 also applies where, as in this case, the 
taxpayer alleges that he has achieved the magic result of creating a tax 
loss by purchasing the tax loss of another taxpayer. … 
 
Whatever the circumstances or complications, if a taxpayer asserts a 
reduction in assessable income, or if a taxpayer seeks tax relief 
without suffering the expenditure which qualifies for such relief, then 
tax avoidance is involved and the commissioner is entitled and bound 
by section 99 to adjust the assessable income of the taxpayer so as 
to eliminate the tax advantage sought to be obtained.”760 
 
The statement that “Challenge fulfilled their duty to inform the commissioner of all the 
relevant facts” shows that, as explained in chapter four, the equation of tax evasion to 
cheating by fraudulent concealment results from the sole focus on the taxpayer and 
the failure to consider the role of the professional advisers involved in “devising and 
implementing the arrangement” in tax avoidance.  
 
As in Charlton, the professional advisers cheated by “devising and implementing the 
arrangement” by which Challenge sought “to obtain a tax advantage without suffering 
that reduction in income, loss or expenditure which other taxpayers suffer and which 
Parliament intended to be suffered by any taxpayer qualifying for a reduction in his 
liability to tax.” Challenge (or more precisely the directors of Challenge) fulfilled 
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their duty to inform the commissioner of all the relevant facts relating to the disclosed 
scheme or arrangement devised and implemented by their professional advisers, but 
they concealed or misrepresented the company’s tax liability because “by the 
arrangement [they sought] to obtain a tax advantage without suffering that reduction in 
income, loss or expenditure which other taxpayers suffer and which Parliament 
intended to be suffered by any taxpayer qualifying for a reduction in his liability to tax.” 
Whether the directors of Challenge involved concealed or misrepresented the 
company’s tax liability fraudulently or negligently or innocently depended on their 
knowledge, abilities and circumstances, but the effect of the principle that “if a taxpayer 
reasonably relies on a reputable accountant for advice in relation to the content of his 
tax return then he will not be liable” for fraud or negligence if the advice proves to be 
wrong is that they were more likely to have acted honestly than negligently or 
fraudulently. According to Lord Templeman: 
 
“In the present case the taxpayer subsidiaries seek to reduce their 
assessable income by a loss of $5.8 million which was sustained by Perth 
and suffered by Merbank and was not sustained by the taxpayer 
subsidiaries or suffered by the taxpayer. It is true that the taxpayer 
expended $10,000 in purchasing the shares in Perth but this purchase price 
is not deductible against the taxpayer's assessable income. Apart from the 
risk of losing $10,000, the Challenge group never risked anything, never 
lost anything and never spent anything but now claim to deduct a loss of 
$5.8 million. The taxpayer has practised tax avoidance to which section 99 
applies. Challenge have not practised tax mitigation because the Challenge 
group never suffered the loss of $5.8m which would entitle them to a 
reduction in their tax liability of $2.85m. The tax advantage stems from the 
arrangement with Merbank and not from any loss sustained by Challenge 
or the Challenge group. 
 
It was argued that if this appeal by the commissioner succeeds, a purchase 
of shares in a company which becomes part of a specified group will always 
be void under section 99. But a purchase of shares will only be void in so 
far as it leads to tax avoidance and not tax mitigation.”761 
 
Tax mitigation is making a true and honest return by a taxpayer without using a 
tax scheme. As Lord Templeman elaborated:  
 
“Income tax is mitigated by a taxpayer who reduces his income or 
incurs expenditure in circumstances which reduce his assessable 
income or entitle him to reduction in his tax liability.  
 
Thus when a taxpayer executes a covenant and makes a payment under 
the covenant he reduces his income. If the covenant exceeds six years and 
satisfies certain other conditions the reduction in income reduces the 
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assessable income of the taxpayer. The tax advantage results from the 
payment under the covenant. 
 
When a taxpayer makes a settlement, he deprives himself of the capital 
which is a source of income and thereby reduces his income. If the 
settlement is irrevocable and satisfies certain other conditions the reduction 
in income reduces the assessable income of the taxpayer. The tax 
advantage results from the reduction of income. 
 
Where a taxpayer pays a premium on a qualifying insurance policy, he 
incurs expenditure. The tax statute entitled the taxpayer to reduction of tax 
liability. The tax advantage results from the expenditure on the premium. 
 
A taxpayer may incur expense on export business or incur capital or other 
expenditure which by statute entitles the taxpayer to a reduction of his tax 
liability. The tax advantages result from the expenditure for which 
Parliament grants specific tax relief.”762 
 
 
In relation to sham, none of the transactions that comprised the scheme was a sham 
or “so constructed as to create a false impression in the eyes of the tax authority” “as 
between subject and subject” in private law, but the scheme, considered as a whole, 
was a fraud “as against the Commissioner for income tax purposes” in the words of 
subsection (2) in tax law. As demonstrated in chapter eight, in order to pepetrate a 
fraud “as against the Commissioner for income tax purposes” in tax law, it was crucial 
that “[t]he appearance created by the documentation was precisely the reality” “as 
between subject and subject” in private law.  
 
11.4.3. Importation of the Evasion-Avoidance-Mitigation Trichotomy  
 
The earliest cases in which a tax avoidance scheme was described judicially as 
cheating the public revenue and held to be ineffective for the purpose of the tax sought 
to be avoided involved dividend stripping. In Harrison v Griffiths Lord Denning 
described it as “a way of getting money out of the Revenue authorities”763 by 
“prospectors digging for wealth in the subterranean passages of the Revenue, 
searching for tax repayments.”764 In Lupton v F.A. & A.B. Lord Donovan said:  
 
“If I am asked what it is, I would reply that it is the planning and execution 
of a raid on the Treasury using the technicalities of revenue law and 
company law as the necessary weapons.”765 
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In Ensign Tankers, which involved section 41 of the Finance Act 1971 that did not refer 
to ‘avoidance’, therefore, Lord Templeman and Lord Goff imported the evasion-
avoidance mitigation trichotomy into English law, using Lord Donovan’s “the planning 
and execution of a raid on the Treasury using the technicalities of revenue law and 
company law as the necessary weapons” to distinguish avoidance from mitigation. 
 
The enabling professional advisers, described by Lord Templeman as “Guinness 
Mahon, a merchant bank specialising in the manufacture of tax avoidance schemes”766, 
cheated the public revenue by devising, marketing, implementing and otherwise 
facilitating the use of a tax avoidance scheme by which the taxpayer-company cheated 
the public revenue by claiming a first-year allowance of $14,000,000 for an expenditure 
of only $3,250,000. As Lord Templeman put it:  
 
“This appeal is concerned with a tax avoidance scheme, a single composite 
transaction whereunder the tax advantage claimed by the taxpayer is 
inconsistent with the true effect in law of the transaction. In the present case 
the taxpayer claims for itself and its partners capital allowances for 
expenditure of $14,000,000 although the partners were never liable to 
spend more than $3,250,000 of their own money. ...  
 
The tax avoidance scheme introduced by Guinness Mahon to the taxpayer 
company presented the taxpayer company (in words adopted from those 
of Lord Donovan in Lupton) with an opportunity to claim from the revenue 
the benefit of a large sum which the taxpayer company had never 
disbursed. Though s 41 of the 1971 Act required a taxpayer to expend 
$14,000,000 in order to qualify for the first-year allowance of that amount, 
the scheme was embraced because it was thought to obtain that allowance 
for an expenditure of only $3,250,000.The Scheme, again in the words of 
Lord Donovan was the planning and execution of a raid on the Treasury 




Four years after he substituted ‘unacceptable tax avoidance’ in Craven for Lord 
Scarman’s ‘unacceptable tax evasion’ (apparently because the latter was “a label which 
is perhaps better kept for those transactions which are traditionally so described 
because they are illegal”), Lord Goff effectively described it as cheating the public 
revenue:   
 
“Like ... Lord Templeman, I approach this case on the basis that there is a 
fundamental difference between tax mitigation and unacceptable tax 
avoidance. Examples of the former ... are cases in which the taxpayer takes 
advantage of the law to plan his affairs so as to minimise the incidence of 
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tax. Unacceptable tax avoidance typically involves the creation of complex 
artificial structures by which, as though by the wave of a magic wand, the 
taxpayer conjures out of the air a loss, or a gain, or expenditure, or 
whatever it may be, which otherwise would never have existed. These 
structures are designed to achieve an adventitious tax benefit for the 
taxpayer, and in truth are no more than raids on the public funds at the 
expense of the general body of taxpayers, and as such are unacceptable. 
... The question in the present case is into which of these two categories 
the transaction under consideration falls.”768 
 
 
The true question in law remains into which of the three categories of the fraud-
negligence-honesty trichotomy the transaction under consideration, or more precisely 
the conduct of the professional enablers and the participating taxpayer, falls, which 
shows that it is cheating the public revenue or “a raid on the Treasury” or “raids on the 
public funds”. By asking “into which of these two categories [of legal nonsense – tax 
avoidance and tax mitigation] the transaction under consideration falls”, therefore, the 
Courts continue to obscure the fraudulent nature of “the judge induced disease of ‘tax 
avoidance’”.  
 
11.4.4. Lord Nolan’s Avoidance-Mitigation Distinction 
 
IRC v Willoughby769 involved section 741 of ICTA 1988 which provided an exemption 
from the charging provisions for the transfer of assets abroad as follows: 
 
“Sections 739 and 740 shall not apply if the individual shows in writing or 
otherwise to the satisfaction of the Board either –  
 
(a) that the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation was not the 
purpose or one of the purposes for which the transfer or associated 
operations or any of them were effected; or 
 
(b) that the transfer and any associated operations were bona fide 
commercial transactions and were not designed for the purpose of 
avoiding liability to taxation.” 
 
In accepting the submissions of counsel for the Revenue, Lord Nolan endorsed the 
speeches of Lord Templeman and Lord Goff in Ensign and reflected their description 
of tax avoidance as cheating the public revenue, but focused solely on the taxpayer 
and thus missed the significance of tax avoidance schemes and their professional 
enablers which distinguish tax avoidance from tax mitigation:    
 
                                                 
768 Ibid, pp.244-245. Emphasis supplied.  
769 [1997] STC 995.   
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“In order to understand the line thus drawn, submitted Mr. Henderson, it 
was essential to understand what was meant by ‘tax avoidance’ for the 
purposes of section 741. Tax avoidance was to be distinguished from tax 
mitigation. The hallmark of tax avoidance is that the taxpayer reduces 
his liability to tax without incurring the economic consequences that 
Parliament intended to be suffered by any taxpayer qualifying for 
such reduction in his tax liability. The hall mark of tax mitigation, on 
the other hand, is that the taxpayer takes advantage of a fiscally 
attractive option afforded to him by the tax legislation, and genuinely 
suffers the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be 
suffered by those taking advantage of the option. Where the tax payer’s 
chosen course is seen upon examination to involve tax avoidance (as 
opposed to tax mitigation), it follows that tax avoidance must be at least 
one of the taxpayer's purposes in adopting that course, whether or not the 
taxpayer has formed the subjective motive of avoiding tax.  
 
My Lords, I am content for my part to adopt these propositions as a 
generally helpful approach to the elusive concept of ‘tax avoidance’, the 
more so since they owe much to the speeches of Lord Templeman and 
Lord Goff in Ensign Tankers v Stokes. One of the traditional functions of 
the tax system is to promote socially desirable objectives by providing a 
favourable tax regime for those who pursue them. Individuals who make 
provision for their retirement or for greater financial security are a familiar 
example of those who have received such fiscal encouragement in various 
forms over the years. This, no doubt, is why the holders of qualifying 
policies, even those issued by non-resident companies, were granted 
exemption from tax on the benefits received. In a broad colloquial sense 
tax avoidance might be said to have been one of the main purposes of 
those who took out such policies, because plainly freedom from tax was 
one of the main attractions. But it would be absurd in the context of section 
741 to describe as tax avoidance the acceptance of an offer of freedom 
from tax which Parliament has deliberately made. Tax avoidance within 
the meaning of section 741 is a course of action designed to conflict 
with or defeat the evident intention of Parliament.”770 
 
 
The distinction between ‘object’ or ‘purpose’ (which is decisive) from ‘motive’ (which is 
irrelevant) is fundamental. In the words of Lord Millett:  
 
“In fact, the use of the word ‘motive’ in this context is inaccurate, and is best 
avoided. ‘Motive’ must be distinguished from ‘purpose.’ ‘Motive’ is the 
reason why; ‘purpose’ is the aim, or object, or end in view. Both words must 
be distinguished from ‘effect,’ which is the result achieved, or actual 
consequence.”771  
 
The decisive ‘object’ or ‘purpose’ in tax avoidance is, however, that of the professional 
enablers that devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate the use of the tax 
avoidance scheme or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind which had never 
                                                 
770 Ibid, pp.1002-1003. Emphasis supplied.  
771 ‘Artificial tax avoidance: the English and American approach’ [1986] B.T.R. 327, 330.   
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taken place before the tax Act they were devised to cheat or defraud was passed 
devised as a result of it or “a course of action designed to conflict with or defeat the 
evident intention of Parliament” rather than the participating taxpayer that use it. In the 
words of Lord Templeman: 
 
“The object of a tax avoidance scheme is to enable the taxpayer to enjoy a 
taxable event without paying the tax.”772 
 
Tax mitigation, where “the taxpayer takes advantage of a fiscally attractive option 
afforded to him by the tax legislation, and genuinely suffers the economic 
consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking advantage of 
the option”, does not require a scheme or “a course of action designed to conflict with 
or defeat the evident intention of Parliament” and thus does not involve cheating or 
fraud or dishonesty. The taxpayer may require professional advice to ensure that he 
properly “takes advantage of a fiscally attractive option afforded to him by the tax 
legislation, and genuinely suffers the economic consequences that Parliament 
intended to be suffered by those taking advantage of the option”, but he will not require 
a scheme.  
 
The business of the tax avoidance industry, which distinguishes it from the legitimate 
role of tax professionals, is the devising, marketing, implementing, and otherwise 
facilitating the use of tax schemes by which “the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax 
without incurring the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered 
by any taxpayer qualifying for such reduction in his tax liability.” If the taxpayer 
“genuinely suffers the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered 
by those taking advantage of the option”, a scheme becomes pointless and the tax 
avoidance industry becomes redundant.  
 
Applying the test of “how an honest person would behave” advanced by Lord Nicholls 
in Brunei, an honest person involved in tax mitigation “takes advantage of a fiscally 
attractive option afforded to him by the tax legislation, and genuinely suffers the 
economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking 
advantage of the option” but a dishonest person involved in tax avoidance “reduces his 
liability to tax without incurring the economic consequences that Parliament intended 
to be suffered by any taxpayer qualifying for such reduction in his tax liability.” 
 
                                                 
772 ‘Tax and the Taxpayer’ [2001] L.Q.R. 575, 576. 
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As explained in the Introduction, the red herrings that are usually introduced into the 
debate on tax avoidance, such as ISAs, premium bonds and pension contributions, are 
cases of tax mitigation distinguishable by the fact that “the taxpayer takes advantage 
of a fiscally attractive option afforded to him by the tax legislation, and genuinely suffers 
the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking 
advantage of the option.” In the words of Lord Templeman in Ensign Tankers: 
 
“There is nothing magical about tax mitigation whereby a taxpayer suffers 
a loss or incurs expenditure in fact as well as in appearance.”773  
 
 
11.5 REJECTION OF THE EVASION-AVOIDANCE-MITIGATION TRICHOTOMY  
 
Lord Oliver delivered the only dissenting judgment in Challenge where Lord 
Templeman invented the evasion-avoidance-mitigation trichotomy. In his article where 
he acknowledged his participation in “emasculating Furniss”774 in Craven (where he 
also rejected Lord Scarman’s description of failed schemes as ‘unacceptable tax 
evasion’), he stated:  
 
“What, it seems to me, the Courts have succeeded in doing is to trespass 
into the legislation field by creating, almost arbitrarily, two categories of 
tax avoidance; permissible tax avoidance and impermissible tax 
avoidance.  And they have done it without at the same time establishing 
any reliable criteria for distinguishing between the two. Pre-ordination is 
no sort of criterion because no commercial transaction is undertaken 
without a measure of pre-ordination. ‘Business purpose’ is no sort of 
criterion, because the saving of money from tax mitigation in order to have 
it available for a business must itself be a ‘business purpose’. So the citizen 




As explained in chapter seven, the rejection of the Revenue’s argument and the 
business purpose test in Craven “because the saving of money from tax mitigation in 
order to have it available for a business must itself be a ‘business purpose’” 
misconceives the fact that paying tax is a business purpose and that the Revenue is a 
stakeholder (on behalf of the public) in every business. 
 
                                                 
773 [1992] STC 226, 240. 
774 Oliver, p.185.   
775 Ibid, p.186. 
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As demonstrated in chapter ten, Lord Hoffmann explicitly rejected the concepts of ‘tax 
avoidance’ and ‘tax mitigation’ in his reaffirmation of the constructional approach in 
MacNiven the way his predecessors rejected ‘tax evasion’ a century earlier, stating: 
 
“Tax mitigation and tax avoidance. 
 
My Lords, it has occasionally been said that the boundary of the Ramsay 
principle can be defined by asking whether the taxpayer’s actions 
constituted (acceptable) tax mitigation or (unacceptable) tax avoidance. In 
IRC v Willoughby Lord Nolan described the concept of tax avoidance as 
‘elusive’. In that case, the House had to grapple with what it meant, or at 
any rate what its ‘hallmark’ was, because the statute expressly provided 
that certain provisions should not apply if the taxpayer could show that he 
had not acted with ‘the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation’. The same 
question arises on the interpretation of the anti-avoidance provisions to 
which Lord Cooke referred in IRC v McGuckian. But when the statutory 
provisions do not contain words like ‘avoidance’ or ‘mitigation’, I do not think 
that it helps to introduce them. The fact that steps taken for the avoidance 
of tax are acceptable or unacceptable is the conclusion at which one arrives 
by applying the statutory language to the facts of the case. It is not a test 
for deciding whether it applies or not.”776 
 
 
“The fact that steps taken for the avoidance of tax are acceptable or unacceptable” or 
more precisely amount to cheating or fraud as a matter of law is not “the conclusion at 
which one arrives [or can arrive] by applying the statutory language to the facts of the 
case.” The corollary of the principle that “fraud unravels all” and the rule of law is that 
it is “a test for deciding whether it applies or not.”  
 
Writing in 2007, Freedman provided this damning indictment of the judicial approach 
to tax avoidance:  
 
“The development of the UK case law over the last 25 years has not been 
impressive. It has failed to produce a clear framework for dealing with tax 
avoidance cases, with the result that an increasing amount of specific anti-
avoidance legislation is necessary, coupled with extensive disclosure 
requirements, which have to be followed up regularly by yet more specific 
provisions. Distinctions have been introduced into the cases only to be 
found to be unsustainable. Attempts have been made to distinguish tax 
avoidance from tax mitigation, but subsequently rejected as unhelpful.”777 
 
 
In these circumstances, as revelations in the courts and increasingly in the media and 
elsewhere illuminate the fraudulent nature of tax avoidance and undermine the dogma 
                                                 
776 [2001] UKHL 6 [62]. 
777 Freedman (2007) pp. 53-54.  
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that it is legal and the tax avoidance industry it underpins, more virulent terms are easily 
invented to fortify them.  
 
11.6. AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING  
 
The foreword to the OECD’s Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries778 published on 
January 11, 2008, which formalised ‘aggressive tax planning’, highlights the role of 
captive national and international tax authorities in this sleight of hand:  
 
“This report has been prepared by a Study Team comprised of HMRC in 
the United Kingdom and the OECD Secretariat. During the course of the 
study, the team included a number of people on short-term attachments 
from several major law and accounting firms. ... There was extensive 
consultation with the private sector. Meetings were held with the ‘Big Six’ 
and other accounting firms and with major law firms, and also with business 
groups including the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC). 
Staff of HMRC and the OECD made numerous presentations on the project 
at conferences organised by the private sector.”779 
 
 
What the Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries described as ‘aggressive tax 
planning’ are cases of cheating the public revenue by tax intermediaries, including “the 
‘Big Six’ and other accounting firms and … major law firms”, but the Study into the Role 
of Tax Intermediaries focused solely on taxpayers thus:  
 
“The following two areas of concern were identified:  
 
 Planning involving a tax position that is tenable but has 
unintended and unexpected tax revenue consequences. 
Revenue bodies’ concerns relate to the risk that tax legislation can 
be misused to achieve results which were not foreseen by the 
legislators. This is exacerbated by the often lengthy period 
between the time schemes are created and sold and the time 
revenue bodies discover them and remedial legislation is enacted.  
 
 Taking a tax position that is favourable to the taxpayer 
without openly disclosing that there is uncertainty whether 
significant matters in the tax return accord with the law. 
Revenue bodies’ concerns relate to the risk that taxpayers will not 
disclose their view on the uncertainty or risk taken in relation to 
grey areas of law (sometimes, revenue bodies would not even 
agree that the law is in doubt). 
 
In this report, these two areas of concern are referred to as ‘aggressive tax 
planning’.”780 
                                                 
778 OECD (2008) p.3. 
779 ibid.  





Tesco Stores v Guardian News & Media781, which involved proceedings for libel and 
for malicious falsehood that arose from the publication in The Guardian newspaper of 
two articles in February 2009 alleging that Tesco had set up an offshore tax avoidance 
scheme to avoid some £1 billion of corporation tax, demonstrated the value of legal 
nonsenses like ‘aggressive tax planning’ to “the ‘Big Six’ and other accounting firms 
and … major law firms, and … business groups including the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee (BIAC).” Seeking to draw a distinction between different types and 
different levels of tax avoidance, counsel for Tesco submitted:  
 
“It is now more usual to divide ‘tax avoidance’ into aggressive and non-
aggressive tax planning behaviour. The claimant would readily put itself 
into the second category, but not the first.”782 
 
 
Judge Eady remarked that he was “grappling with the notion of passive tax 
avoidance”783  
 
11.7. BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS) 
 
The concept emerged from the OECD’s 2013 study commissioned by the G-20 – 
Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.784  
 
The BEPS - Frequently Asked Questions asserted that some BEPS are illegal but then 
proceeded on the basis that all BEPS are legal:   
 
“119. What is BEPS? 
 
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to tax planning strategies 
that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to make profits ‘disappear’ 
for tax purposes or to shift profits to locations where there is little or no real 
activity but the taxes are low, resulting in little or no overall corporate tax 
being paid. 
 
120. Are BEPS strategies illegal? 
 
Although some schemes used are illegal, most are not. Largely they just 
take advantage of current rules that are still grounded in a bricks and mortar 
economic environment rather than today’s environment of global players 
                                                 
781 [2009] E.M.L.R. 5.   
782 Brooks (2013) 122.  
783 Ibid.  
784 OECD (2013). 
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which is characterised by the increasing importance of intangibles and risk 
management. 
 
121.   What causes BEPS?  
 
Corporate tax is levied at a domestic level. When activities cross border, 
the interaction of domestic tax systems means that an item of income can 
be taxed by more than one jurisdiction, thus resulting in double taxation. 
The interaction can also leave gaps, which result in income not being taxed 
anywhere. BEPS strategies take advantage of these gaps between tax 
systems in order to achieve double non-taxation. 
 
122. Why should we be worried about BEPS if it is legal? 
 
First, because it distorts competition: businesses that operate cross-border 
may profit from BEPS opportunities, giving them a competitive advantage 
over enterprises that operate at the domestic level.  Second, it may lead to 
inefficient allocation of resources by distorting investment decisions 
towards activities that have lower pre-tax rates of return, but higher after-
tax returns.  Finally, it is an issue of fairness: when taxpayers (including 
ordinary individuals) see multinational corporations legally avoiding income 
tax, it undermines voluntary compliance by all taxpayers. 
 
123. Is public outcry about the tax affairs of corporate giants the 
driving force behind the OECD’s work on BEPS? 
 
The OECD has been providing solutions to tackle aggressive tax planning 
for years. The debate over BEPS has now reached the highest political 
levels in many OECD and non-OECD countries. The OECD does not see 
BEPS as a problem created by one or more specific companies. Apart from 
some cases of egregious abuses, the issue lies with the tax rules 
themselves. Business cannot be faulted for using the rules that 
governments have put in place. It is therefore governments’ responsibility 
to revise the rules or introduce new rules.”785 
 
 
As stated in the Introduction, the opening paragraph of the Inland Revenue’s Statement 
of Evidence in Charlton corresponds to the OECD’s definition of BEPS (at 119) and 
shows that every offshore or multinational corporate tax avoidance amounts to “tax 
planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to make profits 
‘disappear’ for tax purposes or to shift profits to locations where there is little or no real 
activity but the taxes are low, resulting in little or no overall corporate tax being paid”:  
 
“The prosecution case is that each of the defendants participated in one or 
more of a series of similar schemes to cheat the public revenue. The 
purpose and effect of each scheme was the same. The apparent taxable 
profits of a United Kingdom business would be reduced below their true 
                                                 




level. An untaxed fund would accumulate in an offshore company for the 
use of the directors/proprietors of the United Kingdom business.”786 
 
 
On the face of it, the acknowledgement that “some schemes used are illegal” (at 120) 
might be taken to suggest the abandonment of the mantra that “tax avoidance is legal”, 
which the OECD has long defended in the same way as the national tax authorities 
that constitute it, such as HMRC. One would, therefore, expect to see some guidance 
for distinguishing those schemes which “are illegal” and those which “are not”. But the 
Q&A reverts quickly to the mantra by explaining (at 122) why we should be “worried 
about BEPS if it is legal”. In effect, in order to disguise the fundamentally flawed 
presumption that all BEPS are legal, the BEPS Project resorted to vague notions of 
fairness and inefficiency that are not based in law.  
 
123 indicates that BEPS is a type of “aggressive tax planning” and that some BEPS 
schemes are “cases of egregious abuses”. Again, there is no guidance for 
distinguishing these cases from those where “the issue lies with the tax rules 
themselves.” It is telling that the apologia in the last two sentences of 123 is the same 
formulation used by multinational corporations whose tax avoidance has been exposed 
recently. 
 
The entire BEPS Project is based on the fallacy that BEPS is legal. Like Charlton, 
therefore, the criminal investigations of the BEPS schemes used by Google and Apple 
in France and Italy respectively underscore the fundamental flaw in the Project.  
 
11.8. ABUSE    
 
The General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) in Part 5 of Finance Act 2013 is effectively based 
on the nonsensical notions of ‘aggressive’ and ‘passive’ tax avoidance.  
 
In his recommendation, which was accepted by the Government, Aaronson substituted 
‘responsible tax planning’ for ‘acceptable tax avoidance’ and ‘abusive arrangements’ 
for ‘unacceptable tax avoidance’:   
 
“I have concluded that introducing a broad spectrum general anti avoidance 
rule would not be beneficial for the UK tax system. ... However, introducing 
a moderate rule which does not apply to responsible tax planning, and is 
                                                 
786 Masters, pp 388-389. Emphasis supplied. 
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This sleight of hand did not deceive the Association of Revenue and Customs (ARC) – 
“a body of professional civil servants, administering and ensuring compliance with UK 
tax law”788 – who stated:   
 
“ARC believes the proposal, and the concept of ‘responsible’ tax planning, 
may widen perceptions of what is responsible tax planning and so make it 
harder to tackle avoidance. ... A narrow GAAR may otherwise serve to 
legitimise what is currently held to be avoidance. In other words, under the 
guise of tackling avoidance, it may actually facilitate it.”789 
 
 
Aaronson’s “overarching principle” strengthens the suspicion that “under the guise of 
tackling avoidance, it may actually facilitate it”: 
 
“I have concluded that a GAAR which is appropriate for the UK must be 
driven by an overarching principle. This is that it should target those highly 
abusive contrived and artificial schemes which are widely regarded as 
intolerable, but that it should not affect the large centre ground of 
responsible tax planning.  
 
Critically, I consider that this overarching principle must be supported by 
the simple proposition that where there can be reasonable doubt as to 
which side of the line any particular arrangement falls on, then that doubt 
is to be resolved in favour of the taxpayer so that the arrangement is treated 
as coming within the unaffected centre ground.”790 
 
Aaronson did not define ‘abuse’ or ‘abusive arrangements’ but described it variously 
as ‘highly abusive contrived and artificial schemes’791, ‘highly artificial tax avoidance 
schemes’792, ‘the most egregious tax avoidance schemes’793 and ‘highly aggressive 
schemes’794.  
 
It was against this background that, while announcing the GAAR on March 21, 2012, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer famously declared:  
 
                                                 
787 Aaronson, pp.3-4.  
788 ARC, p.1.  
789 ARC, p.1.  
790 Aaronson, p.28.  
791 Aaronson, p.28.  
792 Ibid, p.41.  
793 Ibid, p.20.  
794 Ibid, p.23.  
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“I regard tax evasion and, indeed, aggressive tax avoidance, as morally 
repugnant”.795 
 
11.9. TAX DODGING  
 
In the Revenue Bar Association’s debate on the subject “This House believes that tax 
avoidance should be punished” on September 28, 2016 Aaronson contended:   
 
“These fine distinctions between tax avoidance and tax evasion; they don’t 
matter a toss. They’re tax dodging.” 
 
As a matter of law and fact, ‘tax dodging’, like the classic tax avoidance, the more exotic 
‘unacceptable tax avoidance’, ‘aggressive tax avoidance’, ‘aggressive tax planning’, 
‘abuse’, ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’, ‘Risk-Mining the Public Exchequer’796, ‘risks 
to the UK Government’s tax take’797, and judicial expressions like “a way of getting 
money out of the Revenue authorities”798, “digging for wealth in the subterranean 
passages of the Revenue, searching for tax repayments”799, “the planning and 
execution of a raid on the Treasury using the technicalities of revenue law and company 
law as the necessary weapons”800, “raids on the public funds at the expense of the 
general body of taxpayers”801 and “attempts to cheat the Revenue”802, is cheating the 
public revenue. In the words of the then Financial Secretary to the Exchequer which 
echoes Lord Simon’s in Latilla:  
 
“Such devices lead to a greater share of the overall tax burden falling on 
the remainder of taxpayers. One person’s successful tax dodge is another 
person’s higher tax bill. If left unchecked, this creates unfairness for the 
many while the few get away with paying much reduced tax bills, ultimately 
bringing the system into disrepute among those who find themselves 




This chapter demonstrated that the concepts of tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax 
mitigation were invented, and serve, to disguise the fraudulent nature of “the judge 
                                                 
795 Rhodes. 
796 Quentin, ‘Risk-Mining the Public Exchequer’, August 2014. 
797 Part of the title of a joint CIOT/IFS debate held in London on April 26, 2016.  
798 Denning, Griffiths, p.915. 
799 Ibid, p.918. 
800 Donovan, Lupton, p.657.  
801 Goff, Ensign, p.244. 
802 Templeman, Fitzwilliam, p.535.  
803 Primarolo, ‘Playing with fire’, Tax Journal, September 22, 1997, p.2. 
322 
 
induced disease of ‘tax avoidance’” and to legitimise the resultant fraudulent multi-





























































































CONCLUSIONS                                              
 
THE NATURE AND MEANING OF TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION IN LAW, 
AND WHY IT MATTERS  
 
Cheating clearly cannot be dismissed as a quaint antiquity of the criminal 
law, nor should it be ignored by professional tax advisers. In one of the most 
recent cases, those convicted (and imprisoned) included accountants and a 
barrister. Yet there has been very little academic consideration of the offence 
and its precise ambit; a fact which is true of most tax frauds. 
David Ormerod, ‘Cheating the Public Revenue’ (1998) Crim. L.R. 627, citing R v 
Charlton and others [1995] 67 TC 500. 
 
 
I. THE EXISTING BODY OF KNOWLEDGE   
 
The fundamental thesis that tax avoidance is cheating the public revenue by the 
professional enablers that devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate the use 
of tax avoidance schemes in which the participating taxpayer using an individual 
scheme may or may not be complicit is a fundamental departure from the existing body 
of knowledge, which continues to rest upon the dogma that “tax avoidance is legal and 
tax evasion is illegal”.  
 
This is attributable to the fact that, more than twenty years after Ormerod’s article, there 
is still “very little academic consideration of the offence and its precise ambit; a fact 
which is true of most tax frauds.” Most significantly, despite the authorities in the 
criminal and civil law like Charlton and Fitzwilliam that held that the relevant schemes 
amounted to cheating the public revenue, there is no published consideration of the 
resultant fundamental question whether tax avoidance is cheating the public revenue 
as a matter of law.  
 
This fundamental gap in the existing body of knowledge is of fundamental 
constitutional, legal and administrative significance because if the meaning of “the 
elusive concept of ‘tax avoidance’”804 in law is cheating, the antidote to “the judge 
induced disease of ‘tax avoidance’”805 must be cheating. In the words of Lord Hughes 
in Ivey: 
 
“There will be a difference in standard of proof as between civil and criminal 
proceedings, but that does not affect the meaning of cheating.”806 
 
 
                                                 
804 Nolan. 
805 Avery Jones.   
806 Ivey [38]. 
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In Ivey, where the appellant professional gambler described himself as an “advantage 
player”, Lord Hughes concluded:  
 
“The judge accepted that he was genuinely convinced that what he did was 
not cheating. But the question which matters is not whether Mr Ivey thought 
of it as cheating but whether in fact and in law it was. ... To label an activity 
‘advantage play’, as Mr Ivey and others did, is of no help at all. It asks,  




The thesis demonstrated that the question which matters in tax avoidance is similarly 
not whether commentators, taxpayers, professional advisers, Revenue officials and 
indeed judges think of it as cheating but whether in fact and in law it is. Charlton showed 
that to label an activity ‘tax avoidance’ is to ask,  rather  than  answer,  the  question  
whether  it  is  legitimate  or cheating. In the words of Rhodes et al: 
 
“Charlton tells us clearly that sitting on top of a set of artificial arrangements 
waving a flag saying ‘tax avoidance scheme’ will not necessarily provide 




Charlton, which was heard by the Court of Appeal in 1995, however, remains what 
Ormerod described in 1998 “one of the most recent cases” of tax avoidance 
prosecution in the UK because of the immunity from prosecution enjoyed by the tax 
avoidance industry from the Revenue. 
 
The rest of this concluding chapter reinforces the proposed definitions of tax evasion, 
tax avoidance and tax mitigation in law and explains the corollaries of the fraudulent 
and criminal nature and meaning of tax avoidance in law.  
 
II. THE NATURE AND MEANING OF TAX EVASION AND TAX AVOIDANCE IN LAW   
 
II.I. Legal Nonsense  
 
It is important to remember that ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax avoidance are not legal concepts 
but legal nonsenses which Cohen defined as “peculiar concepts which are not defined 
either in terms of empirical fact or in terms of ethics but which are used to answer 
                                                 
807 Ibid [27]&[47].  
808 Rhodes, p.203. 
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empirical and ethical questions alike, and thus bar the way to intelligent investigation 
of social fact and social policy.” As Baker stated in his article:  
 
“The fundamental thesis behind this paper is that key terms like ‘tax 
avoidance’, ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax mitigation’ – which are some of the most 
important basic building blocks for discourse about domestic and 
international taxation – are not sufficiently clearly understood or defined, 
and that is wrong.”809 
 
Baker’s proposal demonstrates how the equation of tax evasion (a legal nonsense) to 
tax fraud (a legal concept) restates the dogma “tax avoidance is legal and tax evasion 
is illegal” by substituting tax fraud for tax evasion under the classic evasion-avoidance-
mitigation trichotomy:  
 
“The purpose of this short article has been to suggest a possible – and, 
hopefully, relatively simple – approach to these terms based upon a 
spectrum of conduct and boundaries to be drawn between tax fraud, tax 
avoidance and tax mitigation.”810 
 
As “‘tax avoidance’, ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax mitigation’ ... are not sufficiently clearly 
understood or defined” because they are legal nonsenses rather than legal concepts, 
the correct approach in law should be “based upon a spectrum of conduct and 
boundaries to be drawn between tax fraud” and the related legal concepts of 
negligence and honesty. Legal nonsenses, such as tax avoidance and tax mitigation, 
do not exist upon the same “spectrum of conduct” as the legal concept of tax fraud.  
 
In fact, the subsequent invention of ‘aggressive tax planning’ and ‘BEPS’ by the OECD 
shows that, unlike legal concepts, the categories of legal nonsense are not closed; and 
underscores the flaw in “a spectrum of conduct and boundaries to be drawn between 
tax fraud, tax avoidance and tax mitigation.” 
 
II.II. Cheating, Fraud and Dishonesty  
 
As demonstrated throughout, Hardy J’s classic definition of “what in law is cheating the 
Public Revenue” shows that it boils down to dishonesty: 
 
“The common law offence of cheating the Public Revenue does not 
necessarily require a false representation either by words or conduct. 
Cheating can include any form of fraudulent [or] dishonest conduct by 
the defendant to prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the 
                                                 
809 Baker, p.1.  
810 Ibid, p.14. 
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Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has no right to do 
so.”811 
 
The seminal statement of dishonesty by Lord Hughes in Ivey, therefore, shows that 
cheating the public revenue means the same thing in both the criminal and civil law:  
 
“Dishonesty is by no means confined to the criminal law. Civil actions may 
also frequently raise the question whether an action was honest or 
dishonest. ... There can be no logical or principled basis for the meaning of 
dishonesty (as distinct from the standards of proof by which it must be 
established) to differ according to whether it arises in a civil action or a 
criminal prosecution.”812 
 
The tort of deceit is an example of civil actions that raise the question whether an action 
was honest or dishonest. Lord Herschell’s classic statement in Derry v Peek, which 
outlines the boundaries of the fraud-negligence-honesty trichotomy, embodies a 
generally applicable definition of fraud:  
 
“First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, 
and nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is 
shewn that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) 
without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true 
or false.”813 
 
II.III. Tax Evasion  
 
Tax evasion is cheating the public revenue by a taxpayer who deliberately fails 
to make a return of the relevant tax liability or by a taxpayer who deliberately 
makes a false return of the relevant tax liability without using a tax scheme.  
 
Tax evasion is, therefore, distinguished from tax avoidance by the absence of a tax 
scheme.  
 
In terms of Hardy J’s definition of cheating, the hallmark of tax evasion is that 
the taxpayer cheats the public revenue or “prejudice[s], or take[s] the risk of 
prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has no 
right to do so” by deliberately failing to make a return of the relevant tax liability 
or by making a deliberately false return of the relevant tax liability without using 
a tax scheme.  
                                                 
811 Less. Emphases supplied.  
812 [2017] UKSC 67 [62]-[63].  




In R v Mavji, the taxpayer cheated the public revenue by deliberately failing to make 
returns of VAT liability. According to Davies J:   
 
“This appellant was in circumstances in which he had a statutory duty to 
make value added tax returns and to pay over to the Crown the value added 
tax due. He dishonestly failed to do either. Accordingly, he was guilty of 
cheating HM The Queen and the public revenue.”814 
 
 
In R v Hudson the taxpayer cheated the public revenue by deliberately making a false 
return of income tax liability without using a tax scheme. Goddard CJ stated:  
 
“We think that the offence here consisted of sending in documents to the 
inspector of taxes which were false and fraudulent to the appellant’s 
knowledge ... for the purpose of avoiding the payment of tax. That is 
defrauding the Crown and defrauding the public.”815 
 
 
In terms of Lord Herschell’s definition of fraud, the hallmark of tax evasion is that 
the taxpayer cheats or defrauds the public revenue or makes “a false 
representation ... knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless 
whether it be true or false” by deliberately failing to make a return of the relevant 
tax liability or by making a deliberately false return of the relevant tax liability 
without using a tax scheme.  
 
Baker’s application of Lord Herschell’s definition shows that his proposal substitutes 
tax fraud for tax evasion as stated above:   
 
“Tax fraud – as a criminal matter – must involve intentional behaviour or 
actual knowledge of the wrongdoing. In some countries that is not 
necessarily the case. There should be an internationally accepted 
approach. Tax fraud must involve intentional behaviour or actual 
knowledge. The classic situations will be deliberately failing to put an item 
into a tax return or deliberately claiming a deduction to which a person 
knows he is not entitled. ... 
 
Tax fraud must surely involve a degree of knowledge; in particular, it must 
involve the absence of an honest belief that a person is not liable to the 
particular tax. If a taxpayer cannot show that he has an honest belief that 
he is not liable to the tax, that seems prima facie to fall within the scope of 
tax fraud.  
 
Tax fraud should not extend to negligent conduct and - though this is 
perhaps debatable - it should not include reckless conduct (e.g. submitting 
                                                 
814 Mavji, pp.1391-1392.    
815 [1956] 2 QB 252, 261-262. 
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a tax return with reckless disregard for the accurate position). That may be 




Tax fraud is “a criminal matter” in criminal proceedings where the criminal law “acts 
upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty” and “a civil matter” in civil proceedings where 
the civil law “acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction.”  
 
Lord Herschell’s definition shows that tax fraud includes “reckless conduct.” 
Administrative fines may be imposed, and the level may vary, depending on whether 
“a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, 
or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false”, but this does not affect its nature 
and meaning in law as tax fraud. As Baker, himself, put it: 
 
“In some countries there are different degrees of tax fraud. In Switzerland, 
for example, there is a distinction between tax evasion and tax fraud. It is 
doubtful if these distinctions are very helpful. A State may want to have 
different levels of penalty dependent upon the degree of culpability, but 




II.IV. Tax Avoidance  
 
Tax avoidance is cheating the public revenue by the professional advisers that 
devise, market, implement and otherwise facilitate the use of tax avoidance 
schemes (or “the professional enablers”) in which the taxpayer using an 
individual scheme (or “the participating taxpayer”) may or may not be complicit.  
 
In chapter two, Hardy J’s and Hawkins’s classic definitions of the common law offence 
of cheating were merged to define tax avoidance schemes as deceitful practices to 
prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in 
question by means of some artful device, contrary to the plain rules of common 
honesty in order to reflect the fundamental principle that cheating and fraud are 
‘conduct’ crimes committed by prejudicing the Revenue’s right to the tax in question 
(rather than ‘result’ crimes that require proof of actual loss to the Revenue).  
 
                                                 
816 Baker, pp.6-8. 
817 Baker, pp.8-9.  
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As demonstrated in chapter two, the corollary of that principle is that a tax avoidance 
scheme falls within Hardy J’s definition (“any form of fraudulent [or] dishonest 
conduct by the defendant to prejudice, or take the risk of prejudicing, the 
Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has no right to do so”) 
when it is devised. This means that marketing or implementing or concealing or 
otherwise facilitating the use of the scheme after it is devised, is a distinct and separate 
actus reus. 
 
In terms of Hardy J’s definition, therefore, the hallmark of tax avoidance is that 
each of the professional advisers involved in devising or marketing or 
implementing or otherwise facilitating the use of a tax scheme cheats the public 
revenue or “prejudice[s], or take[s] the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right 
to the tax in question knowing that he has no right to do so.”  
 
In R v Charlton where the professional enablers, but not the participating taxpayers, 
were prosecuted,  Farquharson LJ stated:  
 
“On 1 August 1994 these Appellants were convicted at Nottingham Crown 
Court on an indictment containing 14 counts of cheating the public revenue. 
... Kitchen and Wheeler are qualified accountants. Charlton has practised 
for many years as an accountant, as a partner in a firm called Charltons, 
but was not professionally qualified. Cunningham is a barrister practising 
at the Revenue Bar, with chambers in Lincoln’s Inn. He also works in 
Glasgow in the same field as well as having an association with a firm of 
lawyers in Madrid. Another defendant, Lawlor, pleaded guilty to four counts 
of the indictment. He, too, was a qualified accountant working at the 
relevant time for Charltons. In imposing a suspended sentence of 
imprisonment upon him the Judge said that ‘... the whole Charltons empire 
was riddled with dishonesty’. The firm had offices in Derby, Birmingham, 
Manchester and Jersey.  
 
The case for the prosecution was that Charlton had devised a dishonest, 
tax-avoidance scheme for the benefit of some of the firm’s clients and that 
the Appellants were involved with the implementation of the schemes or 
the concealment from the Revenue of the existence of the fraud.”818 
 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, particularly in the Introduction and in chapter 
five, Charlton proved that the dogma that “tax evasion is illegal but tax avoidance is 
legal” rests for its support upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the fact that in all 
jurisdictions “it is entirely within the discretion of the tax authorities whether they take 
the procedural course of bringing a criminal tax-fraud case or imposing only civil tax-
                                                 
818 Charlton, pp.504-505. 
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fraud penalties or simply establishing tax liability without fines or penalties, applying 
doctrines such as substance over form”819, the Ramsay principle in English law, the 
sham transaction doctrine in American law and the abuse doctrine in European Union 
law. According to Rhodes et al:  
 
“It is a commonly held belief among professional advisers that tax 
avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal. Tax avoidance schemes may 
fail but the taxpayers and their advisers have, until now, been secure in the 
knowledge that the worst that can happen is the receipt of a large bill for 
tax and interest. ... 
 
Amongst professional tax advisers, alarm and concern have been 
expressed at the approach of the Revenue and the conduct of the case. It 
has been argued that there is a general move to ‘blur’ the ‘very clear’ 
distinction between legal tax avoidance and illegal evasion. However, it 
might well be suggested that the distinction is not and has never been as 
clear as many professional advisers (and their clients) would like to believe. 
Where avoidance arrangements are wholly artificial and have no substance 
then clearly it is and always has been open to the Revenue and the courts 
to consider whether they are in fact ‘devices to cheat the public revenue’.  
 
What perhaps has confused the issue is the Revenue’s highly selective 
policy on prosecutions. Although the Revenue are a law enforcement 
agency, their principal purpose is to collect taxes. Accordingly, historically, 
they have only been interested in invoking the criminal law where they 
consider that they will be successful and the case will generate publicity 
which will serve as a warning to other taxpayers or professional advisers. 
Should this attitude change, and should the Revenue seek to act as a law 
enforcement agency on the lines adopted so successfully many years ago 
by the US Internal Revenue Service, then many more taxpayers and their 
professional advisers may find that they are at risk.  
 
Moreover, the terms ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ have been created 
by the legal and accountancy professions as convenient generic terms to 
distinguish what is legal from what is illegal, and the fact that they have also 
been adopted by the courts should not blind us to what they actually are.”820 
 
 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, the terms ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’ are 
legal nonsenses created by the legal and accountancy professions as convenient 
generic terms to disguise the fraudulent nature of tax avoidance. 
 
As a matter of law, tax evasion is clearly distinguishable from tax avoidance as cheating 
cheating by a taxpayer who deliberately fails to make a return of the relevant tax liability 
or by a taxpayer who deliberately makes a false return of the relevant tax liability without 
using a tax scheme.  
                                                 
819 Wisselink, p.203.   




By contrast, in Charlton the prosecution of the participating taxpayers was not required 
to establish the criminal offence. This is because using a tax avoidance scheme by the 
participating taxpayer is a fundamentally distinct and separate actus reus or 
“prejudice, or ... risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question” from 
devising, marketing, implementing and otherwise facilitating the use of a tax scheme 
by the professional enablers.  
 
The corollary of the principle that “if a taxpayer reasonably relies on a reputable 
accountant for advice in relation to the content of his tax return then he will not be 
liable”821 for negligence, let alone fraud, if the advice proves to be wrong is that the 
participating taxpayer using a tax avoidance scheme “to prejudice, or take the risk of 
prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question” is not likely to do so “knowing 
that he has no right to do so.”  
 
In Charlton, Farquharson LJ applied the principle that cheating is a conduct crime which 
means “that the actual result of the loss does not need to be proved”822 and which 
underscores the proposition that a tax avoidance scheme is a cheat and a fraud by 
design thus: 
 
“Furthermore, it was urged upon us that, unusually perhaps in a fraud of 
this scale, there was no loss to the public purse, in the sense that apart 
from one company the tax that was due, as a result of this defrauding of 
the Revenue, has now all been repaid as well as penalties and interest.”823 
 
In terms of Lord Hershell’s statement in Derry, the hallmark of tax avoidance is 
that the professional enablers cheat or defraud the public revenue or make “a 
false representation ... knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, 
careless whether it be true or false” by devising, marketing, implementing and 
otherwise facilitating the use of a tax avoidance scheme.  
 
The Law Commission’s definition, which informed the offence of fraud by false 
representation in section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006, shows that fraudulent 
misrepresentation is wide enough to encompass devising, marketing, implementing 
and otherwise facilitating the use of a tax avoidance scheme: 
 
                                                 
821 [2012] UKFTT 314 at [21]. Emphasis supplied. 
822 Stuart-Smith LJ, Hunt, p.827.  
823 Charlton, p.532. Emphasis supplied.  
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“The concept of fraudulent misrepresentation is well established in both the 
civil and criminal law. It may be defined as an assertion of a proposition 
which is untrue or misleading, either in the knowledge that it is untrue or 
misleading or being aware of the possibility that it might be. The assertion 
may be express, implicit in written or spoken words, or implicit in non-verbal 
conduct. The proposition asserted may be one of fact or of law. It may be 
as to the current intentions, or other state of mind, of the defendant or any 
other person.”824 
 
By facilitating the use of a tax avoidance scheme, the professional enablers 
enable the participating taxpayer to make “a false representation” in a return 
submitted to the Revenue. The principle that “if a taxpayer reasonably relies on 
a reputable accountant for advice in relation to the content of his tax return then 
he will not be liable” for negligence or fraud if the advice proves to be wrong 
makes it unlikely that “a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) 
without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.”  
 
Any legal opinion used to sell the scheme serves to provide the honest belief Lord 
Herschell referred to thus:  
 
“To prevent a false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think, always 
be an honest belief in its truth.”825 
 
As demonstrated in chapter three, the proper focus on the conduct of the 
professional advisers based on the proposition that a tax avoidance scheme is 
a cheat and a fraud by design will show that it is completely irrelevant for the 
purposes of the nature and meaning in law of tax avoidance that the taxpayer 
using the scheme put his cards on the table so that there is no intention on his 
part to mislead.  
 
As demonstrated in chapter two, a defining feature of a tax avoidance scheme is the 
creation by the professional enablers of a mismatch between the true or economic 
position that exists for other purposes and the false or fiscal position that is presented 
to the Revenue for tax purposes. The full disclosure by the participating taxpayer to the 
Revenue of the false or tax position devised by the enabling professional advisers is, 
therefore, still a concealment or misrepresentation of the true or economic position that 
exists in the real world for other purposes. In Charlton, therefore, Farquharson LJ 
stated:   
                                                 
824 Fraud, p.60-61. 




“It was the case for the Crown that the accounts presented to the Revenue 
by the United Kingdom companies were false in that by using Charlton’s 
scheme to transfer part of their profits to the Jersey companies they were 
not disclosing the full extent of the profits they had made. It was this lack of 
disclosure which formed the basis of the false representations alleged in 
the indictment. Each of the Appellants was charged in the relevant counts 
with cheating the Revenue by ‘... falsely representing that the apparent 
purchases (by the United Kingdom company) from (the Jersey company) 
were bona fide commercial transactions’.”826 
 
 
The conviction of the professional enablers for “cheating the Revenue by ‘... falsely 
representing that the apparent purchases (by the United Kingdom company) from (the 
Jersey company) were bona fide commercial transactions’”827 shows that the concept 
of fraudulent misrepresentation encompasses devising, marketing, implementing, 
concealing and otherwise facilitating the use of a tax avoidance scheme. According to 
Farquharson LJ:  
 
“It was apparent, therefore, as the learned Judge said on a number of 
occasions in the course of his summing-up, that there was no dispute by 
the end of the evidence that the schemes were being operated in fraud of 
the Revenue. The issue for the jury, as he correctly pointed out, was 
whether any, and if so which, of the Appellants took part in the devising, 
operation or concealment of the schemes and whether they were doing 
so dishonestly.”828 
 
The underlined terms confirm that concealment (“not disclosing” and “lack of 
disclosure”) and misrepresentation (“false representations” and “falsely representing”) 
are not mutually exclusive, and that tax avoidance, like tax evasion, can be described 
in both terms. The critical misrepresentation or concealment is, however, the mismatch 
between the true and tax positions built into the scheme by the professional enablers.  
 
The frequent argument that tax avoidance could not be fraudulent because the 
participating taxpayer makes a full disclosure of the scheme misconceives the 
fundamental fact that the scheme already constituted a cheat and a fraud when it was 
devised and long before the taxpayer disclosed it to the Revenue.  
 
If the taxpayer implements such transactions in a scheme devised by professional 
advisers and puts all his cards on the table in his tax return, the scheme remains a 
                                                 
826 Charlton, p.506. Emphases supplied.  
827 Ibid, p.507. 
828 Charlton, p.510. 
335 
 
cheat or fraud and the conduct of the professional advisers remains cheating or fraud. 
The corollary of the principle affirmed in Hanson that “if a taxpayer reasonably relies 
on a reputable accountant for advice in relation to the content of his tax return then he 
will not be liable”829 for negligence or fraud if the advice proves to be wrong is that the 
taxpayer putting his cards on the table might mean that the false representation is 
honest (rather than fraudulent or negligent), but that is a fundamentally different issue 
from the nature in law of the conduct of the professional advisers that devised the 
scheme. 
 
This thesis has not been concerned with the question whether a tax avoidance 
scheme ‘works’ as a matter of statutory construction because it remains a cheat 
and a fraud as a matter of law whether it “works” or not.  
 
A tax avoidance scheme is defined in chapter two (for the purposes of the civil law 
where the constructional approach applies and used throughout the discussions on the 
civil law) as two or more interrelated transactions of a kind which had never taken 
place before the tax Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed, devised 
as a result of it in order to reflect Lord Diplock’s theory of retrospective judicial 
legislation which shows that the constructional approach is the recipe for what Avery 
Jones described aptly as “the judge induced disease of tax avoidance”830:  
 
“Whenever the Court decides that kind of dispute it legislates about 
taxation. It makes a law taxing all gains of the same kind or all documents 
of the same kind. Do not let us deceive ourselves with the legal fiction 
that the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what 
Parliament meant. Anyone who has decided tax appeals knows that most 
of them concern transactions which Members of Parliament and the 
draftsman of the Act had not anticipated, about which they had never 
thought at all. Some of the transactions are of a kind which had never 
taken place before the Act was passed: they were devised as a result 
of it. The Court may describe what it is doing in tax appeals as 
interpretation. So did the priestess of the Delphic oracle.”831 
 
As demonstrated in the Introduction and throughout, therefore, a tax avoidance scheme 
or two or more interrelated transactions of a kind which had never taken place before 
the tax Act it was devised to cheat or defraud was passed, devised as a result of it, 
cannot be judged legitimately or countered effectively by “the legal fiction that the Court 
                                                 
829 Cannan J.  
830 Avery Jones. Emphases supplied.  




is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant” but by applying an 
overriding legal principle that operates on a juristic basis independent of the tax Acts, 
such as the common law offence of cheating the public revenue and the pre-existing 
common law of cheating or fraud, to the conduct of the professional advisers that 
devised, marketed, implemented and otherwise facilitated its use and the conduct of 
the taxpayer that used it, as proposed in the fundamental contribution.   
 
As demonstrated in the Introduction and in chapter five, however, in the overwhelming 
majority of cases that are dealt with administratively, the Revenue replicates “the legal 
fiction that the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant.” 
As Gribbon (then Director of the Inland Revenue’s Compliance Division) put it:  
  
“In relation to tax avoidance the ... Revenue’s role involves ascertaining the 
facts (which may require full and detailed investigation) and exercising first 
judgment as to the interpretation of law and its application to those facts. 
The determination of the facts and law is, of course, ultimately for the ... 
Courts, but it is very much the minority of cases that come before ... the 
Courts and in practice, therefore, they operate as a check on the ... 
Revenue’s function. Just as the Courts, in interpreting legislation, will 
not confine themselves to a close literal interpretation, so the ... 
Revenue will seek to ascertain the intention of Parliament when 
applying legislation to novel situations.”832 
 
 
By purporting “to ascertain the intention of Parliament when applying legislation to 
novel situations” or more accurately “transactions ... of a kind which had never taken 
place before the Act was passed ... devised as a result of it”, therefore, “[w]henever the 
[Revenue] decides that kind of dispute it [also] legislates about taxation.” In the words 
of Beighton: 
 
“The general intention of the legislation, and hence its application to 
particular sets of circumstances, can certainly be divined from the words 
with which it is expressed. But to apply the words themselves precisely to 
those circumstances cannot be said to reflect the conscious intention of 
anyone.”833 
 
Like every tax avoidance appeal, D’Arcy v Revenue and Customs Commissioners834 
demonstrates that such decisions by the Revenue and the courts tell us little or nothing 
about the nature and meaning of tax avoidance in law. 
 
                                                 
832 ‘A Sterile Activity’, Tax Journal (1997) p.4. 
833 ‘The Finance Bill process: scope for reform?’ [1995] B.T.R. 33, 42. 
834 [2006] STC (SCD) 543. 
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The agreed statement of facts set out in full by the Special Commissioner in his 
Decision falls within the definition of tax avoidance as cheating the public revenue 
by the professional advisers that devise, market, implement and otherwise 
facilitate the use of tax avoidance schemes in which the taxpayer using an 
individual scheme may or may not be complicit:  
 
“(1) The appellant is Mrs Philippa D’Arcy who is the founder and chief 
executive officer of a company called The Rose Partnership which carries 
on specialist executive search business in the City of London. 
 
(2) The appellant was introduced to the relevant transactions by Mr 
Philip Shirley, a tax adviser. Mr Shirley wrote to the appellant by letter 
dated 10 January 2002. 
 
(3) Attached to this letter was a projection, prepared by Mr Shirley, of the 
returns, costs and tax effects of the proposed transactions, subject (as 
mentioned in the letter) to the possibility of a movement in the value of the 
gilts. 
 
(4) On 16 January 2002, the appellant countersigned the letter of 10 January 
2002 thereby accepting its terms. 
 
(5) The letter and projection referred to proposed transactions with a nominal 
value of £33.5m; in the event the actual transactions had a nominal value of 
£31m. 
 
(6) Having been contacted by Mr Shirley, NCL Investments Ltd (NCL), a firm 
of agency brokers and members of The Stock Exchange, wrote a letter dated 
23 January 2002 addressed to the appellant and headed ‘Execution Only 
Service Terms and Conditions’ setting out their standard terms and 
conditions. This letter was countersigned by the appellant on 24 January 
2002. 
 
(7) By a second letter dated 23 January 2002 addressed to the appellant 
and headed ‘Stock Lending Master Loan Agreement,’ NCL set out the terms 
on which they would provide a facility to ‘repo’ securities on behalf of the 
appellant. This letter was dated and signed for and on behalf of NCL on 24 
January 2002 and countersigned by the appellant on 25 January 2002. 
 
(8) Annexed to the second letter of 23 January 2002 was a Global Master 
Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) between NCL and Royal Bank of Scotland 
Plc (RBS) dated as of 13 August 2001, setting out the standard International 
Securities Market Association (ISMA) terms on which NCL would enter into 
‘repo’ transactions with RBS. 
 
(9) By letter dated 24 January 2002 Mr Shirley told the appellant that he was 
expecting to do the transactions around 13–14 February 2002 and that he 
would contact her shortly before 12 February to inform her of the margin to 
be provided to NCL. 
 
(10) The appellant transferred £350,000 to NCL on 12 February 2002 by 




(11) On 13 February 2002, NCL entered into a ‘repo’ transaction with RBS 
on the standard ISMA terms whereby NCL agreed to buy £31m nominal 
value Treasury 9% 2002 gilts (the gilts) from RBS for settlement on 14 
February 2002 for a purchase price of £33,664,926.15 [at the price of 
£108.596536 which includes accrued interest]; and NCL agreed to re-sell to 
RBS equivalent gilts for settlement on 20 February 2002 for a resale price of 
£33,683,464.92 (interest element £18,538.77). The gilts were transferred 
from RBS’s account with the Central Gilts Office (CGO) to NCL’s CGO 
account in accordance with normal practice. 
 
(12) NCL carried out transactions on behalf of a number of other persons at 
the same time as the appellant and the aggregate transaction related to gilts 
with a nominal value of £139.4m and the documentation in relation to the 
transactions with RBS and JPMS (see below) refer to the aggregate values 
of the transactions. 
 
(13) Since the term of the ‘repo’ extended over an ‘Income Payment Date’ 
(as defined as the record date, here corresponding to the ex div date), it was 
a term of the repo transaction that NCL should pay RBS £1,511,250 by way 
of ‘manufactured interest’. 
 
(14) By letter to the appellant dated 19 February 2002, NCL confirmed the 
terms of the repo transaction. 
 
(15) On 13 February 2002, NCL agreed with a market maker, JP Morgan 
Securities (JPMS) to sell to JPMS £31m nominal value gilts for settlement 
on 14 February 2002 for a sale price of £33,325,176.90. This transaction 
took place in accordance with the rules of the stock exchange with the 
market maker offering the best price prevailing at the time. 
 
(16) NCL subsequently confirmed to the appellant the terms of the 
transaction with JPMS by issuing a contract note dated 13 February 2002. 
 
(17) On settlement of this transaction, on 14 February 2002 JPMS paid NCL 
£33,325,176.90, and this amount was credited by NCL to the appellant’s 
account. The gilts were transferred from NCL’s CGO account to JPMS’s 
CGO account in accordance with normal practice. 
 
(18) On 20 February 2002, NCL agreed with a market maker, again JPMS, 
to buy from JPMS £31m nominal value gilts for settlement the same day for 
a purchase price of £31,855,456.79. This transaction took place in 
accordance with the rules of the stock exchange with the market maker 
offering the best price prevailing at the time. 
 
(19) NCL subsequently confirmed to the appellant the terms of the 
transaction with JPMS by issuing a contract note dated 20 February 2002. 
 
(20) The purchase price was paid to JPMS by NCL on 20 February 2002 
and the appellant’s account with NCL was debited with this amount. The gilts 
were transferred from JPMS’s CGO account to NCL’s CGO account in 
accordance with normal practice. 
 
(21) Also on 20 February 2002, NCL closed out the repo transaction by 
transferring the gilts to RBS for the agreed sale price of £33,683,464.92, 
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which amount was credited to the appellant’s account with NCL. The gilts 
were transferred from NCL’s CGO account to RBS’s CGO account in 
accordance with normal practice. 
 
(22) On 20 February 2002 Mr Shirley sent a fax to the appellant informing 
her of the terms and effects of the closing out of the short position. 
 
(23) On 27 February 2002 the date on which the half yearly coupon was due 
to be paid on the gilts, NCL paid the sum of £6,795,750 to RBS and the 
appellant’s account was debited with her share of that amount (ie 
£1,511,250). 
 
(24) The appellant did not, apart from the above, hold any securities within 
the meaning of s 710 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (the 
1988 Act) in 2000–01 or 2001–02. 
 
(25) The sole reason why the appellant entered into the Stock Lending 




In the words of Hardy J’s definition, “her income tax liability” as “the founder and chief 
executive officer of a company called The Rose Partnership which carries on specialist 
executive search business in the City of London” constituted “the tax in question” and 
necessitated the tax avoidance scheme that amounted to “prejudice, or … the risk of 
prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question”. The sole reason why Philip 
Shirley introduced her to the scheme and the sole reason why she used the scheme 
was to cheat the public revenue of “her income tax liability.” 
 
The fundamental question of law was, therefore, whether each of the professional 
advisers involved in devising, marketing, implementing and otherwise facilitating the 
use of the scheme “to reduce her income tax liability”, including Philip Shirley and his 
collaborators in NCL and RBS, cheated the public revenue or “prejudice[d], or [took] 
the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to the tax in question knowing that he has 
no right to do so.”  
 
Similarly, the less important question of law was whether Philippa D’Arcy cheated the 
public revenue or “prejudice[d], or [took] the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue’s right to 
the tax in question knowing that [s]he ha[d] no right to do so” by using the scheme “to 
reduce her income tax liability.” The corollary of the principle that “if a taxpayer 
reasonably relies on a reputable accountant for advice in relation to the content of his 
                                                 
835 Ibid, 546-547, para [3]. 
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tax return then he will not be liable”836 for negligence, let alone fraud, if the advice 
proves to be wrong is that she “prejudice[d], or [took] the risk of prejudicing, the 
Revenue’s right to the tax in question” but without “knowing that [s]he ha[d] no right to 
do so.” 
 
Under the constructional approach to tax avoidance, however, the case turned solely 
on the interpretations by the Revenue, the Special Commissioner and the High Court 
of the very legislation the scheme was devised to cheat or defraud.  
 
The Special Commissioner’s summary of the Revenue’s contradictory decisions 
underscores the proposition that “[w]henever the [Revenue] decides that kind of dispute 
it legislates about taxation”:  
 
“In brief the appellant entered into a tax avoidance scheme involving 
transactions in gilts designed to create a tax deduction for a manufactured 
interest payment. The Revenue issued a closure notice contending that 
Ramsay applied with the effect that no deduction was created (and a smaller 
amount of income was not taxable), but they have since abandoned that 
contention and now contend that the deduction is allowable but that 
appellant is taxable on an amount approximately equal to the deduction 
under the accrued income scheme.”837 
   
 
Justice Henderson’s summary of his decision and the decision of the Special 
Commissioner in favour of the taxpayer similarly supports the proposition that 
“[w]henever the Courts decides that kind of dispute it legislates about taxation”:  
 
“The substantive issue turns ultimately on a short question of construction of 
an excepting provision in Chapter II of Part XVII of the Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (‘ICTA’) as it applied in the tax year 2001/02 to 
a series of transactions in gilt-edged securities undertaken by Mrs D'Arcy 
with the avowed object of obtaining an allowable deduction against her 
taxable income for a so-called manufactured interest payment of 
approximately £1,511,000. It is no longer in dispute that she is entitled to 
such a deduction as a result of the transactions she entered into. The 
question that I have to decide, in outline, is whether the benefit of that 
deduction is largely cancelled out by a charge to income tax under the 
provisions relating to the transfer of securities with accrued interest (‘the 
accrued interest scheme’) in Chapter II of Part XVII. It is common ground 
that such a charge arises unless it is excluded by the exception in section 
715(1)(b), which applies:  
 
“if the transferor is an individual and on no day in the year of 
                                                 
836 [2012] UKFTT 314 at [21]. Emphasis supplied. 




assessment in which the interest period ends or in the previous year 
of assessment the nominal value of securities held by him exceeded 
£5000.” 
 
At first blush it may seem surprising that there could be any question of this 
exception applying to Mrs D'Arcy, as the transactions which she undertook 
involved two acquisitions and disposals of gilts with a nominal value of 
£31,000,000 over a period of seven days in February 2002. However, as I 
shall explain the exception has to be read in the light of certain interpretative 
provisions in section 710, including in particular section 710(7)(b) which 
provides that a person holds securities on a day:  
 
“if he is entitled to them throughout the day or he becomes and does 
not cease to be entitled to them on the day.” 
 
The short point on which the appeal turns is whether Mrs D'Arcy, who 
admittedly became entitled to £31,000,000 nominal of gilts on 20th February 
2002, also ceased to be entitled to them on that day within the meaning of 
section 710(7)(b), in which case she did not hold them on that day and they 
do not count for the purposes of the £5,000 threshold in section 715(1)(b); 
or whether, as the Revenue contend, she did not cease to be entitled to them 
on 20th February within the meaning of section 710(7)(b) because she is 
already conclusively deemed to have transferred them on 13th February by 
virtue of further deeming provisions in section 710(6). If the Revenue's 
construction is correct, the conclusion follows that Mrs D'Arcy did indeed 
hold the relevant gilts on 20th February 2002 and the exception in section 
715(1)(b) is clearly inapplicable.” 838 
 
As the scheme was devised and implemented after Parliament enacted the “excepting 
provision in Chapter II of Part XVII of ICTA” that came into force on April 6, 1988, the 
decisions of the Revenue and the Courts “as it applied in the tax year 2001/02” could 
not possibly have been made by Parliament. In the words of Lord’s Diplock that cannot 
be over-emphasised:  
 
“Do not let us deceive ourselves with the legal fiction that the Court is 
only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant. Anyone 
who has decided tax appeals knows that most of them concern 
transactions which Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the 
Act had not anticipated, about which they had never thought at all. 
Some of the transactions are of a kind which had never taken place 
before the Act was passed: they were devised as a result of it.” 
 
 
The transactions Philip Shirley introduced to Philippa D’Arcy “by letter dated 10 January 
2002” were undoubtedly “transactions … of a kind which had never taken place before 
the [excepting provision in Chapter II of Part XVII of ICTA] was passed [in 1998] devised 
as a result of it” and were probably “transactions which Members of Parliament and the 
                                                 




draftsman of the [“excepting provision in Chapter II of Part XVII of ICTA”] had not 
anticipated, about which they had never thought at all.” According to Beighton: 
 
“The judges are in theory trying to discern the will of parliament but, in 
seeking to do so by reference to the precise wording with which 
parliamentary counsel has chosen to express the instructions he or she 
received, they are straining at a fiction. The range of detailed circumstances 
which arise in day-to-day life, let alone the arrangements which can be 
made if it is advantageous to the taxpayer so to do, is so enormous that no 
one minister, member of parliament, parliamentary counsel or revenue 
official, or all of them working together, can possibly envisage them. 
 
One major reason why tax legislation is so complex is that the strict basis of 
construction requires counsel, in putting into statutory language the policy to 
which ministers wish to give effect, to attempt to cover every circumstance 
which he or she and those instructing can envisage. Even so it is an idle 
pretence for anyone to suggest that it is humanly possible for the full set of 
possibilities to be foreseen.”839 
 
The different decisions of the Revenue, the Special Commissioner and the High Court 
“on a short question of construction of an excepting provision in Chapter II of Part XVII 
of ICTA as it applied in the tax year 2001/02 to a series of transactions in gilt-edged 
securities undertaken by Mrs D'Arcy with the avowed object of obtaining an allowable 
deduction against her taxable income for a so-called manufactured interest payment of 
approximately £1,511,000” cannot, therefore, mean that Philip Shirley, the other 
professional enablers and Philippa D’Arcy did not cheat the public revenue by using 
the scheme “to reduce her income tax liability” by “approximately £1,511,000” in law 
and in fact. 
 
As demonstrated in chapter five, the unprecedented prosecution in Charlton 
highlighted the fundamental flaw in the notion that a decision by the Revenue or the 
court that a scheme “works” as a matter of statutory construction impels the corollary 
that it is “legal” as a matter of law. As Masters, who appeared as expert evidence for  
Charlton, complained afterwards:  
 
“I can see a general move to blur what is a very clear distinction between 
illegal evasion and legal avoidance, a move in which the Inland Revenue 
itself has had a hand as can be seen from the case. ...  
 
A large number of tax mitigation arrangements of many types were 
implemented in the period covered by the Charlton transactions: from 1978 
to 1990 (and indeed in the years before and after that period). Many were 
accepted by the Inland Revenue as effective, and some were endorsed by 
                                                 




the courts. In fact, schemes using structures set up in Jersey and 
elsewhere were so widespread and so successful that a great deal of 
specific anti-avoidance legislation has to be introduced over the past two 
decades. ...  
 
Most major firms of solicitors and accountants advised clients on tax haven 
operations during the period covered by the indictment. Many would have 
been involved in arrangements similar to Mr Charlton’s schemes. A lot of 
schemes failed to achieve their objective but that was because they were 
caught by one or more of the many anti-avoidance provisions now to be 
found in the tax legislation, or because of the unfavourable approach of the 




D’Arcy shows that the fact that a scheme is “accepted by the … Revenue as effective” 
by purporting “to ascertain the intention of Parliament when applying legislation to novel 
situations” and “endorsed by the courts” under “the legal fiction that the Court is only 
ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant” does not mean that it does 
not amount to cheating the public revenue in law or more specifically that the 
professional advisers that devised, marketed, implemented and otherwise facilitated its 
use and the taxpayer that used it did not cheat the public revenue in law.  
 
Part XVII of ICTA, which includes Chapter II, is entitled ‘Tax Avoidance’ because is a  
specific anti-avoidance legislation. The fact “that a great deal of specific anti-avoidance 
legislation has to be introduced” to counter tax avoidance schemes involving 
transactions in gilts designed to create a tax deduction for a manufactured interest 
payment, therefore, means that they amount to cheating because anti-avoidance 
legislation codifies and decriminalises the pre-existing common law of cheating as 
demonstrated in chapter one. According to Rhodes et al’s rebuttal of Masters’s 
argument:  
 
“It has also been argued that the Revenue and the court were in error in 
seeking to apply criminal law instead of challenging the arrangements 
under civil revenue law, such as the transfer pricing provisions of s 770 
Income & Corporation Taxes Act 1988. Again, such an argument is 
fallacious as it would be a cardinal error to assume that, simply because an 
arrangement can either be challenged under civil law or prosecuted under 
criminal law, the Inland Revenue and the courts have some overriding 
obligation to deal with the matter under the former category. Indeed, 
common sense would suggest that in such instances criminal law should 
take precedence.”841 
 
                                                 
840 Masters, pp.388-390.  
841 Rhodes, p.219.   
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The rule of law and tax justice demand that criminal proceedings should take 
precedence because as things stand they are the only way to determine whether the 
professional enablers and the participating taxpayers cheated the public revenue in 
law.  
 
The civil penalty for the enablers and users of defeated tax avoidance schemes 
introduced by Finance (No. 2) Act 2017 is fundamentally flawed because it can 
only apply to schemes “defeated” or “counteracted” under the fundamentally 
flawed constructional approach. The Consultation Document described it as:  
 
“Proposals for sanctions for those who design, market or facilitate the use 
of tax avoidance arrangements which are defeated by HMRC and to 
change the way the existing penalty regime works for those whose tax 




Arrangements will be defeated under the legislation, therefore, where there is a final 
determination of a tribunal or court that they do not “work” under “the legal fiction that 
the Court is only ascertaining and giving effect to what Parliament meant”843 in a case 
between “those whose tax returns are found to be inaccurate as a result of using such 
arrangements” and HMRC, to which “those who design, market or facilitate the use of 
tax avoidance arrangements” are not parties; or, in the absence of such a decision, 
there is agreement between “those whose tax returns are found to be inaccurate as a 
result of using such arrangements” and HMRC that the arrangements will not “work” 
under the legal fiction in which HMRC “will seek to ascertain the intention of Parliament 
when applying legislation to novel situations.”844 
 
The case studies in the Consultation Document fortify the fundamental thesis that tax 
avoidance is cheating the public revenue by “those who design, market or facilitate the 
use of tax avoidance arrangements” in which “those whose tax returns are found to be 
inaccurate as a result of using such arrangements” may or may not be complicit:  
 
“Case study 2.1 
 
John Combos devises a tax avoidance scheme aimed at contractors and 
freelancers, requiring them to become employees of a special purpose 
                                                 
842 HMRC, Strengthening Tax Avoidance Sanctions and Deterrents: A discussion document, 
August 17, 2016, p.2.  
843 Diplock.   
844 Gribbon.  
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employer and to receive money in the form of loans. A company is created 
to become the employer of the contractors and freelancers and Combos 
offers cash incentives to existing users of the scheme for each new user 
they sign up. He also offers similar fees to a variety of accountants and 
IFAs for any business they refer his way.  
 
The enablers of tax avoidance are:  
 Combos as he receives fees for the scheme  
 IFAs for receiving referral fees  
 Accountants for receiving referral fees  
 The company set up to employ the contractors  
 Individual contractors that have received referral fees  
 
Although all of these players have a role in enabling the avoidance, 
currently none of them face sanctions if the scheme is defeated by HMRC. 
Under the proposals in this consultation, each of them would be within the 
scope of the new penalty. 
 
Case study 2.2  
 
XYZ is a large scheme involving the creation of Limited Liability 
Partnerships, each of which has several hundred members. The scheme is 
devised by Matt Lanyard with external assistance involving advice from 
accountants and a QC, each of whom receive fees from Lanyard. As part 
of the arrangements a bank provides the funds required to drive the 
scheme and takes a fee, which reflects a share of the tax advantage. FCA 
regulations prevent Lanyard from marketing the scheme direct to potential 
clients, so he engages the services of a number of IFAs on a commission 
basis to introduce the concept to their clients. Some of those IFAs make 
contact with local firms of accountants who, again for a commission, make 
their clients aware of the scheme and put them in contact with the IFA. 
Although all of these players have a role in enabling the tax avoidance, if 
the scheme is defeated by HMRC none of them currently face tax-related 
sanctions, other than the bank if it has adopted the banking code. However, 




Although all of these “players” have a role in enabling the tax avoidance and will be 
within the scope of the legislation if the schemes “are defeated by HMRC”, the question 
whether they cheated the public revenue in law does not determine whether the 
schemes “are defeated by HMRC”. 
 
III. THE COROLLARIES OF THE FRAUDULENT AND CRIMINAL NATURE OF TAX 
AVOIDANCE  
 
III.I. A New Approach to Tax Avoidance  
                                                 




III.I.I Compulsory Criminal Investigation  
 
The criminal nature of tax avoidance and the huge amount of revenue involved put it 
squarely within the following provisions of HMRC Criminal Investigation Policy:  
 
“Criminal investigation will be reserved for cases where HMRC needs to 
send a strong deterrent message or where the conduct involved is such 
that only a criminal sanction is appropriate. ... 
 
Examples of the kind of circumstances in which HMRC will generally 
consider starting a criminal, rather than civil investigation are in cases of 
organised criminal gangs attacking the tax system or systematic frauds 




As HMRC “aims to secure the highest level of compliance with the law and regulations 
governing direct and indirect taxes and other regimes for which they’re responsible”847 
and “reserves complete discretion to conduct a criminal investigation in any case”848, 
HMRC should exercise it as a matter of course in every case of tax avoidance. In the 
words of the Keith Committee:  
 
“Enforcement powers are ... necessary not only to coerce the dishonest 
and the neglectful, but to encourage the honest and conscientious.”849 
 
 
III.I.II. Selective Criminal Prosecution   
 
Criminal investigation does not have to result in criminal prosecution. The contention 
here is that the selective prosecution policy, which applies only to tax evasion under 
the dogma that “tax avoidance is legal”, should be applied to tax avoidance because it 
is a criminal offence perpetrated by professional advisers who are currently outside the 
scope of the tax appeals system. In the words of Justice Farquharson’s sentencing 
remarks in Charlton:  
 
“It is a feature, no doubt, of the tax or Revenue law of any country that it 
must, to a large extent, in its tax-gathering activities, rely on the truthfulness 
of the taxpayer in indicating the extent of his income or whatever other 
matter is relevant to the particular statute being considered. It follows also 
that the Revenue not only have to rely on the taxpayer’s good faith, but 
                                                 
846 Ibid.  
847 Ibid.  
848 Ibid.  
849 Final Report, p.3. 
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more especially on the professional advisors they appoint to act for them 
and, accordingly, when professional advisors are found to have acted 
dishonestly towards the Revenue, it is almost inevitable, as I think each 
counsel before us has recognised, that sentences of imprisonment must 
follow and we adhere to that position.”850 
 
 
The equally landmark prosecution in Hudson indicates that prosecution is a 
requirement of the rule of law and tax justice. As “Watchful” stated in a commentary:  
 
“All taxation is the creature of statute, and so far as income tax is concerned 
the relevant statutes are comparatively modern. Yet in the recent case of 
R v Hudson, which was a criminal prosecution arising out of acts alleged to 
have been done by the defendant in relation to his income tax affairs, all 
the counts of the indictment were laid at common law under a precedent 
traceable to the fourteenth century. This is not quite the paradox it seems 
if we remember that the Tax Acts are but a part of the general law of the 
land. Just as, on the one hand, nobody can be taxed otherwise than in 
accordance with the law, so it can and should be insisted that the whole of 
that law is relevant in any question concerning taxation.”851 
 
 
III.I.III. The Cheating or Fraud Approach to Civil Litigation  
 
The landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Ivey that a common test of dishonesty 
applies in criminal and civil law confirms that the courts can give effect to the rule of 
law and tax justice (“Just as, on the one hand, nobody can be taxed otherwise than in 
accordance with the law, so it can and should be insisted that the whole of that law is 
relevant in any question concerning taxation”) in civil proceedings by applying the pre-
existing common law of cheating which “acts upon the offence, by setting aside the 
fraudulent transaction”852 and without resorting to the common law offence which “acts 
upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty”853 in criminal proceedings. 
 
No new law, whether legislation or case law, is, therefore, required to give effect to the 
proposed cheating or fraud approach of deciding tax avoidance litigation on the basis 
of the same legal question whether the participating taxpayer, but more especially the 
professional enablers, cheated or defrauded or otherwise acted dishonestly towards 
the Revenue in law, which was applied in Charlton.  
 
 
                                                 
850 Charlton, p.532. 
851 “Watchful”. 
852 Blackstone. 
853 Ibid.  
348 
 
III.II. Defamation and Malicious Falsehood   
 
The fraudulent and criminal nature of tax avoidance means that an allegation of tax 
avoidance, like an allegation of tax evasion, should not result in liability for defamation 
or malicious falsehood because of “the principle that nobody may benefit from his own 
civil or criminal wrong.”854 
 
The prevailing law and practice rest upon the dogma that “tax avoidance is legal and 
tax evasion is illegal”. In Pirtek v Jackson, where the allegation was “that Pirtek is a 
shady company that practised tax avoidance”, Judge Warby stated:   
 
“The Particulars of Claim allege that all the words complained of are 
defamatory. By that, I take the pleading to refer to the common law 
requirement that, in order to be actionable as a libel, words must have a 
tendency to defame the claimant. That raises a question of law. The law 
requires that the statement be damaging to the reputation of the claimant 
in the eyes of ordinary, right-thinking people generally. ... 
 
It is ... defamatory at common law to accuse somebody of being ‘shady’. 
‘Tax avoidance’ refers to a lawful activity, distinct from tax evasion which is 
unlawful. An allegation of ‘tax avoidance’ may or may not be defamatory, 
according to the context. [Counsel for the claimant] has quite properly 
addressed this point. Her argument is that in the present case the 




In Tesco v Guardian, where the allegation was that the claimant had set up an offshore 
tax avoidance scheme, Justice Eady stated that: “The defendants ... admit that the 
meanings pleaded by the claimant are defamatory.”856 
 
 
As demonstrated in this thesis, tax avoidance refers to an unlawful, and indeed 
criminal, activity. In their article cited above, however, Freedman et al stated: 
 
“Practically  every  media  report  on  avoidance  now  starts with  the  
statement  that  the activities it is discussing are legal but still amount to 
avoidance. It is well understood that there is a difference between evasion, 
which ... is illegal; and avoidance, which is ‘legal’.”857 
 
 
The media invariably includes such caveats as “there is no suggestion that company A 
                                                 
854 Steyn, Hinks. 
855 [2017] EWHC 2834 [42]-[44].  
856 Guardian, p.93.  
857 Ibid.  
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or individual B has done anything illegal” or “tax avoidance is perfectly legal” because 
the courts and the potential expert witnesses in a defamation or malicious falsehood 
claim perpetuate the fallacy that “avoidance is legal.” 
 
III.III. Confidentiality and Whistleblowing    
 
The fraudulent nature of tax avoidance extinguishes the rights of the enabling 
professional advisers and the participating taxpayers to confidentiality. In the words of 
Lord Wood’s classic statement of the iniquity or fraud or illegality exception to 
confidentiality in Gartside v Outram: 
 
“The true doctrine is that there is no confidence as to the disclosure of an 
iniquity. You cannot make me the confidant of a crime or fraud, and be 
entitled to close up my lips upon any secret which you have the audacity to 
disclose to me relating to any fraudulent intention on your part.”858 
 
 
The terms “iniquity” and “a crime or fraud” show that fraud is used here in the widest 
sense that encompasses any illegality to give effect to “the principle that nobody may 
benefit from his own civil or criminal wrong”.  
 
The disclosure of confidential information in the public interest is well established in 
law. As I stated elsewhere:  
 
“Where the general requirements are met under both the old and new law, 
the courts have consistently refused to uphold the right to confidence when 
to do so would be to cover up wrongdoing. Originally this principle was 
narrowly stated, on the basis that nobody can be made the ‘confidant of a 
crime or a fraud.’859 This approach has been developed in the modern 
authorities to include any case in which it is in the public interest that the 
confidential information should be disclosed, whether or not a crime or 
fraud is involved. 860  
 
Lord Goff explained the rationale for this public interest exception thus: ‘It 
is that, although the basis of the law's protection of confidence is that there 
is a public interest that confidences should be preserved and protected by 
the law, nevertheless that public interest may be outweighed by some other 
countervailing public interest which favours disclosure. This limitation may 
apply … to all types of confidential information. It is this limiting principle 
which may require a court to carry out a balancing operation, weighing the 
public interest in maintaining confidence against a countervailing public 
                                                 
858 (1856) 26 LJ (NS) 113, 114.   
859 Gartside v Outram (1857) 26 LJ Ch 113, 114 (Sir William Page Wood V-C). 
860.See Beloff v Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241 (Ch D) at 260 per Ungoed-Thomas J; and 
Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 526 (CA) at 550 per Griffiths LJ. 
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interest favouring disclosure.’861”862 
 
 
Recent public interest disclosures by whistleblowers, such as SwissLeaks, LuxLeaks 
and Panama Papers, underscore the countervailing public interest favouring 
disclosure.  
 
The unprecedented investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of 
the US Senate863 was also sparked by a public interest disclosure by a KPMG lawyer 
acting as a whistleblower. According to Rostain:  
 
“During the late 1990s, large numbers of lawyers joined accounting firms, 
lured by their rapidly expanding tax services. Many were recruited directly 
from school; others were well-established partners at corporate law firm, 
tempted by the enormous income potential of tax product work. It was also 
a lawyer who finally exposed KPMG’s shelter activities.  
 
In the summer of 2002, Michael Hamersley, a tax lawyer who had worked 
at the firm for four years and was a few weeks shy of partnership, refused 
to sign off on the tax treatment of a transaction that was part of a KPMG 
audit of a Fortune 500 company. Pressured to destroy documents related 
to the audit, which he believed was fraudulent, Hamersley contacted 
federal authorities. His cooperation in a government investigation during 




By contrast, in his article analysed in the Introduction, Maugham claimed that “duties 
of confidentiality” trump his “obligation to report serious misconduct”: 
 
“I have on my desk an Opinion - a piece of formal tax advice - from a 
prominent QC at the Tax Bar. In it, he expresses a view on the law that is 
so far removed from legal reality that I do not believe he can genuinely hold 
the view he says he has. At best he is incompetent. At worst, he is criminally 
fraudulent: he is obtaining his fee by deception. And this is not the first such 
Opinion I have seen; they pass across my desk all the time. ...  
 
I have considered my own obligations. To report [them] to the Bar 
Standards Board would involve me breaching my duties of confidentiality 
to my clients (through whose instructions I see the Opinions). And this 
trumps my obligation to report serious misconduct.”865  
 
 
                                                 
861 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No.2) [1988] UKHL 6 at [29]. 
862 Osita Mba ‘Transparency and accountability of tax administration in the UK: the nature and 
scope of taxpayer confidentiality’ [2012] B.T.R. 187, 198-199. 
863 PSI (2003) and (2005).  
864 Rostain, pp.1-2.  
865 ‘Maugham, pp.8-9.  
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III.IV. Money Laundering   
 
The common law offence of cheating the public revenue, which is triable only on 
indictment and punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment at large, became a predicate 
crime for the purposes of money laundering on April 1, 1994 when the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 (CJA)866 came into effect. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer said at the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ meeting on October 5, 1995: 
 
“We must recognise that money laundering is associated with all types of 
crime, from fraud to extortion, arms smuggling to kidnapping. It is quite 
artificial to draw a distinction between drug related crimes and other crimes. 
In Britain we have responded to the shifting threat by passing legislation to 
cover the proceeds of all indictable offences. There is no moral difference 
between drug trafficking and other serious offences, and the risks from both 
are great, and this applies as much to fiscal offences as any other crime. 
All crimes should mean all crimes. Who is the victim is irrelevant. Tax 
crimes make the law abiding suffer. It is they who make up the shortfall 
caused by those who cheat.”867 
 
 
Tax avoidance, like tax evasion, therefore, fell within the term “criminal conduct” in the 
definition of the three principal money laundering offences in sections 93A, 93B and 
93C. As Rhodes et al stated in their article on Charlton which predated the CJA:  
 
“Although it may be a proposition with which the defendants in Charlton are 
unlikely to agree, the timing of the offences and their prosecution was 
perhaps fortunate for them. Sections 93A, 93B and 93C of the CJA came 
into effect on April 1, 1994. ... Any professional adviser indicted on a charge 
of cheat or conspiracy today might face charges under these sections as 
well as the predicate crime of cheating the public revenue.”868 
 
 
The principal money laundering offences are now found in sections 327, 328 and 329 
of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), which came into force on February 24, 
2003. Cheating the public revenue, like fraud under the Fraud Act since 2006, remains 
a “criminal conduct” for the purposes of these sections. Money laundering is defined 
as an act which constitutes an offence under any of these sections or a conspiracy or 
an attempt to commit such an offence, including counselling, aiding, abetting and 
procuring. 
 
                                                 
866 Inserted by section 29 Criminal Justice Act 1993.  
867 HM Treasury Press Office, October 5, 1995. 
868 Rhodes.  
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Any professional adviser indicted for cheating the public by devising or marketing or 
implementing or otherwise facilitating the use of a tax avoidance scheme will, therefore, 
be liable to charges under these sections as well as the predicate crime of cheating 
because tax avoided by the participating taxpayer (like tax evaded by a taxpayer who 
deliberately fails to make a return or deliberately makes a false return without using a 
tax scheme in tax evasion) constitutes “criminal property” for the purposes of these 
sections. No further mens rea is required.  
 
A person guilty of an offence under section 327, 328 or 329 is liable on summary 
conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not 
exceeding the statutory maximum or to both; or on conviction on indictment, to 
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1. At all times relevant to this Information, KPMG LLP (“KPMG) was a limited liability 
partnership headquartered in New York, New Your, and with more than 90 offices 
nationwide. KPMG LLP is and was a member firm of KPMG International, a Swiss 
cooperative of which all KPMG firms worldwide are members. At all times relevant to this 
Information, KPMG was one of the largest auditing firms in the world, providing audit 
services to many of the largest corporations in the United States and elsewhere.  
 
2. In addition, KPMG was in the business of providing tax services to corporate and 
individual clients, including some of the wealthiest individuals in the United States. These 
tax services included, but were not limited to, preparing tax returns, providing tax planning 
and tax advice, and representing clients in Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) audits and Tax 
Court litigation with the IRS. The portion of KPMG’s tax practice that specialized in providing 
tax advice to individuals, including wealthy individuals, was known as Personal Financial 
Planning, or “PFP.” The KPMG group focused on designing, marketing, and implementing 
tax shelters for individual clients was known at different times as CaTS (“Capital 
Transaction Strategies”), and IS (“Innovation Strategies”). The KPMG group focuses on 
designing, marketing, and implementing tax shelters for corporate clients was known as 
Stratecon. KPMG also had a department within the tax practice known as Washington 
National Tax, which was designed to provide expert tax advice to KPMG professionals in 
the field, and which participated in designing tax shelter and drafting opinion letters relating 
to those shelters.  
 
3. At all times relevant to this Information, “Bank A” was a foreign bank with its principal 
United States branch located in New York, New York.  
 
4. At all times relevant to this Information, “Bank B” was a foreign bank with its principal 
United States branch located in New York, New York. 
 




6. At all times relevant to this Information, “Bank D” was a foreign bank with its principle 
United States branch located in New York, New York. 
 
7. In or about 1997, two former KPMG tax professionals, who are co-conspirators not 
named as defendants herein, formed a limited liability company with its principal office 
located in San Francisco and a satellite office located in Denver. In or about 1999, these 
two individuals and another individual formed another limited liability company with its 
principal office located in San Francisco and a satellite office located in Denver. As detailed 
more fully below, the conspirators used the two limited liability companies described in this 
paragraph and certain related entities (collectively referred to herein as “the SF Entities”) 
to participate in certain tax shelter transactions as, among other things, the purported 
investment advisor.  
 
Tax Shelter Fraud 
 
8. During the period from at least in or about 1996 through at least in or about 2003, the 
defendant KPMG, and others known and unknown (hereinafter the “co-conspirators”), 
participated in a scheme to defraud the IRS by devising, marketing, and implementing 
fraudulent tax shelters, by preparing and causing to be prepared, and filing and causing to 
be filed with the IRS false and fraudulent U.S. individual income tax returns containing the 
fraudulent tax shelter losses, and by fraudulently concealing from the IRS those shelters. 
This illegal course of conduct was deliberately approved and perpetrated at the highest 
levels of KPMG’s tax management, and involved dozens of KPMG partners and other 
personnel.  
 
9. KPMG and its co-conspirators designed and marketed these shelters as a means for 
wealthy individuals with taxable income or gains generally in excess of $10 million in 1997 
and of £20 million in 1998-2000 fraudulently to eliminate or reduce the tax paid to the IRS 
on that income or gain. As marketed and implemented, instead of the wealthy clients paying 
U.S. individual income taxes generally exceeding 20% of the income or gain, the client 
could choose the amount of tax loss desired and pay certain of the conspirators and others 
an all-in cost generally equal to approximately 5 to 7% of the desired tax loss. This “all-in” 
cost included the fees of KPMG, the SF Entities, the various law firms that supplied opinion 
letters, including a prominent national law firm with offices in New York, New York (the “Law 
Firm”), the bank participants, and others, as well as a small portion that would be used to 
execute purported “investments” that were designed to make it appear that the shelters 
were legitimate “investments” rather than tax shelters. The size of the purported 
“investments,” the timing of the transactions, and the amount of the fees to certain 
conspirators and participants were all determined based on the tax loss to be generated.  
 
10. In order to conceal the true nature of the tax shelter from the IRS and shield the wealthy 
clients from IRS penalties for underpaying of U.S. individual income taxes, KPMG, and/or 
a law firm provided the clients with opinion letters containing false and fraudulent 
representation and statements and claims that the tax shelter losses where “more likely 
than not” to survive in court if challenged by the IRS. The law in effect from at least in or 
about August 1997 provided that if a taxpayer claimed a tax benefit that was later 
disallowed, the IRS would impose substantial penalties, usually at least 20% of the tax 
deficiency, unless the tax benefit was supported by an independent opinion relied on by 
the taxpayer in good faith that the tax benefit was “more likely than not” to survive IRS 
challenge. Thus, the conspirators issued false and fraudulent opinions letters with the intent 
that the clients would provide the opinion letter and/or the false and fraudulent 
representations and statements containing therein to the IRS if and when the clients were 
audited. 
 
11. Among the fraudulent tax shelter transactions designed, marketed and implemented by 
KPMG, its personnel, and their co-conspirators were FLIP (“Foreign Leveraged Investment 
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Program”), OPIS (“Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy”), BLIPS (“Bond Linked Issue 
Premium Structure”, SOS, (“Short Option Strategy”) and their variants.  
 
12. FLIP was marketed and sold from at least in or about 1996 through at least in or about 
1999 to at least 80 wealth individuals and generated at least $1.9 billion in phony tax losses; 
KPMG’s gross fees from FLIP transactions were at least $17 million; the Law Firm’s gross 
fees from FLIP transactions were at least $3 million; the SF Entities’ gross fees from FLIP 
transactions were at least $3 million.  
 
13. OPIS was marketed and sold from at least in or about 1998 through at least in or about 
1999 to at least 170 wealthy individuals, and generated at least $2.3 billion in phony tax 
losses; KPMG’s gross fees from OPIS transactions were at least $28 million; the Law Firm’s 
gross fees from OPIS transactions were at least $12 million. 
 
14. BLIPS was marketed and sold from at least in or about 1999 through at least in or about 
2000 to at least 186 wealth individuals, and generated at least $5.1 billion in phony tax 
losses; KPMG’s gross fees from BLIPS transactions were at least $53 million; the Law 
Firm’s gross fees from BLIPS transactions were at least $13 million; the SF Entities’ gross 
fees from BLIPS transactions were at least $13 million; SF Entities’ gross fees from BLIPS 
transactions were at least $123 million.  
 
15. SOS was marketed and sold from at least in or about 1998 through at least in or about 
2002 to at least 165 wealthy individuals, and generated at least $1.9 billion in phony tax 
losses; KPMG’s gross fees from SOS transactions were at least $17 million. Among the 
individuals who used BLIPS and SOS-type shelters to evade their own taxes were at least 
14 KPMG partners, and other co-conspirators.  
 
16. The total amount of taxes evaded through the use of FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SOS 
transactions was at least $2.5 billion.  
 
The Fraudulent FLIP and OPIS Shelters 
 
17. FLIP and OPIS were substantially similar. FLIP and OPIS were generally marketed only 
to people who had capital gains in excess of $10 million for FLIP and $20 million for OPIS. 
These shelters were designed to generate substantial phony capital losses (i.e., in excess 
of $10 million for FLIP and in excess of $20 million for OPIS) through the use of an entity 
created in the Cayman Islands (a tax haven), for purposes of the tax shelter transaction. 
The client purportedly entered into an “investment” transaction with the Cayman Islands 
entity by purchasing a purported warrant or entering into a purported swap. The Cayman 
Islands entity then made a pre-arranged series of purported investments, including the 
purchase from either Bank A or Bank D of either Bank A or Bank D stock using money 
purportedly loaned by Bank A or Bank D, followed by redemptions of those stock purchases 
by the pertinent bank. The purported investments were devised to eliminate economic risk 
to the client beyond the all-in cost and minimize the amount of the all-in cost used for the 
investment component. The purported investments were also devised to last for only 
approximately 16 to 60 days.  
 
18. In return for fees totalling approximately 7% of the desired tax loss, including a fee to 
KPMG equal to approximately 1.25% of the desired tax loss, KPMG and its co-conspirators 
implemented and caused to be implemented FLIP and OPIS transactions and generated 
and caused to be generated false and fraudulent documentation to support the 
transactions, including but not limited to KPMG opinion letters claiming that the purported 
tax losses generated by the shelters were more likely than not to withstand challenge by 
the IRS. A New York tax partner at the Law Firm, who is a co-conspirator not named as a 
defendant herein, also issued “more likely than not” opinion letters in return for fees typically 
of approximately $50,000 per opinion, which opinions tracked, sometimes verbatim, the 
KPMG opinion letter. In general, all of these opinion letters were identical, except for the 
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names of the clients, the names of the entities, the dates, and the dollar amounts involved 
in the transactions.  
 
19. KPMG and its co-conspirators issued and caused to be issued the opinion letter 
although, as they well knew, (i) the tax positions taken were not more likely than not to 
prevail against an IRS challenge if the true facts regarding those transactions were known 
to the IRS, and (ii) the opinion letters and other documents used to implement FLIP and 
OPIS were false and fraudulent in a number of ways, including but not limited to the 
following: 
 
a. The opinion letters began by falsely stating that the client requested KPMG’s opinion 
“regarding the U.S. federal income tax consequences of certain investment portfolio 
transactions,” when in truth and in fact, the conspirators targeted wealthy clients based 
on the clients’ large taxable gains and, in return for substantial fees to KPMG, the SF 
Entities, the Law Firm, certain co-conspirators, and others, offered to generate phony 
tax losses to eliminate income tax on that gain, and offered to provide a “more likely 
than not” opinion letter.  
 
b. The opinion letter continued by falsely stating that the “investment strategy was based 
on the expectation that a leveraged position in the Foreign Bank securities would provide 
investor with the opportunity for capital appreciation” when in truth and in fact the 
strategy was based on the expected phony tax benefits promised by certain 
conspirators.  
 
c. The opinion letters also falsely claimed that the clients “reviewed the economics 
underlying the investment strategy and believed it had a reasonable opportunity to earn 
a reasonable profit from each of the transactions . . . in excess of all associated fees 
and costs and not including any tax benefits that may occur” when in truth and in fact, 
they was no such opportunity.  
 
d. The opinions falsely claimed that one of the participants in the transactions (an owner 
of the Cayman Islands entity) was a foreign person unrelated to the other participants, 
when in truth and in fact this foreign person was simply a nominee who received a fee 
to assist KPMG, other co-conspirators, and other participants in generating the phony 
tax losses, and one of the foreign persons had an ownership interest in the SF Entities, 
which participated in many of these transactions.  
 
e. The opinion letters falsely stated that money was paid by the FLIP and OPIS clients 
for an “investment” component of the transactions (a warrant or a swap), when in truth 
and in fact that money constituted fees paid to KPMG, the Law Firm, the bank 
participant, the nominee foreign person, and other participants, as well as money that 
was temporarily parked in the deal but ultimately returned to the client.  
 
f. The opinion letters also falsely claimed that there was no evidence of a “firm and fixed” 
plan to complete the steps making up the shelter in a particular manner, when in truth 
and in fact, there was such a plan, and the transactions in fact were completed in that 
particular manner which was designed to generate the tax loss.  
 
g. The opinion letters stated that the clients were “more likely than not” to survive an IRS 
challenge to the transactions based on the “step transaction doctrine” – a legal doctrine 
permitting the IRS to disregard certain transactions having no economic substance or 
business purpose and the purported tax effects of those disregarded transactions. The 
assertion was false, as the conspirators well knew. Indeed, a co-conspirator not named 
as a defendant herein (“CC 1”), who at the time was in charge of CaTS, instructed KPMG 
partners involved in marketing OPIS not to permit KPMG clients who pitched OPIS to 
retain a copy of KPMG’s PowerPoint presentation describing the transaction “under any 
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circumstances” because to do so “DESTROY any chance the client may have to avoid 
the step transaction doctrine.” 
 
The Fraudulent BLIPS Shelter 
 
20. BLIPS was designed to generate substantial capital and ordinary tax losses through a 
series of pre-arranged transactions that involved the client purportedly borrowing money 
from one of three banks – Bank A, Bank B, or Bank C – in order to make purported foreign 
currency investments including currencies that were “pegged” to the United States dollar. 
The bank involved in the purported loan also served as the counterparty on all of the 
purported currency and other transactions involved in BLIPS. The transaction was 
designed by KPMG and its co-conspirators so that after a short period of time (virtually 
always approximately 67 days), the client would exit the purported BLIPS transaction and 
trigger the desired tax loss.  
 
21. In return for fees totalling approximately 7% of the desired tax loss, including a fee to 
KPMG equal to approximately 1.25% of the desired tax loss, a fee to the SF Entities equal 
to approximately 2.75% of the desired tax loss, and a fee to the Law Firm generally equal 
to approximately $50,000 per transaction, KPMG and its co-conspirators and others 
implemented and caused to be implemented the transactions and generated and caused 
to be generated false and fraudulent documentation to support the transactions, including 
but not limited to KPMG and the Law Firm opinion letters claiming that the purported tax 
losses generated by the shelters were more likely than not to withstand challenge by the 
IRS. In general, all of these opinion letters were identical, except for the names of the clients 
and entities involved, the dates, and the dollar amounts involved in the transactions. 
 
22. KPMG and its co-conspirators issued and caused to be issued the opinion letters 
although, as they well knew, (i) the tax positions taken were not more likely than not to 
prevail against an IRS challenge if the true facts regarding those transaction were known 
to the IRS, and (ii) the opinion letters and other documents used to implement BLIPS were 
false and fraudulent in a number of ways, including but not limited to the following: 
 
a. BLIPS was falsely and misleadingly described as an investment program, when in 
truth and in fact, BLIPS was designed, marketed, and implemented to generate phony 
tax losses in order to eliminate income taxes for wealthy clients and garner substantial 
fees and income for KPMG, the SF Entities, the Law Firm, certain co-conspirators, and 
others. 
 
b. BLIPS was falsely described as a three-stage, seven-year investment program, when 
in truth and in fact, all participants were expected to withdraw at the earliest opportunity 
and within the same tax year in order to obtain their tax losses. Indeed, KPGM and its 
co-conspirators caused the opinion letters to contain a false representation (which 
BLIPS clients adopted) that the duration of the client’s participation in the three-phase, 
seven-year investment program was dependent upon the performance of the program 
relative to alternative investments, when in truth and in fact, the duration of the client’s 
participation was dependent on the client’s desire to obtain the phony tax losses to be 
generated.  
 
c. BLIPS was falsely described as a “leveraged” investment program, when in truth and 
in fact, the purported loan transactions that were part of BLIPS (and were the aspect of 
BLIPS that purported to generate the tax loss) were shams – no money ever left the 
bank and none of the banks assigned any capital cost to these purported BLIPS loans. 
Indeed, at least one of the banks did not fund the loans at all – it neither set aside from 
its own funds nor obtained from the market any money to cover these purported “loans” 
and “loans premiums.” In addition, the sham loans were not in any way used in the 
purported “investment” program involving trades relating to pegged currencies but, 
instead, were used only to generate a phony tax loss. The only money used in making 
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and securing the trades involving pegged currencies as part of BLIPS was money 
contributed by the client as part of the 7% all-in cost.  
 
d. The BLIPS opinion letters falsely stated that the client (based on the client’s purported 
“independent review”) as well as the SF Entities “believed there was a reasonable 
opportunity to earn a reasonable pre-tax profit from the [BLIPS] transactions,” when in 
truth and in fact, there was no “reasonable likelihood of earning a reasonable pre-tax 
profit” from BLIPS, and instead the “investment” components of BLIPS was negligible, 
unrelated to the large sham “loans” that were key elements of the purported tax benefits 
of BLIPS, and was simply window dressing for the BLIPS tax shelter fraud. 
 
e. The opinion letters and other documents were misleadingly drafted to create the false 
impression that KPMG and others were independent service providers and advisors, 
rather than co-promoters and designers of the BLIPS shelter. Thus, for example, the 
KPMG BLIPS opinion letter misleadingly claims that the clients “requested our opinion 
regarding the U.S. federal income tax consequences of certain investments transaction 
that have been concluded” but the opinion letters, which falsely describe a purported 
seven-year investment program and a withdrawal from that program based on the 
purported investment performance of the program, were drafted prior the 
commencement of any BLIPS transaction. 
 
f. Similarly, the KPMG engagement letter used for BLIPS contained the following false 
and fraudulent statements, among others, (i) that the client had engaged KPMG “to 
provide tax consulting services . . . with respect to participation in an investment program 
involving investments in foreign currency positions,” when in truth and in fact KPMG 
marketed a tax shelter to the clients, and the clients engaged KPMG to assist the clients 
in generating phony tax losses using the tax shelter; (ii) that KPMG “understands that 
Client intends to engage” the SF Entities “to provide Client with investment advisory 
services and trading strategies,” when in truth and in fact, the SF Entities were engaged 
to assist the clients in generating phony tax losses using a tax shelter; (iii) that the SF 
Entities “had advised the Client that the utilization of a high degree of leverage is integral 
to the Investment Program,” when in truth and in fact the purported “leverage” was a 
sham loan designed only to support the creating of phony tax losses; and (iv) that 
KPMG’S fees would not be dependent on “the amount of any tax saving projected,” 
when in truth and in fact the amount of KPMG’s fee, as well as the size of the nominal 
investment made as part of the fraudulent tax shelter, and fees for the SF Entities and 
other participants in the transaction were all determined by the amount of phony tax 
losses desired by the client to offset income or gain received from other sources. 
 
23. At various points during the development of BLIPS, KPMG personnel and others 
identified various significant defects of BLIPS, including that the description of BLIPS and 
the factual representations contained in the BLIPS opinions letter and in other documents 
were false, but nevertheless KPMG approved the issuance of BLIPS letters. When 
Washington National Tax approved the BLIPS documentation in August 1999, one of the 
KPMG tax shelter salesmen who helped devise BLIPS (a co-conspirator not named as a 
defendant herein) wrote another co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein “We have 
received our ‘get out of jail free card’ from [Washington National Tax].” 
 
24. In addition, in or about March 2000, and prior to the issuance of any BLIPS opinion 
letters to clients, during a meeting attended by members of KPMG tax leadership, a 
representative from KPMG’s office of general counsel, and others, a top KPMG technical 
expert involved in reviewing the KPMG BLIPS opinion told the other participants in 
substance and in part that if the IRS were to litigate BLIPS in court, the BLIPS participants 
would “lose.” In addition, another member of KPMG’s tax leadership informed the 
participants at the meeting, in substances and in part, that the tax position taken in BLIPS, 
was “close to frivolous.” During that meeting, the participants also discussed the risks of 
proceeding with tax shelter transactions like BLIPS, including the risk of criminal 
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investigation, civil penalties, civil liability for fraud, action by the IRS’s Director of 
Professional Practice, and action by state Boards of Accountancy. Nevertheless, and 
despite the obviously fraudulent nature of BLIPS and the warning conveyed, KPMG 
leadership decided to (i) proceed with the issuance of “more likely than not” opinion letters 
on all the 1999 transactions, and (ii) continue to implement more BLIPS tax shelter 
transactions in 2000. 
 
The Fraudulent SOS Shelter 
 
25. SOS and its variants were designed to generate substantial capital and ordinary tax 
losses through a series of pre-arranged transactions that involved the clients entering into 
virtually offsetting foreign currency option positions with a bank, including but not limited to 
Bank A, transferring the offsetting positions to a partnership or other entity, and then 
withdrawing from the transactions, claiming a loss in the desired amount. KPMG’s 
Washington National Tax office considered whether KPMG should issue “more likely than 
not” opinions regarding SOS-type transactions, and concluded that the phony losses 
generated by those transactions were not more likely than not to withstand IRS challenge. 
Nevertheless, between 1998 and 2002, certain KPMG tax partners assisted in 
implementing SOS-type transactions for KPMG clients for a fee to KPMG generally equal 
to 1% of the tax losses to be generated, and prepared and caused to be prepared tax 
returns based on the phony SOS tax losses. For many of these SOS-type transactions, 
KPMG did not issue an opinion letter, but instead certain lawyers issued “more likely than 
not” opinion letters with respect to those transactions. The SOS opinion letters, and others 
associated documents, were false and fraudulent in a number of ways well known to KPMG 
and KPMG tax partners involved, including the following:  
 
a. They misrepresented SOS as an investment, when in truth and in fact, it was a tax 
shelter designed to generate tax losses in order to eliminate income taxes for wealthy 
clients and garner substantial fees and income for KPMG, certain co-conspirators, and 
others. 
 
b. They falsely claimed that the client would have entered into the option position 
independent of the other steps that made up SOS, when in truth and in fact, the clients 
would have not entered into those positions absent the anticipated tax loss to be 
generated.  
 
c. They falsely claim that the option positions were contributed to a partnership or other 
entity to “diversify” the client’s “investment” when in truth and in fact, the contribution 
was simply a necessary step in the tax shelter, was executed for the purpose of 
generating the tax loss, and was not executed to “diversify” any “investment”. 
 
d. They falsely claim that the client entered into the offsetting option positions for 
“substantial non-tax business reasons,” and contributed the option positions to the 
partnership or other entity for “substantial non-tax business reasons,” when in truth and 
in fact, the transactions were undertaken in order to generate the phony tax losses SOS 
purported to generate and not for any “substantial non-tax business reason.” 
 
26. In addition, from at least in or about 1999 through at least in or about 2002, a KPMG 
partner, who is a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein (“CC 2”), with the 
approval of members of KPMG’s tax leadership, marketed and implemented dozens of 
SOS-type transactions to KPMG clients, often charging fees well in excess of 1% of the 
phony tax losses to be generated. CC 2 also arranged SOS-type transactions for at least 
14 KPMG partners, so that those partners could evade their own taxes. In connection with 
the SOS-type transactions arranged by CC 2, CC 2 issued KPMG opinion letters or caused 
others to issue opinion letters that falsely claimed that the tax losses purportedly generated 
by SOS were more likely than not to withstand IRS challenge. These opinions were false 
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and fraudulent in a number of ways well known to CC 2 and his co-conspirators, including 
but not limited to the following: 
 
a. They misrepresented SOS as an investment, when in truth and in fact, it was a tax 
shelter designed to generate tax losses in order to eliminate income taxes for wealthy 
clients and garner substantial fees for KPMG, certain co-conspirators, and others. 
 
b. They falsely claimed that the clients would have entered into the option positions 
independent of the other steps that made up SOS, when in truth and in fact, the clients 
would not have entered into those positions absent the anticipated tax loss to be 
generated. 
 
c. They falsely claim that the option positions were contributed to a partnership or other 
entity to “diversify” the client’s “investment” when in truth and in fact, the contribution 
was simply a necessary step in the tax shelter, was executed for the purpose of 
generating the tax loss, and was not executed to “diversify” and “investment.” 
 
d. They falsely claim that the client entered into the offsetting option positions for 
“substantial non-tax business reasons,” and contributed the option positions to the 
partnership or other entity for “substantial non-tax business reasons,” when in truth and 
in fact, the transactions were undertaken in order to generate the phony tax losses SOS 
purported to generate and not for any “substantial non-tax business reason.” 
 
Fraudulent Concealment of Tax Shelters 
 
27. In addition to preparing and causing to be prepared false and fraudulent documentation 
relating to and implementing the shelter transactions, and in addition to preparing and 
causing to be prepared tax returns that fraudulently incorporated the phony tax shelters 
losses, KPMG and its co-conspirators employed various means fraudulently to conceal 
from the IRS the fraudulent tax shelters they designed, marketed and implemented, 
including but not limited to the following: (i) not registering the tax shelters with the IRS as 
required by law; (ii) preparing and causing to be prepared tax returns that fraudulently 
concealed the phony losses from IRS; (iii) attempting to conceal from the IRS the tax shelter 
losses and transactions with sham attorney-client privilege claims; and (iv) obstructing IRS 
and Senate investigations into their tax shelter activities.  
 
Failing to Register Tax Shelters 
 
28. Under the law in effect at all times relevant to this Information, an organizer of a tax 
shelter was required to “register” the shelter by filing a form with the IRS describing the 
transaction. The IRS in turn would issue a number to the shelter, and all individuals or 
entities claiming a benefit from the shelter were required to include with their income tax 
return a form disclosing that they had participated in a registered tax shelter, and disclosed 
the assigned registration number. Notwithstanding these legal requirements, KPMG and its 
co-conspirators decided not to register as required any of the tax shelters KPMG devised, 
marketed and implemented, and thereby ensured that registration numbers would not be 
included on returns relating to unregistered shelters. 
 
29. Thus, KPMG decided not to register FLIP, OPIS, or BLIPS based on a “business 
decision” that to register the shelters would hamper KPMG’s ability to sell them, and that 
the IRS penalties applicable to a failure to register would be dwarfed by the lucrative fees 
KPMG stood to collect from selling unregistered tax shelters. Indeed, CC 1 wrote a 
memorandum to a member of KPMG’s tax leadership arguing that, assuming OPIS was 
required to be registered, KPMG should make a “business decision” not to register OPIS 
because (i) registering the shelters would put KPMG at a competitive disadvantage as 
compared to other accounting firms, law firms and other firms that were promoting tax 
shelters; and (ii) selling unregistered shelters would be so lucrative that the benefits 
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outweighed the risk of civil penalties that might be imposed. Moreover, KPMG’s office of 
general counsel, among others, advised that by deciding not to register tax shelters, KPMG 
risked criminal prosecution, but like the CaTS group, advised that KPMG’s tax leadership 
could nevertheless “make a business decision to not register the activity as a tax shelter.” 
 
Fraudulently Concealing Shelter Losses and Income on Tax Returns 
 
30. The conspirators would and did prepare and cause to be prepared tax returns that were 
false and misleading and were intended fraudulently to conceal the fraudulent tax shelters 
from the IRS in a number of ways, including but not limited to the following:  
 
a. Although the law requires that an individual’s items of income, gain, and loss be 
reported on an individual income tax return, KPMG personnel their co-conspirators 
advised certain clients that the phony tax shelter losses and the income or gains that 
were to be sheltered should not be reported on the client’s individual income tax return, 
and instead only the net of those two figures should be reported on the return. One 
method of “netting” pursued by the conspirators in order fraudulently to hide the tax 
shelter transactions from the IRS involved using a “grantor trust.” A grantor trust is a 
trust that, because of certain features enumerated in the tax code, is disregarded as an 
entity for federal income tax purposes. CC 1 and his co-conspirators devised a scheme 
to insert a grantor trust into a tax shelter transaction, and then, rather than disregarding 
the grantor trust as required by the tax code, reporting the large phony tax shelter loss 
and the taxable gain or income those losses were used to offset only on the grantor trust 
information return, while reporting only the small net of those numbers on the client’s 
individual income tax return. Although members of the Innovative Strategies group were 
notified that to pursue this “grantor trust netting” scheme was not a proper reporting 
position, and in fact would result in the filing of false income tax returns, KPMG permitted 
its partners to decide for themselves whether to engage in grantor trust netting. As a 
result, dozens of tax returns of FLIP, OPIS and BLIPS clients used grantor trusts 
fraudulently to hide the tax shelter losses (and the gains they were designed to shelter) 
on the client’s individual income tax returns. 
 
b. In order to conceal tax shelter losses from the IRS, a KPMG tax partner who is co-
conspirator not named as a defendant herein (“CC 3”), and others, advised at least one 
client that phony tax shelters losses could be concealed and made to look like losses 
from the sale of a number of publicly traded stock on behalf of the shelter client, and 
then distributed those stocks to the client upon the clients withdrawal from the 
transaction. CC 3 and others then advised that the shelter could be concealed on the 
client’s tax return and instead reported as losses resulting from the sale of stock so 
distributed. In order to further conceal the phony tax shelter losses from the IRS, in some 
instances CC 2 and others purchased stocks that had already suffered large losses 
during the year as the stocks to which the shelter losses would be attached, in order to 
mislead the IRS into believing that the losses resulted from those stocks’ poor 
performance, rather than from the fraudulent tax shelters. 
 
Concealing Shelters with Sham Attorney–Client Privilege Claims 
 
31. The conspirators also attempted to conceal their fraudulent tax shelters activities by 
attempting to cloak communications regarding those activities and certain of the activities 
themselves with the attorney-client privilege, although the communications in question 
were not privileged. For example, CC 2 attempted to conceal his activities in this manner 
by purporting to have KPMG clients engage a law firm to provide legal advice, which law 
firm would then purport to engage KPMG to work under the direction of the law firm. Under 
United States v. Kovel, communications by non-lawyers professionals such as accountants 
are protected under the attorney-client privilege when the accountant is in fact working 
under the direction of an attorney. Numerous Kovel arrangements established by CC 2 
were sham arrangements because the clients did not directly engage the law firm, in many 
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instances never even spoke to the lawyers who they had purportedly engaged, and CC 2’S 
work was done outside of the purported lawyer-client privilege. The purpose of this 
fraudulent conduct was to enable the client, with the assistance of CC 2 and the law firm, 
to conceal the fraudulent tax shelter from the IRS by attempting to cloak all of the work for 
the shelter in the attorney-client privilege.  
 
Obstruction of the IRS and Senate Investigations 
 
32. Despite the conspirators’ efforts to prevent IRS scrutiny of these fraudulent tax shelters, 
in or about September 2001 the IRS initiated an examination of KPMG for its failure to 
register the transactions with the IRS. As part of this examination, in early 2002 the IRS 
issued 25 summonses to KPMG to designate a knowledgeable person to testify under oath 
at the IRS. KPMG designated a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein (“CC 6”), 
who at the time was the partner in charge of KPMG’s Personal Financial Planning group, 
to testify. CC 6’s testimony was false, misleading, and evasive. Indeed, after one day of 
testimony, another KPMG partner who attended the testimony reported in an email to a 
KPMG tax leader that KPMG’s Office of General Counsel and the outside counsel 
“determined that the best strategy was ‘the less said the better,’” and that CC 6 “felt that he 
had no choice but to be ‘forgetful.’ And so the record will reflect repeated ‘I don’t knows’, ‘I 
don’t recall’ and ‘I was out of the loops’ – the rope-a-dope/Enron defense.” 
 
33. IRS summonses called for production of documents relating to SOS tax shelters, among 
other things. One of the KPMG tax leaders directing KPMG’s response to the IRS 
summonses, who is a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein (“CC 7”) was aware 
of KPMG’s involvement in promoting SOS transactions. Nevertheless, none of the SOS tax 
shelter marketed or implemented by KPMG, or in which KPMG personnel participated, were 
disclosed to the IRS and on a number of occasions, CC7 and others caused KPMG falsely 
to claim to the IRS that the production of documents and information relating to the 
summonses was substantially complete.  
 
34. In addition, when the IRS in May 2003 specifically inquired about KPMG’s failure to 
produce SOS information, CC 6 intentionally caused KPMG’s representative to falsely 
respond that KPMG was not involved in SOS, but may have prepared a couple of tax 
returns containing SOS losses.  
 
35. In January 2003, a Subcommittee of the United States Senate issued a subpoena to 
KPMG calling for documents and information relating to its tax shelter activities, including 
a specific request for documents relating to tax shelters used by KPMG partners to evade 
their own taxes. The subpoena specifically named CC 2 as well as at least two KPMG 
partners who, in fact, had used SOS transactions to evade their own taxes. CC 7 was 
among the KPMG personnel directing KPMG’s response to the Senate investigation. In 
addition, CC 7 was aware of at least one KPMG partner who used an SOS-type shelter to 
offset the partner’s own income or gain, and was aware of related documents responsive 
to the Senate subpoena. However, CC 7 and is co-conspirators caused KPMG’s 
representatives falsely to respond to the subpoena as follows: “to the best of its knowledge 
and belief, after reasonable inquiry to date, the firm has not yet identified any documents 
that are responsive to this request.” 
 
36. In or about November 2003, CC 6, CC 7, other co-conspirators, and others testified 
before the Senate Subcommittee investigating tax shelter activities of KPMG and others. 
CC 6 and other KPMG personnel testified together in panel format. During this testimony, 
among other things, CC 6 falsely denied that KPMG’s fee was a percentage of the tax loss 
to be generated by the shelters. In addition, when asked by a Senator whether FLIP, OPIS 
and BLIPS were “designed and marketed primarily as a tax reduction strategies,” CC 6 
falsely stated “Senator, I would not agree with that characterization.” In addition, among 
other false and misleading testimony presented at the hearing, CC 7 gave evasive 
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37. From at least in or about 1996 through at least in or about 2003, KPMG, the defendant, 
and its co-conspirators, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly, did combine, conspire, 
confederate and agree together and with each other to defraud the United States and an 
agent thereof, to wit, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) of the United States Department 
of Treasury, and to commit offenses against the United States, to wit, violations of Title 26, 
United States Code, Sections 7201, 7206(1), and 7206(2).  
 
Objects of the Conspiracy 
 
38. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that KPMG, the defendant, and its co-
conspirators, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly would and did defraud the United States of 
America and the IRS by impeding, impairing, defeating and obstructing the lawful 
governmental functions of the IRS in ascertainment, evaluation, assessment, and collection 
of income taxes. 
 
39. It was further a part and an object of the conspiracy that KPMG, the defendant, and its 
co-conspirators, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly would and did attempt to evade and 
defeat a substantial part of the income taxes due and owing to the United States by tax 
shelters clients and others, in violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7201. 
 
40. It was further a part and an object of the conspiracy that KPMG, the defendant, and its 
co-conspirators, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly would and did (a) make and subscribe, 
and cause others to make and subscribe United States individual, corporation, and 
partnership income tax returns, which returns contained and were verified by written 
declarations that they were made under the penalties of perjury, and that the defendants 
and their co-conspirators did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter; 
and (b) aid and assist in, and procure, counsel, and advise the preparation and presentation 
under, the internal revenue law, of certain United States individual, corporation, and 
partnership income tax returns which were fraudulent and false as to material matters, in 
violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206. 
 
Means and Methods of the Conspiracy 
 
41. Among the means and methods by which KPMG, the defendant, and its co-conspirators 
would and did carry out the conspiracy were the following: 
 
a. They would and did concoct tax shelter transactions and false and fraudulent factual 
scenarios to support them so that wealthy United States citizens would pay certain of 
the conspirators and other participants in the transactions approximately 5 to 7% of 
income or gain instead of paying federal and state taxes on that income or gain. 
 
b. They would and did prepare false and fraudulent documents to deceive the IRS, 
including but not limited to, engagement letters, transactional documents, 
representation letters and opinion letters. 
 
c. They would and did conceal the contents of tax shelter sales presentations in order 
to prevent the IRS from discovering the true facts regarding those shelters transactions. 
 
d. They would and did prepare and provide to their clients false and fraudulent 
representations that the clients were required to make in order to obtain opinion letters 
that purported to justify using the phony tax shelter losses to offset income or gain. At 
times, the conspirators presented to their clients these false and fraudulent client 
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representations after the all-in cost of approximately 5 to 7% of the desired tax loss were 
collected from the tax shelter clients. 
 
e. They would and did prepare and cause to be prepared tax returns that were false and 
fraudulent because, among other things, they incorporated the phony tax losses and 
therefore substantially understated the tax due and owing by the shelter clients.  
 
f. They would and did (i) fraudulently omit on certain tax returns the losses and the gain 
or income they sheltered: and (ii) disguise the shelter losses on certain tax returns in a 
manner intended to deceive the IRS. 
 
g. They would and did take various steps to prevent the creation and retention of 
documents that might reveal to the IRS the true facts regarding the fraudulent tax 
shelters as well as certain conspirators’ role in designing, marketing, and implementing 
them, including but not limited to concealing from the IRS that the opinion letters 
provided by KPMG, the Law Firm, and other firms were not independent and were 
instead prepared by entities involved in the design, marketing, and implementation of 
tax shelters. 
 
h. They would and did take various additional steps to conceal from the IRS the 
existence of shelters, their true facts, and certain conspirators’ role in designing, 
marketing, and implementing the shelters including, but not limited to, failing to register 
the shelters, using sham attorney-client privilege claims, and concealing documents and 





42. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal objects thereof, KPMG, the 
defendant, and its co-conspirators, committed the following overt acts, among others, in 
the Southern District of New York and elsewhere: 
 
a. On or about July 18, 1997, a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein 
prepared a memorandum to KPMG tax leaders discussing how KPMG and the SF 
Entities should jointly devise, market and implement tax shelter transactions and how 
their fees should be divided. 
 
b. In or about September 1997, KPMG and the SF Entities executed an “operating 
agreement” regarding joint marketing and implementation of FLIP transactions. 
 
c. On or about June 8, 1998, CC 1 advised the KPMG team marketing OPIS not to leave 
the OPIS PowerPoint presentation “with clients or targets under any circumstances” 
because doing so “will DISTROY any chance the client may have to avoid the step 
transaction doctrine.” 
 
d. On or about September 10, 1998, the defendant CC 6 sent an email to a KPMG tax 
leader and others proposing an “alliance” with a competitor of the SF Entities to 
implement OPIS transactions and noting that “we have very little time to work with if we 
are going to execute trades such that our clients can generate the desired benefits in 
calendar 1998.” 
 
e. On or about January 22, 1999, CC 6 instructed KPMG partners that each partner 
should decide for himself or herself whether to attempt to conceal losses from the IRS 




f. In or about September or October 1999, Domenick DeGiorgio, a co-conspirator not 
named as a defendant herein, met at the offices of Bank B in the Southern District of 
New York with personnel of the SF Entities and others.  
 
g. In or about 1999, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, Banks A, B and 
C prepared and caused to be prepared transactional documents relating to BLIPS tax 
shelter transactions. 
 
h. On or about December 8, 1999, a KPMG partner who is a co-conspirator not named 
as a defendant herein advised other KPMG personnel involved in marketing and 
implementing BLIPS that a document on which the client selected how much of the 
BLIPS loss should be ordinary and how much should be capital should not be kept in 
the file because “if the IRS were to discover such as document it could look very bad for 
the client.” 
 
i. On or about March 7, 2000, members of KPMG tax leadership, a representative from 
KPMG’s office of general counsel, and others met in the Southern District of New York 
to discuss, among other things, the risk of civil penalties and criminal investigation 
associated with completing the implementation of 1999 OPIS and BLIPS transactions. 
 
j. On or about March 21, 2000, a KPMG tax partner who is co-conspirator not named as 
a defendant herein advised other KPMG personnel involved in marketing BLIPS that 
they should “NOT put a copy of” an email in their BLIPS files because “it is a roadmap 
for the taxing authorities to all the other listed transactions.” 
 
k. In or about 1998, 1999, and 2000, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, 
KPMG and other participants in FLIP and OPIS tax shelter transactions, who are co-
conspirators not named as defendants herein, prepared, signed and filed tax returns 
that falsely and fraudulently claimed over $4.2 billion in phony tax losses by FLIP and 
OPIS transactions. 
 
l. In or about 2000 and 2001, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, KPMG 
and other participants in BLIPS tax shelter transactions, who are co-conspirators not 
named as defendants herein, prepared, signed and filed tax returns that falsely and 
fraudulently claimed over $5.1 billion in phony tax losses generated by BLIPS 
transactions. 
 
m. In or about 1999, 2000, and 2001 KPMG and other participants in SOS tax shelter 
transactions, who are co-conspirators not named as defendants herein, prepared, 
signed and filed tax returns that falsely and fraudulently claimed over $1.9 billion in 
phony tax losses generated by SOS. 
 
n. On or about February 12, 2002, CC 6 provided false and misleading testimony under 
oath to the IRS. 
 
o. On or about October 2, 20002, CC 7, on behalf of KPMG, sent a letter to the IRS in 
the Sothern District of New York falsely claiming that “KPMG has at this time virtually 
completed its compliance with the summonses” although as CC 7 well knew, KPMG had 
produced no documents or information regarding its involvement in marketing and 
implementing SOS transactions. 
 
p. On or about February 19, 2003, KPMG caused its representatives falsely to represent 
to the Senate that “after reasonable inquiry to date, the firm has not yet identified any 
documents” relating to shelter transactions used by KPMG partners to shelter their own 





q. On or about November 18, 2003, CC 6 provided false and misleading testimony under 
oath to a Subcommittee of the United States Senate. 
 
r. On or about November 18, 2003, CC 7 provided evasive testimony under oath to a 
Subcommittee of the United States Senate. 
 




DAVID N. KELLY 
















































APPENDIX 2  
 




UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  Hon. 
      ) 
 v.     ) Criminal No. ________ 
      ) 





The defendant having waived in open court prosecution by indictment, the United States 
Attorney for the District of New Jersey charges: 
 




1. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) was an agency of the United States Department 
of the Treasury responsible for administering and enforcing the tax laws of the United 
States and collecting the taxes owed to the Treasury of the United Sates by its citizens.  
 
2. United States citizens and residents had an obligation to report to the IRS on Schedule 
B of a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, Form 1040, whether that individual had a financial 
interest in, or signature authority over, a financial account in a foreign country during a 
particular year by checking “Yes” or “No” in the appropriate box and identifying the country 
where the account was maintained. United States citizens and residents also had an 
obligation to report all income earned from foreign financial accounts on their tax returns.  
 
3. United States citizens and residents who had a financial interest in, or signature authority 
over, one or more financial accounts in a foreign country with an aggregate value of more 
than $10,000 at any time during a calendar year were required to file with the Department 
of the Treasury for that calendar year a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts on 
Form TD F 90-22.1 (“FBAR”). The FBAR for a particular calendar year was due by June of 
the following calendar year.  
 
4. An “undeclared bank account” was a financial account maintained in a foreign country 
that was required to be, but was not, reported to the United Stated government on a tax 
return or an FBAR.  
 
5. The Internal Revenue Code and associated regulations required financial institutions, 
including banks, to issue an IRS Form 1099 to each individual who was paid $10 or more 
of interest income during a calendar year reporting the recipient’s name, address, Social 
Security number and the amount of interest income paid, and to file a copy of the Form 
1099 with the IRS.  
 
6. A “bearer share corporation” is one where the ownership is based on physical possession 
of the shares of the corporation. Ownership of a bearer share corporation is not readily 
identifiable, as opposed to a corporation with registered stock shares, where the owners of 
the entity are identified in the corporation’s records. Bearer share corporations are often 
368 
 
set up in tax havens to hide the true ownership of assets, because ownership records are 
not maintained and nominee officers and directors are often used to appear to control the 





7. San Vision Technologies, Inc. (“SVT”) was a U.S. corporation created in 1992 and owned 
by defendant SANJAY SETHI. SVT provided technical consulting, software development, 
database management, and other information technology services for banking and 
insurance clients.  
 
8. Karol Bagh Charitable Trust (“Karol Bagh”) was an entity created under Swiss law that 
defendant SANJAY SEITH used to conceal his ownership of undeclared accounts in 
Switzerland into which SETHI deposited the proceeds of real estate transactions related to 
properties located in India.  
 
9. Fundus, Inc. (“Fundus”) was a Cayman Islands bearer share corporation that defendant 
SANJAY SETHI used to conceal his ownership of U.S. bank accounts funded with the 
proceeds of real estate transactions related to properties in India.  
 
10. SNS Investments, Ltd. (“SNS Investments”) was a British Virgin Islands bearer share 
corporation that defendant SANJAY SETHI used to conceal his ownership of undeclared 
bank accounts in Switzerland into which SETHI deposited the proceeds of real estate 
transactions related to properties in India.  
 
11. Driftmore International, Ltd. (“Driftmore”) was a British Virgin Islands bearer share 
corporation that defendant SANJAY SETHI used to conceal his ownership of an undeclared 
bank account in Switzerland into with SETHI deposited unreported business receipts and 
reimbursements for actual business expenses of SVT.  
 
12. Ace Marketing, Inc. (“Ace Marketing”) was a corporation that defendant SANJAY SETHI 
owned and used to send funds to an undeclared bank account in Switzerland held in the 
name of Driftmore.  
 
13. An international bank (“the International Bank”) was one of the largest international 
banks and was headquartered in England. It maintained offices throughout the world, 
including India, Singapore, Hong Kong and the United States, including in the District of 
New Jersey. 
 
14. The International Bank operated a division in the United Stated called “NRI Services” 
that marketed offshore banking services to United States citizens of Indian descent. 
Through its NRI Services division, the International Bank encouraged United States citizens 




15. Defendant SANJAY SETHI was born in India, become a lawful resident of the United 
States on or about March 10, 1989, and became a naturalized United States citizen on or 
about June 1, 2004. From at least 2004 to the present, SETHI lived in Watchung, New 
Jersey.  
 
16. Form in or about 2001 until in or about 2009, defendant SANJAY SETHI had a financial 
interest in undeclared bank accounts located in Switzerland and India. The accounts 






17. U.S. Banker A, a co-conspirator who is not charged as a defendant herein, was a senior 
vice president of a cross-border banking group with the private bank division of the 
International Bank that focused on developing and servicing clients in the United States 
with ties to India and elsewhere in South Asia. U.S. Banker A was based in the International 
Bank’s New York, New York office.  
 
18. U.K. Banker A, a co-conspirator who is not charged as a defendant herein, was a high-
ranking executive of the International Bank and the head of a cross-border banking group 
within its private bank division that focused on developing and servicing clients worldwide 
with ties to countries in south Asia. U.K. Banker A was based in the International Bank’s 
London, England office.  
 
19. Swiss Banker A, a co-conspirator who is not charged as a defendant herein, was a 
financial advisor for the International Bank and was based in Geneva, Switzerland.  
 
20. From in or about 2001 through on or about April 21, 2010, in the District of New Jersey 
and elsewhere, the defendant,  
SANJAY SETHI,  
did knowing and intentionally combine, conspire, confederate and agree with others to 
defraud the United States and an agency thereof, that is, the Internal Revenue Services of 
the United Sates Department of the Treasury, in the ascertainment, computation, 
assessment and collection of federal income taxes.  
 
Object of the Conspiracy 
 
21. The object of the conspiracy was for defendant SANJAY SETHI and his co-conspirators 
to conceal from the IRS the existence, ownership, and income derived from SETHI’s 
undeclared bank accounts in Switzerland and India. 
 
Manner and Means of the Conspiracy 
 
22. It was part of the conspiracy that defendant SANJAY SETHI and his co-conspirators 
used nominee and shell companies formed in tax-haven jurisdictions and elsewhere to 
conceal the defendant’s ownership and control of assets and income from the IRS. 
 
23. It was further part of the conspiracy that defendant SANJAY SETHI and his co-
conspirators used bank accounts opened in the name of shell companies and nominees to 
conceal SETHI’s ownership and control of assets and income from the IRS. 
 
24. It was further part of the conspiracy that defendant SANJAY SETHI and his co-
conspirators provided, and caused to be provided, false documents to banks to conceal 
SETHI’s ownership and control of assets and income from the IRS.  
 
25. It was further part of the conspiracy that defendant SANYJAY SETHI and his co-
conspirators prepared and filed with the IRS, and caused to be prepared and file with the 
IRS, false and fraudulent United States Individual Income Tax Returns to conceal SETHI’s 
ownership and control of assets and income from the IRS. 
 
26. It was a further part of the conspiracy that defendant SANJAY SETHI failed to file 




27. In furtherance of the conspiracy and in order to effect the object thereof, defendant 
SANJAY SETHI and his co-conspirators committed and caused to be committed the 




a. In or about 2001, during a meeting with the U.S. Banker A, defendant SANJAY SETHI 
discussed opening an undeclared bank account in India at the International Bank for the 
purpose of concealing income and assets from the IRS.  
 
b. In or about 2001, the defendant SANJAY SETHI opened an undeclared bank account 
in India with the NRI Services division of the International Bank by visiting the bank’s 
New York City offices, using his Indian passport as identification, and causing 27,000 
Indian Rupees (approximately $400) to be transferred to his account at the International 
Bank. 
 
c. In or about 2002, U.S. Banker A telephoned defendant SANJAY SETHI and set up a 
meeting between SETHI and U.K. Banker A, the head of cross-border banking group 
within the private bank division of the International Bank, who would be visiting New 
York City.  
 
d. Shortly thereafter, in or about 2002, defendant SANJAY SETHI met with U.K. Banker 
A at the offices of the International Bank in New York City and discussed the opening of 
an undeclared bank account for SETHI at the international Bank in Switzerland. U.K. 
Banker A told SETHI that the undeclared account would allow SETHI’s assets to grow 
tax-tree and that the bank secrecy laws in Switzerland would allow SETHI to conceal 
the existence of the account. 
 
e. On or about July 24, 2002, defendant SANJAY SETHI obtained authority to conduct 
financial transactions and make decisions, contracts, and other commitments on behalf 
of Fundus.  
 
f. In or about 2003, several months after defendant SANJAY SETHI’s meeting with U.K. 
Banker A in New York City, SETHI travelled to London at the direction of U.K. Banker A 
to complete the paperwork needed to open the undeclared bank account at the 
International Bank in Switzerland. 
 
g. On or about January 15, 2003, as a result of meeting with U.K. Banker A in London, 
defendant SANJAY SETHI caused SNS Investments to be incorporated. 
 
h. In or about 2003, defendant SANJAY SETHI caused approximately £3.4 million to be 
transferred from a bank account in the name of Fundus to an undeclared bank account 
at the International Bank in the name of SNS Investments.   
 
i. On or about June 2, 2006, defendant SANJAY SETHI transferred, $2,346,979.80 from 
an undeclared bank account in the name of SNS Investments into various certificates of 
deposits held in undeclared bank accounts at the International Bank in India and 
managed through the International Bank’s NRI Service Division.  
 
j. In or about August 2007, defendant SANJAY SETHI sold his home in Watchung, New 
Jersey for approximately $2.2. million and wired the proceeds from the sale from an 
account at the International Bank in the United States to the undeclared SNS Investment 
bank account.  
 
k. In or about 2007, defendant SANJAY SETHI and Swiss Banker A discussed opening 
a second undeclared bank account in Switzerland in the name of Driftmore for the 
purpose for concealing income and assets from the IRS.  
 
l. In or about January 2008, Swiss Banker A incorporated Driftmore in the British Virgin 
Islands for the use of defendant SANJAY SETHI in connection with an undeclared bank 




m. On or about April 11, 2008, defendant SANJAY SETHI sent Swiss Banker A by 
private letter carrier a check made payable to Ace Marketing in the amount of $12,500. 
 
n. On or about June 10, 2008, defendant SANJAY SETHI sent Swiss Banker A by 
private letter carrier a check made payable to Driftmore from SVT, drawn on an account 
maintained at the International Bank in New York, in the amount of $35,191.20. 
 
o. On or about January 21, 2009, defendant SANJAY SETHI sent Swiss Banker A by 
private letter carrier a check made payable to Driftmore from SVT, drawn on an account 
maintained at the International Bank in New York, in the amount of $10,080. 
 
p. On or about February 5, 2009, defendant SANJAY SETHI sent Swiss Banker A by 
private letter carrier a check made payable to Driftmore from SVT, drawn on an account 
maintained at the International Bank in New York, in the amount of $11,466.40. 
 
q. On or about March 1, 2007, in North Bergen, New Jersey, defendant SANJAY SETHI 
caused to be prepared and caused to be filled electronically with the IRS a U.S. 
Individual Income Tax Return, Form 1040, for the tax year 2006, which falsely reported 
that he did not have signature authority over any foreign financial accounts, and which 
failed to report income earned from his undeclared bank accounts. 
 
r. On or about April 21, 2010, in the District of New Jersey, defendant SANJAY SETHI 
signed, mailed, and filed with the IRS a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, Form 1040, 
for the tax year 2009, which falsely reported that he did not have signature authority 
over any foreign financial accounts, and which failed to report income earned from his 
undeclared bank accounts. 
 
 




        PAUL J. FISHMAN  
































Dear Sirs,  
 
Exempt Debt/Capital Loss Scheme (‘the Scheme’).  
 
We now enclose the joint Written Opinion of Tax Counsel Mr George Graham, QC and Mr 
Andrew Park together with Company Counsel, Mr Michael Wheeler, QC’s opinion. This 
document is sent and the information set out hereunder is furnished to you subject to and 
in accordance in all respects with the terms of your written undertaking to us dated the 23rd 
day of February 1973. It is essential both from our point of view in order to protect the 
Scheme and from your point of view to maximize the chances of success of the Scheme, 
that it suffers the minimum of exposure and that the implementation of the Scheme is 
carried out through our offices or those of our duly authorised representatives.  
 
The enclosure to this letter sets out the detailed steps to be taken to implement the Scheme. 
These however, can be briefly summarised as under (which will be subject to minor 
variations in the case of a corporate taxpayer):- 
 
(a) The taxpayer (‘T’) acquires a company (‘X’ Limited) and appoints himself and two 
nominees as directors. For the convenience of the Scheme and in certain 
circumstances to comply with the financing requirements of the Scheme, a 
representative of this company will be one of the nominated directors. 
 
(b) The subscriber shares are allotted to T and his nominees. 
 
(c) X Limited makes a rights issue, the rights shares being payable as to £5 upon 
application and the balance of the subscription price being payable on call. 
 
(d) T then offers to make two loans to X Limited (‘L1 and L2’) L1 being repayable on 
demand at the expiration of 30 years and L2 being repayable on demand at the 
expiration of 31 years, in each case at par. X Limited will be at liberty to repay either of 
the loans at any time and is obliged to do so if it goes into liquidation and the terms of 
the loans are that if either of them is repaid prematurely by X Limited; the amounts to 
be repaid will be whichever is the higher of the face value of the loan or the market 
value of the loan on the assumption that it would remain outstanding for the full period. 
 
(e) Each loan will carry interest at the rate of 11% per annum payable quarterly and T 
reserves the right, exercisable on one occasion only and only while both L1 and L2 
remain in his beneficial ownership, to decrease the interest rate on one of the loans and 
to increase correspondingly the interest rate on the other loan. 
 
(f) T will after receiving one payment of interest on both the loans exercise the right 
reserved to him and will direct that the rate of interest on L1 should be reduced to nil 
and that the rate of interest on L2 should be correspondingly increased to 22% per 
annum. 
 
(g) Following this, X Limited will call up the amount of capital outstanding on the 98 
shares issued to T by way of rights. 
 
(h) T will then sell L2 to a finance company (‘F’) for its market value, less a discount 
equal to 5% thereof, and contemporaneously therewith and conditional thereon will 
grant an option to F to purchase at market value either or both of L1 and the shares in 
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X Limited, such option to be exercisable at any time while L2 remains outstanding in 
F’s beneficial ownership and then only if X Limited is asked by F to redeem L2 and 
declines to do so within 14 days of such request. The option will contain undertakings 
by T that the assets of X Limited will not be depleted, to secure the appointment to the 
Board of X Limited of a director nominated by F and to alter the bank mandate of X 
Limited so that X Limited's bank account cannot be operated without the signature of 
the director nominated by F. 
 
(j) U Limited (a wholly-owned subsidiary of X Limited) will then purchase L2 from F and 
the option granted by T to F will lapse. 
 
(k) U Limited will then go into a members’ voluntary liquidation and the liquidator will 
distribute its sole asset (L2) to X Limited. 
 
(l) X Limited will then go into a members’ voluntary liquidation and L1 will be repaid to 
T at par. 
 
(m) The value of T’s shareholding in X Limited will as a result of the repayment of L2 at 
a premium and the repayment of L1 at par be reduced, thereby giving rise to a capital 
loss. 
 
(n) T will then exchange the shares of X Limited with Z Ltd for the allotment and issue 
by Z Limited of its loan stock of a nominal value equal to the market value of the shares 
in X Limited. 
 
(o) T will then sell for cash Z Limited’s loan stock to H Limited for its nominal value and 
the Scheme so far as T is concerned will have been completed. 
 
We should point out the following: 
 
(i) The Scheme is a pure tax avoidance scheme and has no commercial justification 
insofar as there is no prospect of T making a profit; indeed he is certain to make a loss 
representing the cost of undertaking the Scheme. 
 
(ii) Nevertheless, every transaction in the Scheme will be genuinely carried through, 
and will in fact be exactly what it purports to be. 
 
(iii) Although the Scheme is a scheme in the sense of a preconceived series of steps, 
T should understand before deciding to embark upon the Scheme, that there is no 
binding arrangement or undertaking to the effect that once the first step has been taken, 
then every other step must be taken in its appointed order. It is reasonable for T to 
assume that all steps will in practice be carried out, but as a matter of law, T is free to 
withdraw at any time, and so are all the other contemplated parties to the Scheme. If 
any party does withdraw, T will have no redress. 
 
(iv) It will be essential for T to provide the necessary finances for the share subscriptions 
and the loans, either out of his own resources or by entering into suitable borrowing 
arrangements. 
 
Our fee is 8% of the required capital loss; of this 6 7/8 % is payable as soon as T embarks 
on the scheme, the balance being incorporated in the profit realised by the purchaser of 
L2; if T decides voluntarily not to carry through the entire scheme, then no refund will be 
made. However if any party over whom T has no control decides that it does not wish to 
embark upon the scheme or having so embarked, withdraws voluntarily, then a refund of 




Finally, we would point out that we do not undertake any enforceable obligation to procure 
the implementation of the entire scheme. There is no guarantee that the anticipated tax 
relief will result from the implementation of the scheme and we can accept no responsibility 
or liability whatsoever for any expense or loss incurred as a result of the scheme being 
embarked upon. The decision to enter the scheme should be taken on the advice of T’s 
accountant, solicitor or other professional adviser.  
 
Please sign and return the enclosed copy of the letter by way of acknowledgement that you 
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To: Jeffrey N. Stein 
From: Greg W. Ritchie 
 
May 26, 1998 
 
OPIS Tax Shelter Registration  
 
Attached is a memorandum from Jeff Zysik (Tax Innovation Center) concerning the 
potential financial consequences associated with failing to register a tax shelter under IRC 
section 6111. For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that we will conclude that the 
OPIS product meets the definition of a tax shelter under IRC section 6111(c). 
 
Based on this assumption, the following are my conclusions and recommendations as to 
why KPMG should make the business/strategic decision not to register the OPIS product 
as a tax shelter. My conclusions and resulting recommendations are [is] based upon the 
immediate negative impact on the Firm’s strategic initiative to develop a sustainable tax 
products practice and the long-term implications of establishing [such] a precedent in 
registering such a product. 
 
First, the financial exposure to the Firm is minimal. Based upon our analysis of the 
applicable penalty provisions, we conclude that the penalties would be no greater than 
$14,000 per $100,000 in KPMG fees. Furthermore, as the size of the deal increases, our 
exposure to the penalties decreases as a percentage of our fees. For example, our average 
deal would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with a maximum penalty exposure of only 
$31,000. 
 
This further assumes that KPMG would bear 100 percent of the penalty. In fact, as 
explained in the attached memo, the penalty is joint and several with respect to anyone 
involved in the product who was required to register. Given that, at a mimimum, Presido 
would also be required to register, our share of the penalties could be viewed as being only 
one-half of the amounts noted above. If other OPIS participants (e.g., Deutsche Bank, 
Brown & Wood, etc.) were also found to be promoters subject to the registration 
requirements, KPMG’s exposure would be further minimised. Finally, any ultimate 
exposure to the penalties are abatable if it can be shown that we had reasonable cause. 
 
Second, the rules under section 6111(c) have not changed significantly since they were 
imposed in 1984. While there was an addition to section 6111 in the 1997 Tax Act, it only 
applies to products marketed to corporate investors under limited circumstances. To my 
knowledge, the Firm has never registered a product under section 6111 [and it is my opinion 
that we should not begin with OPIS].  
 
Third, the tax community at large continues to avoid registration of all products. Based on 
my knowledge, the representations made by Presido and Quadra, and Larry DeLap’s 
discussions with his counterparts at other Big 6 firms, there are no tax products marketed 
to individuals by our competitors which are registered. This includes income conversion 
strategies, loss generation techniques, and other related strategies. 
 
Should KPMG decide to begin to register its tax products, I believe that it will position us 
with a severe competitive disadvantage in light of industry norms to such degree that we 




Fourth, there has been (and, apparently, continues to be) a lack of enthusiasm on the part 
of the Service to enforce section 6111. In speaking with KPMG individuals who were at the 
Service (e.g. Richard Smith), the Service has apparently purposefully ignored enforcement 
efforts related to section 6111. In informal discussions with individuals currently at the 
Service, WNT has confirmed that there are not many registration applications submitted 
and they do not have the resources to dedicate to this area. 
 
Finally, the guidance from Congress, the Treasury, and the Service is minimal, unclear, 
and extremely difficult to interpret when attempting to apply it to ‘tax planning’ products. 
The Code section, regulations and related material were clearly written with a view toward 
the sale of ‘traditional’ tax shelters. That is, the rules anticipate that there will be the sale of 
a partnership interest by a promoter which purports to allow an investor to claim deductions 
significantly in excess of their investment. While the rules are written broadly enough to 
arguably include OPIS and other purely tax planning products, they are not easily applied 
to the marketing of an idea or strategy to a client which carries with it tax advantage.  
 
Although OPIS includes the purchase of securities by the investor, the tax results are driven 
simply by an interpretation of the application of Code section 302 and the regulations 
thereunder. When coupled with the Service’s apparent lack of enforcement effort, the lack 
of specific guidance is a further indication that the risk of noncompliance with the rules 
could be excused.  
 
Based on the above arguments, it is my recommendation that KPMG does not register the 
OPIS product as a tax shelter. Any financial exposure that may be applicable can easily be 
dealt with by setting up a reserve against fees collected. Given the relatively nominal 
amount of such potential penalties, the Firm’s financial results should not be affected by 
this decision. 
 
In summary, I believe that the rewards of a successful marketing of the OPIS product (and 
the competitive disadvantages which may result from registration) far exceed the financial 
exposure to penalties that may arise. Once you have had an opportunity to review this 
information, I request that we have a conference with the persons on the distribution list 
(and any other relevant parties) to come to a conclusion with respect to any 
recommendations. As you know, we must immediately deal with this issue in order to 
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Supplementary Written Evidence from HM Revenue and Customs  
 
This document has been prepared by HMRC for submission to the Public Accounts 
Committee to assist the Committee with its examination of witnesses at its hearing on 11 
February 2016. The document sets out certain facts in relation to Google and the settlement 
reached with HMRC. Google UK Limited has consented to the disclosure of the information 





Google is a US-headed multinational business which owns a unique search engine and 
automated auctions process which the group exploits to generate profits through sales of 
advertising services. The US is by far the group's largest market, contributing almost 50% of 
Google’s gross revenues. The UK is the second largest market and has consistently 
contributed around 10% of global turnover. ln 2014, the group’s turnover from the UK market 
was approximately $6.6 billion. 
 
Google lreland Ltd 
 
Google lreland Ltd (GlL) is the Google group's sales hub for Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa (EMEA). (Until 2010, GIL also acted as the sales hub for the Asia Pacific region.) All 
UK advertisers must enter into a contract with GIL in order to advertise on Google. 
 
GIL’s operation in Dublin is the only point of contact for around 99% of Google’s advertisers 
in the UK. Since 2012, GIL’s operation in Dublin has also provided the account manager 
service for Google’s high value advertisers in the UK (prior to 2012, this service was 
provided by Google UK Ltd). 
 
The number of employees in 2013 was 2,288. 
 
The turnover shown in the accounts increased from €3,343m in the year ended 31 December 
2006, to €18,268m in year ended 31 December 2014. 
  
Google lreland Ltd is not resident in the UK for tax purposes. Even if it had a 
permanent establishment in the UK, it would only be liable to UK corporation tax on the 
activities of that UK establishment. 
 
Google UK Ltd 
 
Google UK Ltd (GUK) provides marketing services to GlL, and as part of this service, its 
UK-based employees can be a point of contact for Google's high value 
UK advertisers. lt also provides research and development services to 
Google lnc. (Google lnc is incorporated in the United States and in the period for which 
our enquiries were concerned, it was Google UK Ltd's ultimate parent company.) 
 
The turnover shown in the accounts from these business activities increased from £27 million 
in the year ended 31 December 2005 to £1,178 million in the 18 months ended 30 June 2015. 
  




The company reported profits before tax in the 2005, 2006, 2012, 2013 and 2015 financial 
statements. lt reported losses before tax from 2007 to 2011. 
 
GUK is resident in the UK for tax purposes, and therefore subject to UK corporation tax on all 
of its trading profits. As it provides services wholly to other companies in the global group, 
transfer pricing rules apply to require GUK to pay tax on profits arising from an arm’s length 




HMRC formally opened an enquiry into GUK’S returns in March 2010 after having carried out 
a detailed risk review. 
 
We concluded our enquiry in January 2016, when we reached agreement with GUK about 
additional tax that was due. This is a way of settling the correct tax position provided for by 
law; the other way is to have matters determined by the decision of a tax tribunal or relevant 
appellate court. 
 
There were two agreements between GUK and HMRC; one covered the period 1 January 
2004 to 31 December 2004, and the second covered 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2015. 
 
We examined whether there was a permanent establishment of Google lnc or GIL in the UK. 
 
We also examined the transfer pricing methodology applied to transactions between GUK 
and other group companies. ln particular, we examined the treatment of share-based 
remuneration and the adequacy of the reward that GUK received for its marketing function. 
We also examined whether there was any liability to Diverted Profits Tax for the three months 
from 1 April 2015 - 30 June 2015. 
 
For each year covered by the enquiry, we secured additional tax reflecting the full value of the 
economic activities carried on by Google in the UK. We agreed that the Diverted Profits Tax 
did not apply for the three months ended 30 June 2015. 
 
In the course of our enquiry, we: 
 questioned senior Google executives, managers, customer-facing staff, customers and 
intermediaries, such as advertising agencies 
 visited Google lreland Ltd’s Dublin offices to understand better the business being carried 
on there and to talk to lrish employees 
 analysed information from many sources about the business, its profits and activities in 
the UK, including documents provided by a whistle-blower 
 exchanged information with tax authorities in other countries to obtain information and 
documents to help us understand Google’s global arrangements and profitability in relation 
to the UK business 
 took extensive legal advice, including consulting external leading Counsel on matters 
such as whether the activities of Google’s staff in the UK gave rise to a permanent 
establishment of Google lreland Ltd. 
 
Governance of enquiry 
 
ln line with our published processes, this enquiry was subjected to our strong governance 
procedures to provide assurance that we have secured the full amount due in law. This 
means that before the enquiry was concluded, the proposals put forward for settlement in this 
case were considered and approved by three Commissioners of Revenue & Customs, 




HMRC is transparent about how it conducts its enquiries and resolves matters under dispute. 
Our published Litigation & Settlement Strategy makes it clear that we do not settle for less 
than the full amount that we would expect to get if we proceeded to the courts. 
 
We have published details of the comprehensive governance arrangements we follow 
when resolving tax disputes which provide assurance that they are resolved correctly. 
Resolution of large and sensitive disputes is subject to approval of three Commissioners of 
Revenue & Customs, including the Tax Assurance Commissioner, who is not involved in 
the conduct of enquiries with taxpayers. Every year our Tax Assurance Commissioner 
publishes a report about how we have resolved disputes during the year, which provides 
transparency about how HMRC is performing in this area. 
 
HMRC’s analysis of the tax charges in GUK’s published accounts 
 
GUK have disclosed in their 2015 financial statements that HMRC’s enquiry has been 
closed, with GUK agreeing that it has to pay additional tax. 
 
GUK have said that, as a result of HMRC's enquiry, they have an additional liability of £130 
million in corporation tax and interest for the period ended 30 June 2015 and prior years. This 
sum is over and above the tax that they have paid for those years (or would pay for the current 
period were it not for HMRC's enquiry), but does not indicate the full impact of that enquiry. 
This is because it does not include the agreement reached in respect of 2004 and does not 
reflect that from 2012 the company's reported profits took account of the revised treatment of 
share based compensation put forward by HMRC during the course of the enquiry. 
 
The cumulative current tax over the period 2005 to 2015 shown in GUK's financial statements 
may be seen as a reasonable (although not precise) proxy for the tax payable over that 
period. GUK’s accounts show a cumulative tax charge in the financial statements from 2005 
to 2011 of £11.6 million. ln their 2012 statements, GUK disclosed that they were under enquiry 
by HMRC and made a provision of £24 million for potential corporation tax for the years 2005-
2011. lt is clear from GUK accounts that thereafter they also made more substantial charges 
for tax in their accounts year on year - the cumulative tax charge in the 3½ years ended 30 
June 2015 was £166.8 million. ln addition, the financial statements show 
cumulative interest of £18 million on that tax. 
 
























APPENDIX SIX  
 
LETTER FROM CHANCELLOR OSBORNE ON BEHALF OF HSBC AND SCB TO 




HM Treasury, 1 Horse Guards Road, London, SW1A 2HQ 
 




The Federal Reserve System 
20th and C Streets NW 





The ongoing US investigations into HSBC and SCB for breaches of US anti-money 
laundering (AML) and sanctions regulations have attracted significant market attention in 
the UK and elsewhere. Following publication of the Order by the New York Department for 
Financial Services (DFS) on 6 August, SCB’s share price fell by almost 30% in a single day 
of trading. Even though SCB’s market value has now recovered much of this loss, the 
incident raises broader concerns, and gives us an opportunity to reflect more generally on 
how we might collectively ensure that regulatory and enforcement action does not lead to 
unintended consequences.  
 
The SCB case raises three main issues. First, is serves as a further illustration of the 
importance which financial markets attach to access to the US dollar market. It was the 
perceived threat of SCB’s loss of access to this market, rather than any potential penalty, 
that triggered such a significant reaction. To date, the majority of US enforcement action 
for AML/sanctions breaches had ended in settlements involving a Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement: the suggestion of a criminal indictment or, worse, conviction implies a problem 
that is more akin to the Riggs case, and therefore a more severe outcome. Markets price 
in this risk accordingly.  
 
Second, the reaction was almost certainly more severe in the SCB case because markets 
were not prepared for the news. While SCB had disclosed that it was under investigation, 
nobody expected an Order of this sort to be served. Its unannounced publication and some 
of the language used (“rogue institution”) created uncertainty over the magnitude of the 
offences and what regulatory action would follow, especially as it quickly became evident 
that the DFS action had not been co-ordinated with the other US agencies involved.  
 
Thirdly, it highlighted the potential financial stability risks of enforcement action. In 
particular, if such action created a liquidity crisis for the bank concerned – as might have 
been the case with SCB, and as might still be the case for HSBC – this could jeopardise its 
stability. For a systemically important financial institution, this could lead to contagion. I do 
not want to overstate these risks but I think that they bear consideration. 
 
Next steps  
 
It is not my intention to interfere with criminal or regulatory action and procedures in 
the US. The UK and the US share an extremely strong partnership on AML and 
sanctions issues, whether through the Financial Action Task Force or in seeking to 
exert pressure on the Iranian and Syrian regimes. It (sic) for you, and your partners in 
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other departments and agencies, to decide how best to supervise, regulate and 
enforce compliance within your jurisdiction. And Adair Turner, Mervyn King and I are 
together combined to ensuring that UK financial institutions are fully compliant with 
global standards and rules. 
 
Going forward, however, I would appreciate your assistance in ensuring that 
enforcement action does not have unintended consequences. In particular, I would 
appreciate early warning of such action before it is announced. I know that you 
recognise the consequences of uncoordinated actions by the authorities, and I 
appreciate that the SCB Order was not within your control. But, in future, prior sight 
would help us to manage some of the potential market and stability risks, and consider 
what (if anything) we should collectively do to manage them.  
 
I would also ask that the outcome of current and future investigations against UK-
headquartered banks is consistent with previous settlements, and with US settlements 
made with banks headquartered throughout the world. I understand, for example, that 
HSBC is currently facing a series of settlements with the US authorities that may 
cumulate at around $1.9bn. I have not seen the details of this case, but it has been 
highlighted to me on a number of occasions that a settlement of this nature would be 
around three times greater than the largest US settlement to date for comparable 
AML/sanctions breaches. In HSBC’s case, I understand that a criminal conviction 
would require US regulators to consider whether to revoke its banking authorisations 
in the US. Questions about HSBC’s continued ability to clear US dollars would risk 
destabilising the bank globally, with very serious implications for financial and 
economic stability, particularly in Europe and Asia. 
 
The scale of this enforcement action, particularly following the SCB case, is leading 
many to suggest that UK banks are being unfairly targeted. This narrative is 
unwelcome, not least given the extremely strong partnership that we continue to enjoy. 
I would therefore be grateful for your assistance in demonstrating that the US is even 
handed and consistent in its approach. 
 
I would welcome a discussion of these issues when we see each other next.  
 
I am copying this letter to Treasury Secretary Geithner, with whom I have also 
discussed this issue. 
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